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Abstract
This study examines the responses of firms in the Indonesian manufacturing industry to the 
deep economic crisis in 1997/98. It utilises a rich annual data set on medium and large plants 
in the manufacturing industry from 1993 to 2000, which covers the high-growth pre-crisis 
period, the peak of the crisis and the early recovery period. Three aspects of the responses are 
the focus of this study: general performance and survival, export-supply response and firm- 
entry response.
The study begins with an overview of the development of Indonesian manufacturing in the 
three decades leading up to the 1997/98 economic crisis and the crisis period. This is 
followed by a summary of the crisis and a review of the relevant literature to provide a 
framework for the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters. The descriptive analysis of the 
impact of the crisis reveals that there is a substantial variation in the plant-level impact of the 
crisis. The evidence also shows that, while many firms contracted and recorded very weak 
performance, some actually expanded and improved during the crisis. This variation can be 
seen even at a very disaggregated level of industry and in the early recovery period. The 
analysis also shows that the crisis severely affected the demographics of plants. Exit rates, for 
example, increased to almost double the pre-crisis level during the peak of the crisis.
The analysis shows that the firm responses and survival during the crisis were not simply 
random in nature. It finds that foreign ownership, sales orientation, size, factor intensity and 
product market competition are the major determining characteristics of the responses and 
survival. In the econometric analysis, the coefficients of the variables representing foreign 
ownership and sales orientation consistently show a positive relationship with respect to the 
various performance variables used in this study. The positive effect of foreign ownership 
was more significant in the early stage of recovery, suggesting that the role of parent 
companies was more important during this period. In contrast, the positive effect of sales 
orientation appears to have been weaker in the early stage of recovery. The analysis also
found some interrelationship between some of the characteristics explaining the responses 
and survival. Several interesting findings emerged. In particular, the effect of sales 
orientation was higher at plants with a high foreign ownership share and did not necessarily 
weaken with the extent of plant financial leverage.
The study extends to the investigation of factors determining the success in their export 
response. It is motivated by the findings of other studies which highlight the weak export 
performance of the crisis-affected countries, despite the increase in competitiveness from the 
sharp exchange rate depreciation during the crisis. The results, confirming the earlier 
findings, point to the characteristics of firms and industry as the determinants of the firm 
success in their export response. More importantly, the results reveal the significant role of 
sunk-costs into exporting activities in determining the export response. The descriptive 
analysis shows a strong trend for plants that were non-exporters before the crisis to remain so 
during and after the crisis. The econometric analysis reveals that the variables which are 
related to sunk-costs - such as exporting history, an industry’s export intensity, and an 
industry’s prior export competitiveness - are positively related to the probability to export 
during and after the crisis. In addition to the sunk-costs, the ability to compete in 
international markets and foreign ownership are the other important determinants. In 
particular, non-exporters before the crisis found it easier to become exporters in the crisis 
period if they are more efficient, able to produce goods to international standards and have 
some foreign ownership share. Finally, the analysis reveals that access to credit is important 
for successful switching by non-exporters.
As for entry response, this study analyses the difference in the determinants of firm entry 
between the pre-crisis and crisis period. The analysis is motivated by the earlier finding 
which shows that the rates of firm entry in the industry had not begun to recover by 2000. 
The analysis provides several interesting findings. The extent of cost-disadvantages faced by 
entrants appears to have increased during and shortly after the crisis. The competitive 
pressure among firms also appears to have been much stronger in this period. This particular 
conclusion is supported by several findings: demand and profit opportunities seem to have 
become more important, the likelihood for collusive behaviour appears to have fallen 
significantly and the crisis seems to have pushed some less-efficient firms out of the industry. 
The crisis, finally, seems to have provided opportunities for some potential entrants, despite 
the unfavourable economic situation. For example, the results suggest that entry rates rose in 
export-oriented industries during and after the crisis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and objective of the thesis
The 1997/98 economic crisis was one of the most important events in the history of 
Indonesian economic development. After growing rapidly in the 30 years leading up to 1996, 
the economy contracted severely by about 14 per cent in 1998. At one stage, the Rupiah was 
valued at only about 20 per cent of its value preceding the crisis. The crisis also resulted in 
the end of the New Order regime, which had dominated the political arena. During and 
shortly after the crisis there was a period of accelerated trade liberalisation, owing to the 
structural adjustment program attached to the rescue packages of international institutions.
While the decline in manufacturing industry was broadly similar to the economy-wide 
picture, there was considerable variation in performance across industries and individual 
firms. While some firms went bankrupt and others contracted sharply, some were able to 
endure the crisis relatively successfully and a few even prospered.
This thesis focuses on the response of firms in manufacturing industry. It utilises a rich 
annual data set on medium and large plants from 1993-2000, which covers the high growth 
period, the peak of the crisis and the early recovery period. This thesis will examine the 
response in order to gain some insight into the determining factors.
The motivation for this study is twofold. First, little is known about the responses of firms to 
the crisis, despite some studies that examined the impact on industry, such as Dwor-Frecaut 
et al. (2000) and the papers published in a special issue of the journal The Developing 
Economies in December 2000 (Volume 37, No. 4). Most of these studies focused solely on 
the impact at the aggregate industry level. As has been indicated in a few studies, and also in
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this thesis, there was a large variation in responses across firms. Of the studies highlighting 
this variation, such as Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000), Thee (2000) and Sato (2000), all have 
some methodological limitations. For example, the analysis by Dwor-Frecaut et al., which is 
based on a firm level survey of some manufacturing firms in the crisis affected countries 
done by The World Bank, was criticised as being subject to survival bias. This is because the 
findings were based only on firms that survived the crisis. The survival bias is also a concern 
even in studies where a case study approach has been adopted (e.g. Sato 2000). All in all, 
these studies are limited in methodology because of the ability of researchers to only observe 
surviving firms.
Second, the crisis in Indonesia has provided a valuable ‘natural experiment’ for a broader 
topic of how firms in general respond to a severe downturn. Empirical studies on this subject 
are scarce, even for developed countries.1 There are some topics of research that can be 
derived from this subject, a few of which are addressed in this thesis. The crisis event is even 
more valuable because each of these topics is not only relevant in the context of this thesis, 
but also in the context of the more general literature. For example, the export supply response 
to the crisis is related to a more general topic which questions why a favourable trade and 
exchange rate regime often induces only a minimal export response.
A particular focus of the thesis is the role of firm characteristics in shaping firm performance 
response, export supply response and change in the determinants of entry between the pre­
crisis and crisis periods. These issues are the core of the thesis and all presented in Chapters 6 
to 10.
1.2 Thesis organisation
Chapter 2 provides an overview describing the evolution of trade and industrial policies in 
Indonesia and the key features of the country’s industrialisation.
Chapter 3 describes the 1997/98 economic crisis in Indonesia. It consists of two main parts, 
the course of the crisis and the economy-wide impact.
Chapter 4 reviews some relevant literature to provide an analytical framework for the
1 Despite this, there are a limited number of studies which to some extent address this issue in the context of 
Latin America crises (e.g. Krueger and Tornell 1999; Aguiar 2005; Watkins et al. 2004; Pratap and Urrutia 
2004).
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empirical analysis in the thesis. The discussion emphasises the role of aggregate shocks and 
the characteristics shaping firm performance during the crisis. The key theme is that firm 
characteristics played an important role in determining the success of firms in responding to 
the crisis.
Chapter 5 describes the data base and details the data adjustment and cleaning process.
Chapter 6 derives some basic facts about the impact of the crisis on industry. The findings 
provide a backdrop for the empirical analysis. It re-examines the impact at the industry level 
and attempts to determine whether there was a large variation in the performance impact 
across plants. Five performance measures are used to proxy performance, namely: real value 
added, real output, employment, real value added per labour and price-cost margin.
The chapter also aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the impact of the crisis in 
relation to how entry and exit of plants was affected. As mentioned, all previous studies have 
focused only on the subset of surviving firms.
Chapters 7 and 8 identify which plant characteristics matter in determining the response. An 
interesting fact derived from the previous Chapter 6 is that there was a large variation in the 
performance impact across plants. Some were more severely affected than others and some 
actually expanded. The fact that the variation persists at a disaggregated industry sub-sector 
indicates some plant specific factors might have been important in shaping the performance 
response.
Several characteristics considered important in the theory and which can be measured from 
the data base are tested. The role of exogenous shocks from the crisis literature, the shock to 
the financial sector and the sharp exchange rate depreciation, suggest financial leverage, sales 
orientation, and factor intensity are the major important characteristics. From the general 
literature on firm performance, size, age, and ownership can also be important. The fact that 
there was a more liberal trade regime during the crisis -  due to the accelerated trade 
liberalisation during the period -  suggests the extent of competition from imports could also 
have been the determining characteristics.
Two methodological approaches are adopted: descriptive and econometric analysis. The 
descriptive analysis, undertaken in Chapter 7, seeks to determine whether there are
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systematic patterns of performance impact across the groups of considered characteristics. 
The analysis uses the five performance measures defined earlier. The descriptive analysis is 
extended to an integrated econometric analysis in Chapter 8 for three reasons. First, to 
ascertain whether the results from the descriptive analysis are robust. Second, to control the 
results from a possible survival bias, and third, to explore some interrelationships between 
the characteristics in a simpler and more efficient way.
The econometric analysis adopts the Heckman selection model to eliminate survival bias. 
The main equation, i.e. the equation to explain the difference in performance between the 
crisis and pre-crisis, is estimated jointly with an estimation of survival equation.
Chapter 9 examines the export supply response of plants to the crisis. Sharp exchange rate 
depreciation is one of the characteristic features of the crisis. It is a common view that sharp 
exchange rate depreciation should convert to improved export performance for countries 
affected by the crisis. Several studies (e.g. Duttagupta and Spilimbergo 2004) have 
contradicted this prediction. Although some explanations have been offered in the literature, 
those which focus on firm or plant behaviour are scarce. This chapter aims to fill this gap. In 
particular, it derives the picture of plants’ export supply response and attempts to gain insight 
into the factors determining the success of plants in responding to the crisis in terms of 
exports.
Two dependent variables are considered to represent the export supply response: change in 
export participation and change in export intensity. The changes are defined as the 
differences between crisis and pre-crisis periods. Some characteristics of firms are tested 
against these changes. This approach is motivated by the literature on micro exporting 
behaviour, which suggests that characteristics, such as exporting history, size and foreign 
ownership, play an important role in determining a firm’s export supply response.
The equation of the change in export participation is estimated within the framework of a 
binary choice model. An instrumental variable approach is adopted to guard against the 
potential endogeneity problem from the exporting history variable. Meanwhile, the equation 
of the change in export intensity is estimated using the Heckman selection model, in order to 
eliminate survival bias. In the sample, about 50 per cent of exporting plants before the crisis 
were no longer recorded as exporting during the crisis period.
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This chapter also examines the data to shed some light on the view that the observed sluggish 
export performance in the crisis affected countries was caused by the contraction in credit to 
the private sector. The estimating equations are re-estimated by adding two variables that 
proxy the plant liquidity situation, that is, financial leverage and the percentage change in 
investment financed by bank loans.
Chapter 10 addresses the response of new firms entering the industry. It is motivated by the 
examination of the crisis impact on the population of plants, which reveals that the pattern of 
plants’ entry does not seem to have recovered in 1999 and 2000, compared to the other 
performance measures. This raises the question of why such a pattern is observed? 
Accordingly, the chapter analysis whether there are differences in the factors determining 
plant entry between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Based on the views of entry during business cycles, this chapter hypothesises the factors 
determining entry in the industry would not have been the same between the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. More detailed hypotheses are developed in respect of the key determinants of 
firm entry. A few of the most important are: (1) displacement entry should have been more 
important than replacement entry, (2) profitability, market growth and industry’s export 
orientation should have been more important in attracting entry and (3) the negative effect of 
capital requirement as an entry barrier is expected to have been stronger in the crisis period.
An entry equation is estimated along with an exit equation. The exit equation is specified to 
take into account the possible interdependence between the entry and exit process. The 
equations are estimated for the pre-crisis and the crisis periods to test the developed 
hypotheses. In addition, the equations are also estimated within the crisis period to 
understand whether the determinants differed between the peak of the crisis and early 
recovery period. The earlier data examination reveals that the entry pattern differed 
significantly between these two periods.
Several estimation methods are experimented with (i.e. OLS, 2SLS and SURE methods). The 
analysis is based on the SURE method, since the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
statistics suggests the entry and exit equations are correlated.
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Chapter 11 draws the whole study together, provides the major findings, and attempts to 
derive policy implications of the findings. It also provides some suggestions for the future 
research.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Industrialisation in Indonesia
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of industrialisation in Indonesia over the 30 years leading 
up to the 1997/98 economic crisis. It begins with a summary of policy directions since the 
mid 1960s, and is followed by a brief discussion on the salient features of Indonesian 
industrialisation.
2.2 Policy direction between 1967 and 1995: a summary
At the risk of oversimplifying, it is possible to identify three policy objectives which affected 
the process of industrialisation in Indonesia over the period 1967-96.
The first policy objective was the shift from a heavily state-interventionist economy during 
President Soekamo’s Guided Economy era, towards a more market-oriented economy. The 
policy, which was initiated by the New Order government under President Soeharto, aimed at 
restoring the Indonesian economy after a total breakdown in the mid 1960s. As is widely 
known, the economy at that time was operating at a very low level of production and trade, 
had negligible foreign reserves and was suffering from hyperinflation.
In 1967, the government introduced a new investment law. This opened up the economy to 
foreign investment, providing a wide range of incentives, such as a two-year tax holiday, and 
exemption of capital goods from import duties and sales tax. The same incentives were also 
given to domestic investors one year later. In addition to these laws, the government 
introduced other substantive policy reforms in 1970, including the unification of the multiple 
exchange rate system and simplification of export and import procedures.
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Despite opening up the economy, to some extent the laws still restricted foreign investment. 
They required foreign firms to allow for domestic participation within a limited period of 
time.1 2The laws also restricted foreign investment in sectors which were considered strategic 
and related to the supply of public goods. According to Pangestu (1996, p. 154), the tendency 
to limit foreign investment reflected a perennial dilemma faced by the government. On the 
one hand, the government needed foreign linkages to obtain capital, technology and market 
access, on the other, it was faced by the perceived threat of foreign domination.
The second major policy objective was a shift back to greater government intervention and a 
move towards more protectionist trade policy. Like other developing countries, the 
Indonesian government initiated an import substitution policy in the early 1970s. Ariff and 
Hill (1985) and Hill (1996) identified three factors behind adoption of the policy. First, there 
was political tension, resulting from growing resentment among nationalist groups to strong 
involvement of foreign interests created by the market-oriented policy.“ Second, there were 
high oil and commodity prices during the decade. Large increase in oil revenues provided 
funds for the government to finance heavy industry investment and expand the state 
enterprise sector into such diverse areas as steel, fertiliser and cement. The third factor was 
an accumulated backlog in consumer demand as a result of a growing economy fuelled by the 
high commodity and oil prices.
The import substitution strategy lasted for about 14 years from 1972 to 1985. Within this 
period, the government implemented tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) to support the 
strategy. According to Thee (1994), tariffs were implemented to support the earlier stage of 
import substitution which focused on the downstream industries (i.e. final consumer goods) 
and NTB were used to support the second stage of import substitution which focused on 
upstream industries (i.e. intermediate and capital goods). As in other developing countries, 
this policy had a ‘cascading effect’ which sets higher tariff rates for consumer goods 
compared to intermediate and capital goods (Ariff and Hill 1985).
1 By law, a foreign firm was initially given a licence to operate for a period of 30 years. However, it was 
required to transfer the foreign shares to domestic investors. If it failed to do so, the firm would be subject to 
mandatory liquidation.
2 The resentment culminated in a large-scale protest in 1974 against the visit of Japan’s Prime Minister Tanaka, 
popularly known as the ‘Malari’ protest.
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The government implemented a wide range of measures. The most significant were the 
restrictions on foreign investment and imports. In 1973 the government established the 
Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanciman Modal, BKPM). The board 
was given discretionary authority to approve both foreign and domestic investment. BKPM 
published an annual Priority Investment List that detailed the economic sectors in which 
investment was allowed, for both domestic and foreign investors. The number of industries 
which were closed to foreign investors continuously increased during this import-substitution 
period.
An approved importers’ system (Tata Niaga Impor, TNI) that restricted imports was 
introduced in 1982. Before this system, importers who obtained a licence from the 
government were either general importers (who could import most goods) or importer- 
producers (who imported raw materials and intermediate goods necessary for production). 
Under TNI, two types of licence were issued. The first was a general licence, under which an 
importer was approved to import goods falling under certain categories. The second was a 
specific licence, under which an approved importer was eligible for a licence to import 
particular goods, the amount and type of which were specified by the government. The 
specific licence system was aimed at controlling the amount and type of goods entering the 
economy. During the period 1982-86, many licences of the second type were issued 
(Pangestu 1996) and, as the licences were extended to more industries, it became obvious that 
politically connected business interests were the prime beneficiaries (Hill 1996).
Despite the inward orientation of the industrial strategy, some reforms were introduced in the 
early 1980s in response to falling oil and commodity prices. Exchange rate devaluation and 
banking sector deregulation were undertaken. The latter included removal of the interest rate 
ceiling, the credit ceiling and a reduction in liquidity credits. Apart from the macroeconomic 
and financial sector reform, the government also introduced tax and trade reforms during this 
period.
Two other major trade reforms were undertaken in 1985. The first was the rationalisation of 
tariffs, in the form of an across-the-board reduction in the range and level of nominal tariffs. 
The range of tariffs was reduced from an initial 0-225 per cent to 0-60 per cent, with most 
tariffs ranging from 5-35 per cent. The second reform was the improvement of customs and 
port procedures. All operations relating to import and export goods by the customs
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department were handed over to private companies. The handover significantly streamlined 
and simplified the customs procedures and reduced export bias.
The continuing threat of falling oil prices between 1982 and 1986 forced the government to 
initiate a third policy objective, which was export promotion. The government reacted 
quickly by devaluating the Rupiah by a massive 45 per cent in 1983, while at the same time 
controlling inflation using monetary and fiscal policies. In addition, a series of deregulation 
packages aiming to liberalise trade and investment regimes, and the financial sector, were 
introduced.
For trade liberalisation, bold measures were taken to reduce the export bias. Included in these 
were measures to reduce the costs of exports and to increase the flow of investment. In May 
1986, a new and improved duty drawback scheme was introduced. Unlike the old system, 
this scheme allowed exporters to source imported input at international price and exempted 
them from all duties and regulation on imported inputs. Moreover, the scheme also allowed 
exporters to import directly without having to deal with import licensing.
The measures to reduce protection included the reduction of the general level of tariffs and 
the removal of many NTBs. These were undertaken in a series of deregulation packages from 
1987 to 1997 before the 1997/98 crisis. The NTB removal was done by transforming them to 
equivalent tariffs and export taxes. One example was the removal of the import monopoly on 
plastics. Before the reform, import for raw material plastics had been awarded to a single 
government trading company, which then appointed a sole agent from a well-connected 
group. All of the imports had to be undertaken by the agent, who charged a fee and took a 
longer time to deliver the goods than would have happened if there were imported directly.
Concerning the liberalisation in the investment regime, equity restriction and divestment 
rules were gradually removed in a series of deregulations between 1986 and 1995. Significant 
reforms were undertaken between 1992 and 1994 to respond to the perceived decline in the 
investment climate in Indonesia (Pangestu 1996). Three policy measures were important 
during this period. First, the obligation for foreign firms to establish joint ventures with 
Indonesian partners and to divest the majority of capital over a certain period of time was 
removed. Second, minimum capital on foreign investment was reduced from about $1 million 
to $250,000 in 1992 and finally removed in 1994. Third, the government finally opened up 
nine sectors which before were closed for foreign investment.
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The government introduced major financial sector reform in 1988, which principally 
removed entry restrictions for new banks. Foreign banks could enter Indonesia as a joint 
venture, with equity up to 85 per cent and without any product or geographical restrictions. 
As a result of this reform, the banking sector boomed and funds available to firms were 
greatly increased. Goeltom (1995) shows that the financial sector reform, including the 
changes in 1983, greatly improved access to credit for small and medium size, and export 
oriented firms.
Although economic reforms supporting export orientation were the dominant feature of 
policy changes between 1985 and 1995, there were remaining regulations that preserved the 
protectionist industrial policy. Some sectors remained closed to foreign investors and 
untouched by the reforms. In terms of NTBs, some industries continued to be assisted by 
restrictive licensing, administratively determined local-content requirements, restrictive 
marketing arrangements and export taxes (WTO 1998). Further, in more recent years there 
was a reappearance of interventionist industrial policy. Major examples were the granting of 
clove-industry monopoly rights to a private-state trading enterprise, and tax exemptions 
granted to a company to support the National Car Programme (Mobil Nasional, Mobnas). 
Each of these companies were partly owned by Soeharto’s children.
2.2.1 Impact of the policy reforms on the extent of trade protection
What happened to trade protection after the policy reforms in the 1980s? Several studies have 
examined this issue. Among others, Fane and Condon (1996) provide estimates of the real 
effective rate of protection (RERP) between 1987 and 1995. Whereas the effective rate of 
protection (ERP) of a sector is defined as the proportionate increase in its value added per 
unit due to entire system of trade policy, the RERP is defined as the corresponding increase 
in its real value added per unit, where real value added is obtained by deflating nominal value 
added by the nominal wage (Fane and Condon 1996, p.35). The advantage of RERP is that it 
shows the effect of protection on the general price level and hence on the exchange rate, 
whereas ERP does not.
Table 2.1 demonstrates that trade protection was reduced across all broad sectors since the 
mid 1980s. RERP in non-oil and gas manufacturing fell significantly from 59 per cent in 
1987 to 16 per cent in 1995. Similarly, the standard deviation of RERP dropped from 102
1 1
percent in 1987 to 39 percent in 1995. The standard deviation is important because the higher 
the deviation, particularly within groups of similar products, the greater the likelihood that 
the decisions of consumers and producers are distorted by the tariff structure, since the 
products within a group are highly substitutable. A similar picture can also be found across 
broad industry groups, with the exception of wood products (Table 2.2). Looking at an even 
more disaggregated level, however, Fane and Condon found that several industries 
experienced a significant increase in the RERP between 1987 and 1995. The few important 
ones were milled cereals, non-alcoholic beverages, leather and plywood.
Included in Table 2.1 is the anti-trade bias (ATB), which measures the extent to which the 
overall system of tariff, export taxes and NTBs inhibit trade (Fane and Condon 1996, p.37). 
The ATB fell from 50 per cent in 1987 to 28 per cent in 1995 - indicating that policy decision 
reduced the anti-export bias, which was in place during protectionist industrialisation.
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Table 2.1 Estimates of Real Effective Rates of Protection (%), 1987 and 1995
Sector 1987 1995
Agriculture 9 4
Forestry, fishing and hunting -36 -34
Mining and quarrying -12 -6
Manufacturing (excluding oil and gas) 66 16
Manufacturing (including oil and gas) 32 11
Anti-trade bias (ATB),in % 50 28
Standard deviation o f RERPs
Manufacturing (excluding oil and gas) 42 26
All sectors 102 39
Source: adapted from Fane and Condon (1996, p.40)
Table 2.2 Estimates of Real Effective Rates of Protection (%) in 1987 and 1995 by 
broad industry groups in non-oil and gas manufacturing
Industry 1987 1995
Food, beverages and tobacco 106 21
Textiles, clothing and footwear 78 -9
Wood products 10 27
Paper products 15 2
Chemicals 44 -7
Non-metal products 38 15
Basic metals -1 -4
Machinery, equipment and transportation 121 86
Other manufacturing 95 12
Source: adapted from Fane and Condon (1996, p.39)
2.3 Several features of industrialisation in Indonesia
The previous section’s summary tells us that during the three decades before the 1997/98 
crisis, there was a small number of dramatic changes in policy that affected the national 
industrialisation process. This section addresses this subject by way of discussing several 
important features of the industrialisation. In particular, it focuses on the following issues: 
structural change, export performance and structure, and the pattern of ownership and 
concentration.
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2.3.1 Structural change
There was rapid structural transformation in the Indonesian economy during these 30 years. 
This is shown in Table 2.3. The share of the agriculture sector in GDP declined from 45 per 
cent in 1975 to 17 per cent in 1995, while the share in manufacturing increased from 12 to 24 
per cent. Other non-manufacturing industry sectors, such mining and quarrying, utilities and 
construction, also experienced rapid increases in the share. This pattern suggests the shift of 
resources from agriculture to the industry sector and is consistent with the stylised facts on 
economic transformation in a country.
Table 2.3 Output share (%) in the Indonesian economy by sectors, 1970-1995
S e c to r s 1 9 7 0 1975 1 9 8 0 1985 199 0 1995
A g r ic u l tu r e 4 4 .8 2 8 .8 2 2 .6 2 3 .2 2 1 .5 17.1
M in in g  a n d  Q u a r r y i n g 5 .4 19.9 25 14 13.4 8.8
M a n u f a c tu r i n g 12.2 11 .9 14.8 16 19.9 24 .1
E le c t r ic i ty ,  G a s  a n d  W a t e r  S u p p ly 0 .2 0.3 0.3 0 .4 0 .6 1.2
C o n s t r u c t io n 3.1 4 .6 5 5 .5 5.5 7 .6
T r a d e ,  H o te l  a n d  R e s t a u r a n t 13.7 13.8 13 .4 15.9 16.9 16.6
T r a n s p o r t  a n d  C o m m u n ic a t io n 3.3 4 .5 4 .4 6.3 5 .6 6 .8
S e rv ic e s 17.3 16.2 14.5 18.7 16.6 17.8
G r o s s  D o m e s t ic  P r o d u c t  ( G D P ) 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: National Income Statistics, Badem Pusat Statistik (BPS) 
Note: Share of output is measured at current prices.
Accompanying this rapid overall change structural has been structural change within the 
manufacturing sector. This is demonstrated in Table 2.4, which shows the share of output and 
employment of broad non-oil manufacturing industries from 1975 to 1995. Focusing first on 
the period 1975-85, it is clear how the state-intervention and protectionist policy changed the 
structure of industry. The share of heavy processing and metal goods industries rose 
substantially, by about 7 percentage points, while food processing and footloose labour- 
intensive industries declined by about 14 and 3 percentage points respectively. The share of 
wood and paper products industries, meanwhile, grew rapidly.
However, there was a turnaround in the period 1985-95. The share of heavy processing and 
metal goods industries began to decrease. This can be explained by the impact of the decline 
in oil revenue in the 1980s, which forced the government to either cancel or postpone 
projects in these industries. In contrast, the share of footloose labour-intensive industries, 
dominated by textiles, garments and footwear, and metal goods industries increased. The 
share of wood and wood products industries continued to rise, particularly as the furniture
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and the paper products industries became increasingly important (Hill 1996). These patterns 
are also observable for the industries’ share in terms of employment.
Table 2.4 Share of output and employment by broad industry groups (% of total non­
oil/gas manufacturing), 1975-1995
a) Share of output
Industry  g roup ISIC 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
F ood  p ro cessin g 31 43 .3 37 .9 28 .8 27 .5 22 .4
F oo tloose  labo r-in tensive (3 2 + 3 9 ) 15.1 12.4 12.3 15.0 18.6
W ood  and  p a p e r p ro d u c ts (3 3 + 3 4 ) 6.9 9.2 12.0 15.6 13.0
H eavy  p rocessing (3 5 + 3 6 ) 18.2 21 .2 24 .8 18.0 16.5
M eta l goods (3 7 + 3 8 ) 16.4 19.3 22 .2 23 .8 29 .4
b) Share of employment
In d u stry  g roup IS IC 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
F ood  p rocessing 31 38 .8 32.8 30 .9 23.1 21 .5
F o o tlo o se  labo r-in tensive (3 2 + 3 9 ) 28 .8 26 .6 23 .4 28 .6 33.3
W ood  and  p a p e r p ro d u c ts (3 3 + 3 4 ) 8.2 10.1 14.2 18.5 16.5
H eavy  p rocessing (3 5 + 3 6 ) 13.6 17.1 20 .0 18.7 15.6
M eta l goods (3 7 + 3 8 ) 10.6 13.4 11.6 11.0 13.1
Source: Annual manufacturing survey, BPS
Note: Definition for industry group follows that of Hill (1996)
While the expansion in footloose industries can be attributed to the policy reforms, there is no 
clear indication as to what factors contributed to the expansion of metal goods industries. 
Aswicahyono (1998) attributed this result to high government investment during the oil boom 
period, which provided the industries with room to expand. The expansion, however, might 
have been the result of increased foreign participation. With advanced technology brought 
into the country by multinationals, firms in these industries should have been able to improve 
efficiency, and hence, performance.
Overall, the pattern of structural change in Indonesian manufacturing reflects the country’s 
resource endowment (Bird 1999) and is a pattern observed in some other developing 
countries (Hill 1996). That is, declining shares of traditional resource-intensive products but 
rising shares of labour- and capital-intensive products as industry employs more sophisticated 
technology. The pattern also seems to move closely with the dynamics of policy over the 
course of industrialisation. With the dramatic reforms in the 1980s, this implies that
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Indonesian manufacturing had become more integrated with the global economy. The data in 
Table 2.4, in fact, provide evidence of this.
2.3.2 Export performance and structure
Reflecting the import substitution industrialisation, the export of manufacturing goods was 
never important in Indonesia’s export outcomes during the oil boom period. It was not until 
the early 1980s that there was a change of outlook, as the government embarked on strategy 
to promote exports.
Figure 2.1 Composition of exports by broad sector in the economy, 1970-95 (% of total 
exports)
90 n
fa during
Oil and gas
rimary
X x , x X-afc
Source: calculated from export statistics, BPS, various years
The impact of trade reforms during the period 1985-90 on manufacturing exports is evident 
in Figure 2.1. The share of manufacturing exports increased significantly from 1982 to 1992 
and reached about 50 per cent of Indonesia’s total exports at the end of the period. In terms of 
growth, Table 2.5 shows that manufacturing exports have grown at a very high rate between 
1985 and 1995. The table shows the main manufacturing products that contributed to the high 
growth included wood and paper products, processed food, textiles and garments, and 
electrical products.
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Table 2.5 Major Indonesian manufacturing exports, 1985 and 1995
Product
Value (US$ million) Average
growth
1985 1995
Pharmaceutical 4 4 2
Plywood 825 3462 32
Sawnwood 307 454 5
Other Processed Wood 53 1074 193
Aluminum 246 475 9
Garments 340 3316 88
Other Textiles 220 2816 118
Cattle Fodder 68 142 11
Essential Oils 50 80 6
Fatty Acids 59 327 45
Electrical Apparatus 144 922 54
Processed Food 57 819 134
Cement 22 8 -6
Plaited Articles 13 66 41
Chemicals 57 519 82
Fertilizer 80 277 25
Leather and Leather Goods 44 65 5
Paper and Paper Goods 21 1011 474
Other Industrial 354 9960 272
Source: Export statistics, BPS
Pangestu (1996, p.52) pointed out that the positive impact of trade reforms on manufacturing 
export performance was moderated by excess capacity, which existed because of weak 
domestic demand and a favourable world market. For the latter, it was particularly true in the 
case of textile and garment, primarily because Indonesia had unfilled export quotas until the 
late 1980s (Hill 1996).
Table 2.6 shows the share of manufacturing exports by factor intensity. Three characteristics 
are worth highlighting. First, impressive manufacturing exports until the early 1990s tended 
to lie in sectors in which Indonesia had a comparative advantage. This can be seen clearly 
from the pattern of unskilled labour intensive (ULI) group, which increased from 34 per cent 
in 1985 to 47 per cent in 1990. The share, however, began to decrease in 1993 and was 42 
percent in 1995. The most important source for this decline has been the drop in the share of 
textiles and garments.
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Table 2.6 share of exports by factor intensity (% of total manufacturing exports),
1980-95
SITC Products 1980 1985 1987 1990 1993 1995
Resource intensive (NRI) 2 4 4 9 52 3 7 28 22
631 Veneers, Plywood, etc 14 46 49 31 24 17
Unskilled labour intensive (ULI) 53 3 4 3 2 4 7 4 6 42
65 Textile, yam, fabric etc. 9 12 12 14 14 12
82 Furniture 1 0 1 3 3 4
84 Clothing 20 17 15 18 18 15
85 Footwear 0 0 1 6 8 9
893 Plastic products 0 0 0 1 1 1
894 Toys and sporting goods 0 0 0 0 1 2
899 Other manufactured goods 1 0 0 1 1 1
Technology intensive (TI) 12 8 5 6 7 11
71 Machinery, non-electric 1 1 0 1 2 4
722 Electrical powered machinery 0 0 0 0 1 1
Human capital intensive (HCI) 12 9 11 10 15 19
62 Rubber manufacturer n.e.s 0 0 1 1 1 1
64 Paper, paperboard and manufacturing 1 1 3 2 3 4
724 Telecommunications equipment 0 0 0 1 3 4
Source: Export statistics, BPS, various issues
Note: Classification of the products by factor intensity follows that developed by Ariff and Hill (1985),
see Appendix 2.1.
While the case is clear for the ULI group, the comparative advantage argument does not seem 
to hold with the pattern of the natural resource intensive (NRI) group. Its share decreased 
from 49 per cent in 1985 to 37 and 22 per cent in 1990 and 1995 respectively. The decrease, 
however, was largely caused by the declining for demand and price of plywood, the product 
which dominates exports of this group, in international markets (Aswicahyono and Pangestu 
2000) .
The second feature was the growing importance of exports from the capital intensive industry 
group. Export share of human capital and technology intensive (HCI and TI respectively) 
groups increased between 1985 and 1995. The share increased from 9 per cent in 1985 to 19 
per cent in 1995 for HCI group, and from 8 per cent to 11 per cent for TI group. This pattern 
is consistent with the general trend in the stages of industrialisation where capital- and 
technology-intensive industries take over labour-intensive industry as the process of 
industrialisation progressively moves (Hill and Phillips 1997). The pattern, therefore, 
provides an indication of the positive impact of reforms in the investment regime and is 
consistent with the pattern observed earlier of structural change in manufacturing. The
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foreign investment reforms had likely increased the flow and adoption of technology in 
Indonesian manufacturing.
The third feature was increasing diversification of Indonesia’s exports. In 1987, 
manufacturing exports were dominated by plywood, textiles and garments, all of which 
accounted for 76 per cent of total manufacturing exports. By 1995, the total share of these 
products declined to 44 per cent. The share of other products, such as footwear, furniture, 
non-electrical machinery, telecommunication equipment and paper products, had been 
increasing since the late 1980s. The total share of these products reached 24 per cent in 1995 
as compared to 3 per cent in 1985.
2.3.3 Ownership
The pattern of ownership in Indonesian manufacturing appears to be closely related to the 
dynamics of policies summarised earlier. This is shown by looking at the pattern of 
ownership share in the manufacturing industry from 1975 to 1995 (Figure 2.2). Two 
observations are worth mentioning regarding the import substitution period (i.e. early 1970s 
to mid 1980s). First, the share of government ownership was slightly above 20 per cent in the 
period 1975-80 and most of the 1980s. As discussed, this was probably related to the massive 
oil revenue from the 1970s’ oil boom that enabled the government to finance investment in 
heavy industries. The temporary decline in the early 1980s was mainly due to the lag between 
investment and production. Second, the share of foreign ownership had been high in the early 
1980s, with a declining trend, before it rose again in late 1980s. This was likely due to high 
foreign participation in capital-intensive industries in that period. Bird (1999) shows that 
more than half of the foreign firms invested in chemicals (ISIC 35), and machinery and 
transportation (ISIC 38).
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Figure 2.2 Ownership share in Indonesian manufacturing, 1975-95 (% of total non-oil 
manufacturing’s value added)
Domestic-private
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Source: calculated annual medium and large manufacturing, BPS
Substantial changes in the patterns are evident for the export orientation period (1985-95). 
The share of government ownership declined over this period and reached 10 per cent in 
1995. In contrast, the share of foreign and domestic-private ownership increased. The share 
of domestic-private ownership, after it was broadly constant 1981 to 1985, began to increase 
and reached a peak of 73 percent in 1993, before declining in 1994. The share of foreign 
ownership only began to increase in the early 1990s. This increase, however, had only been 
small between 1990 and 1992 (i.e. about 1 percentage point). It was only in the 1993-95 
period that the share increased by about 5 percentage points. This considerable increase 
reflects the positive effects of further investment reform in the early 1990s.
According to Hill (1996), the increased role of foreign ownership in Indonesian 
manufacturing reflects the interplay between policy and industrial organisation factors. He 
demonstrated that when entry was permitted, foreign firms tended to enter the industries in 
which they could exploit their advantages in technology, brand names and knowledge of the 
international market.
Table 2.7 highlights the importance of policy in determining foreign participation. Foreign 
participation in textiles, garment and footwear industries (ISIC 32) seemed to occur only after
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the policy reforms in the 1980s. The share of foreign plants in these industries increased 
significantly from 10 per cent in 1980 to 19 per cent in 1995. Similarly, in terms of output 
(value added), the share increased from 9 to 15 per cent between the two years. This pattem 
points to a close relationship between foreign ownership and exporting behaviour, which is 
strongly supported by the theory of multinationals (e.g. Caves 1982; Dunning 1993). 
Meanwhile, the share in heavy processing industries (i.e. ISIC 37 and 38) also increased 
significantly between 1980 and 1995. This may well be attributed to the liberalisation in the 
investment regime. In this respect, it is particularly evident for the share in the machinery 
industry (ISIC 38) where the increase was considerably high during 1990-1995 compared to 
the earlier periods. As noted earlier, a substantial reform encouraging higher foreign 
participation was undertaken within this period (i.e. 1994).
Table 2.7 Distribution of foreign plants by broad industry groups (%), 1980-95
a) In terms of plant numbers
ISIC Industry 1980 1985 1990 1995
31 Food and tobacco products 13 12 12 11
32 Textile, garment and footwear 10 11 13 19
33 Wood products, inch furniture 15 17 14 9
34 Paper and paper products 3 2 2 3
35 Chemical, rubber and plastics 27 27 27 18
36 Non-metallic mineral products 4 4 3 4
37 Basic metal industries 2 1 4 3
38 Machinery and equipment 25 25 23 28
39 Other manufacturing 2 1 3 6
Total 100 100 100 100
b) In terms of value added
ISIC Industry 1980 1985 1990 1995
31 Food and tobacco products 27 16 10 9
32 Textile, garment and footwear 9 16 11 15
33 Wood products, inch furniture 3 5 5 4
34 Paper and paper products 1 1 6 5
35 Chemical, rubber and plastics 22 24 22 19
36 Non-metallic mineral products 11 11 4 3
37 Basic metal industries 3 6 10 11
38 Machinery and equipment 24 20 31 33
39 Other manufacturing 1 1 0 2
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Annual survey of medium and large manufacturing plants, BPS 
Note: Foreign plants are defined as plants with any foreign ownership,
i.e. foreign share is greater than zero.
' In this study, a foreign plant is defined as any firms with non-zero foreign shares.
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Another important feature of foreign firms in Indonesian manufacturing is their close 
relationship with export orientation. This is demonstrated by Table 2.8 which shows the 
average export-output ratios of foreign and domestic private plants in manufacturing for 1990 
and 1995. Focusing first on the two years’ average values (column 5), foreign plants have 
significantly higher export-output ratios compared to domestic private plants. For 
manufacturing sector as a whole, these ratios were 0.32 for foreign plants and 0.08 for 
domestic private plants. The same conclusion is also observable across broad industry 
groups. Turning to the pattern overtime (column 3 and 4), the ratio of foreign plants 
increased by 82, per cent from 0.22 in 1990 to 0.42 in 1995. This is an exceptional increase 
compared to the 38 per cent increase in the ratio of domestic plants.
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Table 2.8 Average of plants’ ratio of exported to total output by ownership and 
industries
a) Foreign plants
ISIC Industry 1990
(3)
1995
(4)
A verage o f  
1990 &  1995
(5)
Percen tage 
increase betw een 
1990 and  1995 
(6)
3 Manufacturing 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.82
31 Food and tobacco  products 0.13 0.28 0 .20 1.26
32 Textile, garm ent and  footw ear 0.41 0.57 0.49 0.38
33 W ood p roducts, inch furniture 0.52 0.72 0.62 0.39
34 P aper and  paper p roducts 0.15 0.25 0 .20 0 .74
35 C hem ical, rubber and p lastics 0.17 0.27 0.22 0 .60
36 N on-m etallic m ineral products 0 .09 0.24 0 .16 1.64
37 B asic m etal industries 0 .10 0.34 0.22 2.27
38 M achinery  and equipm ent 0.13 0.39 0 .26 1.98
39 O ther m anufactu ring 0.41 0.63 0 .52 0 .54
b) Domestic plants
ISIC Industry 1990
(3)
1995
(4)
A verage o f  
1990 &  1995
(5)
Percen tage 
increase betw een 
1990 and  1995 
(6)
3 Manufacturing 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.38
31 Food and tobacco  products 0 .04 0.05 0 .04 0 .33
32 Textile, garm ent and footw ear 0 .08 0.11 0 .10 0.27
33 W ood p roducts, inch furniture 0.22 0.29 0.25 0 .34
34 P aper and paper p roducts 0.01 0.03 0.02 2 .77
35 C hem ical, rubber and p lastics 0.07 0.08 0 .07 0 .06
36 N on-m etallic m ineral products 0 .02 0.02 0 .02 -0 .05
37 B asic m etal industries 0 .04 0.06 0.05 0 .54
38 M achinery  and equipm ent 0.02 0 .04 0.03 1.09
39 O ther m anufactu ring 0.07 0.20 0 .14 1.68
Source: Annual survey of medium and large manufacturing plants, BPS
Notes: Foreign plants are defined as plants with any foreign ownership, i.e. foreign share is greater than zero
Domestic plants are defined as plants with fully domestic ownership, i.e. domestic share is equal to 100 percent
2.3.4 Concentration
Another feature of industrialisation in Indonesia is the steady decline in the level of 
concentration. In a comprehensive study, Bird (1999) shows that the simple average of CR4 
(i.e. the market share of the largest four plants in an industry) decreased from 64 per cent in 
1975 to 51 per cent in 1990 (Table 2.9), despite a short rising trend between 1990 and 1993.
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The same inference can also be drawn out from the trend in the weighted averages of the 
ratio.
Table 2.9 average four-firm concentration ratio (CR4), 1975-93
Sim ple
average
W eigh ted
averag e
1975 63 .6 55 .0
1976 61 .9 53.8
1977 61.5 54 .0
1978 61 .2 54.3
1979 6 0 .0 53 .6
1980 57 .9 53.5
1981 57.5 53.1
1982 56 .0 50 .9
1983 54.5 50 .0
1984 53 .6 4 8 .4
1985 52 .6 4 6 .6
1986 52 .4 4 5 .9
1987 52.3 44 .3
1988 51 .8 4 4 .2
1989 52.1 43 .8
1990 50 .9 42 .5
1991 51 .8 43 .3
1992 53.7 4 3 .4
1993 53.5 4 4 .0
Source: Bird (1999, p.67)
Notes: CR4 is defined as the market share of the largest 
four plants in an industry.
Whether the declining trend in concentration level had been affected by the economic 
reforms in 1980s, however, is not clear. On one the hand the declining trend has been a 
stylised fact in the process of industrialisation. On the other, the trade reform in the 1980s 
should at least have led to some increased in competition from abroad through the 
restructuring process (Hill 1996). Despite this ambiguity, there is some evidence the 
declining trend was affected by the reform. Bird (1999) demonstrated that average 
concentration for export-competing industries (not shown here) in particular garments and 
plywood, considerably declined during the period 1986-91. He attributed this decline mostly 
to the increased export opportunities that allow domestic industries to support greater 
numbers of producers.
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2.4 Summary
This chapter presents an overview of industrialisation in Indonesia during the three decades 
up to the crisis of 1997-98. Over this time, major changes in policy direction took place in 
response to various events experienced by the Indonesian economy. After about 15 years of 
import substitution policy, sheltered by large oil revenues, the policy direction shifted 
dramatically towards outward orientation. This was assisted by a series of bold and 
comprehensive reforms aimed at liberalising the economy, increasing investment and 
promoting exports.
The impact of the policy changes on industrialisation is apparent. The Indonesian 
manufacturing sector transformed rapidly during this time and had become an important 
source of growth by the mid 1990s. The share of the sector in GDP increased from 12 per 
cent in 1975 to 24 per cent in 1995. In addition, some other features of industrialisation 
accompanied is rapid structural change. This chapter highlights the rapid change in the 
structure of Indonesia’s manufacturing exports, reflecting the country’s comparative 
advantage, increasing foreign participation (particularly after the major investment reforms 
during 1992-94) and declining, although high, concentration. Understanding that these have 
been the salient features of industrialisation in Indonesia will be important for analysing the 
diverse response of individual firms in subsequent chapters.
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Appendix 2.1 Classification of manufacturing sector according to factor intensity
S IT C In d u stry
61
A g r ic u l tu r a l  r e s o u r c e  in te n s iv e  
L ea th er, d ress fu r, etc.
63 W ood , co rk  m a n u fac tu res
661 -3
M in e r a l  r e s o u r c e  in te n s iv e  
N o n -m eta l b u ild in g  p ro d u c ts  and  m inerals
667 P ea rls , p rec io u s, sem ip rec ious stones
671 P ig  iron , etc.
54
U n s k i l le d  la b o u r  in te n s iv e  
M ed ica l p ro d u c ts
65 T ex tile , ya rn , fa b ric  etc.
6 6 4 -6 G lass , g la ssw are , p o tte ry
6 9 5 -7 T o o ls , cu tle ry , m eta l h ouseho ld  equip
729 E lec trica l m ach in ery
735 S hip  a n d  bo a t
81-5 P lum bing , hea ting , lighting , etc. equ ipm ent; fu rn itu re , trav e l goods, c lo th ing  foo tw ear
893-5 artic les  o f  p la s tic  n .e .s .; toys; sp o rting  goods; o ffice  supp lies, n .e.s.
899 O th e r m a n u fa c tu red  goods
951 W a r firea rm s, am m un ition
51
T e c h n o lo g y  in te n s iv e  
C h em ica l e lem en ts, com pounds
56-9 F ertilise rs , exp lo sives, p la s tic s , chem icals n .e .s
71 M ach in ery , n o n -e lec tric
7 2 2 E le c tric a l p o w ered  m ach inery
723 E lec trica l d is tr ib u tiv e  m ach inery
726 E lec tro -m ed ica l, X -ra y  equipm ent
734 A irc ra ft
861-3 In stru m en ts , pho to , c inem a supp lies, m ovie
53
H u m a n  c a p i ta l  in te n s iv e  
D yes, tann ing , co lo u r p ro d u c ts
55 P erfum es, c lean in g  etc. p ro d u c ts
62 R u b b e r m a n u fa c tu re rs  n .e .s
64 P ap er, p a p e rb o a rd  and  m an u fac tu rin g
6 7 2 -9 Iron a n d  steel ex c lu d in g  670-1
6 9 1 -4 M eta l m an u fa c tu re s  exc lud ing  695 -9
6 9 8 -9 M eta l m a n u fa c tu re s  n .e .s
724 T eleco m m u n ica tio n s equipm ent
725 D om estic  e lec tric  equipm ent
731-3 R a ilw ay  an d  ro a d  vehicles
864 W atch es an d  clocks
891 S ound  reco rd ers , p ro d u cers
892 P rin ted  m a tte r
896 W orks o f  a r t etc
897 G old , s ilv e rw are , jew elle ry
Source: ArifYand Hill (1985, p.241-42).
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Chapter 3
The 1997/98 Economic Crisis in Indonesia
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter noted that the Indonesian economy had transformed rapidly in the 30 
years leading up to 1996. The crisis in 1997/98 dramatically interrupted this trend. The 
economy contracted severely by about 14 per cent in 1998 and the nominal exchange rate lost 
almost 70 per cent of its value in 1997-98. Together with the previous chapter, this one 
completes the historical introduction to the crisis, setting the scene for the empirical analysis 
that follows. This chapter begins by describing the path of the crisis and is followed by a 
general description of its impact on the economy.
3.2 The course of the crisis
The 1997/98 crisis in Indonesia was unique because of the interaction between economic, 
political and social factors. Indeed, as becomes clear throughout the chapter, the economy’s 
performance deviated drastically from that of other economies affected by the same turmoil. 
Because the crisis was so unique, this section focuses on the way it unfolded. At the risk of 
oversimplification, it is possible to identify six sub-phases in the course of the crisis which 
covers the period 1997. The flow of major events and trends in the exchange rate are 
provided in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 respectively.
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Figure 3.1 Indonesia’s 1997/98 Economic Crisis: a summary
Sharply rising 
inflation
Production begin to 
decline
Baht floated 
(2/7/1997)
Declining growth and 
other economic 
performance
Rupiah floated (14/8/1997) and 
capital flight commenced
Exchange rate and financial 
sector collapse
Money supply increase in 
bailing out the banking sector 
from bank runs
Continuing Rupiah decline (Sept 
Oct 1997) and beginning of 
financial crisis
Political turmoil (May 1998): 
Soeharto regime collapse and anti- 
Chinese protests and riots
Increasing social unrest, weak 
government and business 
confidence
Beginning of confidence crisis (end 
of 1997 -  early 1998):
Stand off between the government 
and IMF, bank runs and unrealistic 
state budget.
Source: Adapted from Hill (1999)
28
Figure 3.2 Exchange rate Rupiah to $, January 1996 -  December 1999
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Source: CEIC data base
August-September 1997: the beginning
The problems in Indonesia began through a contagion effect from Thailand’s economic 
crisis. There was pressure on the Rupiah as soon as the Thai government decide to float the 
Baht, on July 2, 1997. On July 21, the Rupiah fell by 7 per cent, prompting Bank Indonesia 
(BI) to intervene. Faced with steady and strong pressure for the Rupiah’s depreciation, but 
reluctant to squander its reserves, BI finally freely floated the Rupiah on August 14. At the 
same time, it also responded by tightening liquidity. The one-month Bank Indonesia 
Certificate {Sertifikat Bank Indonesia, SBI) rate was increased from 14 to 22 per cent. The 
policy, however, turned out to be ineffective as the currency continued to fall.
The tight monetary policy was not effective partly because the market expected a clear signal 
from the government to reform the economy, which only came three weeks after the Rupiah 
was floated. In mid September, the government outlined its program to tackle the currency 
crisis. It had five objectives: (1) stabilisation of the Rupiah to a new equilibrium; (2) fiscal 
consolidation; (3) reduction of the current account deficit; (4) strengthening of the banking 
sector; and (5) strengthening of the private corporate sector. Following the program 
announcement the Rupiah stabilised at about Rp3000/$, but only until the third week of
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September. The combination of a growing concern about private companies having difficulty 
meeting their external obligation, and the weakened regional currency and stock markets, 
contributed to the Rupiah’s further depreciation. By early October, the Rupiah had 
depreciated by 35 per cent. By this time the Jakarta Stock Market Index had also fallen by 44 
per cent.
October 1997-January 1998: deteriorating situation
On October 8, the government decided to seek assistance from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The motivation for inviting the IMF, however, was rather unclear. In his initial 
statement, Finance Minister Mar’ie Muhammad, explained that what the government sought 
from the IMF was technical assistance. This was primarily aimed at strengthening the 
financial system, and the possibility of financial support would only be explored as a 
precaution. There was no clear reason as to why the government took this position. 
Nevertheless, there was a sense at that time that President Soeharto was reluctant to draw on 
IMF assistance (Soesastro and Basri 1998).
Many saw the involvement of the IMF as necessary to restore market confidence. Its 
inclusion was also seen by the market, particularly the international community, as an 
opportunity to reform the country’s problems with cronyism, corruption and collusion. This 
was because the terms set by the IMF were expected to be politically difficult (Soesastro and 
Basri 1998).
An agreement with the IMF was reached on October 31, providing Indonesia with a $43 
billion package.1 Unlike other IMF packages, the Indonesian agreement included measures 
affecting the real sector of the economy. While these measures were unusual for an IMF 
agreement, it is likely that they were proposed voluntarily by the Indonesian government as a 
way of increasing the credibility of the package, having taken into accounts the comments 
and expectations of the general public and international markets (Soesastro and Basri 1998).
The package included efforts to restore the health of the financial sector, adjustment in fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies, and reforms in the real sector. These reforms were to be 
implemented over a three-year period and tightly monitored by the IMF, the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). On November 1, one day after the agreement was
1 The package consisted of a ‘first line of fund’: $23 billion provided by the IMF, The World Bank and The 
ADB, and a ‘second line of funds’: $20 billion provided by the bilateral donors.
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reached, the government announced the closure of 16 commercial banks without provision of 
a sufficient deposit guarantee. This created a panic in the country, and led to sudden 
withdrawals of savings even from banks which were considered safe. On November 3, the 
government announced some macro- and micro-economic policies to implement the reforms 
required by the IMF package. The initial reaction from the market was positive. Combined 
with a joint effort between BI, the Bank of Tokyo and the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
to intervene in the market, the currency strengthened from Rp3600/$ at the end of October to 
about Rp3200/$.
This optimism, however, did not last long. The currency depreciated to a level about 
Rp4000/$. There are several reasons for the declining optimism. First, there was stronger 
pressure on the regional currency market because an economic crisis had hit Korea. Second, 
there were some government decisions that raised questions about its credibility in 
implementing the reforms. One example of this was the reversal of some large projects which 
were initially put on hold. It is worth mentioning here that most of these projects had links to 
Soeharto-family businesses. Third, demand for dollars was expected to rise as the issue of 
burgeoning private-sector debt became apparent. While there was no exact figure about the 
extent of this debt, it was widely believed to be substantial, ranging from $35 to $50 million. 
Finally there was a substantial losts of credibility for domestic commercial banks, partly as a 
result of the lack of deposit-insurance schemes. There was an increasing number of cash 
withdrawals from banks from late November.
All of these external and internal factors further weakened the currency. It reached Rp6000/$ 
in mid of December.
The situation deteriorated even further in January 1998. It began with the announcement of 
the draft state budget. The budget was highly unrealistic. It assumed an exchange rate of 
Rp.4000/$, compared to the prevailing rate of Rp.8000/$ at that time, economic growth of 4 
per cent and an inflation rate of 9 per cent. These unrealistic assumptions illustrated the stand 
off between the government, particularly the president and the IMF.“ The unrealistic 
assumptions, combined with the growing gap with the IMF, were responded too negatively 
by the market. The currency weakened further to reach the psychologically important level of 
Rp. 10,000/$.
2 The IMF’s disappointment was expressed in the Washington Post on January 8, 1998.
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On January 15, the second agreement with the IMF was signed. Although a good program 
seemed to be in place, the market was not convinced. The currency continued to fall and 
reached Rp 17,000/$ at the end of January. Several reasons explained the further 
deterioration, including the questionable credibility of an economic council set up by the 
president, the absence of measures related to bank and private-debt restructuring programs, 
and concerns about the promotion of BJ Habibie as vice-president.
February-April 1998: mounting crisis of confidence
This was a period of deteriorating confidence. The president seemed to lose faith in his 
economic advisers and neglected them for some time. He seemed to only listen to close 
associates and family members (Johnson 1998) and, without consulting his economic 
minister and advisers, he considered implementing the controversial plan for a Currency 
Board System (CBS). Serious consideration to implement the CBS increased the stand off 
between the president and the IMF. In response, the IMF delayed disbursement of the second 
instalment because of great concern about the government’s compliance to its agreement.
In addition to the CBS proposal, Soeharto’s seventh cabinet, after the presidential election in 
March, was poorly-received by the public and the market. Apart from the instalment of 
Habibie as vice president, Soeharto included a few of his associates and family members in 
the cabinet. Further, the cabinet’s composition reinforced the view that the president 
neglected the opinions of the public and the international community (Johnson 1998).
It is worth noting that, despite the mounting crisis of confidence, the third agreement with the 
IMF was reached during this period. The main difference between the third and the second 
agreement was a willingness to consider government assistance in solving the corporate 
external-debt problem (Johnson 1998). In implementing this, the government set up the 
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) in July 1998. It provided a guarantee on the 
exchange rate and the availability of foreign exchange for debtors who agree with creditors to 
restructure their external debt (Johnson 1998).
May 1998: political turmoil
May 1998 was the chaotic month. The government’s announcement of increased petrol and 
electricity prices, by 70 per cent and 20 per cent respectively, escalated the political tension. 
Students were protesting all over Indonesia, demanding a change in political leadership. A
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shooting incident on May 14 involving some students at the Trisakti University, led to 
devastating riots, looting and destruction, specifically targeting the Sino-Indonesian 
community. These events led to political chaos, and most significantly, weaker support for 
the president from the military and his cabinet members. This culminated in Soeharto’s 
resignation, and the handing over of leadership to Habibie.
June-August 1998: the new administration
President Habibie announced his new cabinet on May 22, 1998, and there was widespread 
approval of his choice of economic ministers. The optimism, however, stood in contrast to 
the enormous and complex problem that the government had to solve. For example, efforts to 
solve the external debt problem were implemented too slowly. Cameron (1999) reported that, 
until December 1999, only one company was interested in the debt-restructuring scheme 
designed by INDRA. The political environment was also unfavourable. Many projects were 
put on hold and capital flight continued (Hill 1999).
Uncertainty surrounded the progress of economic recovery and, combined with problems 
with the Japanese economy, the economic situation deteriorated. The Rupiah depreciated 
further to reach about Rp 14,000/$ in August 1998 (Figure 3.2). At the same time, BI was 
implementing excessive monetary tightening which pushed inflation up. High seriously 
damaged the cash flow of companies and consequently stopped activities in the real sector. 
By this time it was clear that the financial problems had translated into a serious economic 
crisis.
September 1998-March 1999: mixed trends
Optimism for recovery began to occur in September 1998. The strategy to have high interest 
rates seemed to work as the growth in liquidity had slowed down. Some improvements in the 
regional environment, such as optimism with the Japanese, Korean and Thai economies, were 
also evident. As a result of this optimism, the Rupiah strengthened to about Rp7500/$, a level 
that many considered manageable.
The optimism, however, was overshadowed by great uncertainty. Externally, it was not clear 
if the improvement in the region was robust. Internally, banking-sector and external-debt 
restructuring had been progressing slowly. A lack of transparency in decision making and 
problems in the legal system were the major issues constraining the recovery process. In 
addition, the social instability had not ended, and ethnic and religious violence continued.
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3.3 General description on the impact of the crisis
To provide a deeper understanding of the magnitude of the crisis, this section provides a 
description of the impact it had on several economic indicators. The impact of the crisis on 
trade policy will be also presented. This is because, as noted, the agreements with the IMF 
included some reforms targeted at the real sector of the economy.
3.3.1 Economic indicators 
Economic growth
The crisis severely affected Indonesia’s economy. Figure 3.3 shows it contracted by 14.1 per 
cent in 1998 after growing rapidly, at the rate of 6 per cent on average, in the 30 years before 
the crisis. Viewed in historical context, the contraction in 1998 was far deeper than any other 
recession that Indonesia had experienced (Hill 1999). Indeed, the figure shows the growth 
rate in 1985, when the economy adjusted from the fall in the oil price, was still positive at 2.4 
per cent.
The severe impact of the crisis appears even harsher when the short-term trend in the GDP is 
considered. The GDP index in Figure 3.3 shows that the level of the GDP in 1998 was about 
the same of that in 1995, implying that the crisis had ‘cost’ Indonesia three years of economic 
growth. Further, comparing the GDP index with the index representing the level of GDP that 
the economy would have attained if there had not been any crisis (and the economy had 
grown at the typical 1990s’ rate of 7 per cent p.a.), the magnitude of contraction in 1998 was 
greater. It was about 20 per cent lower than the level that would have been expected had there 
been no crisis.
In spite of the deep contraction, the economy began to recover in 1999, which was indicated 
by 0.8 per cent growth in they year. By 2000, the rate of growth was back to the 1997 rate at 
the beginning of the crisis, although well below the pre-crisis trend growth.
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Figure 3.3 Annual GDP growth and index, 1984-2000 (%, 1993=100)
■ ■  GDP growth ■ ♦— Index of GDP (1993=100)
Source: National Income Statistics, BPS
Table 3.1 shows that the impact of the crisis was different across sectors in the economy. 
Focusing first on the peak of the crisis (1998) construction, finance and trade, hotel and 
restaurant were the most severely affected sectors. The massive contraction in construction 
sector was probably caused by the delay of many projects. Demand for cement in Indonesia’s 
major cities was substantially reduced in early 1998 (Johnson 1998). The contraction in the 
finance sector largely reflected the difficulties faced by the banks. As shown by the figures, 
the contraction in this sector was largely explained by the bank, rather than the non-bank, 
financial sectors. Manufacturing, particularly non-oil and gas, contracted at about the 
economy-wide average. As later described in Chapter 6, there was large variation in the 
contraction across industries.
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Table 3.1 GDP growth by broad sectors of economy (%), 1997-2000
Sectors 1997 1998 1999 2000
Agriculture 1.0 -1.3 2.1 1.9
Mining & Quarrying 2.1 -2.8 -1.6 5.4
Manufacturing Industries 5.1 -12.2 3.9 5.8
Oil & Gas -2.0 3.6 6.6 -1.7
Non-oil & Gas 5.9 -14.0 3.5 6.8
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply 11.7 3.0 7.9 7.3
Construction 7.1 -45.3 -1.9 5.5
Trade, Hotel & Restaurant 5.7 -20.1 -0.1 5.5
Transport & Communication 6.8 -16.4 -0.8 8.2
Finance 5.8 -31.0 -7.5 4.5
Bank 4.9 -47.6 -14.7 5.4
Other non-bank financial sectors 6.8 -19.4 -0.9 4.1
Services 3.6 -3.9 1.9 2.3
Public Administration 1.2 -7.6 1.7 1.4
Private Services 7.6 1.9 2.3 3.7
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 4.59 -14.07 0.79 4.8
Source: National Income Statistics, BPS
Turning to the early recovery period (1999-2000), much of the large variation and patterns 
recorded in 1998 persisted into the following year. Bank-financial and construction sectors 
contracted further, by 15 and 1.9 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, non-oil and gas 
manufacturing seemed to begin recovering as it grew by 3.5 per cent. Recovery appeared 
stable in 2000 as all sectors recorded positive growth. More importantly, the sectors which 
were hit hardly by the crisis grew at a rate above 4 per cent, including the bank-financial 
sectors and construction.
The data from the expenditure side of the national account provides more information on the 
impact of the crisis (Table 3.2). In 1998, private consumption declined moderately in contrast 
with the large decline of government consumption. The decline in private consumption 
reflected various survival strategies by households (Hill 1999), while the huge decline in 
government consumption was probably the result in the delay of many government projects.
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The crisis severely affected investment and inventories. On an annual basis, these 
expenditure groups contracted by 40 and 291 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, exports 
increased only moderately despite a large exchange rate depreciation in this year, and imports 
contracted modestly.
Table 3.2 GDP growth by expenditure (%), 1997-2000
1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
C o n su m p tio n  E x p en d itu re  (C E ) 6 .7 -7 .4 4 .2 2 .0
P riv a te  C o n su m p tio n  E x p en d itu re 7.5 -6 .4 4 .5 1.6
G o v ern m en t C o n su m p tio n  E x p en d itu re 0.1 -1 6 .7 0 .7 6.3
G r o ss  F ixed  C a p ita l F orm ation 8.2 -40 .1 -20 .1 15.5
C h a n g e  in S to ck -5 6 .4 -2 9 1 .1 4 1 .0 3 6 .0
E x p o rts  o f  G o o d s  &  S erv ice s 7 .5 10 .6 -3 8 .3 2 3 .5
Im p o rts  o f  G o o d s  &  S erv ice s 13 .7 -5 .4 -5 2 .2 23 .1
Source: National Income Statistics, BPS
While private consumption and inventories increased, expenditure on investment goods, 
exports and imports contracted even more. The beginning of the recovery only became 
apparent in 2000. The fact that expenditure on investment, inventories, exports and imports 
increased substantially in this year suggests the beginning of recovery.
Balance of payments
The impact of the crisis is also clearly reflected in the country’s balance of payments (Table 
3.3). The current account deficit had been declining between 1997 and 2000. The factors 
contributing to the decline, however, were slightly different across these years. For the fiscal 
year 1997/98 and 1998/99, the decline was mostly caused by the large contraction in imports 
and the surprisingly weak performance of exports. The table shows that imports fell by about 
$14 billion in 1997/98. By contrast the 1999/2000 decline was mostly driven by large 
increases in exports. The non-oil and gas exports increased by $9 billion in this fiscal year.
The trend observed in the current account was largely reflected on the capital account. Net 
capital outflow turned out to be negative in the fiscal year 1997/98 and continued to be so. 
Despite the signs of recovery, this suggests that business confidence had not fully recovered.
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In fact, net capital flow from private direct investment had been negative and large in 
1998/99 and 1999/2000.
As noted in the past two tables, exports failed to accelerate despite the large exchange rate 
depreciation during the crisis. This, however, was not only specific to Indonesia. Duttagupta 
and Spilimbergo (2004) demonstrated that weak export performance during the crisis was 
experienced by other countries affected by the 1997/98 turmoil in Asia. Several factors might 
explain this, including the decline in the price of export commodities, the effect of 
competitive devaluations in competitor countries and tightening credit markets. All of these 
factors are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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Table 3.3 Balance of payments ($ billion), 1995-96-1999/2000
1995 /96 1996 /97 1997 /9 8 1998/99 1999 /2000
C u rren t A ccou n t -7 .8 -5 .0 4.1 5.8 8 .0
E x p o rts 50 .2 56 .3 5 0 .4 51 .2 65 .4
N o n  O il and  G as 38 .0 4 4 .6 4 3 .0 4 1 .0 50.3
O il and  G as 12.2 11.7 7 .4 10.3 15.1
Im p orts 44 .2 46 .2 3 1 .9 30 .6 40 .4
N o n  O il an d  G as 39 .9 41 .4 29.1 26 .6 34 .4
O il and  G as 4 .4 4 .8 2 .9 4 .0 6.0
T r a d e  B alance 5 .9 10.1 18.4 20 .6 25 .0
S erv ice s -1 3 .7 -15.1 -1 4 .5 -14 .9 -17.1
N o n  O il an d  G as -10 .2 -10 .5 -1 1 .4 -11 .7 -12 .5
O il and  G as -3 .5 -4 .6 -2 .9 -3 .2 -4 .6
C a p ita l A ccou n t 11.0 2 .5 -3 .9 -4 .6 -6 .8
O ffic ia l C a p ita l
In flow s 5 .7 7 .6 13 .7 9.4 7 .5
O ffic ia l C G I 5.1 7 .6 2 .8 2.4 2.4
N o n  o ffic ia l C G I 0 .6 0 .0 10.9 7.0 5.1
O u tflo w s  (D eb t R ep aym en ts) -6 .2 -4 .7 -3 .8 -4.1 -4 .3
P r iv a te  C a p ita l
T o ta l 11.5 -0 .3 -1 3 .8 -9 .9 -1 0 .0
D irec t Investm ent 6 .2 4 .7 -0 .4 -2 .7 -4 .6
O th ers 5.3 -5 .0 -13 .5 -7 .2 -5 .4
T o ta l (C ap ita l p lus curren t accoun t) 3 .2 -2 .5 0 .2 1.2 1.2
Source: Balance of Payment Statistics, BPS
Monetary and financial market indicators
To get a picture of how severely the crisis affected monetary and financial indicators, it is 
useful to examine the trend of money supply, inflation and interest rates over the period 
1997-2000. Money supply is represented by base money (M0), inflation is computed using 
the consumer price index (CPI) and the interest rates are represented by one-month Bank 
Indonesia Certificate (SBJ) and the three-month time deposit. The trends are given in Figures 
3.4 and 3.5.
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Figure 3.4 Inflation and base money (MO), January 1997 -  December 2000
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Inflation (CPI) —♦— Base Money (M0)
Source: BPS and Bank Indonesia
Notes: Inflation (%, year-on-year), base money (M0) (index, 1997=100).
Figure 3.5 Interest rate, January 1997 -  December 2000 (% p.a.)
One-month Bank Indonesia Certificates (SBI) Three-month Time Deposit
Source: Bank Indonesia
Money supply continued to increase from the onset of the crisis (Figure 3.4). The jumps in 
January and May 1998 were during a time of a mounting crisis of confidence characterised 
by bank runs. The runs forced BI to inject liquidity support to prevent the banking system
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from collapse. As a result, base money increased by about 60 per cent in the first six months 
of 1998. BI finally managed to control the base money growth from August.
Figure 3.4 shows that the impact of the crisis on inflation was dramatic. Inflation began to 
increase in the second half of 1997 when the crisis had just started, but it rose rapidly in since 
January 1998 and reached 82 per cent in September. A number of factors simultaneously 
contributed to the sudden increase. The sharp exchange rate increased the price of imported 
goods and the drought in early 1998 contributed to substantial increases in food prices. The 
excessive monetary expansion also contributed to high inflation. In fact, the figure shows that 
inflation moved closely with base money, albeit with a lag and it thus confirms the 
conventional inflation theory. In addition, panic buying in early 1998 was not limited to food 
but included other essential durable items. At the same time, a seasonal increase in demand 
further compounded the problem.
Interest rates increased substantially in September 1997 in response to the rapid exchange 
rate depreciation. The September one-month SBI rate doubled from about 11 per cent in July. 
Similarly, the three-month time deposit rates rose from 16 per cent in July to 26 per cent in 
September. The rates had been declining since then, but this was occurred the period of high 
inflation. As a result, real interest rates were negative, which consequently caused a strong 
disincentive to hold the Rupiah. SBI rates had been increased dramatically since September 
1997 and reached a peak of about 71 per cent in July 1998. The rising trend was followed by 
a similar trend in time deposits although the increase was not as dramatic as that seen in SBI 
rates. Interest rates began to decline in September after BI regained control over the base 
money growth, and almost reached the pre-crisis level at the end of 1999.
The policy to maintain high interest rates in 1998 put strong pressure on the balance sheet of 
companies that were dependent on, or borrowed from, domestic banks because the cost of 
servicing debt increased dramatically during this year. Figure 3.6 shows that the average 
lending rates for working capitals in commercial banks increased dramatically from just 
below 20 per cent in mid 1997 to about 35 per cent in mid 1998.
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Figure 3.6 Average lending rates in commercial banks, January 1997 -  December 2000
—♦— Working Capital Investment
Source: Bank Indonesia
The high interest rate environment also severely affected the stock market. The Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Index fell by about 45 per cent from 720 in June to 400 in November 1997 (Figure 
3.7). The index continued to fall, reaching its lowest level of 280 in September 1998. As with 
other indicators, the index began to recover from October onwards.
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Figure 3.7 Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) Index, January 1997 -  December 2000
♦ Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index
Source: CEIC data base 
Note: JSX Index, 1982=100
The crisis severely affected the exchange rate. By 1999, the exchange rate had lost about 70 
per cent of its nominal value from \996 (Table 3.4). The excessive monetary expansion in 
1998 played a major role in this sharp depreciation. The nominal depreciation was translated 
into a sharp real depreciation in 1998 and hence boosted Indonesia’s competitiveness. 
However, the improved competitiveness did not last long as the nominal appreciation took 
place in 1999 and 2000. It is important to note that the Rupiah’s depreciation was comparable 
to the movement of currencies in other countries affected by the Asian crisis (Figure 3.8). But 
because of the mounting crisis of confidence and the excessive monetary expansion in 1998, 
the depreciation dramatically deviated from the common pattern observed in these other 
countries.
Table 3.4 Exchange rate indices
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Nominal exchange rate index (1993=100) 89.0 70.8 21.2 26.8 24.5
Real effective exchange rate index (1993=100 126.0 114.4 57.2 81.8 76.0
Source : Bank Indonesia
43
Figure 3.8 Exchange rate movements of several crisis-affected countries (index, 
January 1996 = 100), January 1996 -  December 2000
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Source: CEIC data base
It is important to mention that the sharp exchange rate depreciation was likely to deepen the 
extent of financial difficulties faced by Indonesian companies who borrowed in foreign 
currency and sold their products on domestic markets. The core of the problem was the fact 
that most of the debts had short-term maturity profiles. According to de Koning (1998), most 
of the external debt of companies was in the form of bank loans with average maturity profile 
of about 18 months. Apart from the maturity level, the debt was also believed to be large and 
usually unhedged (Soesastro and Basri 1998). There was also uncertainty about the size of 
the debt. Soesastro and Basri indicated that the amount needed to service the debt in 1998, 
i.e. for paying both the principal and interest, could be as large as $59.8 million.
3.3.2 Trade policy
As described in Section 3.2, the first and second agreements with the IMF included reforms 
in the real sector. Although some analysts thought that these reforms were unnecessary, 
because the greatest problem was in the financial sectors (e.g. McLeod 1997), many believed 
they were needed to restore confidence. In this respect, the reforms need to be put in the more 
general context of trade reform in Indonesia. As noted in the previous chapter, there were
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rapid trade and investment reforms undertaken from the mid 1980s until the mid 1990s. From 
that time onwards, however, no major progress was undertaken before the crisis, given the 
framework for further trade liberalisation which was set in the May 1995 deregulation 
package. Indeed, a few years before the crisis, the World Bank urged Indonesia to reduce the 
tariffs of several sectors, which were untouched by the earlier reforms of the 1990s, into line 
with the overall program of tariff reduction (Soesastro and Basri 1998).
Significant trade reforms were undertaken as a result of the first two agreements with the 
IMF. The reforms aimed at reducing tariffs, promoting exports, and particularly NTBs. The 
latter largely captured The World Bank’s proposal to continue the stalled trade reform in the 
early 1990s (Soesastro and Basri 2005). These reforms, particularly those related to the 
manufacturing sector, are briefly summarised below.
Tariffs
In the IMF agreement, Indonesia committed to gradually reduce tariffs on items subject to 
15-25 per cent tariff rates prior to the crisis by 5 percentage points. The items included iron, 
steel and chemical products. Tariffs on these products were mostly reduced in 1999.
The reforms also substantially reduced trade protection in the automotive industry. Import 
tariffs on completely knocked down (CKD) and completely built up (CBU) vehicles were 
substantially reduced by the June 1999 automotive deregulation package. The tariff 
reductions, and the deregulation package in particular, were significant in regard to the 
protectionist policy aimed at supporting the National Car Program.
As a result of trade reforms in the mid 1990s, and the acceleration of the reform by the IMF 
agreements, the simple average tariff rates were reduced from 20 per cent in 1994 to 9.5 in 
1998 and 7.5 in 2002 (WTO 1998, 2003).
Non-tariff barriers
The government removed many trade restrictions affecting import licenses, the local content 
schemes, trade monopolies and marketing arrangements. In 1998, it discontinued the tax, 
customs and credit privileges granted to the National Car program and local content scheme 
for dairy products. Through the automotive deregulation package in 1999, the government 
ended the local content scheme in the automotive industry and permitted general importers to 
import CBU vehicles. It also disbanded the clove marketing agency (BPPC) that held a
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monopoly over domestic marketing and the distribution of cloves. Finally it removed a 
number of restrictive formal and informal marketing arrangements, including those for 
cement, paper and plywood.
Other reforms related to NTBs included in the IMF agreements were aimed at reducing 
restrictions on exports. In the second IMF agreement, the government committed to gradually 
remove export taxes and eliminate all other types of export restrictions, such as quotas and 
provincial taxes levied on inter-provincial and inter-district trade. In addition, the government 
in 1998 reformed the export licensing system by removing many products from the regulated 
export lists and allowed cement producers to export with a general export licence.
To promote exports, the government granted export-oriented companies duty exemption and 
drawbacks. Eligible exporters operating in export processing zones or export-oriented 
manufacturing were eligible for tariff exemptions for all capital equipment, machinery and 
raw materials needed for initial investment and production. Exporters were also allowed to 
bypass import monopolies as long as the imported goods were used in export production.
3.4 Summary
The crisis in Indonesia, which began through a contagion effect from Thailand’s economic 
turmoil, followed a similar path to that of neighbouring countries from August to December
1997. Indonesia’s path, however, deviated significantly from late December 1997 because 
there was no confidence that the government would implement the necessary economic 
reforms. The situation worsened in 1998 with the onset of political trouble. The mounting 
crisis of confidence led to the exchange rate depreciation, bank runs and capital flight. As a 
result, the financial and banking sectors collapsed, which consequently led to the collapse of 
the real sector.
The crisis severely affected the Indonesian economy. It contracted by about 14 per cent in
1998. The manufacturing sector, which contributed to rapid economic growth in the 30 years 
leading up to the crisis, contracted by about 12 per cent. By 1999, the nominal exchange rate 
was only about 30 per cent of its value in 1996. Despite improvement in the country’s 
competitiveness in 1998, export performance was disappointing. It only showed a positive 
response in 2000 when the overall economy began to recover. The crisis, through the IMF 
agreements, accelerated the process of reform in the trade regime, which had seemed to lose
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pace after 1995. The trade reforms during the crisis reduced tariffs and removed both 
regulations and NTBs, which were untouched by the pre-crisis reforms.
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Chapter 4
Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the relevant literature to provide the framework for the empirical 
analyses in subsequent chapters. It begins with a discussion of the analytical approaches to 
examining the response of firms to the crisis, followed by a review of empirical studies.
4.2 Analytical approaches for examining firms’ responses to the crisis
In contrast to wide-ranging studies debating the causes of the 1997/98 Asian crisis, there has 
only been a limited number of studies exploring the responses of firms to the crisis. Drawing 
on these studies and the general economic literature, this section discusses several alternative 
approaches to explaining firms’ responses to the crisis.1 It is important to note here that some 
arguments in the discussion are interrelated.
4.2.1 The role of aggregate shock
This approach comes from the crisis literature. It argues that the firms’ responses during the 
crisis were largely determined by the aggregate shocks experienced by the crisis-affected 
countries. In the literature, two aggregate shocks have received large attention: shocks in the 
financial sector and the sharp exchange rate depreciation.
Shock in the financial sector
The importance of the shock in the financial sector is related to the theory of imperfection 
information in the capital market. In particular, two channels are often thought to have
1 Claessens et al. (2000) provides a useful survey of some explanations put forward in the Asian crisis literature.
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affected firms adversely: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending channel. The 
balance sheet channel is based on the view that the premium on external financing, i.e. the 
difference in cost between funds raised externally and funds generated internally, decreases 
with net worth (Jensen and Meckling 1976). It emphasises the potential depressing impact of 
the crisis on firms’ collateralisable net worth, including the variables such as cash flow and 
liquid assets, which in turn increase firms’ risk premium. A rise in interest rates, for example, 
directly weakens the firms’ balance sheets by reducing the net cash flow of interest payments 
and by lowering the value of their collateral assets. Higher risk premiums imply a higher cost 
of borrowing or a lower ability to borrow, which will consequently result in lower capital 
investment and hence weaker performance. According to financial accelerator models, such 
as that of Bemanke and Gertler (1989), the decline in investment will amplify the increase in 
the premium, and hence reduce the investment even further.
The second channel is based on the assumption that banks play an intermediary role in 
channelling credit to an economy. The combination of macroeconomic management during 
the crisis (which often involved policies of high interest rates and tighter regulation on bank 
lending) and massive bank runs in some crisis-affected countries, can cause a deficiency in 
the capital of banks and therefore reduce the amount of available lending for firms. Such a 
reduction will curtail the amount of firms’ investment and can impair performance.
In addition to these channels, after the crisis, banks had more difficulty differentiating 
between good and bad loan applicants. As a result, banks were likely to adopt more stringent 
lending policies favouring those who were able to provide more collateral assets or had a 
more established credit record. In other words, the degree to which credit was rationed, as a 
result of imperfections in the capital market (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), should have been 
larger during and after the crisis.
The channels outlined above suggest a ‘credit crunch’ during the crisis. Here, credit crunch is 
defined as the situation where interest rates do not equilibrate supply and demand for credit 
and there is credit rationing (Gosh and Gosh 1999).
The impact of the crisis on firms through the channels described above, however, is unlikely 
to have equal impact across companies. The bank lending channels are likely to have 
adversely affected firms which were dependent on domestic banks. This, however, should 
particularly be the case for small and medium firms, because they tend to borrow from
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domestic banks. Based on a firm-level survey conducted by the World Bank in the countries 
affected by the crisis, Kawai et al. (2000) indeed found that large firms (mostly exporters and 
foreign companies) relied relatively more on debt-financing from international capital 
markets. The balance sheet channel, which in principle has equal impact on all firms 
irrespective of their financial structure, is likely to have penalised highly leveraged firms 
more because they have to expend more to service debts.
The potential for credit rationing is thought to have been higher for small firms. As argued by 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), the amount of information that banks could acquire is usually 
much less in the case of small firms, because banks have little information about these firms’ 
managerial capabilities and investment opportunities. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) provide 
evidence for this, which shows that flows of credit into small firms in US manufacturing after 
tight money policy, and at the onset of recession, substantially contracted compared to the 
flows into large firms. The extent of credit rationing to small firms may also occur simply 
because they are not usually well-collaterised (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994).
Potential for credit rationing can also be expected to have been higher for young firms. 
Central to the proposition is that the risk associated with any loan varies with respect to the 
duration of relationships between firms and financial institutions (Diamond 1991). Rosen 
(1998) and Berger and Udell (1998) argue that financing patterns of firms may be related to 
their growth stages. In particular, Rosen suggested a non-monotonic relationship between age 
and proportion of internal finance. That is, the proportion increases for several years, declines 
and then is replaced by external finance.
Sharp exchange rate depreciation
The usual argument for the impact of exchange rate depreciation on firms relates to potential 
change in their competitiveness. For firms producing tradable goods, sharp exchange rate 
depreciation can benefit local firms by raising import prices. This causes consumers to 
substitute towards domestically-produced goods and, by lowering production costs relative to 
firms in other countries, provides cost advantages in export markets (Desai et al. 2004). The 
cost advantages are derived from the decline in the relative costs of labour faced by firms in 
the country depreciating its exchange rate (Forbes 2002a). Several studies, in particular 
Forbes (2002a, 2002b), provide evidence that exchange rate depreciation improves the 
performance of firms that produce tradables. More generally, Ghei and Pritchett (1999)
2 Similar characteristics were also evident for firms in Mexico (Krueger and Tomell 1999).
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summarise the empirical evidence on the impact of exchange rate depreciations on exports, 
and conclude that exchange rate depreciations mostly translated to an improved export 
performance.
Despite this evidence, some factors might mitigate the impact of improvement in 
competitiveness. The first is competitive depreciation, which means that the expansionary 
effect of exchange rate depreciation in a country (through exports) may not materialise if the 
trade competitors of the country also undertake similar depreciation. The second is a period 
of high inflation during the crisis, which limits the extent to which the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation translates into a real depreciation.
The third factor is firms’ production structure. As shown in the theoretical framework 
developed by Forbes (2002a), the short-run benefit of exchange rate depreciation on a firm’s 
production costs (i.e. lowered relative labour costs) depends on the share of imported input 
used in production. If the share is large, exchange rate depreciation increases the costs of 
capital and thereby weakens the positive impact of lower production costs from the cheaper 
labour.
The last factor involves exchange rate depreciation and firms’ financial constraints, working 
through the balance sheet channel. If a large share of firm debt is denominated in foreign 
currency, exchange rate depreciation may diminish their net worth by inflating the domestic- 
currency value of the debt, and hence lowering the firms’ ability to increase investment. The 
negative impact of the depreciation on the firms’ financial constraints, however, is less likely 
to affect export-oriented companies, since there is a better match between foreign-currency 
revenue and foreign-currency debt.3 4
Exchange rate depreciation increases firms’ incentive to export. Whether the advantage can 
be captured, however, depends on some other factors. Literature on exporting suggests that 
firm efficiency is one such factor. The argument, which is often termed as the ‘self-selection 
hypothesis’, is based on the notion that export markets are far more competitive than 
domestic firms, which allow only the most productive firms to survive (Aw and Hwang,
3 Competitive depreciation has long been recognised as a major constraint on export expansion (Gupta et al. 
2003).
4 For Mexican firms in the 1990s, this was in fact the case. Firms which borrowed abroad were largely exporters 
(Aguiar 2005; Krueger and Tornell 1999). A similar characteristic was also evident for firms in the South East 
Asian countries. The World Bank’s firm-level survey in 1998 revealed that firms in these countries which 
borrowed abroad were mostly exporters, foreign and large firms (Kawai et al. 2000).
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1995). Many empirical studies have established support for this hypothesis. In particular, 
productivity (as measured either by total factor productivity or labour productivity) is found 
to be significantly different between exporters and non-exporters (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 
1999).
Differences between exporters and non-exporters, however, are not only limited to 
productivity. Several other studies have also found significant differences in terms of the 
other characteristics, including size, ownership and capital intensity. While many of these 
differences can be attributed to efficiency, they also reflect the significance of other factors in 
explaining firms’ export behaviour. One of these factors, which received large attention in 
the literature, is differences in sunk-costs for entering export markets. The underlying 
assumption is that non-exporters must incur large sunk costs in entering export markets. 
Recent studies have confirmed the sunk-cost hypothesis empirically. Roberts and Tybout 
(1997), for example, found that firms’ previous export status is an important determinant of 
the decision to export.
The discussion above suggests that, assuming that competitiveness did improve during and 
after the crisis, the success of firms in responding to the situation is likely to vary. Firms in 
labour- and resource-intensive industries could have been more successful since they gain 
more from a relatively cheaper cost of production. Similarly, firms with low capital intensity 
could have been more successful than others even in the same industry because the capital 
intensity across firms could vary substantially within an industry. Export-oriented firms are 
likely to have been more responsive in increasing their exports. This is because they did not 
need to incur all the necessary costs required to penetrate export markets. The domestic- 
oriented firms, in contrast, needed to pay all of the necessary costs which, as explained, are 
large and sunk in nature.
While domestic-oriented firms can be expected to be unresponsive to the crisis, particularly 
in terms of export, some studies drawing on Latin America’s crisis (e.g. Blomstrom and 
Lipsey 1993) indicate that these firms may have successfully increased their exports. The 
variables which could increase the firms’ ability to compete in export markets and reduce the 
extent of sunk exporting costs are likely to be the key determinants. These variables, along 
with their hypotheses, are discussed in more detailed in Chapter 9.
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4.2.2 Characteristics of firms
Several studies have suggested that the diversity at firms’ performance can be explained by 
heterogeneity in the characteristics of companies. Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000), for example, 
indicate a systematic performance difference across firms with different sales orientation and 
leverage.
Emphasising the role of firm characteristics has become an increasingly important 
consideration in the empirical studies examining performance of firms. In his review of the 
recent empirical studies on this subject, Geroski (1998) observes that size seems to be an 
important characteristic associated with systematic differences in firm performance. Based on 
this observation, he further argues that understanding and identifying the source of firm 
heterogeneities is a key to making some progress in explaining heterogeneity in their 
performance.
Justification for this approach can also be derived from the resource-based theory of firms. 
According to this theory, the differences observed in firms’ performance can be explained by 
some specific factors attached to the firms (e.g. Rumel 1984; Barney 1991). There is no clear 
definition, however, about which resources constitute the firm-specific resources. 
Nevertheless, as argued by Barney (1991), these resources can be defined to include all 
assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc that 
are controlled by firms. Dierickx and Cool (1989) argue that the most important element of 
these resources is that they are not available in the market but must be developed by firms.
If heterogeneity in firm characteristics matters in explaining their responses to the crisis, the 
question is what are the sources of this heterogeneity? The discussion so far indirectly 
suggests some of these sources, namely financial structure and characteristics, sales 
orientation and production characteristics. Literature on firm performance indicates that some 
other sources may also have been important. The following discusses the reasons why these 
other sources, namely size, age and ownership, might have been important.
a. Size
The argument traditionally put forward in the literature for the importance of size is related to 
scale economies in production. If economies of scale in production exist, large firms may 
outperform small ones in a low demand situation by setting lower prices.
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However, this argument is not supported by evidence in the empirical literature, which 
revealed mixed findings on the relationship between economies of scale and firms’ 
performance. Berry (1992, p.56) concluded that "... the generally positive relationship 
between profits and size observed in US corporations does not seem to characterise LDC 
plants.” He further argued that: “Even were such a link to show up, it would not necessarily 
reflect technical economies of scale. Since most large firms are multi-product, and since in 
many industries technologies change rapidly. ”
As also noted in Berry (1992), the literature provides several reasons for the presence of a 
size-performance relationship that does not arise from economies of scale. First, large firms 
tend to perform better than small ones because they often have better management. Large 
firms are filled with more capable people (workers and managers), train their employees 
more thoroughly and are able to afford specialist advice (Geroski 1998). Second, the good 
performance of large firms might also be a result of the market power they posseses. In fact, 
this is one of the typical empirical findings in the industrial organisation literature within the 
Structure-Conduct-and-Performance framework (Porter 1974; Shepherd 1972).
Nevertheless, the modem theory of the firm provides two arguments which might offset some 
advantages at large firms. The existence of transaction costs (Williamson 1985) gives rise to 
the importance of organisational structure in affecting firm performance. Transaction costs in 
practice are associated with planning and task monitoring. Large firms characterised by large 
management and administrative layers are associated with high transaction costs, implying a 
complex organisational structure. The complexity in turn, can reduce ability of the firms to 
quickly respond to changes in the business environment. Among others, Tomatzky and 
Fleischer (1990) and Utterback (1994) show that small firms exhibit greater responsiveness 
in adapting to changes in the business environment, because of their leaner organisational 
structure. Further, to some extent small firms are family-based, and this characteristic greatly 
reduces transaction costs and contributes to an even leaner organisational structure.
The second argument is related to the managerial discretion hypothesis (Grossman and Hart 
1982) which emphasises the agency problem arising from the misalignment in interests 
between managers and shareholders. When ownership and control are separated, firm 
managers enjoy greater discretion in the decision-making process. Firms in which ownership 
and control is separated, likely in the case of large firms, often have difficulty monitoring the 
activities of managers, who may sacrifice company objectives for their own short-term gains.
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In addition to these arguments, some other reasons might also have contributed to small firms 
having an advantage during the crisis. First, they tend to focuses on niche markets which 
avoid potentially higher competition from large firms. This argument is based on the theory 
of strategic market choice (Caves and Porter 1977; Porter 1979) which posits small firms 
strategically and deliberately occupy a market niche to avoid direct competition with larger 
ones. Second, small firms are usually less connected to the financial sectors and more likely 
to self-finance. Hence, they are unlikely to suffer from the tightening credit market and rising 
debt burden during the crisis.
b. Age
The significance of a firm’s age lies in the differences in managerial experience available to 
it. Greater experience would have provided older firms with more strategic options to deal 
with the effects of the crisis. The emphasis on experience can be derived from theoretical 
models explaining growth of firms, such as Jovanovic (1982) which postulates that over time 
firms ‘learn’ about and improve their efficiency. Supporting this argument, a sizeable amount 
of empirical research on firm dynamics has developed the stylised fact that the probability of 
firm survival increases with their age/
Although differences in experience might explain the importance of age, much of the 
explanation can also be attributed to the stylised fact that many large firms are older. 
Consequently, the advantages and disadvantages of a firm being large, as outlined in the 
previous sub-section, may also be relevant in explaining the importance of age in shaping the 
responses of firms during the crisis.5 6
c. Ownership
There are several aspects of firms’ ownership which might be important for in their responses 
to the crisis. This study focuses only on ownership by the source of investment (foreign, 
government or private domestic), because of data limitations.
5 Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998) provide excellent theoretical and empirical reviews of the subject.
6 In comparing the growth rates between small and larger firms of UK companies over the period 1975-85, 
Dunne and Hughes (1994) found that variation of the growth rates are larger for the group of small firms. The 
variation, however, was reduced substantially after the comparison controlled for age of the firms.
55
Foreign ownership
There are several reasons why foreign firms might have responded better to the crisis than 
domestic firms. First, foreign firms have better access to international sources of capital 
which allows them to overcome potential financial difficulties during the crisis (Blalock and 
Gertler 2005; Desai et al. 2004). Second, foreign firms were likely to take advantage of the 
sharp exchange rate depreciation during the crisis (i.e. by increasing their exports), since they 
have the advantage of being part of a global economy network (Globerman et al. 1994) and 
many foreign firms in Asia, and in the crisis-affected countries in particular, were in fact 
exporters (e.g. Athukorala et al. 1995; Urata 1998; Ramstetter 1999, 2002; Kawai et al. 
2000). This prior export experience provides the firms with lower costs of export expansion, 
relative to those faced by domestic firms.
There are at least two factors, however, which might have mitigated the superiority of the 
foreign firms. The first is the degree of foreign control in them. As shown by Ramstetter 
(1999) for Indonesia, the extent of competitiveness in firms with some foreign ownership 
varies depending on the foreign shares in them. He attributed this to the possibility that the 
parent companies may restrict the flow of firm-specific assets, such as technology and 
international marketing networks, to their uncontrolled affiliates. The other factor is the 
financial structure of the firms. The response of foreign firms might have been depressed by 
the burden of servicing their debt, since their debt structure is most likely dominated by 
foreign-currency debt (Blalock and Gertler 2005). As noted, however, this argument is more 
applicable to domestically-oriented foreign firms, as the export-oriented foreign firms are 
able to match their foreign-currency denominated debt with foreign-currency revenue.
State ownership
State-owned enterprises (SOE) might have performed better than other firms during the 
crisis, because that they are probably more likely to be bailed out by the government. 
Underlying this argument is the fundamental difference of the objective function between 
private and public firms. While the objective for the former is to maximize profit, the latter’s 
is to maximize multiple variables, many of which involve social objectives (Laffont and 
Tirole 1993). In many cases, the most important objective is related to employment.
The capacity of the Indonesian government to support SOEs, however, was very limited 
during the crisis. As in the other crisis-affected countries, government revenue fell 
substantially during this time, while fiscal deficit rose.
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Given this fiscal constraint, there is a chance that SOEs may have responded successfully to 
the crisis. This prediction is based on the managerial discretion hypothesis of agency theory 
(Grossman and Hart 1982). The increase in financial pressure and bankruptcy risk due to a 
weakened government’s support can lead to a reduction in organisational slack caused by the 
agency problem between the SOE’s managers and the owner (i.e. government). As a result, 
this can lead to actions by the managers aimed at improving efficiency, and hence 
performance. Recent studies of developing countries have confirmed this kind of behaviour 
empirically. Bertero and Rondi (2000, 2002) found that the tightened government support for 
Italian public firms from the late 1980s forced these firms to respond positively, by 
increasing productivity and investment, and reducing employment.
4.2.3 Firms’ strategic responses and the impact of greater competition
Apart from the two approaches discussed above, there are two other alternative views which 
might be useful for explaining firms’ responses to the crisis. We discuss these in turn.
Firms’ strategic responses
The crisis was characterised by a massive decline in consumer demand, implying that firms 
faced greater product market competition during the crisis. In such an environment, strategic 
responses by firms might have been crucial in determining the success of firms in coping 
with the crisis.
According to Porter (1980), there are three generic strategies firms can adopt in an 
environment with high competition. These are cost leadership, product differentiation and 
focusing on a niche market. Cost leadership refers to a set of policies aimed at reducing costs, 
including tight cost and overhead control, construction of efficient-scale facilities and cost 
minimisation in areas such as marketing and advertising. This strategy emphasises a large 
role for managerial attention to help firms undertake these policies. In contrast, product 
differentiation refers to a strategy which creates a unique product for the firms. This strategy 
emphasises action to segment the markets or to customise the products. Finally, focusing on a 
niche market is a strategy to focus on a group of customers or some particular markets. This 
strategy can be likened to product differentiation as it may involve some customisation of 
products.
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To the author’s knowledge, there is no empirical study in the context of the Asian crisis 
which examined firm responses within Porter’s framework. Nevertheless, the study by 
Geroski and Gregg (1997) in the context of the 1990s UK recession provides few insights 
into the implementation of these strategies. Based on a firm-level survey of about 2500 firms 
in the country - and the question of how they responded to the recession - they found that 
firms adopted several strategies simultaneously in responding to the recession. These 
strategies can be broadly grouped as financial decisions (such as debt rescheduling and assets 
disposal), strategic decisions (such as a change in marketing strategies and focusing on core 
business) and cost control (such as reducing employment and closing down plants). In 
addition, Geroski and Gregg found that firms mostly concentrated on strategies for 
controlling costs, particularly those companies which were severely affected by the recession.
Another important aspect regarding the firms’ strategic response is the adjustment in their 
labour demand. The basic hypothesis is that firms tend to hoard labour in the event of 
negative shocks. Labour hoarding here is defined in a specific way following Oi (1962), 
which argues that labour can be considered as a quasi-fixed factor of production arising from 
training activities that create firm-specific human capital in their employees. When there is a 
decline in their output demand, firms retain some of their employees to preserve the human 
capital.
Whether or not firms hoard labour, however, depends on the adjustment in the labour market. 
In particular, it requires real wages to be flexible. For Asian countries, this is likely to be the 
case, as labour markets in these countries generally adjust quickly to changes in economic 
conditions (Manning 1998). As shown by their experience during the stages of developments, 
wages were closely tied to productivity and adjusted in response to fluctuation in demand 
(Fields 1994).
The extent of labour hoarding is also likely to vary between firms. As noted, this is because 
the underlying source of labour hoarding is the firms’ investment in their employees. Thus, 
firms with a high degree of mechanisation, or in capital-intensive industries which require 
skilled labour, are more likely to hoard labour.
The impact of greater competition
The success of firms in responding to the crisis may have depended on the level of 
competition in product markets. The industrial organisation literature outlines two rationales
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for this. The first is that a low level of competition is often associated with high managerial 
slack introduced by high monopoly rent. Theoretical models, such as those of Hart (1983) 
and Leibenstein (1975), posit that the increase in the number of players in a market decreases 
the potential for managers to deviate from firms’ profit-maximising objectives. Schmidt’s 
(1997) theoretical model posits that high managerial slack arising from low levels of 
competition lowers the firms’ efficiency and thereby raises the probability of bankruptcy.
The other rationale is derived from theories on the relationship between collusive behaviour 
and business cycles. Two competing hypotheses are offered by these theories. First, low 
demand, or a demand shock, alters the optimal behaviour of oligopolies from collusive 
behaviour to more perfectly-competitive outcomes. In the Green and Porter (1984) model, 
collusive behaviour reverts to the Cournot outcome if price falls below the agreed “trigger 
price” level, leaving the optimal collusive outcome unsustainable. Slade (1989) provides a 
model that, in the presence of demand shock, price-cutting action is triggered and leads the 
equilibrium towards the Bertrand outcome, which is identical to the competitive market 
outcome. The second hypothesis, in contrast, predicts that the likelihood of collusion 
breaking down is small when demand is low. This hypothesis is put forward by theoretical 
models such as those of Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1992). The firm that lowers its price relative to another is not likely to capture a large 
portion of the market since the market price has already been lowered. Meanwhile, 
punishment from the deviation could be large if the demand resumes to its normal state. The 
benefit from deviating may be exceeded by its costs.
4.3 Review of empirical studies
As noted, empirical studies examining the response of firms to the crisis are scarce and, 
moreover, they are sporadic in terms of the issues and countries covered. Perhaps this is 
because such studies require detailed information at firm level, which is sometimes difficult 
to obtain. Despite this scarcity, there are few studies available in the literature. Examples 
include Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000), Forbes (2002a, 2002b), Claessens et al. (2000) and Desai 
et al. (2004).7 This section reviews these studies to gain some insights into several related 
issues. To organise the discussion, the review is divided into four sub-sections based on the 
major issues to be extracted from the studies.
7 Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000) reported the findings from the World Bank’s firm level survey of some 3700 firms 
in five crisis-affected countries which covers the peak of the crisis period (from early 1998 to early 1999). 
Despite its limitations, this study is the most comprehensive empirical study on this subject.
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4.3.1 The nature of the previous empirical studies
Previous empirical studies on the subject usually use samples which only include firms or 
plants that survived the crisis. Methodologically, this assumes that there were no systematic 
forces governing the disappearance of some firms or plants during and after the crisis. This 
assumption, however, is not very realistic. As indicated by some studies, there were many 
firms that experienced severe financial difficulties during the crisis, which may have led to 
bankruptcy. Moreover, with such a deep economic contraction, many firms faced cash-flow 
problems. Thus, focusing only on those that survived the crisis may potentially lead to what 
is commonly known as ‘survival’ bias. Indeed, Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000, p.3) noted that the 
World Bank’s study suffered from this bias.
Another important aspect of these studies is that to date there has been no study which 
focuses on the response of firm entry during the crisis. This subject is important because 
many factors governing entry might have changed during and after the tummoil. Highlighting 
this, the World Bank firm-level survey revealed that about five per cent of exporters in 
Indonesian manufacturing were new entrants during the crisis (Bappenas 2000).
For Indonesia, it is worth noting that most of the other studies concentrate on an aggregate 
picture of the responses. Examples include Thee (2000), Fukuchi (2000) and Azis (2000) 
which appeared in the December 2000 issue of The Developing Economies dedicated to the 
impact of the crisis on Indonesian manufacturing. Thee shows how deep the crisis affected 
the sector in terms of several major indicators, such as output, employment, capacity 
utilisation and number of firms. In addition, he also shows that the crisis affected industries 
unevenly.
4.3.2 Determinants of the firms’ responses to the crisis
Several studies suggest the importance of aggregate shocks in shaping the firms’ responses. 
The World Bank’s firm-level survey, reported in Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000), asks 
respondents a qualitative question to rank the perceived causes in the decline of their 
performance during the crisis. The responses are reproduced in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1. 
They indicate that, in order of decreasing importance, declining domestic demand, high 
imported input costs caused by exchange rate depreciation, costly loans stemming from high
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interest rates and labour costs are the major perceived causes of the decline in the 
respondents’ performance during the peak of the crisis. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
decline in availability of credit, which partly reflects the alleged credit-crunch, was not 
considered a major cause of firms’ weak performance in the period.
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Figure 4.1 Source of output decline of firms in the crisis affected countries
Collapse o f Exc. rate Costly loans High labor Heavy debt Working Foreign Supply o f  
domestic depreciation costs burden capital demand credit
demand
Source: Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000)
Note: The crisis affected countries are Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia
Table 4.1 Rank for the source of output decline during the crisis in the crisis affected 
countries
Table 4.1 continued
Country The source o f decline
Collapse o f 
domestic demand
Exchange rate 
depreciation
Costly loans High labor costs
Indonesia 3.5 3.6 3.1 2.6
Korea 4.3 2.9 3.1 2.0
Malaysia 4.0 3.6 2.8 2.5
Philippines 3.2 3.9 3.4 3.3
Thailand 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.4
Table 4.1 concluded
Country The source o f decline
Heavy debt 
burden
Working capital Foreign demand Supply o f credit
Indonesia - 2.1 1.8 1.8
Korea 2.3 2.6 2.8 2.1
Malaysia 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.1
Philippines - 2.7 2.4 2.3
Thailand 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.4
Source: Adapted from Table 1.3 in Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000). 
Note: 1= not important, 5=important
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The low response to the issue of credit availability questions the validity of the credit- crunch 
argument as one of the sources for firms’ weak performance during the crisis. One possible 
explanation for the hypothesis was that the result reflected the reduction in demand for credit, 
instead of reduction in the supply of credit. Gosh and Gosh (1999) attempted to shed some 
light on this issue. Estimating the supply of, and demand for, credit in Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand from 1992 to 1998, they concluded that, while the supply of credit to the real sector 
declined, the estimated demand for credit fell even more sharply (Gosh and Gosh 1999, 
p.19). They demonstrated that, for Indonesia and Korea, the estimated supply of credit 
declined at the beginning of the crisis (i.e. during the last few months of 1997) but the 
estimated demand for credit contracted substantially at its peak (i.e. 1998). Ding et al. (1998) 
reach a similar conclusion to that of Gosh and Gosh, drawing on some aggregate banking 
financial indicators. Their results provide no indication of whether there was a decline in 
demand for credit. Nevertheless, these studies did not provide a clear indication about 
whether there was credit rationing. As explained, credit rationing is another important 
element of credit crunch, apart from curtailment in credit supply. Nevertheless, both studies 
argue that credit rationing was likely during the crisis and affected small and medium firms 
more adversely than large ones.
Forbes (2002a) examines the impact of exchange rate depreciation on firms in some ‘crisis’ 
countries, as well as on firms in the rest of the world, for the major devaluation events 
between 1997 and 2000. She found that, immediately after the devaluation, firms in the crisis 
countries recorded superior performance over those in the rest of the world, in terms of 
growth and profitability. She also found that the impact of the devaluation depended on the 
capital-to-labour ratio and changes in costs of capital, although the capital-costs change 
occurred within the context of the long-run impact of the devaluation.
As reviewed above, although considering the aggregate shocks is helpful in explaining the 
general pattern of firm responses, it ignores the significant differences across industries and 
companies. As indicated by some researchers (e.g. Claessens et al. 2000; Forbes 2002b), such 
differences might be more important than the effect of exogenous shocks for explaining firm 
responses. Taking this view on board, some other studies have focused on the idea that 
differences in characteristics may have mattered in explaining the responses.
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The World Bank’s study (i.e. Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000) indicates that heterogeneity did 
matter. This is shown in Table 4.2, which tabulates the number of firms in the sample that 
expanded in 1998, relative to their position in 1997. As shown in the table, the number of 
expanding firms differed significantly between groups of firms distinguished by three 
characteristics, namely size, sales orientation and foreign ownership. The pattern of these 
differences was robust as they persisted across the countries. Apart from demonstrating the 
importance of the characteristics of firms, Table 4.2 also suggests the importance of some 
industry characteristics. The number of expanding firms evidently varies considerably across 
industrial sectors. The pattern also varies considerably across countries, perhaps reflecting 
differences in industrial structure.
Table 4.2 Characteristics of the firms that expanded in 1998 relative to the end of 
1997
Table 4.2 continued
Percentage o f firms that expanded
By size By sales orientation Foreign ownership
Small Large Non-exporters Exporters Non-foreign
firms
Foreign
firms
Indonesia 43.1 56.9 40.1 59.6 79.4 20.6
Korea 70.1 29.1 21.9 78.1 81.9 18.1
Malaysia 65.1 34.9 39.3 60.7 68.5 31.5
Philippines 43.9 56.3 33.8 66.2 59.8 40.2
Thailand 56.0 44.0 25.9 74.1 67.0 33.0
Total 57.9 42.1 30.8 59.2 71.2 28.8
Table 4.2 concluded
Percentage o f firms that expanded The expanded firms
Industry
Number o f  
firms
Percent o f the 
total sample
Food Textiles and 
Garment
Electrical
machinery
Chemical Auto
Indonesia 47.6 7.9 17.5 26.9 - 51.0 6.3
Korea - 31.4 25.0 32.4 1.0 103.0 12.0
Malaysia 31.5 19.1 20.2 27.0 2.3 86.0 10.6
Philippines 25.6 40.2 19.5 14.1 - 71.0 12.6
Thailand 12.1 66.4 12.9 - 8.6 100.0 15.2
Total 20.4 36.3 21.3 19.1 2.9 411.0 56.7
Source: Adapted from Table 1.3 in Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000).
Note: The expansion or contraction is measured based on the change in capacity utilisation
Building on the framework from her earlier study (i.e. Forbes 2002a) and using a larger 
dataset, Forbes (2002b) examined which characteristics of firms determined the impact of an 
exchange rate depreciation on their performance. She found that the most important 
characteristic was sales orientation. Firms with greater sales orientation had significantly 
better performance after the exchange rate depreciations. The result is robust in respect to
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alternative measures of performance. She also found that firms with higher debt ratios and 
larger size tended to have weak performance after the depreciation, although the significance 
and consistency of these results varied across the alternative performance measures and 
model specification.
Claessens et al. (2000) underline firms’ financial structure as an important determinant of 
their performance during the crisis. After estimating the regression equations relating to 
firms’ profit-margins in 1998 to various variables representing aggregate shocks, financial 
and non-financial characteristics of firms in 1996 for a sample in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, they found that firms with high leverage and higher proportion of 
short-term debt tended to perform weakly compared to those without these characteristics. 
They attributed this finding to the weak and vulnerable financial structure of firms in Asian 
countries before the crisis.
In contrast to Forbes (2002b), Claessens et al. found that larger firms tended to have been 
better able to weather the crisis than smaller ones. The coefficients of variables representing 
size were positive across the specifications. The coefficients, however, showed only a low 
degree of confidence, since they were not statistically significant.
Several studies demonstrated that foreign-owned firms responded better than domestic firms 
during the crisis. But more importantly, these studies indicated that the superior performance 
of the foreign firms can be attributed to their ability to seek financial support from their 
international-linked sources. Desai et al. (2004), in examining the performance of US 
multinationals relative to that of local firms in countries which experienced large exchange 
rate depreciations in 1990s, demonstrated that the leverage of local firms increased 
significantly in the first two years after the depreciations, while the leverage of the 
multinationals did not. Using a similar approach but focusing on the investment response of 
exporters in Indonesian manufacturing, Blalock and Gertler (1995) showed that while all 
exporters increased their value added and employment after the crisis, only those with foreign 
ownership increased investment, implying that these firms were not financially constrained.
A similar conclusion is reached by Fukao (2001) and Urata (2002). They found Japanese 
parent companies supported their “suffering” affiliates in the crisis affected countries. That 
support was not only limited to financial assistance. Parent companies continued to transfer 
firm-specific assets and investing in their affiliates over this period. More importantly, they
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also helped domestically-oriented affiliates (pre-crisis) to redirect their sales to foreign 
markets.
In addition to showing the importance of foreign ownership, Blalock and Gertler (2005) 
found significant differences in the value added and employment responses between 
exporters and non-exporters. In particular, they found that domestic exporters in Indonesian 
manufacturing increased value added and employment by 20 and 12 per cent, respectively, 
relative to those who did not export. A similar pattern was also evident in Thailand. Dollar 
and Driemeier (1998) found that foreign firms in Thailand which survived the crisis had a 
higher export to sales ratio than independent local firms.
4.3.3 Adjustment in labour employment
The World Bank study (i.e. Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000) indicates that some firms were 
hoarding labour during the crisis. First, for firms in Indonesia and Thailand, a significant 
number of them were found to have maintained their employment level despite the decline in 
their capacity utilisation. Second, job destruction was concentrated in production rather than 
in managerial jobs. The destruction in production jobs accounted for about 75 per cent of the 
total job destruction, and was most severe in Thailand and Malaysia.
The study also found that young workers, who can be considered as those with very low 
firm-specific human capital, were severely affected by the crisis. For Indonesia, Thailand and 
Malaysia, about 70 per cent of those who left firms were workers in the age group of 20-30.
As noted, labour hoarding will be optimal if, among other factors, real wages decline. Given 
the very limited studies on this issue, Manning (2000) shows real wages in Indonesia indeed 
declined dramatically during the crisis and more than the other crisis affected countries. That 
is, they fell by about 35 per cent in 1998 for the whole economy and nearly 40 per cent in 
manufacturing.
4.3.4 Export supply response to the crisis
As discussed, exchange rate depreciation is expected to improve export performance of the 
countries affected by the crisis. However, several studies (e.g. World Bank 2000; Duttagupta 
and Spilimbergo 2004) have demonstrated that the evidence conflicted with this prediction.
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As shown in Table 4.3, export growth in terms of the value of all crisis-affected countries 
contracted adversely in 1998, ranging from 4 per cent in Indonesia to nearly 16 per cent in 
the Philippines. This sluggish export supply response played a role in prolonging the crisis in 
these countries, and more importantly, is puzzling from an analytical point of view 
(Duttagupta and Spilimbergo 2004).
Several possible explanations for the sluggish export response have been popularised in the 
Asian crisis literature. The most common is the decline in demand for exports during the few 
years before the crisis. Reflecting this, Table 4.3 shows the substantial decline in export 
growth in 1996 and 1997 across all countries affected by the crisis. Decomposing the source 
of export growth in the period 1995-96, the ADB (2002) revealed that 86 per cent of decline 
can be attributed to a weakening export demand. Several factors underlie the weakened 
demand. First, these countries specialised in trading among themselves. According to World 
Bank (2000), intra-regional exports accounted for about 40 per cent of East Asia’s total 
exports. Therefore, when a region-wide export shock hits, as occurred in 1995 and 1996, 
these countries are likely to experience some decline in their exports because they are not 
able to diversify their exports to other markets. In addition to the high trade intensity within 
the region, many product sectors in which these countries specialised, such as textiles, 
garments and footwear, experienced a slump in 1995 and 1996 (World Bank 2000; ADB 
2002). Finally, the depreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar contributed to 
lower price-competitiveness of these countries’ exports, since their currencies were 
effectively pegged to the US dollar. The effect of weakened export demand was mostly 
manifested through the decline in prices, instead of volume. According to the ADB (2002), 
about two-thirds of the decline in export value (in US dollars) was due to a decline in export 
prices (also in US dollar terms).
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Table 4.3 Trends in export of East Asian countries, 1991-98
a. By export value
Country
Growth (%)
1991-95 1996-98 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia 12.3 2.9 14.3 10.4 2.4 -4.1
Malaysia 20.7 0.6 25.8 9.6 1.6 -9.3
Thailand 19.3 -1.9 25.3 1.5 1.6 -8.9
Philippines 17.4 3.0 24.3 15.5 9.1 -15.7
Korea 15.2 2.2 31.6 4.0 7.5 -5.0
World 8.2 2.3 18.6 5.0 3.9 -1.9
b. By export volume
Country
Growth (%)
1991-95 1996-98 1995 1996 1997 1998
Indonesia 11.1 6.2 7.9 8.2 7.8 2.5
Malaysia 15.5 6.7 17.6 7.2 10.8 2
Thailand 14.3 2.9 15.5 -1.8 6.6 3.9
Philippines 9.5 12.6 12 8.6 20.9 8.3
Korea 14.9 16.6 24 13 23.6 13.3
World 6.7 6.9 8.9 6.1 10.3 4.3
Source: Adapted from Table 3.1 in World Bank (2000)
The other explanations for the sluggish export response during the crisis include the 
contraction in credit to private sectors (credit crunch hypothesis) and, as noted in Section 
4.2.1, the impact of competitive depreciation. That is, the export decline in a country which 
experienced sharp exchange rate depreciation during the crisis might have been due to 
currency depreciation by its competitors. Duttagupta and Spilimbergo (2004) tested these 
explanations by estimating the short- and long-run export demand and supply equations of 
several Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong). 
Their results provide only weak support for the credit-crunch hypothesis, primarily because 
there was mixed evidence about the relationship between the domestic credit variable and 
export supply price. In addition to this, they found a relatively quick adjustment in export 
supply, ranging between 1.5 and 2 years. As one would expect, the adjustment would have 
been longer than what was found if the credit-crunch hypothesis was true.
Duttagupta and Spilimbergo’s findings on the credit-crunch hypothesis, as they also noted, 
are consistent with findings in other studies (Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Gosh and Gosh 1999; 
Krueger and Tornell 1999). Drawing on the Mexican currency and banking crisis in 1994, 
Krueger and Tornell showed that firms in tradable sectors were not significantly affected by 
of credit crunch. They attributed the success of exporting firms in the tradable sector to the
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fact that, since the early 1990s, most of these firms had been able to obtain trade financing 
from the international capital market.
Duttagupta and Spilimbergo provide some evidence supporting the competitive devaluation 
explanation. From the supply side, they found that nominal depreciation resulted in lower 
export prices, suggesting that exchange rate depreciation should increase the export demand 
in a country. However, from the demand side they found that the export demand elasticity 
with respect to competitors’ price was positive and large. Thus, export demand in a country 
would be reduced substantially if the country’s export competitors also reduced their export 
price.
In the case of Indonesia, there were additional factors contributing to the sluggish export 
response. First, the social and political instability in 1998 caused international buyers to 
cancel export orders and shift to other countries. Rosner (2000) provides some support for 
this. He shows that exports of manufactured goods declined sharply during the second half of 
1998 and, more importantly, his interviews with several textile, garment and footwear 
manufacturers confirmed that many companies suffered severe cutbacks in orders after the 
1998 riots. The second factor causing the poor export performance was the rejection of 
Indonesian letters of credit from the beginning of 1998, which severely affected imports of 
some crucial products (Johnson 1998). The fall in imports would have been expected to 
affect the export performance of manufacturers who use a great deal of imported intermediate 
inputs or raw materials in their production. Finally, the poor export performance was also 
caused by the shortage of containers (Johnson 1998), since the collapse of imports greatly 
reduced the number of containers entering the country.
4.4 Summary
The literature provides several analytical approaches to examining the responses of firms to 
the crisis. The first, which comes from the crisis literature, argues that the responses were 
largely determined by the aggregate shocks experienced by the crisis-affected countries. Two 
aggregate shocks have received large attention in the Asian crisis literature: shocks to the 
financial sector and the sharp exchange rate depreciation. Although the importance of these 
aggregate shocks in shaping firms’ responses is evident in several empirical studies, the 
discussion points to the uneven impact of these shocks on firms, depending on characteristics 
of companies and industries.
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The second approach argues that the diversity of firm responses can be explained by the 
heterogeneity at their characteristics. This perspective agrees with the more general approach 
for analysing the heterogeneity of firm performances (Geroski 1998) and the resource-based 
theory of firms. Our chapter discussion highlights several characteristics which might have 
been important in shaping firms’ diverse responses to the crisis, namely size, age, ownership, 
sales orientation, financial structure and production characteristics.
The other two approaches, derived from the industrial organisation literature, emphasise the 
importance of firms’ strategic responses and the impact of greater competition in product 
market competition. The former suggests that the success of firms in weathering the crisis 
might have depended on their strategic responses. According to Porter (1980), these can be 
categorised into three broad groups of strategies: cost leadership, product differentiation and 
focusing on a niche market. The other approach argues that the success of firms may have 
been determined by the level of competition in the product market. The reasoning is that 
extent of the competition may change the behaviour of firms’ managers and the equilibrium 
of collusive behaviour in the market.
A few researchers argue that, while helpful in explaining the patterns of firms’ exports, only 
considering the aggregate shocks ignores significant differences across firms and industries. 
Several studies which explore this approach found that heterogeneity in the characteristics of 
firms had implication for the diversity firms’ responses during the crisis. Most of these 
studies, however, tend to suffer from survival bias because they only include firms or plants 
that survived the crisis. The empirical work also shows that export recovery did not 
immediately take place. Several explanations were popularised in the literature. They include 
the combination of cyclical factors and structural characteristics of exports in the crisis- 
affected countries, curtailment of credit to the private sector and competitive depreciation.
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Chapter 5
Data
5.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the data used for the empirical analyses. Section 5.2 describes and 
discusses the data base and Section 5.3 provides more detail on data cleaning and 
adjustments.
5.2 The data base
The data base for the empirical analysis is constructed from the following sources:
• The annual manufacturing surveys of medium- and large-scale establishments (Statistik 
Industry, or SI) from 1993 to 2000. The establishments are defined as those with 20 or 
more employees and the time period aims to capture the pre-crisis and crisis period. The 
surveys are undertaken by the Indonesian Central Board of Statistics (Badan Pusat 
Statistik or BPS).1
• The estimates of average tariff rates are taken from the Trade Policy Review (TPR) 1994, 
1998 and 2003 published by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (WTO 1995, 1998, 
2003).
• The estimates of effective rate of protection are derived from Fane and Condon (1996).
• The data on imports are derived from UN Comtrade (United Nation Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database), provided by the 1EDB (International Economic Data Bank) 
maintained by The Australian National University.
1 BPS provided the author with the raw data of these surveys in electronic form.
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In addition, other information is used for adjusting the data base and constructing the 
variables, with the following detail:
• Concordance Tables between ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification) 
Revision 2 and 3, provided by BPS (BPS 2000).
• Concordance Table between ISIC Revision 2 and SITC (Standard Industrial Trade 
Classification) Revision 3 to transform import data, provided by IEDB.
• Concordance Table between ISIC Revision 2 and 1-0 (Input-Output) Table, provided by 
BPS.
• Wholesale Price Index (WPI) data at two- and three-digit industry level, provided by BPS 
and Garrick Blalock (Cornell University).
As noted in many studies, SI data are considered one of the best by the standard of 
developing countries. The data cover a wide range of information on the establishments, 
including some basic information (ISIC classification, year of starting production, location), 
ownership (share of foreign, domestic and government), production (gross output, stocks, 
capacity utilisation, share of output exported), material costs and various type of expenses, 
labour (head-count and salary and wages), capital stock and investment, and sources of 
investment funds.
However, the data have several limitations. First, they do not include information which can 
identify whether an establishment is a single-unit or a part of a multi-plant firm. As a result, 
establishments owned by an enterprise can not be linked up, and hence the number of 
enterprises is over-numerated: some plants may have been counted as firms whereas in 
practice they are not. Unfortunately, the extent of the over-numeration is unknown. 
Nevertheless, there are two reasons which suggest it might not have been large. First, a 
separate BPS publication that lists the surveyed firms reveals that the number of multi-plant 
firms is not large, i.e. about 500 to 1,000 firms out of more than 15,000 firms surveyed each 
year by BPS in the early 2000s. Second, each plant might be run as an independent business, 
as plants owned by a multi-plant firm are not necessarily interconnected. However, this is 
likely to occur if each of the plants produces different goods.
2 This information was provided by Dr. Sadayuki Takii.
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The other limitation is that the surveys produce only annual data. In this study, the ideal is to 
have high-frequency data -  either monthly or quarterly -  because, especially during a crisis, 
firms’ adjustment is likely to occur within a one-year period.
Finally, a few variables relevant to this study are not available. The surveys do not include 
the number of working hours, which is important for calculating a better labour productivity 
measure. They also do not include detailed accounting and financial information that fully 
reveals plants’ financial leverage. Another unavailable variable is that which identifies 
whether or not plants are owned by business groups (conglomerates). Being part of a 
business group might be important in shaping the firm’s response to the crisis because the 
group might support financially-distressed firms, owing to its business operation in diverse 
markets. Also, the surveys do not provide information on the skill content of employees. 
Finally, the surveys do not include the reasons for plants entering and exiting the industry. 
This information is important because there are substantial differences in the various modes 
of entry and exit.3
It is important to make a clarification here related to the unit of observation. That is, 
throughout this thesis, the terms o f ‘firm’, ‘company’ and ‘plant’ are used interchangeably. In 
principle, the unit of observation of interest is firm (company), but, because of the data 
limitations, plant is used as the unit of observation. In other words, a single plant is 
considered as a firm. While this assumption clearly has a limitation -  as it does not 
acknowledge the existence the multi-plant firms -  it is still reasonable to accept the 
assumption, for the two reasons outlined above.
A plant-level unbalanced panel is constructed from 1993 to 2000. The panel is constructed by 
matching the plants according to the plant-code variable ( PSID). While there is a possibility 
of mistakes in data-entry for each survey year, data examination suggests the extent of 
mistakes is low. Moreover it shows that the entry for PSID is highly consistent, at least for 
the period covered in this study.
The panel has been cleaned and adjusted for some possible mistakes in data entry, for 
changes in ISIC, and for variable definitions. The cleaned panel contains about 11,000 to 
13,600 plants over the period 1993-2000. The exact number of plants between the cleaned 
and original panel, along with the percentage difference between the two, are given in Table
3 See the discussion about the measurement of entry and exit rates in Chapter 6.
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5.1. The plants in the cleaned panel cover 71 and 60 per cent of manufacturing value added 
and employment respectively (see column five and six of Table 5.1). A more detailed 
description on the data cleaning and adjustment process is presented in the next section.
Table 5.1 The cleaned and uncleaned panel data: some statistics
Y ear N u m b er o f  p lan ts D iffe ren ce C ov erag e  o f  the c lean ed  pane l (% )
T h e  c leaned T he u n c lean ed be tw een  the u n c lean ed V alu e  added E m p lo y m en t
panel pane l and  c leaned  pane l (% )
1993 10984 18,163 -39.5 68 61
1994 10893 19,016 -42.7 70 60
1995 11578 21,551 -46.3 69 57
1996 12152 22 ,997 -47.2 72 58
1997 11908 22 ,386 -46.8 86 60
1998 11551 21 ,423 -46.1 69 60
1999 13343 22 ,0 7 0 -39.5 67 62
2000 13621 22 ,174 -38 .6 70 63
A v erag e 12,004 21 ,223 -43.3 71 60
Source: Author's computation.
The four-digit industry covered in the cleaned panel is smaller than those covered in the 
original SI data, which are 109 industries based on ISIC Revision 2. The main reason is the 
unavailability of ERP estimates, average tariff rates and import data for all 109 industries. 
The ERP estimates are available for 87 industries, of which 81 can be exactly matched with 
the ISIC SI data. Import data are taken from trade statistics (UN Comtrade) and in integrating 
them into the panel, some concordance difficulties are encountered between SITC -  the 
industry classification used in the trade statistics -  and ISIC. As for average tariff rates, the 
WTO provides them only for 72 industries.
Oil and gas refining sectors (ISIC 353 and 354) are excluded. They were only included in the 
survey in the 1990s and, by comparing their aggregate figures between SI and other data 
sources (i.e. National Income Statistics published by BPS), it is clear that the data are still 
weak.
5.3 Data cleaning and adjustment
This section provides more details on the cleaning and adjustment in the data set. Several 
studies (e.g. Ramstetter and Takii 2000; Blalock and Gertler 2004) indicate there are 
substantial errors at plant-level in the SI data. Like other micro-level studies, the approach 
taken by this study is rather ad hoc. Nevertheless, some basic steps and rules are applied in
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the cleaning and adjustment process. This process can be grouped into three broad steps, all 
of which are described in more detail below.4
5.3.1 Adjustment in ISIC codes
Within the period covered in the panel data, BPS changed the ISIC code from Revision 2 to 
Revision 3 starting from 1998.5 Therefore the codes need to be harmonised. Because this 
study decided to base its analysis on ISIC codes Revision 2, some adjustments in the codes 
for the period 1998-2000 are necessary.
In practice, the adjustments should be straightforward, provided that the concordance table 
between the two codes is available. Indeed, BPS publishes this concordance table (BPS 
2000). However, there are some complications. The main reason is that there are some 
Revision 3 codes which do not have one-to-one matches with those of Revision 2. 
Conceptually, this problem might be solved if the weights used for the mapping of the two 
versions of the codes are known. Unfortunately, this information is not available. In addition, 
the change in the codes is so large, which seems to have created some errors or incomplete 
ISIC entries in the SI data. To illustrate, there are about 9 per cent of total observations in the 
1999 and 2000 data which do not have complete five-digit ISIC entries.
Given this information, the ISIC codes in 1999 and 2000 were adjusted according to some 
basic rules. No adjustment was made for the codes in 1998 because BPS still provides the 
two versions of codes for this year’s data.
1. For observations in 1999 or 2000 which are observed in 1998, their ISIC codes were 
replaced with their 1998 codes.
2. For observations that appear only in 1999 or 2000 or both, the following adjustments 
were made:
a. Observations which have incomplete ISIC entries (i.e. those which are reported only 
at one- to four- digit level) were identified. Of these observations, those which have 
the incomplete entries in both 1999 and 2000 up to three-digit level were first 
removed. The observations with incomplete entries in either 1999 or 2000 were 
retained. Following this step, observations which have inconsistent ISIC codes
4 Appendix 6.1 lists and describes the variables from the SI data used in this study.
5 BPS changes the ISIC codes about once every ten years.
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between the two years, at two-digit level, were removed, 
b. Of the retained observations after the previous steps, those which have one-to-one 
matching at the five-digit level between the two code versions were identified and 
adjusted accordingly based on the concordance table. Those which do not have the 
one-to-one matching, were firstly worked on the concordance table of these codes to 
identify the highest digit-level for which the corresponding ISIC Revision 2 is the 
same. Table 5.2 presents the results of this computation. Based on these results, 
observations were removed for which the largest corresponding digit-levels are one or 
two, such as 19209 and 28920 but the rest were retained (see Table 5.2).
Following the above adjustments, we check for consistency of the ISIC codes for every plant 
over the panel period. Plants with inconsistent codes at two-digit level were removed but 
those with inconsistent codes at three- to five-digit level were retained. The deletions were 
motivated by the fact that a plant might produce more than one good in a year but the amount 
of goods it produces might vary significantly across years. The cutting rule of two-digit is 
applied because only at this level can the industry characteristics be considered to be 
substantially different.
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Table 5.2 1S1C Revision 2 and 3: some ambiguous concordance
ISIC
R ev is io n  3
ISIC
R ev ision  2
T he  la rg e s t d ig it- lev e l 
fo r w h ic h  th e  ISIC 
R ev. 2 a re  the  sam e
15131 31131-32 4
15491 3122122 4
15492 31231-32 4
15493 31241-42 4
15494 31243-45 4
15495 31246
31249
4
15496 3 1251-52 4
15497 31261-62 4
15499 31271
31279
4
19113 32331-33
32339
4
19209 3241 9 -2 0
35602
1
2 6 509 36919
36929
3
27202 37203
38194
1
289 1 0 37104
37205
2
2 8 9 2 0 37101-4
37201-5
38191-9
1
28932 38112
38119
4
289 3 9 38192
381 9 9
4
29112 38212
38412
2
2 9 120 38293
38295
38297
4
29141 38292
38297
4
291 4 2 38295
38297
4
2 9 1 5 0 38292
38297
4
29193 3 8 294
38297
4
2 9 199 38295-97 4
Table 5.2 continued
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Table 5.2 concluded
IS IC
R ev is io n  3
ISIC
R ev isio n  2
T h e  la rg est d ig it-lev e l 
fo r w h ich  the  ISIC 
R ev. 2 are  the  sam e
2 9 2 4 0 382 9 2
382 9 7
4
2 9 2 6 2 38291
3 8 2 9 7
4
2 9 2 9 9 3 8 2 4 1 -4 7 4
29301 3 8 1 1 3 -1 4
3 8 1 2 0
3
31101 383 1 2
383 1 7
4
2 9 2 3 0 382 9 2
382 9 7
4
2 9 2 2 4 38315
383 1 7
4
311 0 2 3831 1 
383 1 7
4
31103 38313
383 1 7
4
31201 3 8 314
3 8 317
4
3 1 9 0 0 3 8 3 1 6 -1 7
3 8 3 9 9
3
3 3 1 1 9 38323
3 8 5 1 1 -1 4
2
331 3 0 3851 1-13 4
35115 3 8 2 4 3 -4 4 4
36991 39051
390 5 9
4
369 9 9 390 1 4
3 9 0 9 0
3
Source: BPS, 2000. Tabel Kesesuaian Lapangan Usaha/Kegiatan 
Ekonomi, KB LI 2000 - KLUI1990, BPS: Jakarta
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5.3.2 Consistency of variable definitions in SI data
The consistency of variable definitions over time was checked. While they are generally 
consistent, BPS might have changed some of the definitions. Data examination at the 
computational stage revealed the definitions are relatively consistent, albeit there is a large 
variation in the enumeration of some variables. Despite that, one important variable was 
found to have different definitions. For the period 1993-96, LPMNOU and LPWNOU were 
defined as the number of male- and female-paid production workers, but for the period 1997- 
2000, they were defined as the number of male- and female- unpaid production workers.
5.3.3 Corrections for errors in data entry
This study focuses on growth in real value added and employment, and we sought to detect 
observations which contain errors, due to misreporting or key-punching mistakes. The 
variables refer to VTLVCU and LTLNOU in the SI data (see Appendix 5.1). The choice of 
the variables is based on a well-established perception in the studies using SI data that the 
variables are consistent and contain minimum errors. Following the usual approach in other 
studies (e.g. Hall and Mairesse 1995), observations were removed for which the growth rates 
of real value added were less than minus 90 per cent or greater than 300 per cent, or for 
which the growth rates of employment were less than minus 70 per cent or greater than 200 
per cent. This removed about 11 per cent of observations for every year’s observations in the 
panel.
It is important to note that the approach might have removed the ‘true’ observations, 
particularly when the decision was based on the growth in value added. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of this occurring is low. In principle, this is because the approach also considers 
employment growth. Contraction in the rate of employment was unlikely to have been more 
than that defined in the decision rule, because firms are likely to hoard labour during a 
difficult situation.6 Meanwhile, intuitively it is also difficult to argue that during a deep 
economic contraction firms would have increased employment at a rate exceeding the one 
defined in the decision rule. This argument also applies even if some firms were in fact 
significantly better off (e.g. from higher exports due to the competitiveness effect of the sharp 
exchange rate depreciation). This is because the process of hiring new employees takes a 
considerable length of time, suggesting a sudden jump in a firm’s employment stock would 
have been unlikely.
6 The findings in the next few chapters in fact support this argument.
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Another error concerns missing observations. Having constructed the panel data, 
observations were detected which contain temporary missing observations over time. 
Observations that contain at least two temporary missing observations were removed but 
those with only one temporary missing were retained. The variables’ values of the retained 
observations were replaced with those of the previous year. Single-entry observations, i.e., 
those which appear only once during the panel period, were also removed because they might 
reflect an error in the entry of the PSID (establishment code) variable.
It is worth mentioning here that very few observations were found with missing values in 
value added and output variables ( VTLVCU and OUTPUT) but not in other variables. This 
appears mostly in data for 1996 and 1997. These observations were retained because the 
values of other variables are consistent and do not seem to contain errors. The missing 
variables’ values were replaced by those of the previous year.
This study also considers error correction in the variables used to construct independent 
variables. Ideally, we would examine all of the relevant variables. However, because the 
tedious and time-consuming nature of data cleaning process, examining each of these 
variables is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, this study only considers several 
variables, namely year of starting operation, foreign and government ownership shares, and 
the percentage of output exported. Most of these variables were found to contain some errors 
or inconsistency. It is important to mention that for the year of starting production and the 
ownership variables, the adjustments are focused only on the variables’ value in 1995 and 
1996, although their consistency were examined for the whole period of the panel.
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Year of starting operation
Data-entry error or misreporting in the variable of the year of starting operation ( DYRSTR ) is 
significant. About 14,000 observations (50 per cent of total observations) in the raw panel 
display inconsistency. For these plants, the entries are not the same for some years within the 
panel period. Moreover, some entries clearly show obvious mistakes, such as 0 or 1. Because 
of the large number of inconsistencies, removing the observations is clearly not the first-best 
option and, hence, some adjustments were made on these observations.
To correct this variable, ideally it is necessary to know in which year the observation was 
observed for the first time. However, applying this rule is impossible, for at least three 
reasons. First, the time series covered in this study began in 1993. For observations that are 
always observed during the panel period, it is difficult to determine when they appear for the 
first time. Second, even if a much longer panel data is available, identifying when an 
observation appears for the first time might be misleading. SI data were known to be more 
under-enumerated in the 1970s and 1980s, so that the first appearance is not necessarily the 
birth year of a plant. Finally, reported data on this variable is apparently characterised to have 
some variation between years. According to a BPS official, this is due to lack of knowledge 
on the part of people responsible for responding to the questionnaire.7
Based on this information, the following steps and rules were applied in adjusting DYRSTR :
1. Define DYRSTRit equal to the entry on the variable for which i (a plant) is observed in t
= 1993, ...,2000,
then we computed ADYRSTRi t = DYRSTR, -  DYRSTR.
2. Following (l), observations in the raw data were segregated into three groups:
• Group 1: including those for which all ADYRSTRj over the period 1993-2000 meet the
rule that-2 > ADYRSTRtJ < -2  .
• Group 2: including those for which all ADYRSTR^ver the period 1993-2000 meet the 
rule that -10 > ADYRSTRi f < -2  or 2 > ADYRSTRi t < 10.
• Group 3: including those for which one of ADYRSTR: over the period 1993-2000 
meets the rule that A < - 10 or ^> 10 .
7 Interviews with BPS officials, June, 2003.
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The decision rule for each group is based both on conversation with a BPS official and data 
examination. According to the BPS official, the ‘true’ DYRSTR entries are those which were 
mostly and/or most recently reported. A data examination in the experiment stage suggested 
the acceptable values of ADYRSTRi, which reflect the situation advised by the BPS official,
are bounded between -10 and 10. Clearly, the suggestion is rather subjective. While not ideal, 
this approach is unavoidable, because it is difficult to ascertain whether an ambiguous entry, 
or a series of inconsistent entries, can be classified as an error. The difficulty arises both 
because determining the exact birth of a plant is impossible, for the reasons mentioned 
earlier, and because there are no other variables that can be confidently used to cross-check 
the correctness of the entries.
Despite the weakness in the decision Rile, some adjustments were made, according to some 
rules in the following three steps:
3. Within Group 1, no adjustment was made for the observations with ADYRSTRj t = 0
(since they are the correct entries), while for the other observations, the entries were 
replaced by the last non-missing entry.
4. For Group 2, firstly the entries were tabulated to create a frequency table. After that, 
entries were replaced by the mode of the frequencies. In the case where the mode is 
ambiguous, they were replaced by the most recent and consistent series of entries. This 
rule was applied following the advice from a BPS official mentioned earlier.
5. Finally, all observations in Group 3 were removed, since the likelihood of mistakes is 
high for this group.
Examples of the adjustments based on the above rules are given in Table 5.3.
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Ownership shares
Data examination revealed about 300 entries in the foreign share variable ( DASING) which 
are not consistent over the panel period. Although this inconsistency might reflect a real 
change in ownership, most are likely to be the result of data entry error or misreporting.
About 45 per cent of the total observations were identified as inconsistent. The following 
rules were applied to adjust these observations. Here the rules focus on the entries of 1995 
and 1996 since only these years were considered in the subsequent analyses with respect to 
ownership variables:
• If DASINGl994 > 0, and DASING,995 = 0 and DASINGl996 > 0, DASING,99S was replaced 
by DASING,996 .
• If DASING,994 > 0 and DASING,995 > 0, and DASING,996 = 0 , DASING,996 was replaced 
by DASING]991, provided that DASING,991 > 0. If DASING,991 = 0, DASING,996 is 
replaced by the subsequence entries for which DASINGt >0 for t = 1998, 1999, 2000.
• If DASING,994 > DASING,995 < DASING,996 and DASING,99b = DASING,991, DASING,995 
was replaced by DASING,99b.
• If DASING,995 > DASING,,^ < DASING,991 and DASING,991 = DASING,99S, DASING,996 
was replaced by DASING,991.
• If DASING,995 > 0 and DASING, =0 for t=  1993, 1994, 1996, ..., 2000, the 
observation was removed.
• Similarly, if DASING,99b <0 and DASING, =0 for t = 1993, 1994, 1995, 1997, ...,
2000, the observation was removed.
Table 5.4 provides examples of the adjustment made based on the above rules. Following 
these adjustments, the other ownership shares variables ( DDMSTK, DPUSAT and 
DPEMDA) were adjusted accordingly, with the sum of all ownership variables to equal to 
100.
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Following the above adjustments, the data was examined for consistency with respect to the 
government-ownership shares variables (DPUSAT and DPEMDA). Slightly less 
observations that exhibit inconsistency were found, at about 200 and 150 for DPUSAT and 
DPEMDA, respectively. The entries of these variables were adjusted using the same rules 
applied earlier for DASING.
Percentage of output exported
The raw panel data was examined for data-entry errors in the variable of percentage of output 
exported ( PRPREX). Here, the focus is to identify and adjust entries exceeding 100 per cent. 
Consistency over time is not the focus because plants might change their proportion of output 
exported in every year. In this respect, it was found that the PRPREX entries for the period 
1993-96 are cleaned. As shown in Table 5.5, there are no entries in which PRPREX > 100 
per cent in the raw panel data. However, for the period 1997-2000, the picture is different. 
Some entries exceed 100 per cent, with those in 1998 being the largest.
Table 5.5 Number of plants by status PRPREX entries in uncleaned panel data
S tatu s o f  the en tries Y ear
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
P R P R E X >  100% 0 0 0 0 2 253 16 10
0Vo> PRPREX  < 100% 3,219 3 ,390 3,625 4,357 3 ,059 500 3,012 3,663
Source: Author's computation.
Therefore, the following adjustment rules were applied:
• If PRPREXt >100 for t = 1997, ..., 2000, it was replaced by P R P R E X starting from
1997. It is worth mentioning here that all adjusted entries in 1998 have positive 
PRPREX in 1997. Thus none were replaced by zero.
• A slight modification of the rule is applied for the entries in 1999. That is, if 
PRPREX1999 > 100 and PRPREXj 998 = 0 , P R P R E X was replaced by PRPREX2000 .
Table 5.6 provides examples of the changes on PRPREX entries based on the above rules.
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Appendix 5.1 Variables from SI data used in this study
N o. V a ria b le D esc rip tio n
1 . P S ID E sta b lish m e n t co d e
2. P R O D 5 D 1 ISIC  code , R ev isio n  2
3. D IS IC 5 2 ISIC  code , R ev is io n  3
4. D Y R S T R S ta rtin g  y e a r  o f  co m m erc ia l o p e ra tio n
L o ca tio n  v a riab le s
5. D P R O V I P ro v in ce
6. D K A B U P R eg en cy
C o st an d  in p u t v a riab les
7. R T L V C U T o ta l m a te ria l co s t
8. R D N V C U D o m estic  m a te ria ls
9. R IM V C U Im p o rted  m ate ria ls
10. E F U V C U E n erg y  cost
11. E P L V C U
3E x p e n d itu re  on  e lec tric ity : fro m  P L N
12. E N P V C U E x p e n d itu re  o n  e lec tric ity : fro m  n o n -P L N
13. IIN V C U E x p e n d itu re  on  in te re s t p ay m en t
14. IT 1 V C U T o ta l co s t
15. IIN P U T T o ta l inpu t
O u tp u t v a ria b le s
16. O U T P U T O u tp u t p ro d u ced
17. P R P R E X P ro p o rtio n  o f  ex p o rte d  o u tp u t
18. V T L V C U V a lu e  added
E m p lo y m e n t v a riab les
19. L T L N O U T o ta l n u m b e r o f  em p lo y ees
20. L P R N O U T o ta l n u m b e r o f  p ro d u c tio n  e m p lo y ees
21. L N P N O U T o ta l n u m b e r o f  n o n -p ro d u c tio n  e m p lo y ees
W ag e  a n d  sa la ry  v a riab le s
22. Z P D V C U W ag e  an d  sa la ry  o f  p ro d u c tio n  e m p lo y ees
23. Z N D V C U W ag e  an d  sa la ry  o f  n o n -p ro d u c tio n  em p lo y e e s
In v estm en t v a riab le s
24. F L D O C U S o u rce  o f  fund  fo r in v estm en t: d o m estic  loan
25. F L F O C U S o u rce  o f  fund  fo r in v estm en t: fo re ig n  loan
26. F T T L C U S o u rce  o f  fund  fo r in v estm en t: to ta l
Note: 1. Available only from 1993-98.
2. Available only from 1999-2000.
3. PLN (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) or State-owned Electricity Company
Source: Annual Manufacturing Survey, 1993-2000, BPS.
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Chapter 6
Impact of the Crisis on Indonesian Manufacturing
6.1 Introduction
This chapter paints a picture of the impact of the crisis on Indonesian manufacturing. The 
descriptive analysis presented highlights some basic facts about how the crisis affected the 
industry, and provides a backdrop for the statistical analysis in subsequent chapters.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the conceptual approach in 
measuring the impact of the crisis. Section 6.3 and 6.4 document the basic facts of the crisis 
impact on the manufacturing performance and demographics of plants. Finally, Section 6.5 
summarises the main findings of the chapter.
6.2 Measuring the impact of the crisis
In evaluating how the crisis affected Indonesian manufacturing, this study focuses on two 
aspects: the impact on performance and the impact on plants demographics. The latter is 
considered because focusing only on performance may give an incomplete picture about the 
overall impact of the crisis on the industry. For example, it does not capture the extent to 
which the crisis forced some firms to leave the industry. As noted in Chapter 4, the incidence 
of firm exit during the crisis was likely to be high during the peak of the turmoil.
To organise the discussion, the description of the variables which represent these two aspects 
is postponed until Section 6.3 and 6.4. Before discussing the results, it is important to firstly 
outline the conceptual approach for measuring the impact of the crisis.
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To measure the extent of the crisis’ impact on the industry, this study takes the percentage 
difference of the considered variables between the crisis and pre-crisis periods. Throughout 
this thesis, the crisis period is defined as the period 1997-2000, with subdivisions as noted 
later. This definition is based on the fact that the crisis began on about the fourth quarter of 
1997 and the picture shown in this chapter is that industry began to recover in 1999 and 2000. 
It is important to note, though, that the 1997 data might give an ambiguous picture, as there 
might be a time lag in order for the crisis to show some negative impact. The pre-crisis period 
is defined throughout the thesis as the period 1995-96. This definition, which excludes the 
period 1993-94 covered by the data base, is mostly intended to capture the situation just 
before the crisis. The exclusion is aimed at minimising the variation in some of the variables’ 
values, which can vary substantially even in a very short time period.
Letting y  denote the variables, the measure to estimate the impact of the crisis is defined as
%& y, = y' -x 100 (6.1)
3*9596
where t = 1997, ..., 2000 and y9596 is the average of the variables for 1995 and 1996.
It is important to note the weakness of the method given by the formula in (6.1). In principal, 
it tends to understate the true magnitude of the impact as it only compares the pre-crisis level 
of the variable, but not the level it would have attained had there been no crisis. Obviously, 
an alternative way to measure the impact is to take the difference to an established 
counterfactual, reflecting the situation in the absence of the crisis. In the quasi-natural 
experiment literature, this method is known as the difference-in-difference (DID) method, 
and the counterfactual description is often termed as the control group (Meyer 1995). 
Although the DID method should give a more robust evaluation of the crisis’ impact, 
implementing the method is not possible because the control group does not exist. In this 
study, all plants in the industry were essentially exposed to the crisis, regardless of the fact 
that the degree of exposure might have varied across plants.
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6.3 The impact of the crisis on performance
This section examines the data to draw several facts about how the crisis affected the 
performance of the industry.1 We first discuss the performance variables used in this study.
6.3.1 The performance variables and their measurements
There is a range of measures to represent performance. The choice of the measures is usually 
based on the study’s objective and, often, data availability. Given the information provided 
by SI data, this study considers the following measures: output, employment, labour 
productivity and profitability.
Output
The preferred measure of output is physical output. In practice, however, information on the 
unit of physical output is often unavailable. Even when the information is available, it does 
not reflect the quality of goods that may change over time. For this reason, the measure of 
output is generally obtained by deflating the nominal value of output by an appropriate price 
index. Using a deflated output series, however, has some drawbacks. First, common practice 
usually uses the aggregate price index at the industry level. Therefore, the index does not 
represent the price of goods faced by individual firms, which is likely to vary across firms 
because of differences in costs of production, market structure (perfectly or monopolistic 
competitive) or type of goods (i.e. homogenous or differentiated). Second, even when the 
price index is adjusted for quality, the method for deriving the index by a statistical agency 
may not capture the complete quality change in output, since it is created by observing the 
changes in prices of a representative sample of goods. Thus, overall, the deflated output only 
gives an approximation on the quantity of goods produced.
Bearing these limitations in mind, this study uses deflated output to estimate the quantity of 
output produced. Although the extent of bias from using deflated output is not clear, it seems 
reasonable to presume that the deflated output during the crisis period tends to overstate the 
true output produced. Firms are likely to focus on activities aimed at generating cash flow as 
a means of survival rather than activities aimed at improving the quality of goods. This study 
uses wholesale price indices (WP1) at the two- and three-digit commodity level.
1 To organise the analysis, the description of how the crisis affected Indonesian manufacturing exports is 
presented in Chapter 9.
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This study considers real gross output (ROUT) and real value added (RVA) as proxies for 
output produced, defined as nominal gross output and value added deflated by WPI, 
respectively. Gross output represents the value of sales adjusted for the stock of inventories 
but without adjustment for the use of intermediate goods. Value added subtracts for the value 
of intermediate goods from gross output.
Both proxies are considered because each has its own strength and limitation. Gross output 
may be more realistic than value added in representing the quantity of output produced. For 
example, the output of a garment firm is garment products and not the “value added of 
garment products”. The use of value added as a concept of output, nonetheless, is still 
relevant for two reasons. First, value added avoids the bias that arises from double-counting 
due to flows of goods within and between industries. Value added, therefore, gives more 
reliable output approximation than gross output at a more aggregated level. Second, value 
added might be more relevant to the idea of firm performance when a firm is profit- 
maximising. As broadly defined in Nickell (1995), a successful firm is one that produces a lot 
of output relative to the input it uses, which obviously corresponds to the concept of value 
added.
Employment
Employment is measured by the total number of paid employees (EMPL), which consists of 
production and non-production workers. The head-count measure is chosen because the 
number of hours worked, which is the ideal measure of employment, is not available.
The use of the head-count measure, however, has limitations. The main one is that it hides 
the variations or changes in employees’ average working time, most of which is a result of 
changes in the number of shifts, holding multiple jobs and differences in quality across the 
employees. Therefore, the head-count measure overstates the true level of employment. This 
bias tends to be large for the crisis period, as firms might have hoarded labour because of the 
high costs of firing and re-hiring. The extent of the bias, unfortunately, is difficult to predict. 
On the one hand, it tends to be higher in firms or industries that employ large numbers of 
skilled employees, because of firms large investment in building the human capital of these 
employees. On the other, the financial distress faced by firms in a deep economic crisis might 
leave them with no other choice but to reduce their employees. Earlier it is observed by
2 As noted in Chapter 4, there is evidence from previous studies suggesting that firms in the crisis-affected 
countries hoarded labour during this time.
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Geroski and Gregg (1997) that many firms in the UK reduced employment in response to the 
recession.
Labour productivity
This study employs real value added per labour (RVL) as a proxy for labour productivity. 
Value added is chosen to proxy output, instead of gross output, because it avoids the double­
counting problem and is less sensitive to the substitution between intermediate and labour 
inputs.
There is a weakness in using the proxy, however. This is because, as explained, labour input 
is not perfectly measured. The prediction that firms might hoard labour during a recession 
could overstate the level of labour input, and hence understate labour productivity. Because 
the extent of labour hoarding is difficult to estimate, the extent of bias from using RVL, 
accordingly, is also not clear.
Profitability
The ideal measure of profitability is some measures of rate of return, which indicates the rate 
at which firms are able to generate profits for every unit of assets employed. Empirical 
studies usually employ the accounting-based return measures. The most often used are return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Neither of these measures is used in this study, 
because the data on equity are not available and the data on assets are not reliable.
As an alternatively, we use price-cost margin (PCM) as the proxy for profitability. PCM is 
defined as the ratio of gross profit to sales:
„ _ , ,  output -  inputs -  wagesPCM  =  — --------------------------- ------------------------------- ----—
output
Gross profit is computed as the value of output minus inputs, and wages and salary. Included 
in inputs are raw material, fuel and electricity.
The main criticism of PCM is related to its purpose. In empirical literature, PCM is often 
used as a proxy of the Lemer index, which measures the ability of a firm to elevate price 
above marginal costs. Therefore, PCM is more appropriately used as a proxy to measure the 
extent of competition in product markets. Nevertheless, a positive correlation between PCM
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and the return measures is often found in the empirical literature, justifying PCM as a proxy 
for profitability.3
6.3.2 Descriptive analysis4 
6.3.2.1 Industry-level data
Figure 6.1 displays indices of the performance variables for manufacturing industry from 
1993 to 2000. To avoid the bias from double-counting, only RVA is considered to proxy 
output.
3 Collin and Preston (1969) found a correlation of 0.8, while Liebowitz (1982) found a correlation of about 
0.3 to 0.4.
4 Unless otherwise stated, the source of the tables and figures in this section and Section 6.4 is the author’s 
computation from the SI data.
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Figure 6.1 Trends in the performance indices (1993=100), 1993-2000
a. Real value added (RVA)
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c. Real value added per labour (RVL)
d. Price-cost margin (PCM)
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The prevailing pattem is broadly the same across the variables. That is, after a sharply rising 
trend before the crisis, it declined substantially during 1998 and 1999, and is followed by a 
modest increase in 2000. This is consistent with the picture of the crisis impact on the general
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economy as described in Chapter 3. The figures also suggest that the beginning of recovery in 
2000 is robust, as the level of performance reached that of the pre-crisis level (1995 and 
1996).
The figure shows that the crisis immediately affected performance in 1997 in terms of output, 
employment and labour productivity, but not in terms of profitability. This can be seen more 
clearly in Table 6.1, which shows growth of the above indices. The aggregate growth of PCM 
in fact increases significantly, by 5.5 per cent in 1997, before contracting in 1998. The table 
also shows that the immediate impact on employment has been so large, compared to the 
impact on output and labour productivity. However, employment begins to recover in 1998. 
This finding contradicts other studies, such as Manning (2000), which indicated that the 
major adjustment in the labour market occurred in wage levels rather than employment 
levels, and during 1998. To gain more of an insight into this matter, it is useful to examine 
how the crisis affected the aggregate performance at the more disaggregated industry level.
Table 6.1 Growth in the performance variables (%), 1994-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real value added (RVA) 7.5 16.6 20.4 4.8 -10.4 0.8 11.3
Employment (EMPL) 5.8 9.7 0.8 -1.3 -0.9 2.3 2.9
Real value added per labour (RVL) 0.6 6.3 20.2 5.6 -9.1 -1.8 10.9
Pricc-cost margin (PCM) 1.9 -1.6 1.3 5.5 -11.4 5.9 1.0
Table 6.2 presents the percentage difference of the performance variables computed using the 
formula in 6.1 by broad industry group.5 The table shows the impact of the crisis was felt 
differently across industries. While this observation has been noted in previous studies (e.g. 
Thee 2000; Fukuchi 2000), the table provides more insights into what happened during the 
crisis. First, some industries actually benefited. This is shown by the difference for the period 
1998-2000, based on the differences in output and labour productivity. These industries are 
textile-and-garments, wood and paper products (1SIC 32 -  34) -  all of which recorded higher 
positive percentage differences during the peak compared to the beginning of the crisis. The 
wood and paper products industries seem have benefited most. Its output increased by about 
50 to 60 per cent in 1998, the peak of the crisis. The food and beverage industry improved its 
performance slightly in terms of output but not in terms of the other performance variables.
5 At aggregate industry-level, the formula in 6.1 for industry j  can be written as follows 
% A y ,, = y , J _  y , * ~  x 100
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While some industries benefited, basic metal and machinery industries (ISIC 37 and 38) were 
the hardest hit. Over the period 1998-2000, contraction in the basic metal industry was 
extremely large, about 60 to 70 per cent in output and labour productivity.
The second observation is that adjustment in employment, particularly during the period 
1998-2000, took place both in labour- and capital-intensive industries, and the immediate 
employment contraction in 1997 was caused by the large contraction in the food and 
beverage industry (ISIC 31). Comparing the differences in employment to those in output, 
the output expansion observed earlier in the food-beverage and textile-garment industries 
appeared, to some extent, to be a result of a reduction in employment. This suggests a large 
cost-reduction adjustment of firms in these industries. The comparison also indicates labour 
hoarding appeared to happen mostly in capital-intensive industries. For example, the deep 
contraction in output of the basic metal industry (ISIC 37) is accompanied by a less than 10 
per cent contraction in employment. This observation is consistent with a finding by Fukao 
(2001) which revealed that instead of dismissing them, many Japanese-owned firms sent their 
employees for training during the crisis.
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Table 6.2 Aggregate performance difference by broad industry group (%)
a. Real value added (RVA)
IS IC Industry 1997 1998 1999 2000
31 F o o d  an d  to b a cc o  p ro d u c ts 14.3 16.8 15.4 19.5
32 T ex tile , g a rm e n t and  leathers 8.5 30 .7 18.6 24 .4
33 W o o d  p ro d u c ts , inch F u rn itu re 8.2 58 .0 33 .0 31 .0
34 P ap e r  and  p ap e r  p ro d u c ts 15.7 52 .0 27 .5 40 .0
35 C h em ica l, ru b b e r  and  p lastics 33 .2 16.3 49 .2 64 .2
36 N o n -m eta llic  m inera l p ro d u c ts 29.3 2 .6 -1.3 29.1
37 B asic  m eta l industrie s 22 .6 -74 .7 -69 .9 -63 .9
38 M ach in e ry  an d  eq u ip m en t 4 .7 -3 .9 -3 .6 56.2
39 O th e r  m a n u fac tu rin g 39 .9 86 .6 44 .0 52.8
b. Employment (EMPL)
ISIC In dustry 1997 1998 1999 2000
31 F o o d  an d  to b a cc o  p ro d u c ts -7 .4 -1 .7 -3 .0 0 .0
32 T ex tile , g a rm e n t and  leathers 0.3 -4 .2 0.7 5.5
33 W o o d  p ro d u c ts , inch F u rn itu re 0.3 2 .9 4.5 2.1
34 P ap e r  an d  p a p e r  p ro d u c ts 6.5 14.9 0.5 5.8
35 C h em ica l, ru b b e r  and  p lastic s -0 .8 1.0 2.1 6.8
36 N o n -m eta llic  m inera l p ro d u c ts -0 .6 -12.1 -9 .8 -9.5
37 B asic  m e ta l ind u strie s 4 .9 -7 .6 -8 .6 -6 .7
38 M a ch in e ry  an d  eq u ip m en t 1.9 -8 .2 1.8 5.6
39 O th e r  m an u fa c tu rin g 14.7 16.5 21 .7 20 .0
c. Real value added per labour (RVL)
ISIC Industry 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
31 F ood  an d  to b a cc o  p ro d u c ts 22 .8 18.2 18.3 18.9
32 T ex tile , g a rm e n t an d  lea thers 8.2 36 .5 17.8 18.0
33 W o o d  p ro d u c ts , inch F u rn itu re 7.9 53.5 27 .3 28 .4
34 P ap e r  an d  p ap e r  p ro d u c ts 9 .0 32 .7 27 .2 32.8
35 C h em ica l, ru b b e r  and  p lastic s 34 .4 15.2 46 .3 53.8
36 N o n -m eta llic  m inera l p roduc ts 30.5 17.2 9.8 43.1
37 B asic  m e ta l in d u strie s 17.3 -72 .6 -67 .0 -61 .2
38 M ach in e ry  and  eq u ip m en t 2.9 4 .9 -5 .2 48 .2
39 O th e r  m an u fa c tu rin g 21 .9 60 .0 18.2 27.3
d. Price-cost margin (PCM)
ISIC In dustry 1997 1998 1999 2000
31 F o o d  an d  to b a cc o  p ro d u c ts 3.7 -4 .2 5 .0 -4.4
32 T ex tile , g a rm en t and  lea thers -0 .7 3 .0 4 .0 4.1
33 W o o d  p ro d u c ts , inch F u rn itu re 0.3 -1 .8 1.9 -1 .8
34 P ap e r  an d  p a p e r  p roduc ts 15.9 2.5 9.8 -4.3
35 C h em ica l, ru b b e r  and  p lastics 0.4 -13 .3 3 .0 8.2
36 N o n -m eta llic  m ine ra l p ro d u c ts 5.7 9.1 7.4 10.2
37 B asic  m eta l in d u strie s 17.7 -52 .9 -40 .8 -38.3
38 M a ch in e ry  an d  eq u ip m en t 10.9 2.5 -0 .4 11.4
39 O th e r  m an u fa c tu rin g 3.8 16.6 0 .8 0.5
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Finally, the tables show a declining performance over the period 1998-2000 in wood and 
paper products industries (ISIC 33 and 34). This is in contrast with the tendency towards 
improving performance in other industries. Another key observation is that recovery was 
dramatic in the chemical and machinery industries (ISIC 35 and 38). Outputs of these 
industries were already 50 to 60 per cent above their pre-crisis level in 1999 and 2000.
What do these observations tell us? At least three points stand out. First, industries which are 
export-oriented seem to have benefited from the crisis. This is clearly shown by the positive 
performance of textile-garment and wood industries. As indicated by the table in Appendix 
6.1, pre-crisis export intensity of these industries is higher than others. This point is also 
supported by the declining performance of the wood industry in 2000. As described in 
Chapter 3, the exchange rate appreciated in 2000, which meant that firms in this industry 
were no longer able to gain from the exchange rate depreciation compared to the peak of the 
crisis.
Second, factor intensity seems to have been important in shaping the impact of the crisis. The 
industries which benefited from the crisis are relatively labour- and natural-resource intensive 
industries. Meanwhile, the sectors that were severely affected by the crisis (basic metal and 
machinery) are the capital-intensive industries. The adverse impact on these industries, 
however, might also have been contributed to by their large use of imported inputs. Appendix 
6.1 shows that the share of imported inputs used in total input of these industries is large 
compared to the others. The importance of imported input might explain the slow recovery in 
textile-garments and paper industries, as the share in these sectors is also relatively large.
Finally, the observations suggest that foreign ownership might have influenced the recovery 
trajectory. This is demonstrated by the fact that the two industries which dramatically 
increased output in 2000 (chemical and machinery) are those with high a share of foreign 
ownership (32 and 35 per cent respectively, see Appendix 6.1). According to Thee (2000) 
and Feridhanusetyawan et al. (2000), foreign ownership played a key role by facilitating sales 
redirection to exports in automotive and automotive-component industries (two major sectors 
within the broad machinery group). The percentage of cars exported increased from 1.4 per 
cent in 1997 to 15 per cent in 1998 (Thee 2000, p.432).
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63.2.2 Plant-level data
Examining the data at industry-level, the previous sub-section shows that the crisis unevenly 
affected industries’ performance. What about the picture at plant-level? Is the performance 
impact of the crisis evenly distributed across the plants?
To answer this question, we examine the frequency distribution of the percentage difference 
in performance using the formula in 6.1. For plant z, this formula is
% Ay., = y,J_  x 100
T/,9596
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 present the frequency distribution of the difference for the peak of the 
crisis and the early recovery periods, defined in this chapter as 1998 and the period 1999- 
2000, respectively. For the peak of the crisis, the definition excludes 1997 since it creates an 
ambiguity in the results. As noted, this is most likely because the crisis only began in the last 
quarter of 1997. Figure 6.2 confirms the uneven impact of the crisis was not only felt at 
industry-level, but also at plant-level. It was evident in all performance variables. Moreover, 
the variation is evidently very large. While slightly above 50 per cent of plants in the sample 
recorded a performance contraction, about 10 to 12 per cent recorded an extremely positive 
performance, as the percentage differences with respect to all performance variables (except 
employment) exceed 100 per cent. The variation persists in the early recovery period (Figure 
6.3), indicating that while some plants were recovering, others were still suffering from the 
crisis.
101
Figure 6.2 Frequency distribution of %A,yi t, peak of the crisis (the difference for t
1998)
Real value added (RVA) Real gross output (ROUT) Employment (EMPL)
Real value added per labour (RVL) Price-cost margin (PCM)
Note: Classes of the frequency distribution:
1 = -100<%Ayit<-50
2 = -50<%Ay,t<0
3 = 0<%Ayiit<50
4 = 50<%Ayu<100
5 = % Ay, ,>100
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Figure 6.3 Frequency distribution of %Ayit, early recovery (average of the difference
for t = 1999 and 2000)
Real value added (RVA) Real gross output (ROUT) Employment (EMPL)
Note: Classes of the frequency distribution:
1 = -100<%Ayit<-50
2 = -50<%Ay,,<0
3 = 0<%Ayu<50
4 = 50<%Ayjt<100
5 = %Ayjt>100
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The variation persisted even at the more disaggregated level of industry. At the two-digit 
level (Table 6.3), a significant number of plants experienced performance contraction, even 
in the industries which were earlier shown to be better off during this period (i.e. textile and 
garments, wood and paper). This contraction is observed for all performance variables. 
Similarly, of the industries which were severely affected by the crisis (i.e. basic metal and 
machinery), about 30 to 40 per cent of their plants improved performance. The persistent 
variation can also be observed at the four-digit level, presented in Appendix 6.2.6 The 
appendix shows that, in almost all major industries in Indonesian manufacturing, at least 60 
per cent of plants experienced a contraction in performance during the peak of the crisis. 
Only a few industries (ISIC 31 15, 3321 and 3411) recorded the percentage number of 
contracting plants at below 50 per cent, in respect to some of the performance indicators.
Table 6.3 and Appendix 6.2 indicate that the differences in industry, suggested earlier by 
Table 6.2, might not be the only factor determining the variation. To illustrate, even in the 
wood industry, which performed extremely well during the peak of the crisis, about 40 to 50 
per cent of plants contracted (Table 6.3). Moreover, within the textile and garment, and food 
and beverages industries, substantial variations in the form of the distribution are still 
observed (Appendix 6.2). The empirical investigation into the factors that determine this 
variation is the subject of the next chapter.
6 Appendix 6.2 only gives the major industry at the four-digit level, defined here as an industry where its plants 
are at least 5 per cent of the total plants in manufacturing.
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6.4 The impact of the crisis on firms demographics
The previous section has examined the data to gauge some facts about the crisis impact on 
industry performance. This section extends the analysis to examine the crisis impact on firms 
demographics. As noted in Chapter 4, there are few studies of this subject for Indonesia (e.g. 
Thee 2000).
Figure 6.4 shows the trend in the number of plants in the industry between 1993 and 2000. 
The figure does not suggest that the crisis severely affected firms demographics. Unlike its 
impact on the industry output, the crisis did not seem to affect the number of firms in the 
sector. The number of plants declined by about four per cent in 1998, which is only a modest 
decline compared to about 12 per cent contraction in output.
Figure 6.4 Number of plants in Indonesian manufacturing
□ Total plants
Source: annual manufacturing surveys, BPS.
Although useful, focusing only on Figure 6.4 to assess the crisis impact on firms 
demographics might mask the detail of the impact. Therefore, the examination needs to be 
extended to several other demographic variables. We begin here with the rates of firm entry 
and exit. As commonly adopted in other research, this study defines entry and exit rates in 
terms of the number of plants and employment. Entry and exit rates in terms of number of
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plants are labelled as EN\ and EX 1, while entry and exit rates in terms of employment are 
labelled as EN2 and EX2.
EN\ and EX 1 for industry j  between t and / - I  are defined as
EN\ j,/
EXT , j-tjj NTP,,_,
where: NEP
NXPU
NTPjja
= total number of plants that enter industry j  between t and t -1 
= total number of plants that exit industry j  between t and t -1 
= total number of plants in industry j  in year t -1
EN2 and EX2 for industry j  between t and t-1 are defined as
EMPL EN ,
EN2 - = -------- =----^  ,
J’' EMPL T t ,
EX 2j,t
EMPL EX j t 
EMPL _ Tjt_x ’
where: EMPL _ ENj t = total employment of plants that enter industry j  between
t and / - I
EMPL _ EX j t = total employment of plants that exit industry between 
t and t -1
EMPL _ Tj M = total employment of plants in industry j  in t - 1
There are different types of entry and exit. Within the entry category, entry can occur through 
acquisition of the established production units or creation of new ones (greenfield entry). 
Within the exit category, exit can occur through divestiture or closing down of production 
units. There is a substantial difference in the effect of these types of entry and exit. A 
greenfield entry and closing down (i.e. exit) affect industry's supply directly and 
immediately, while it is not clear whether or not the effects of acquisition entry and
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divestiture exit are immediate (Baldwin 1998). This difference ideally leads to separation of 
the analysis according to each type of entry and exit. The separation, however, cannot be 
done. As described in Chapter 5, information needed (i.e. the reasons for firms entry and exit) 
is unavailable. Consequently, this study assumes that the entry and exit are greenfield entry 
and closed-down exit, respectively.
Figure 6.5 and 6.6 show the trend of entry and exit rates in terms of the number of plants and 
employment, respectively. The figures clearly show the dramatic impact the crisis had on the 
extent to which firms are created and destroyed. Consider, first, the impact on the creation of 
firms. Figure 6.5 shows that entry rates during the period 1997-2000 fall to about half of that 
during the period 1993-96 (pre-crisis). The trend of the rates in terms of employment also 
reveals a similar picture (Figure 6.6), although the magnitude of the decline is slightly lower. 
Another key observation is that the rate of establishment of firms did not seem to have 
recovered in 2000. This is in contrast to the observation in the previous section where, in 
terms of performance, the industry appeared to have recovered in this year.
Turning to the impact on the closure of firms, Figure 6.5 shows that the exit rates increased 
during the peak of the crisis. This suggests that the crisis put some firms into receivership, 
bearing in mind that this inference is likely to be overstated as the data do not include the 
reasons for the plants’ disappearance. This negative impact, however, seems to have 
disappeared during the period 1999-2000. The exit rates return to the pre-crisis level and, in 
fact, move further down to slightly below that level. Unlike the trend in the entry rates, the 
trend in the exit rates is consistent with the general impression of the industry’s early 
recovery. Therefore, the earlier observation of the entry rates (during the period 1999-2000) 
suggests that most of the recovery in performance must have originated from firms that 
survived the crisis.
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Figure 6.5 Entry and exit rates in Indonesian manufacturing in terms of number of 
plants (EN1 and EX1) (%), 1994-2000
□ EN1 m EX 1
Figure 6.6 Entry and exit rates in Indonesian manufacturing in terms of employment 
(EN2 and EX2) (%), 1994-2000
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The continuously declining pattern in the entry rates can also be observed across the broad 
industry groups. This is shown in Table 6.4 which presents the entry rates and the percentage 
difference in the rates between the crisis and pre-crisis periods by two-digit industries. Across 
the industries, the percentage differences in the rates for 2000 are lower than those for the 
period 1998-99 (see columns 8 to 10 on the table).
Another important observation from Table 6.4 is that, although the entry rates between 1997 
and 2000 declined in all industry groups, the extent of the declines are different between 
industries. These differences are demonstrated more clearly at the three-digit industry level 
(provided in Appendix 6.3). Within the textile-garments industry, for example, the 
differences in entry rates in terms of employment (EN2) in 1998 range from -50 per cent in 
leather (ISIC 323) to -88 per cent in footwear (ISIC 324) industries. It is worth noting here 
that, to a large extent, the decline in these industries, particularly in footwear, might have 
reflected the decline in export orders, as importers were concerned that firms would not be 
able to deliver products on time (Booth 1999). Still in terms of employment, Appendix 6.3 
also shows the extent of firm entry a few industries, i.e., transport equipment (ISIC 384) and 
porcelain (ISIC 361), were in fact higher during the period 1998-99. This indicates that 
business opportunities in some industries might have been more favourable during the crisis.
Overall, the observations on entry rates suggest that the behaviour of firm entry during the 
crisis was significantly different to that before the crisis. More importantly, it did not seem to 
recover as seen in other performance measures. One possible explanation, of course, is the 
recovery might have come with a lag, probably because business confidence had not 
completely recovered in 2000. Nevertheless, the different behaviour might also signal that the 
factors which govern entry might have changed after the crisis. Empirical studies on firm 
entry (e.g. Highfield and Smiley 1987; Yamawaki 1991) have found that determinants of 
firm entry are sensitive to changes in business cycles. An attempt to shed some light on this 
issue is carried out in Chapter 10.
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Table 6.5 presents the exit rates and their percentage difference between the crisis and pre­
crisis period by the two-digit industry group. The table reveals that large increases in the rates 
during the period 1997-98 occurred in capital-intensive industries -  non-metallic minerals, 
basic metal and machinery -  suggesting that factor intensity might have been important in 
shaping the firm survival during this time. This observation is consistent with the general 
picture portrayed in the previous section (see Table 6.2). However, it is important to note 
that, in basic metal and machinery, the increase in terms of number of plants (EN1) is 
substantially different to that in terms of employment (EN2). Therefore, it suggests that most 
of the exited plants were small and large firms survived better, at least in these industries.
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As defined, EN2 and EX2 reflect the industry’s adjustment in employment originated from 
the entering and exiting firms. The adjustment obviously does not only come from these 
firms, but also from incumbents. Computing employment change for the group of incumbents 
can provide a picture of how the crisis affected the extent of the incumbents’ expansion and 
contraction. To proceed, we define the rate of expansion (POS) in industry j  at time t as
POS
i , t
EMPL _ POS j t 
EMPL Ti t ,
—  j , i - i
and the rate of contraction (NEG) in industry j  at time t as
NEGj,
EMPL_ NEGU 
EMPL _ Tjj_,
where: EMPL _ POS.1 = total employment of plants that expand between t and t-1 
EMPL _ NEG. = total employment of plants that contract between t and t-1
A simple relationship that links EN2, EX2, POS and NEG is the following:
EMPL _ GROWTHf J = EN2 j t + POSJ t + EX2j t + NEGj t (6.2)
where EMPL GROWTHj , is the annual employment growth between t and t-1.7 In other
words, 6.2 decomposes the annual employment change into the component associated with 
“growing-and-new” and “shrinking-and-exiting firms”.
7 Equation 6.2 and the definition of POS and NEG follow those devised in Davis et al. (1996).
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Figure 6.7 Expansion (POS) and contraction (NEG) rates (%), 1994-2000
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Figure 6.7 shows the trend in the expansion and contraction rates for the period 1993-2000. 
Consider, first, the expansion rate. The figure shows that it declined significantly in 1997 and 
1998 but recovered immediately in the following year. This observation is in contrast to the 
continuously declining trend of the entry rates demonstrated earlier, but supports the 
inference that much of the industry’s recovery in performance was contributed to by firms 
that survived the crisis. As for the contraction rates, the figure shows how dramatic the 
adjustment made by the incumbents was. The rate in 1998 jumped to about double its average 
pre-crisis level. Consistent with the view of recovery, the rate started to decline in 1999 and 
even in 2000 reached the average pre-crisis level.
Figures 6.8a and 6.8b decompose the annual employment change for the period 1994-2000, 
by putting together EN2, POS, EX2 and NEG. The key observation from the figure is that the 
aggregate annual employment contraction in 1998 and 1999 was dominated by employment 
contraction from the incumbents, rather than from those which exited the industry (see Figure 
6.8b). This indicates a high survival rate of firms in weathering the crisis, as they tend to 
reduce employment before declaring bankruptcy. It is also in contrast to the pre-crisis pattern. 
As shown in Figure 6.8a, employment destruction in this period was almost evenly divided 
between that originating from incumbents and the exiting plants.
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Figure 6.8 Decomposition of employment growth (%), 1994-2000 
a. 1994-96
8
7 -
6
5 - 
^ 4  
3 
2
1 -  
0
1997 1998 1999
f f :
W : ' / / / / /
. . .
_
' / / / / /
. . . ' / / / / /
■■V. ' / / / / /
w . ' / / / / /
. . . ' / / / / ;
. . . ' / / / / /__ ' / / / / /
' / / / / /
2000
0  EN2 O POS B EX2 □ NEG
b. 1997-2000
8
7
6
5
^  4 
3 
2 
1 
0
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  -' / / / / /  
' / / / / /  -' / / / / /  
■ ' / / / / /  
- ' / / / / /  
' / / / / /
1996
H EN2 a  POS a  EX2 □ NEG
1 16
However, the more dominant contraction by incumbents in the crisis period seems to apply 
only to firms in some groups of industries. This is shown in Table 6.6 which presents the 
decomposition for the period 1997-2000 at the two-digit industry level. The contraction from 
incumbents dominates in the paper, chemical, basic metal and machinery industries (ISIC 34, 
35, 37 and 38). These industries are characterised by being capital-intensive and having a 
high share of imported inputs (see Appendix 6.1). Again, this observation suggests that factor 
intensity and the share of imported inputs might have been important in shaping the diverse 
impact of the crisis on firms.
It is worth noting that expansion rates in 1999 are significantly higher than those of 1998 in 
several industries: textiles and garments, non-metallic minerals, basic metals and machinery. 
The rates translated to the picture of the immediate employment recovery7 as depicted in 
Figure 6.1. While it is too early at this stage to draw some inferences, examining a few pre­
crisis industry characteristics (Appendix 6.1) suggests that foreign ownership might have 
been important in explaining this observation. The share of foreign ownership in these 
industries is at least about the industry-wide average.
117
Table 6.6 Decomposition of employment growth (%) by major industry groups, 1997- 
2000
IS IC /In d u stry Y e a r E n try  ra te  
(E N 2 )
E x p an sio n  ra te  
(P O S )
E x it ra te  
(E X 2 )
C o n tra c tio n  ra te  
(N E G )
31 F o o d  an d  b ev e rag e 1997 5 .48 3 .1 6 3 .7 4 4 .0 6
1998 2.35 4 .8 5 3.41 5.23
1999 2 .1 0 4 .4 4 1.69 4 .9 4
2 0 0 0 2 .24 3 .5 2 2 .38 2 .9 2
32 T e x tile  an d  g a rm en ts 1997 4 .8 4 3 .2 6 5 .58 4.81
1998 2.81 3 .5 4 3.93 5 .69
1999 3 .22 5 .78 1.51 3 .74
2 0 0 0 2.53 4 .4 0 3.33 1.80
33 W o o d  p ro d u c ts 1997 5.75 3 .1 7 9 .1 4 4 .1 3
1998 8.68 4 .4 6 4 .5 0 5 .99
1999 9 .69 4 .4 9 5 .47 6 .05
2 0 0 0 3 .84 3 .6 6 9 .24 2 .88
34 P ap e r p ro d u c ts 1997 7 .00 2 .8 8 4 .1 7 4 .3 0
1998 3.43 3.01 2.71 7.01
1999 1.40 4 .0 6 1.30 5 .47
2 0 0 0 1.20 2 .3 4 1.00 2 .57
35 C h e m ic a l, ru b b e r an d 1997 3 .14 3 .3 6 2.71 4 .9 6
p la s tic s 1998 3 .87 3 .8 9 3.21 4 .8 9
1999 1.72 4 .8 9 0 .4 4 5 .14
200 0 1.55 3 .6 7 1.20 3 .34
36  N o n -m e ta llic  p ro d u c ts 1997 5 .98 3 .3 0 6 .69 4 .1 6
1998 3.91 2 .1 6 8.08 7 .82
1999 3 .59 4 .9 2 2 .4 0 4 .6 8
2 0 0 0 1.84 2 .4 9 1.13 2 .0 0
37  B asic  m eta l 1997 7 .8 4 1.29 1.13 3 .94
1998 2 .3 2 1.98 2.11 8 .29
1999 1.12 5 .37 1.67 5 .10
2 0 0 0 0 .33 2 .6 3 1.47 1.09
38 M a c h in e ry  an d  tra n sp o rt 1997 3 .93 4 .0 5 5 .08 4 .6 3
e q u ip m e n t 1998 6.43 2 .8 7 8.55 9 .99
1999 2 .57 6 .0 0 0 .62 5.41
2 0 0 0 1.25 3.43 1.84 1.89
39  O th e r  m a n u fa c tu r in g 1997 5.45 4 .1 7 7 .02 2 .6 9
1998 6.61 6 .3 7 4 .1 7 4 .3 4
1999 4 .7 8 3 .4 4 0 .9 4 6 .3 8
20 0 0 1.57 2 .2 6 2.91 2 .4 3
Note: See text for the definition of EN 1, POS, EX2 and NEG
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6.5 Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to derive some basic facts about how the crisis affected 
the Indonesian manufacturing industry. This provides the basis for the empirical analysis in 
the next three chapters.
The crisis severely affected the industry. After the strong pre-crisis growth, the industry 
contracted significantly in 1998. However, almost immediately it began to recover. All the 
performance measures reached the pre-crisis (1995-96) level in 2000.
The results show large variations in performance across industries. While some contracted, 
others expanded. This variation can also be observed during the early recovery. Despite the 
general trend of improvement, the magnitude of the recovery was dramatic in several 
industries. The results suggest that some characteristics at the industry level -  namely sales 
orientation, factor intensity, the share of imported inputs and foreign ownership -  might have 
been the determining variables generating these variations.
Examining the data at the plant-level indicates a large variation in the performance impact 
across firms, even within the industries which were expanded during the crisis. This 
observation suggests that the differences across industries, or their characteristics, as 
suggested earlier might not be the only factors explaining the variation.
This chapter also shows that the crisis severely affected the demographics of plants. Entry 
rates declined significantly in 1998 but, unlike the trend in the performance measures, they 
did not seem to recover in 2000. Exit rates increased to almost double the pre-crisis level 
during the peak of the crisis but recovered immediately. The results revealed that firms were 
resilient during the crisis. Most of the employment contraction in 1998 and 1999 was 
dominated by the contraction from incumbents, rather than from exited plants. As with the 
earlier analysis, the analysis of plants demographics suggests that some industry and firm 
characteristics were crucial in determining the diversity of the plant-level responses. It is to 
this issue that we now turn.
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Appendix 6.1 Selected characteristics of Indonesian manufacturing by broad industry
group
ISIC/Industry Export
Intensity
(% o f industry value 
added)
Share o f 
imported input 
(% o f total intermediate 
input)
Share of
foreign ownership 
(% o f value added)
31 Food and beverage 22.2 8.9 10.4
32 Textile and garments 43.8 38.2 22.6
33 Wood products 70.0 2.3 11.0
34 Paper products 14.8 33.3 27.4
35 Chemical, rubber and plastics 21.9 37.4 32.8
36 Non-metallic mineral products 11.5 26.0 19.9
37 Basic metal industries 13.7 62.0 28.6
38 M achinery and transport equipment 17.3 53.2 35.2
39 Other manufacturing 52.4 38.9 54.1
Source: Author's computation.
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Chapter 7
The role of firm characteristics in shaping firms’ responses to the
crisis: a descriptive analysis
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated there was a large cross-sectional variation in performance 
impact of the crisis at the plant level. This variation occurred both during the peak of the 
crisis and the early recovery period, and even at the disaggregated industry level. This and 
the following chapter ask which firm characteristics were important in shaping plant success 
in responding to the crisis?
Two quantitative approaches are presented to answer this question: descriptive and 
econometric analysis. This chapter presents the former, providing a picture of how the impact 
on performance varied across different groups of plants according to their characteristics.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 spells out the hypotheses. Section 
7.3 discusses the proxy variables and describes their measurement. Section 7.4 presents the 
descriptive analysis. The main findings of this chapter are summarised collectively with the 
findings of the next chapter.
7.2 Hypotheses
This study considers the following plant characteristics, all of which are able to be measured 
from the database: size, age, ownership, sales orientation, financial leverage, import 
dependence, factor intensity and competition.
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Before discussing the empirical results, it is important to spell out the hypotheses based on 
the discussion in Chapter 4. To organise the discussion, this section focuses only on the direct 
effect of each characteristic. The hypotheses about some interaction effects are discussed in 
the next chapter along with their empirical findings.
a. Size
The impact of firm size on performance during the crisis is difficult to predict a priori 
(.Hypothesis 1). Large firms might have been more successful because of advantages which 
stem from economies of scale, market power and employment of more skilled managers. 
Moreover, they were unlikely to suffer from credit rationing as banks tended to adopt more 
stringent lending policies after the crisis. However, inflexibility to changes in the business 
environment and dependence on the financial sector might also have made them less 
successful than small firms. Small firms might also have performed better due to less 
expensive overheads and often operate in niche markets which might not be so severely 
affected by the crisis.
b. Age
Similar to size, the impact of firm age is unclear (.Hypothesis 2). Older firms might have 
performed better owing to greater experience and familiarity with the business environment, 
having built up a reputation and business network which could provide them with more 
survival strategies. However, the experience effect might not be particularly large and 
important in the Indonesian context. It must be recognised that the 1997/98 crisis was the first 
major economic crisis since the mid 1960s, so there were no “prior” lessons for firms on how 
to deal with such a deep economic contraction.
c. Ownership
Foreign firms are expected to have responded better than domestic-private and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) (Hypothesis 3A), and the relationship between foreign ownership and the 
crisis’ impact on performance is expected to be positive (Hypothesis 3B). They might have 
sought financial support from their international-linked sources and have been able to benefit 
from the boost in competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. However, this 
expected better performance for foreign firms might have depended on the percentage of 
foreign share in the firms (Hypothesis 3C). The flow of firm-specific assets, which give the 
affiliates abilities to successfully respond to the crisis, might be restricted for firms with no or 
low foreign ownership share.
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The effect of government ownership is ambiguous (Hypothesis 3D). SOEs might have 
responded better given the government’s commitment to support and ability to bail them out 
financially. However, pressure on the government’s budget during the crisis might have 
substantially reduced this support. The impact of government ownership in contrast might 
have been positive because the threat of bankruptcy could discipline SOEs’ managers to 
behave in the interest of the government as owner.
d. Sales orientation
Export-oriented firms are expected to have performed better than domestic-oriented ones 
(.Hypothesis 4). They were able to take advantage of the boost in competitiveness from the 
sharp exchange rate depreciation, as a result of lowered relative costs of labour and cheaper 
exporting goods. However, the expected positive effect might have been weak. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, there are some reasons which may have caused a weak export response. 
Moreover, a weak relationship may also be observed simply because there were many 
cancellations of export orders due to the social and political turmoil in 1998.1
e. Financial leverage
Highly leveraged firms are expected to have been severely affected by the crisis (Hypothesis 
5). Their ability to seek external financing was likely to be reduced significantly as debt 
service costs increased sharply. However, the expected negative impact is likely to have 
varied considerably across firms. Some firms might have been able to negotiate with their 
banks to defer a substantial portion of their debt payments (principal and interest). One 
problem with the quantitative approach employed in this study is that it is difficult to identify 
which firms (or plants) were successful in negotiating debt payment. Hence the expected 
impact might have been weak. Nevertheless, much of the effect of this debt resolution is 
likely captured by other variables, namely firm size, age and sales orientation. Large and old 
firms are more likely to have been able to negotiate their debt payment because banks usually 
have more information about these firms. Exporters also have a higher chance for negotiation 
because they generate foreign-currency denominated revenue which can increase lenders’ 
confidence in the firms’ payment capability.
Financial leverage also captures the effect of bank-dependency. The collapse of the domestic 
financial system should have significantly reduced the amount of loanable funds through the
1 See the descriptive analysis in Chapter 2.
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bank-lending channel, and should have severely affected bank-dependent firms. Nonetheless, 
this effect might have been captured by the effect of size. Previous studies 
(e.g. Claessens et al. 2000) found that bank-dependent firms in Asian countries are mostly 
large.
f. Import dependency
Firms that use a large share of imported input are expected to have been adversely affected 
by the crisis (Hypothesis 6). A high share of imported input increases production costs in 
terms of local currency and outweighs the lowered relative labour costs stemming from the 
sharp exchange rate depreciation.
g. Factor intensity
Firms in labour- and resource-intensive industries should have been less affected than those 
in capital-intensive industries (Hypothesis 7Ä). They are able to benefit from cheaper 
production costs -  vis-ä-vis firms abroad -  as a result of the exchange rate depreciation.
Hypothesis 7A assumes that factor intensity at industry level to a large extent reflects factor 
intensity at firm level. However, in practice there might be a large variation in intensity 
across firms. Accordingly, the following are hypothesised:
• Firm-level capital intensity is negatively related to the performance impact of the crisis 
(Hypothesis 7B).
• Firm-level skill intensity is negatively related to performance impact of the crisis 
(Hypothesis 70).
h. Competition
This study considers two aspects for the role of competition: trade and product market 
competition. For the former, the impact is ambiguous (Hypothesis 8A). On the one hand, 
firms in less protective industries might have been more successful because they tend to have 
more efficient management and hence are more resilient to changes in economic shocks. On 
the other hand, firms may have contracted more because they only have small “room” to 
compress their economic rents compared to those in protected industries.
The impact of product market competition is also difficult to predict a priori (Hypothesis 8B). 
Performance contraction might have been lower for firms in a non-competitive industry 
because they might have strongly exercised their market power in response to contracted
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demand. Industrial organisation theory predicts dominants firms might initiate collusive 
behaviour during a low demand situation. In contrast, the contraction might have been higher 
in non-competitive industries because the deep economic demand contraction might have 
completely eliminated the ability of firms to exercise market power. Industrial organisation 
theory predicts any collusive arrangement could break down in such a situation.
7.3 Firm characteristic variables and their measurement
The following variables are employed to account for the firm characteristics discussed 
earlier. Unless otherwise stated, the variables are defined in their pre-crisis values, i.e. the 
average values of 1995 and 1996. The average was taken because 1996 was unlikely be a 
‘normal’ year. As noted in the previous chapter, the values of 1993-94 were not taken into 
account to minimise the variation in the variables’ values. Some variables, such as sales 
orientation and ownership, can change dramatically over a short period of time.
a. Size
Size (SIZEj) is proxied by number of employees. The other common alternatives, such as
output or profits, are not used as they tend to be more sensitive to changes in the business 
cycle. Previous studies found mixed results on the relationship between profitability and 
business cycles. For example, Domowitz et al. (1986) found a positive relationship while 
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) found a negative one. As for output, even if real value is used, 
there is still a substantial limitation in the quality of price index computed by the statistical 
agency. Therefore, the use of output-based proxy could result in less precise estimates.
b. Age
Age of plant (AGE)  is proxied by the number of years the plant has been in commercial 
production.
c. Ownership
Two types of variables were created to facilitate the hypotheses testing on firm ownership: 
continuous and dummy ownership variables. Two continuous ownership variables were 
created for every plant i : the percentage share of foreign ownership ( FORj) and the
percentage share of government ownership ( GOVi ). Three dummy variables were created for
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every plant plant /': domestic-private ( DPRL), foreign ( DFOR: ) and state-owned plants 
( D G O V D P R L  and DFORi are defined as
DPRI,
r = 1 if the share of domestic-private ownership in 
plant i is equal to 100 per cent 
 ^= 0 otherwise.
r — 1 if FORl > 0 per cent
DFOR, <
= 0 otherwise.
Three joint venture groups of plants, which are foreign-government, foreign-domestic and 
foreign-govemment-domestic, are considered foreign plants (i.e. DFORi = 1). This
consideration is based on previous empirical studies which suggest the share of foreign 
ownership does not necessarily reflect the extent of control. According to Aswicahyono and 
Hill (1995), many Indonesian case studies have demonstrated that local partners often play a 
relatively minor role even when they hold the majority of equity. This is particularly true for 
matters related to finance and technology. Moreover, Ramstetter (1999) demonstrated that 
one important role of foreign ownership is to widen a firm’s access to international market. 
For plants in Indonesian manufacturing, he showed the propensity to export was even higher 
for plants with a low foreign ownership share (10 to 50 per cent), compared to that for the 
domestic plants.
The other groups of plants not considered are state-owned plants and the group of 
government-domestic private. Following a similar argument as for DFORj , the government-
domestic group is classified as ‘government’ and hence, DGOVj is defined as
= 1 if GOVj > 0 per cent
DGOVt<
-  0 otherwise.
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d. Sales orientation
Sales orientation is proxied by plant export propensity ( EXP). For plant i , it is defined as the 
ratio of export to total output
EXPi =_EXi_
Outputi
where EXi is export of plant i . EXi is not reported in SI data. As in previous empirical 
studies, EXi is estimated by multiplying the percentage of exported output in production (i.e. 
PRPREX in SI data) with the value of output.
e. Import dependence
Import dependence ( IMDEPj ) is proxied by the intensity of imported input in total input. For 
plant i, it is defined as
IMDEP. {value o f imported input)i
{value o f imported + domestic input)i
The domestic input here is defined as the domestically produced input, which is different to 
the concept of domestic input in Input-Output Table sense.
f. Financial leverage
In empirical literature, financial leverage is usually proxied by some financial ratios, such as 
debt-to-equity ratio, debt ratio and interest coverage ratio. All of these are computed based on 
a firm’s accounting information (balance sheets and income statement). Although data on 
balance sheets are unreliable and incomplete, this study employs interest coverage ratio to 
construct variable financial leverage {LEV).  For plant i, it is defined as
LEVi =------------------------
(Interest Coverage),
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where
(Interest coverage ratio), = ----------------1-------
(interest payments);
and EBITi is equal to sales (or earnings) before deduction of interest payments and income 
taxes.
Interest coverage ratio measures the number of times a firm’s earnings exceed debt payments. 
In other words, it indicates how well a firm’s earnings can cover interest payments. In 
general, a low interest coverage ratio implies that a firm is highly leveraged (i.e. higher 
LEV]) and has low capability to take on additional debt (i.e. more financially constrained).
While often used in empirical studies, the ratio -  as with the other leverage ratios -  is very 
approximate. In general, this is because the ratio tends to understate the true extent of a firm’s 
financial leverage. It focuses only on servicing the interest liability and does not take into 
account debt repayment. Usually, repayment of debt principal is higher than the interest 
payment, and therefore drains a larger amount of cash than the interest payment. In addition, 
the ratio does not take into account other mandatory and discretionary items, such as 
dividends and capital commitment, which are not included in -  and thus overstate -  the 
earnings figure.
g. Factor intensity
This study employs two types of variables to measure factor intensity: industry-level and 
plant-level variables. For the former, dummy variables are created based on the industry 
classification defined by Ariff and Hill (1985). The ISIC version of this classification is 
provided in Appendix 8.1. Based on this classification, three dummy variables were created 
for resource-intensive (DRE),  labour-intensive ( DL/ )  and capital-intensive industries
( DCl t ). For industryy,
r  = 1 if industry j  is classified as mineral- or 
DR1. “S resource-intensive industries.
= 0 otherwise.
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r  = 1 if industry j  is classified as unskilled labour-intensive 
DLL A industries.
= 0 otherwise
r  = 1 if industry j  is classified as technology- or 
DC1 i A human capital-intensive industries
= 0 otherwise
Industry j , both for these dummy variables and the other industry-level variables used in this 
thesis, is defined at the four-digit ISIC level.
For the plant-level variables, two groups of variables were created: capital intensity and 
skilled-labour intensity. In the absence of reliable data on capital stock, capital intensity is 
measured in two ways (PCI land PCI 2). For plant z, PCI\ is defined as the ratio of non­
wage value added to labour:
PCI 1 (non ~ waSe value added) t
(total number o f employee),
(value of output)f - (inputs)- (wages and salary)
(total number o f employee)i
PCI2 is defined as the ratio of energy costs to production labour, motivated by previous 
studies showing that capital and energy are complementary inputs in production 
(Globerman et al. 1994). For plant
PCI 2. (energy costs) i
(total numbers o f production employee)j
(fuel costs)f + (electricity costs)j 
(total numbers o f production employee)i
Similarly, skilled labour intensity is measured in two ways (PSI\ and PSI2). For plant z, 
PSI\ is defined as the average of wages and salary per employee
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PSI 1,
(total exp enditure on wages and salary) . 
(total numbers o f employee)i
The major limitation of PSI 1 is that it might be distorted by imperfection in the labour 
market, although the Indonesian labour market was generally competitive before the crisis. 
Therefore, an alternative measure of the variable (PSI2) is employed. For plant z, PSI2 is 
defined as the ratio of non-production to production labour
PSI 2,
(total numbers o f non - production employee). 
(total numbers o f production employee)i
h. Competition
For industry competition, this study employs the concentration ratio of the largest four plants 
in an industry ( CR4) and the Herfindahl Index ( HH1) to proxy the extent of competition in 
the product market. For industry j ,  the formula for both proxies are
CÄ4,
4
Z VA.
i=1
n
H H f  = Z
y
)
where VAj is the value added of plant i in industry j  .
This study uses import penetration ratio ( IMP) and the level of trade protection to measure 
the extent of competition arising from trade. IMP for industry j  is defined as
M
IMP = —
J Q,
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where QJ and M j are the domestic production and imports in industry j , respectively. The
alternative measure of import penetration in which the denominator of IMPj is the sum of the
domestic production and net import is not employed because it could mislead the 
interpretation (Athukorala and Hazari 1988). For instance, if exports in an industry have 
outpaced imports, the alternative measure suggests that industry’s trade competitiveness 
deteriorates, when in fact the opposite has occurred.
For trade protection, two proxies are chosen: nominal rate of protection ( NRP) and effective 
rate of protection ( ERP). NRP measures the extent of protection to an industry provided 
directly by the tariff on its output. In contrast, ERP measures the extent of protection 
provided by the entire tariff structure, taking into account the effects of tariffs on inputs as 
well as on outputs (Corden 1966).
These two proxies have been used in other empirical studies. However, there is no consensus 
among researchers on the best proxy. Clearly, ERP is theoretically superior, since it 
measures the extent to which resources in an economy are reallocated by the entire tariff 
structure (Corden 1966; Caves et al. 1980). Nevertheless, NRP is presumably more realistic 
in practice, since interest groups tend to be concerned more with the nominal rates of 
protection on outputs rather than on inputs (Cheh 1974). Analysis in this study experimented 
with the two proxies.
This study uses average tariff rates calculated by the WTO (WTO 1995) which covers trade 
policy until the end of 1994. The rates are available at four-digit ISIC level. For ERP, this 
study employed the ERP estimates calculated by Fane and Condon (1996). The estimates 
cover the period immediately after the May 1995 trade reform package. They are available 
for 131 sectors based on the 1990 Input-Output table, of which 88 are manufacturing sectors.
7.4 Descriptive analysis
This section statistically describes the variation in performance impact of the crisis across 
groups of plants by their characteristics. The objective is to examine whether there are some
2 The alternative import penetration ratio is defined as 
Mj
I M P  = ---------------------, where X  is exports in industry /
'  Qj + Mj - X j
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systematic patterns in the variation and to serve as a prelude to a formal econometric test in 
the next section. For every group, the mean of the percentage difference in performance 
(%Ayu ) was computed for the period 1998-2000, which covers the peak of the crisis (1998)
and the early recovery (1999-2000). i and y  denote plant and performance measures, 
respectively. This chapter, as with the previous one, includes the following as the 
performance measures:
• Output, proxied by real value added (RVA) and real gross output (ROUT).
• Employment, proxied by the number of employees (EMPL).
• Labour productivity, proxied by real value added per labour (RVL).
• Profitability, proxied by price-cost margin (PCM).
Definition of these measures has been discussed in Chapter 6. The computational results are 
presented in Tables 7.1 to 7.14. Unless otherwise stated, they have been computed by the 
author from the data base.
7.4.1 Size
Plants were classified into five groups which make up three more aggregated groups of small, 
medium and large plants: small plants (average number of employees in 1995 and 1996, or 
SIZEj 9596 , was between 20-49 and 50-99), medium plants (SIZEi9590 was between 100-199
and 200-499); and large plants (SIZEj 9596was greater than 500).
The results are given in Table 7.1. Focusing first on the whole period 1998-2000 (i.e. the first 
column for each performance measure), the results seem to suggest a positive relationship 
where the contraction in performance is lower for larger plants. They even indicate some 
large plants expanded in terms of output and labour productivity. The relationship, however, 
can only be seen clearly for the differences in labour productivity and profitability. For the 
other performance measures, plants in the smallest group (Small 1) are indicated to have 
contracted less than plants in the other group of small plants (Small 2).
The results do not reveal any apparent pattern of change between the peak of the crisis and 
the early recovery period except for the average differences in profitability. Regarding
3 The definition of peak of the crisis and early recovery period follows that used in the previous chapter.
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profitability, the pattem becomes unclear in the early recovery period. The average 
contraction among the group of large plants increases in the early recovery period but the 
average contraction among the group of the smallest plants declined at this time.
The unclear relationship observed in Table 7.1 could be because size might represent other 
plant characteristics that significantly affected performance. Large firms are often 
multinationals, exporters and located in concentrated industries. Therefore, these 
characteristics need to be controlled for to reveal the true relationship and this is done in the 
next section.
It is worth mentioning that the results seem to suggest an adjustment to improved efficiency 
in large firms. Large plants appear to have shed labour but produced more, albeit only 
slightly. This suggestion is corroborated by the results which indicate an increase in labour 
productivity among large plants during the period 1998-2000. The results show that large 
plants on average increased their real value added per labour by about 9 per cent during this 
period.
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7.4.2 Age
Plants were classified into three groups according to the years spent in commercial 
production until 1996 ( AGEi96): young ( AGEj96equal to or less than 5 years); middle-aged
plants ( AGEj96between 5 and 15 years); and old plants (AGEj96greater than 15 years).
The results presented in Table 7.2 seem to suggest a negative relationship between 
contraction in performance and firm age. For the period 1998-2000, old plants on average 
experienced a larger contraction in respect to all performance measures except profitability. 
This relationship persists during the peak of the crisis and in early recovery. The pattern 
therefore does not provide support for the importance of experience. Nevertheless, the 
inference is not robust as what was reflected in the table has not been controlled for the effect 
of the other characteristics.
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7.4.3 Ownership
To examine the role of firm ownership, plants are classified into the groups as in the three 
dummy ownership variables: domestic private ( DPRIi959(J , foreign ( DFORi 9596 ), and
government plants ( DSOEi 9596 ). The definition of these variables was discussed in the 
previous section.
The results presented in Table 7.3 support the hypothesis that foreign firms responded better 
than other firms during the crisis {Hypothesis 3A). The average differences in output and 
labour productivity are positive during the peak of the crisis among the group of foreign 
plants, indicating some foreign plants expanded during this time. In line with this 
observation, the average contraction in employment and profitability among this group of 
plants was very small compared to that of the other groups.
The positive impact of foreign ownership is indicated to be even higher in the early recovery 
period and average expansion in performance for the group of foreign plants is indicated to 
significantly higher than during the peak of the crisis.
As explained, the observed better performance of foreign plants is most likely due to their 
ability to boost competitiveness from the exchange rate depreciation during the crisis. This 
suggests the impact of foreign ownership might be interrelated with the other plant 
characteristics, particularly sales orientation. This interrelationship will be tested in the 
econometric analysis.
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The table also show government plants were severely affected by the crisis. Their output and 
profitability on average fell by more than 20 per cent for the entire period 1998-2000, in 
addition to moderately high employment contraction. These results do not suggest the 
government -  as main shareholder -  bailed out these firms. This probably reflects the tight 
fiscal situation during the crisis when, as discussed, the government’s ability to raise revenue 
fell substantially.
Given the picture in Table 7.3, it is important to examine the variation in performance 
differences across foreign plants in order to understand whether the suggested better 
performance of plants depends on foreign ownership share or, in other words, to test 
informally Hypothesis 3C. Table 7.4 presents the results. Foreign plants are classified into 
four groups: plants with low foreign ownership (average foreign share in 1995 and 1996, or 
FORj 9596 less than or equal to 20 per cent); plants with moderately-low foreign ownership
( FORi 9596 between 20 and 50 per cent); plants with moderately-high foreign ownership 
( FOR' 9596 between 50 and 80 per cent); and plants with high foreign ownership ( FORj 9596 
greater than 80 per cent).
The table provides some support for the hypothesis. First, focusing on the results during the 
peak of the crisis, a positive relationship between contraction in performance and foreign 
ownership is suggested. That is, the contraction was lower among plants with a higher share 
of foreign ownership. Second, the performance expansion observed earlier in Table 7.3 was 
likely to have originated from the plants with high foreign ownership. The magnitude of 
expansion is large: about 30 per cent in real value added and 10 per cent in employment, 
leading to an increase in real value added per labour by about 20 per cent. Finally, the 
average contraction in performance at the group of foreign plants with a very low foreign 
ownership share (less than 20 per cent) was extremely large during the peak of the crisis. For 
real value added, real gross output and price-cost margin, this is about 45, 35 and 33 per cent 
respectively.
Although displaying a positive relationship, the pattern is less clear for the early recovery 
period. While plants with high foreign ownership are suggested to have performed far better 
than the other plants, plants with moderately-low foreign ownership performed better than 
plants with moderately high foreign ownership. This finding is particularly evident in the 
differences for output and labour productivity.
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The same experiment as in Table 7.4 was conducted to further explore the effect of 
government ownership. The results are presented in Table 7.5 where all government plants 
are grouped according to a similar rule as in Table 7.4.4
It turns out that, although no clear pattern emerges from Table 7.5, across the performance 
measures and for the two sub-periods, two observations are worth noting. First, the 
differences in real gross output seems to suggest a negative relationship: the contraction is 
higher for plants with a high government share (more than 80 per cent). This pattern is even 
clearer for the early recovery period. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction 
that SOEs are less efficient than private firms due to higher managerial slackness. Perhaps 
more importantly, the finding suggests the adjustment of the Indonesian manufacturing SOEs 
does not follow that commonly observed in developed countries. Some studies (e.g. Bortero 
and Rondi 1999, 2002) show SOEs are able to improve their performance under fiercer 
competition and lower budget assistance from government.
While this chapter does not go deeper into the underlying factor of this finding, a comment is 
worth making. The finding implies that the threat of bankruptcy stemming from the crisis 
was apparently not able to reduce managerial slack in the SOEs. It does not mean, however, 
that the threat was not large. The threat might simply have been considered low by the SOEs 
managers because of a perception that the government would guarantee their existence, 
mainly for the social objective they carry (particularly in providing employment).
The comment above is consistent with the second observation which suggests that to some 
extent SOEs retained their employees. The contraction in employment was significantly 
lower for the plants with a very high government ownership share (more than 80 per cent).
4 See Table 7.5 for the details of the definition.
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7.4.4 Sales orientation
To examine the impact of sales orientation, plants are categorised into four groups based on 
their average export propensity in 1995 and 1996 ( EXPi 9596 ): domestic oriented plants
( EXP 9596 equal to zero); low export oriented plants ( EXPi 9596 between zero and 0.1); 
moderately export oriented ( EXPj 9596 between 0.1 and 0.5) and highly export oriented 
( EXPi 9596 greater than 0.5).
The results are presented in Table 7.6. Consider, first, the results for the entire period. A 
positive relationship where contraction in the performance decreases as export propensity 
increases is suggested. However, this relationship is only weakly suggested by the differences 
in employment and profitability.
The results also indicate that plants with high export propensity greatly benefited from the 
crisis. Excluding the results for profitability, some of these plants appeared to have expanded 
during the period. The findings provide some support for the hypothesis that export-oriented 
firms performed better than domestic-oriented ones (Hypothesis 4).
Turning to the figures for the crisis peak and the early recovery period, the results show that 
the positive impact of sales orientation seems to have been weaker during the early recovery. 
This is particularly clear for the group of plants with high export intensity, where output and 
labour productivity expansion was significantly lower in this period.
Although the impact of sales orientation as a single factor is fairly clear from Table 7.6, it 
might have depended on other firm characteristics. As explained in Chapter 4, the two most 
important are foreign ownership and leverage. As with other characteristics, these 
interrelationships are tested in the next section.
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7.4.5 Import dependence
Plants were categorised into five groups based on the average of the imported to total input 
ratio in 1995 and 1996 ( iMDEPi 9596 ). The first is completely domestic input dependent
plants, defined as plants that do not use any imported input. The second and other groups are 
categorised based on the quartiles of IMDEPL 9596 distribution of the remaining plants: low
import dependent plants ( IMDEP19596 between 0 and 0.1); moderately low import dependent 
plants ( IMDEP19596 between 0.1 and 0.36); moderately high import dependent plants 
( IMDEPi 9596 between 0.36 and 0.74); and highly import dependent plants ( JMDEPi 9596 
greater than 0.74).
As shown in Table 7.7, there is no clear relationship between the contraction in performance 
and the ratio of imported to total input. On the one hand, the differences in real output and 
employment exhibit a U-shaped pattern, with moderately low import dependent plants on 
average having experienced the largest contraction. This pattern is observed for the entire 
1998-2000 period. On the other hand, a positive relationship is weakly suggested for the 
differences in real value added and labour productivity for the entire period. The finding does 
not support Hypothesis 6 and tends to contradict the previous observation on the impact of 
sales orientation. One possible explanation is that the effect of import dependency might have 
depended on some other characteristics.
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7.4.6 Leverage
Plants were classified based on the average of interest coverage ratio in 1995 and 1996 
(LEVj 9596 ). Non-leveraged plants are defined as the plants with zero LEVi9596. The other four
groups are classified based upon the quartiles of LEVi9596 distribution of the remaining 
plants: low leveraged plants (LEVj9596 is between 0 and 0.04); moderately low leveraged 
( LEVi 9596 is between 0.04 and 0.1); moderately high (LEVj 9596 is between 0.1 and 0.25); and 
highly leveraged (LEVj 9596 is greater than 0.25).
The results in Table 7.8 do not suggest a clear relationship between contraction in 
performance and financial leverage. The differences seem to suggest a positive relationship 
for the differences in output (real value added and real gross output) but a negative one for 
the differences in employment and profitability. Therefore the patterns only provide weak 
support for Hypothesis 5. However, it needs to be confirmed by econometric analysis because 
-  as with the other characteristics -  they might have been affected by other factors.
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7.4.7 Factor intensity
To examine whether factor intensity affected performance, plants are categorised into three 
groups based on the dummy-variables representing industry factor intensity defined earlier 
( DRI, DLI and DC/).
The results displayed in Table 7.9 suggest that factor intensity determined the performance 
impact, providing some support for Hypothesis 7A. Focusing on the entire 1998-2000 period, 
a clear pattern is observed for the differences across all performance measures. Plants in 
capital-intensive industries are suggested to have contracted the most severely while the 
opposite is suggested for plants in labour-intensive industries.
The pattern changes slightly in the early recovery period. The average contraction in output 
(real value added) and labour productivity for the group of plants in capital-intensive 
industries was lower in this time compared to that during the peak of the crisis. This change, 
however, does not necessarily reflect the change in the effect of factor intensity. The 
improvement in labour productivity might have been the result of a large employment 
contraction for plants in these industries relative to the other plants in resource- and labour- 
intensive industries.
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The importance of factor intensity, however, is not clearly shown by performance variation 
according to the plant level factor intensity variables. Consider, first, the capital intensity 
variables (PC/1 andPC/2). Table 7.10a present the results for the groups of plants 
categorised by the quartiles of PCI 1 (non-wage value added per labour): low, moderately 
low, moderately high and high capital intensive plants. For both the crisis peak and the early 
recovery period, no clear pattern emerges. The performance differences exhibit a negative 
relationship between the performance contraction and factor intensity in terms of output, 
labour productivity and profitability but a positive relationship in terms of employment. 
These relationships can also be observed in the differences of most performance measures 
when plants are categorised by the quartiles of PCI2 (energy cost per labour) (see Table 
7.10b).
Turning to skill intensity variables (PSI 1 and PSI2), the results again do not suggest a clear 
relationship. This is shown in Tables 7.11a and 7.11b which present the variation in 
performance differences across groups of plants categorised by the quartiles of the variables. 
While a negative relationship between the performance contraction and skill intensity is 
observed in the differences in output and labour productivity, a vague positive relationship is 
observed in the differences in employment and profitability.
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7.4.8 Competition
7.4.8.1 Trade competition
As mentioned, this study employs two types of variables to measure the effect of trade 
competition: import penetration (IMP) and the level of trade protection (NRP and ERP). 
Table 7.12 present the results when plants are categorised according to the value of IMP in 
the industry where they operate in: low import competition ( IMPJ 9596 between 0 and 0.25);
moderate import competition ( IMPj 9596 between 0.25 and 0.5); high import competition
(/M P„5%>0.5).
The table does not provide a clear picture as to how import competition affected 
performance. First, a U-shaped pattern seems to be suggested for the differences in output 
and labour productivity, with plants in industries with moderate competition from imports on 
average the most severely affected by the crisis. Second, there is no pattern for the 
differences in employment and profitability for the entire period 1998-2000.
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A mixed picture is also suggested for the effect of trade protection, as shown in Tables 7.13a 
and 7.13b which evaluate the performance differences across groups of industries with 
different protection levels. The groups are defined based on NRP (in Table 7.13a) and ERP 
(in Table 7.13b) as the following:
Low protected industries: (0< NRPj 94 <20) or (0< ERPj 95 <5)
Moderately protected industries: (20< NRP; 94 <40) or (5< ERP/ 95 <25)
Highly protected industries: ( NRPf 94 >40) or ( ERPj 95 >25)
First, consider Table 7.13a. In terms of output (real value added and real gross output), plants 
in low and highly protected industries were the most severely affected during the peak of the 
crisis. This observation changes in the early recovery period where plants in low protected 
industries contracted the most compared to plants in the other groups. A negative relationship 
is suggested in terms of employment, where the contraction is higher for plants in industries 
with high rates of nominal protection. This relationship is apparent during the peak crisis as 
plants in highly protected industries on average shed labour by about 15 per cent. The 
patterns observed earlier result in a positive relationship for the differences in labour 
productivity. The contraction in labour productivity decreases as the nominal rates of 
protection increase. This relationship is particularly evident for the early recovery. 
Meanwhile, a positive relationship is observed for the differences in profitability. The 
average contraction in price-cost margin decreases as the industries’ nominal rate of 
protection increases. This pattern is clearly observed for both the crisis peak and the early 
recovery period.
Turning to Table 7.13b, two main differences are observed. First, a positive relationship is 
now observed for the differences in output (real value added and real gross output) for the 
entire period. Second, no clear pattern is suggested from the differences in employment and 
price-cost margin. Despite these differences, the table shows the same positive relationship 
regarding the differences in labour productivity.
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7.4.S.2 Product market competition
To examine the effect of competition in the product market, plants are categorised into four 
groups based on quartiles of the pre-crisis CR4 and HHI distributions:
Competitive industries (0 < CR4 / 9596 < 0.27) or (0 < HHI / 9596 < 0.03);
Moderately competitive industries (0.24 < CR4j 9596 < 0.44) or (0.03 < HHI/9596 < 0.1) 
Moderately non-competitive industries (0.44 < CR4j 9596 < 0.67) or 0.1 < HHI / 9596 < 0.2); 
Non-competitive industries ( CR4/ 9596 > 0.67 ) or ( HHI1 9596 > 0.2).
The results based on CR4 are presented in Table 7.14a. Except for profitability, the table 
shows that the contraction in performance was larger for plants in more concentrated 
industries. At this stage, however, it is difficult to confirm whether the suggested relationship 
is robust. One of the reasons is that there is a substantial difference in the pattern between the 
peak and the early recovery period. Indeed, the table shows that the relationship becomes less 
clear in the early recovery period. The same picture can also be observed based on HHI, 
presented in Table 7.14b. Despite a negative relationship for the entire period 1998-2000, 
there is a large difference in the pattem between the peak of the crisis and the early recovery.
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Chapter 8
The role of firm characteristics in shaping firms’ responses to the
crisis: an econometric analysis
8.1 Introduction
This chapter extends the analysis in the previous chapter to an integrated econometric 
analysis. This is necessary to ensure whether some of the suggested relationships observed in 
the descriptive analysis are robust, since it does not take into account the possibility that a 
plant might share several important characteristics. For example, multinationals are often 
large, export oriented and located in concentrated industries, and thus the positive effect of 
foreign ownership observed earlier could have been complicated by the positive effect of 
sales orientation. Apart from ensuring the findings from the descriptive analysis, an 
econometric analysis is necessary to take into account the possibility of survival bias and to 
test whether there is evidence of interrelationships between some of the characteristics.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. Section 8.2 discuses the statistical 
framework and econometric procedure. The basic econometric results are presented in 
Section 8.3. Section 8.4 extends the basic results by considering some interactions between 
the characteristics. Section 8.5 presents the main findings of the chapter and the previous one.
8.2 Statistical framework and econometric procedure
The general estimating equation is given as follows:
%Ayi l =a + ß ' X i + ö'Yj +£il (8.1)
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where %Ayu is the percentage difference of the performance measures used in the previous 
chapter, i and t represent plant i and the period 1997-2000 (i.e. / = 1997,..., 2000) 
respectively. X j and Yj are sets of explanatory variables capturing the firm characteristics at
plant and industry level. A list of the explanatory variables and their expected signs is given 
in Table 8.1, which represents the hypotheses stated in Section 7.2.
Table 8.1 Summary of the hypothesis and list of explanatory variables
P la n t  c h a ra c te r is t ic s E x p la n a to ry  v a r ia b le s E x p e c te d  s ig n
S iz e S IZ E i9596 + /-
A g e A G E i96 + /-
O w n e r s h ip a. D u m m y  v a r ia b le s 1
DFOR.,9596 +
D G O V i95%
b. C o n t in u o u s  v a r ia b le s
+ /-
FORi,9596 +
GOVj9596 + /-
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n E X P  j 9596 +
F in a n c ia l  le v e ra g e L E V j 9596 -
Im p o r t  d e p e n d e n c y IM D E P j 9596 -
F a c to r  in te n s ity a. D u m m y  v a r ia b le s “
D G Iji9596 -
E*EIj,9596
b. C o n t in u o u s  v a r ia b le s
- /+
P C I  li,9596 -
P G I2 i9596 -
P S I l j  9596 -
P S I2 i9596 -
In d u s try  c o m p e ti t io n a. Im p o rt  c o m p e ti t io n
IMPj.95% + /-
N R P j,94 + /-
ERPj,95
b. P ro d u c t m a rk e t 
c o m p e ti t io n
+ /-
G R 4j,9596 + / -
H H Ij 9596 + /-
Notes: 1. Base dummy variable is DPRIj 9596 
2. Base dummy variable is DRI, 9596
The sample is an unbalanced pooled cross-section which consists of 10,050 plants for the 
period 1996-2000. About 75 per cent of the sample is made up of plants which are observed 
for the entire period 1996-2000.
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Dummy variables that represent industries, regions and years of the period were included in 
the equation. Industry and region dummies were introduced to control for differences across 
industries and regions, respectively. As observed in Chapter 6, there are substantial 
differences in the performance impact of the crisis across industries. The year dummies were 
introduced to control for changes in the macro economic situation during the period.
The main limitation of using the pooled cross-section sample is that the unobserved firm 
characteristics, such as managerial capabilities and product attributes, may not be captured by 
the explanatory variables. Hence, the estimates might be biased. The way to solve this 
problem is to introduce a firm specific effect into equation 8.1 and to estimate the equation 
either by panel data (either fixed- or random- effect) or the dummy variable method. For the 
estimating equation, the only choice is the dummy variable method, since the panel data 
methods require some variation in the explanatory variables across years. Unfortunately, 
regressing the equation by the dummy variable method is not possible because of a 
computational limitation, that is, about 30,000 dummy variables for plants need to be 
included in the equation. As a result, no action was taken to eliminate this potential bias (i.e. 
no specific effects were introduced to the equations). Consequently, one needs to bear this 
shortcoming in mind and take into account that the estimates may be biased.
An important statistical issue regarding the estimation is sample censoring. The dependent 
variables (%Ayit) can only be calculated for the plants observed throughout the period 1995-
2000. An Examination of the sample indicated that about 33 per cent of the observed plants 
were no longer recorded in any year during the period 1997-2000. As a result, the distribution 
of the sample is truncated and estimating equation 8.1 only on the selected sample may lead 
to bias. To solve this problem, the Heckman (1976) two-step estimation approach was 
employed.
To understand the approach, it is necessary to show why estimating equation 8.1 on a 
truncated distribution might lead to biased estimates, borrowing from Johnston and Dinardo 
(1997). First, rewrite the equation as
%AyiJl=a + ß ' X i +S'Yj +eUj (8.2)
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where £Vit is now the error term for observed plant i during the period 1997-2000. It is
assumed that the selection of observed plants in this particular period is not random, as the 
pressure for going into receivership was likely to be high during this period. Thus, survival -  
in its general form -  can be written as
S.,=\[r 'Z,+s2IJ>0] (8.3)
where Sit =1 if plant i is observed and zero otherwise, and Z( includes variables that 
determined the survival, or whether plant z is observed or not. Taking the expectation of 8.2,
E(%Ayt l \X i,Yp SiJ=\) = a  + ß 'X ,+ S 'YJ + E(sUl | s2iJ > -y 'Z ß  (8.4)
and if eln and e2it are jointly normally distributed, a relationship between the two can be 
written as
£ 2 i,t 2 £ \ i,t +  V i,t (8.5)
where v. is uncorrelated with e2it, cr,2 is the covariance between £Ul and £2jl and of is 
the variance of £u t . Thus,
e ( £ \ u \ £ 2 u > ~ r ' z i )  =
°"l,2 £ 2i,t I £n,t . - y ' Z i>
V ^ 2
° ~ i,2 Mr'Zj/cr,)
cr2 0 ( / ’Z; /cr2)
(8 .6)
where (/>{.) and <f> are the standard normal density and its cumulative distribution function, 
respectively.
It is now clear why estimating equation 8.2 might lead to biased estimates: the last expression 
in the equation might not be zero. In other words, the bias is caused by the potential non-zero 
correlation between £ht and £2il.
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The main problem of estimating equation 8.2 is that the non-random selection process is not 
controlled. Thus, OLS estimation of the equation suffers from omitted-variable problem and, 
hence, would produce biased estimates. The omitted variable is reflected in 8.7 and often 
called the inverse Mills ratio:
j'ir'zjc, )  ( g 7 )
4>(r'z,/<r2)
The approach that Heckman proposed to solve the selection problem is to include the inverse 
Mills ratio as another explanatory variable in equation 8.2. This is done in two steps. In the 
first, a probit model to estimate Zf. is regressed and the estimates of y / cr2 for every plant i
are obtained to construct the inverse Mills ratio. In the second step, equation 8.2 is regressed 
with the estimated inverse Mills as an additional regressor. A test for a selectivity problem 
can be done by evaluating the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of inverse 
Mills ratio.
In this study, the process that determines plant survival during the crisis is assumed to be the 
same as the one that determines the performance impact of the crisis. In other words, the 
same sets of explanatory variables included in equation 8.2 are included in equation 8.3. 
Although financial distress is likely to be the main determinants of the survival, Geroski and 
Gregg (1997) and Schary (1991) pointed out that the decision to put a firm into receivership 
may be constrained by firm characteristics, such as size (Jovanovic 1982; Ghemawat and 
Nalebuff 1985), age (Jovanovic 1982) and financial leverage (Jones 1987; Schary 1991).
8.3 Econometric results1
The regression results relating to the plant- and industry-specific determinants of the 
performance impact of the crisis are reported in Table 8.2. They are the results from OLS 
estimation of the second stage of the Heckman selection model, using the percentage 
difference of all performance measures (real value added, real gross output, employment, real 
value added per labour and price-cost margin) as the dependent variables.
1 Unless otherwise stated, the results are computed by the author from the data base.
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The F-test for overall statistical significance passes at the 1 per cent level. Meanwhile, the 
White’s robust F- and t-statistics were used to correct for heteroscedasticity. Graphical 
examination and heteroscedasticity tests (Cook-Weisberg and White) at the experimental 
stage reveal that the variance is not homogenous.
The results presented in the table have been controlled for the presence of outliers. The 
examination for the presence of outliers was done in the experimental stage using the Hadi 
(1992) method. Introducing a dummy variable which identifies the outliers improved the 
results as it helps the results pass the Pregibon (1980) specification test (commonly known as 
the link-test), even though it was not able to pass the results from Ramsey’s specification test 
(i.e. RESET test). Therefore, the concern that the estimates may be biased -  as a result of the 
limitation in the methodology to control for unobserved factors -  can be reduced. Despite 
this, the results of the equations for price-cost margin do not pass both specification tests. 
This situation persists even when some form of independent variables were introduced 
instead of the linear ones. This suggests the extent of the equations in omitting some 
important variables is quite large. Accordingly, the chance for biased estimates in these 
equations may be higher than for the other equations.
SIZE9596 and AGE9596 were introduced in their natural logarithm form. There are two reasons 
for this. First, and this is particularly for SIZE9596, previous studies often found that firm size
is non-linearly related to performance. Second, introducing the variables in their natural 
logarithm form significantly improved the model fit and specification tests.
Several alternative specifications were tried, four of which are displayed in the table. The 
first included only all plant-level variables, while the second and the third subsequently 
added the industry-level factor intensity variables ( DLI9596 and DCI9596) and competition
variables ( CR49596 , IMP9596 and ERP9596 ). Adding the competition variables in the third 
specification slightly complicates the picture. The coefficients of DLI9596 change sign from
negative to positive and become less statistically significant in several equations across the 
performance measures. This suggests much of the negative effect of being in capital- 
intensive industries is picked up by the competition variables. For this reason, the fourth 
specification experimented by excluding the industry-level factor intensity variables. The 
specification improves the results as they now depict a more consistent relationship for the
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competition variables and give slightly higher F-statistics. Accordingly, the discussion is 
based on the results of the fourth specification.
In the experimental stage, industry dummy variables were introduced progressively from 
two-digit to four-digit level of ISIC. The results are reported at four-digit level. Introducing 
the dummies at four-digit level significantly improved the model fit compared to that at the 
two-digit level. It also serves as an informal way to control for the unobserved factors. It can 
be argued that plants within an industry at this digit level might share some similar 
characteristics because the classification is quite detailed. Meanwhile, region dummy 
variables were defined at province level.
Although it is common to find low R~ from cross section regressions, the results show R2 
are rather low compared to those commonly found in plant-level studies. This suggests a lack 
of explanatory variables in the model, which is consistent with the results of Ramsey’s 
RESET tests. Nevertheless, the low R2 does not necessarily mean the model is bad. As 
pointed out by Gujarati (1995), there should be more concern with the theoretical relevance 
or logic of the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables rather than the low 
value of R2.
The coefficients of inverse Mills ratio are statistically significant in most of the equations 
apart from those for real value added. As explained, this finding implies that the disturbances 
in the performance and survival difference equation, i.e. equation 8.2 and 8.3, respectively, 
are correlated and without a correction the estimates are expected to be biased. The evidence 
on the survival bias points to the limitation of previous studies (e.g. Dwor-Frecaut et al. 
2000) as they based the analysis only on the observed firms or plants.
The use of the alternative measures of some explanatory variables (PCI 19596 , PSI\9596 , 
HHI9596 and NRP94) yielded similar results. The results are presented in Appendix 8.2. Based 
on the overall statistical significant (F-test), the discussion is based on the estimates of 
C7? 49596 , PCI295%, PSI29596 and ERP95.
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Table 8.2 The determinants of performance impact of the crisis: regression results
D ependen t variab le % A R V A it % A R O U T j t
Specification 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6
log(S IZ E i959 6) -0 .022
(1 .74)+
-0 .022
(1 .71)+
-0 .020
(1 .49)
-0 .020
(1 .46)
0.025
(2 .68)**
0 .024
(2 .57)*
log(A G E j95 9 6) -0 .077
(7 .77)**
-0 .076
(7 .65)**
-0 .076
(7 .58)**
-0 .076
(7 .59)**
-0 .046
(6 .03)**
-0 .047
(6 .01)**
F O R i .9 5 9 6 0.229
(5 .61)**
0 .230
(5 .62)**
0 .250
(5 .98)**
0.251
(6 .00)**
0.214
(7 .13)**
0 .214
(7 .12)**
G O V i9596 0.037
(0 .94)
0 .037
(0 .94)
0 .036
(0 .90)
0.035
(0 .89)
0.089
(3 .29)**
0 .090
(3 .32)**
E X P i9596 0 .184
(6 .16)**
0.181
(6 .04)**
0.198
(6 .29)**
0 .197
(6 .26)**
0 .164
(6 .80)**
0 .162
(6 .66)**
LEV j;9596 0 .002
(0 .81)
0 .002
(0 .81)
0.002
(0 .76)
0.002
(0 .76)
-0.003
(1 .14)
-0 .003
(1 .14)
IM D E P i9596 0 .069
(2 .41)*
0 .069
(2 .43)*
0.071
(2 .48)*
0.071
(2.47)*
0.034
(1 .52)
0 .034
(1 .52)
P C I2 ,9596,,) -0 .384
(1 .94)+
-0 .387
(1 .95 )+
-0 .406
(2 .02)*
-0 .407
(2 .02)*
-0 .609
(4 .69)**
-0 .609
(4 .68)**
P S I2 i9596 -0 .028
(3 .17)**
-0 .028
(3 .16)**
-0 .029
(3 .21)**
-0 .029
(3 .23)**
-0 .029
(3 .82)**
-0 .029
(3 .80)**
D E I j  9596 0.045
(0 .86)
0 .369
(1 .86)+
0.025
(0 .57)
D C I j  9596 -0 .192
(1 .42)
0.071
(0 .34)
-0 .276
(2 .48)*
GR4j 9596 0.013
(0 .05)
-0 .044
(0 .16)
I M P j  ,9596 0.008
(2 .12)*
0.008
(2.28)*
E R P j ,9 5 <a> -0 .349
(1 .75)+
-0 .277
(1 .32)
M ills ra tio -0 .052
(0 .54)
-0 .047
(0 .48)
-0.041
(0 .41)
-0 .039
(0 .39)
0 .276
(3 .57)**
0 .269
(3 .45)**
Y ear dum m y 1998 -0 .207
(11 .84)**
-0 .207
(11 .86)**
-0 .215
(11 .92)**
-0.215
(11 .92)**
-0 .186
(13 .66)**
-0 .185
(13 .57)**
Y ear dum m y 1999 -0 .232
(11 .18)**
-0 .233
(11 .20)**
-0 .240
(11 .17)**
-0 .240
(11 .17)**
-0 .336
(20 .72)**
-0 .335
(20 .57)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -0.143
(5 .78)**
-0 .144
(5 .81)**
-0 .147
(5 .74)**
-0 .147
(5 .75)**
-0.235
(12 .25)**
-0 .234
(12 .11)**
D um m y variab les 
for p rov inces Included Included Included Included Included Included
D um m y variab les 
for industries Included Included Included Included Included Included
C o nstan t 0 .370
(2 .06)*
0 .366
(2 .04)*
0 .324
(1 .48)
0 .356
(1 .64)
-0 .144
(1.11)
-0 .134
(1 .03)
R -squared  
F -sta tis tics 
S pecification  tests 
R am sey  R E S E T  
P reg ibon  L IN K  test
0.05
14.55
Pass
Pass
0.05
14.34
Pass
Pass
0.05
14.04
Pass
Pass
0.05
14.24
Pass
Pass
0.07
22 .36
N ot Pass 
Pass
0.07
21 .99
N ot Pass 
Pass
Table 8.2 continued
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D ependen t variab le % ARO UTj t % A EM PLj t
Specification 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.10 8.11 8.12
log(S IZ E i9596) 0.025
(2 .50)*
0 .026
(2 .58)**
-0 .025
(4 .88)**
-0 .026
(4 .94)**
-0 .029
(4 .97)**
-0 .029
(4 .99)**
log(ACiEi9596) -0.043
(5 .51)**
-0 .043
(5 .50)**
-0 .036
(9 .23)**
-0 .036
(9 .14)**
-0 .036
(8 .84)**
-0 .036
(8 .90)**
FOR; 9596 0.212
(6 .87)**
0.213
(6 .91)**
0.083
(5 .64)**
0 .084
(5 .67)**
0 .084
(5 .46)**
0 .084
(5 .47)**
G O V ii9596 0.093
(3 .41)**
0 .092
(3 .39)**
0 .042
(2 .11)*
0.043
(2 .13)*
0 .044
(2 .14)*
0 .044
(2 .14)*
E X P i ,9 5 9 6 0.179
(7 .02)**
0 .177
(6 .94)**
0.081
(6 .77)**
0 .079
(6 .59)**
0.081
(6 .39)**
0 .080
(6 .38)**
L E V i9596 -0.003
(1 .14)
-0.003
(1 .14)
-0.001
(1 .61)
-0.001
(1 .62)
-0.001
(1 .65)+
-0.001
(1 .65)+
IM D E P i9596 0.048
(2 .13)*
0.048
(2 .13)*
0.051
(4 .78)**
0 .052
(4 .79)**
0 .058
(5 .24)**
0 .057
(5 .23)**
PCI2,,»596,s| -0.621
(4 .69)**
-0 .622
(4 .70)**
0.662
(7 .65)**
0 .660
(7 .64)**
0 .669
(7 .55)**
0 .668
(7 .55)**
P S I2 i9596 -0 .029
(3 .83)**
-0 .029
(3 .87)**
-0 .035
(5 .47)**
-0 .035
(5 .45)**
-0 .035
(5 .35)**
-0 .035
(5 .35)**
D L Ij 9596 0.524
(2 .59)**
0 .038
(1 .63)
0 .116
(1 .69)+
D G Ij>9596 0.130
(0 .65)
-0 .129
(2 .33)*
-0 .034
(0 .41)
GR4j 9596 0.006
(0 .02)
-0.073
(0 .30)
-0 .347
(3 .39)**
-0 .380
(3 .66)**
IM Pj 9596 0.010
(2 .95)**
0.011
(3 .19)**
0 .004
(2 .75)**
0 .004
(2 .91)**
E R P i.,s(,) -0 .386
(2.48)*
-0 .287
(1 .70)+
-0 .002
(0 .03)
0.021
(0 .30)
M ills ra tio 0 .296
(3.68)**
0.302
(3 .76)**
0 .229
(5 .55)**
0 .227
(5 .46)**
0.223
(5 .01)**
0.221
(4 .96)**
Y ear dum m y 1998 -0.194
(13 .79)**
-0 .195
(13 .83)**
-0 .064
(9 .21)**
-0 .064
(9 .17)**
-0 .065
(8 .90)**
-0 .065
(8 .87)**
Y ear dum m y 1999 -0.347
(20 .55)**
-0 .347
(20 .59)**
-0 .065
(7 .65)**
-0 .065
(7 .59)**
-0 .066
(7 .34)**
-0 .066
(7 .30)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -0.243
(12 .18)**
-0 .244
(12 .23)**
-0.065
(6 .30)**
-0 .064
(6 .24)**
-0 .064
(5 .90)**
-0 .064
(5 .86)**
D um m y variab les 
for p rov inces Included Included Included Included Included Included
D um m y variab les 
for industries Included Included Included Included Included Included
C onstan t -0 .189
(1 .10)
-0 .149
(0 .86)
0 .127
(1 .99)*
0 .132
(2 .06)*
0 .356
(4 .56)**
0.379
(4 .82)**
R -squared  
F -sta tis tics 
S pecification  tests 
R am sey  R E S E T  
P reg ibon  LIN K  test
0.07
21.13
N ot Pass 
Pass
0 .07
21 .34
N ot Pass 
Pass
0.07
16.69
N ot Pass 
Pass
0.07
16.44
N ot Pass 
Pass
0 .07
15.64
N ot Pass 
Pass
0 .07
15.86
N ot Pass 
Pass
Table 8.2 continued
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Table 8.2 concluded
Dependent variable %ARVLj, %APCMjjt
Specification 8.13 8.14 8.15 8.16 8.17 8.18 8.19 8.20
log(SIZEj 9 5 % ) 0.001
(0.06)
0.002
(0.13)
0.006
(0.43)
0.006
(0.46)
0.016
(2.00)*
0.017
(2.12)*
0.016
(1.93)+
0.016
(1.92)+
log(AGEij9596) -0.043
(4.37)**
-0.042
(4.28)**
-0.042
(4.18)**
-0.042
(4.16)**
-0.013
(1.55)
-0.012
(1-45)
-0.015
(1.80)+
-0.015
(1.77)+
FORi 9 5 % 0.145
(3.67)**
0.145
(3.67)**
0.167
(4.12)**
0.168
(4.14)**
0.100
(3.52)**
0.101
(3.56)**
0.115
(3.91)**
0.115
(3.92)**
GOVj95% -0.031
(0.75)
-0.032
(0.76)
-0.033
(0.78)
-0.033
(0.78)
-0.104
(2.25)*
-0.104
(2.25)*
-0.101
(2.15)*
-0.102
(2.18)*
EXP i,9 5 9 6 0.096
(3.32)**
0.096
(3.28)**
0.110
(3.60)**
0.110
(3.57)**
0.056
(2.25)*
0.052
(2.10)*
0.058
(2.24)*
0.058
(2.24)*
LEVi>95% 0.003
(1.79)+
0.003
(1.79)+
0.003
(1.74)+
0.003
(1.74)+
-0.001
(0.57)
-0.001
(0.55)
-0.001
(0.64)
-0.001
(0.64)
IMDEPj 9 5 % 0.021
(0.79)
0.022
(0.81)
0.018
(0.67)
0.018
(0.67)
-0.031
(1.35)
-0.030
(1.30)
-0.040
(1.72)+
-0.040
(1.73)+
PCI2,9596w -1.027
(4.79)**
-1.029
(4.80)**
-1.054
(4.84)**
-1.054
(4.84)**
-0.280
(2.72)**
-0.283
(2.74)**
-0.318
(3.03)**
-0.318
(3.03)**
PSI2j 9596 -0.002
(0.19)
-0.002
(0.19)
-0.003
(0.26)
-0.003
(0.28)
-0.025
(2.43)*
-0.024
(2.40)*
-0.024
(2.36)*
-0.024
(2.37)*
D L I j i9 5 9 6 0.010
(0.20)
0.258
(1.55)
0.071
(1.57)
0.040
(0.29)
D C I j 9 5 9 6 -0.024
(0.16)
0.142
(0.77)
-0.210
(1.09)
-0.288
(1.51)
G R 4 j 9 5 9 6 0.398
(1.40)
0.385
(1.38)
0.614
(2.26)*
0.511
(1.90)+
lMPj9596 0.004
(1.06)
0.004
(1-16)
-0.002
(0.35)
-0.002
(0.29)
ERPJi95(a) -0.396
(2.03)*
-0.347
(1.74)+
-0.231
(0.84)
-0.222
(0.80)
Mills ratio -0.289
(2.96)**
-0.280
(2.86)**
-0.271
(2.68)**
-0.268
(2.64)**
-0.219
(2.72)**
-0.214
(2.67)**
-0.266
(3.24)**
-0.257
(3.13)**
Year dummy 1998 -0.142
(8.23)**
-0.143
(8.26)**
-0.148
(8.32)**
-0.149
(8.34)**
-0.014
(0.97)
-0.015
(1.01)
-0.012
(0.78)
-0.012
(0.84)
Year dummy 1999 -0.166
(8.06)**
-0.167
(8.10)**
-0.173
(8.06)**
-0.173
(8.08)**
-0.030
(1.66)+
-0.030
(1.70)+
-0.023
(1.28)
-0.025
(1.35)
Year dummy 2000 -0.077
(3.11)**
-0.079
(3.17)**
-0.081
(3.15)**
-0.082
(3.17)**
-0.036
(1-75)+
-0.037
(1.79)+
-0.026
(1.20)
-0.027
(1.28)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.275
(1.48)
0.264
(1.43)
-0.022
(0.10)
-0.019
(0.08)
0.294
(1.88)+
0.293
(1.88)+
-0.029
(0.14)
0.023
(0.11)
R-squared 
F-statistics 
Specification tests 
Ramsey RESET 
Pregibon LINK test
0.04
12.13
Not Pass 
Pass
0.04 
11.90
Not Pass 
Pass
0.04 
11.79
Not Pass 
Pass
0.04
11.98
Not Pass 
Pass
0.02
4.67
Not Pass 
Not Pass
0.02
4.63
Not Pass 
Not Pass
0.02
4.44
Not Pass 
Not Pass
0.02
4.50
Not Pass 
Not Pass
Notes:
1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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To assist the discussion, the results of the preferred specification were rewritten in Table 8.3.
Like those from descriptive analysis, the results in the table give mixed evidence on the effect 
of size. The coefficients of log(SIZE9596) are positive in the equations for output (real gross
output), labour productivity and profitability but negative for real value added and 
employment. For the positive coefficients, only those related to real gross output and price 
cost margin are statistically significant while for the negative ones, only that related to 
employment is statistically significant.
The results give only weak support to the inference from the descriptive analysis that large 
firms seem to have strongly improved their efficiency in responding to the crisis. Earlier it 
was shown that the contraction in labour productivity decreases as size increases (i.e. 
positively related). The coefficient of log(SIZE9596) in the equation for labour productivity,
although positive, is not statistically significant and has a very low t-statistic. This finding 
suggests the inference from the descriptive analysis does not necessarily apply to all large 
firms. According to the labour hoarding hypothesis (Oi 1962), one possible explanation is 
that the adjustment in employment is likely to depend on factor intensity, where the tendency 
to hoard labour is likely to be higher in firms with high capital intensity or employing many 
skilled workers. It turns out that the descriptive results support this explanation. Based on 
plant-level factor intensity variables ( PC/1, PC /2 , PSI\ , PSI2), it was found earlier that 
contraction in employment is lower in capital-intensive plants or plants possessing more 
skilled employees.
The results confirm the earlier negative relationship between firm age and contraction in 
performance, which does not lend any support for Hypothesis 2. Thus, younger firms are 
suggested to have performed better than older ones. The coefficients of log(AGE9596) are
consistently negative and statistically significant across all equations, albeit there is a weak 
statistical significance in the equation for profitability. This finding might indicate only 
younger firms benefited from higher exports due to the exchange rate depreciation. It 
supports the argument made by Ramstetter (1999, p.52) that younger plants in the industry 
may be more inclined to participate in international trade because they were established when 
the policy environment is more open. As described in Chapter 2, policies to promote exports 
had only begun to be applied in the mid 1980s.
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Table 8.3 The determinants of performance impact of the crisis: selected regression
results
Dependent variable %ARVAj t %AROUTj t %AEMPLj t %ARVLm %APCMj t
Specification 8.4 8.8 8.12 8.16 8.20
log(SIZEi 9596) -0.020
(1.46)
0.026
(2.58)**
-0.029
(4.99)**
0.006
(0.46)
0.016
(1.92)+
log(AGEj 9596) -0.076
(7.59)**
-0.043
(5.50)**
-0.036
(8.90)**
-0.042
(4.16)**
-0.015
(1.77)+
F O R i ,9 5 9 6 0.251
(6.00)**
0.213
(6.91)**
0.084
(5.47)**
0.168
(4.14)**
0.115
(3.92)**
GOVj 9596 0.035
(0.89)
0.092
(3.39)**
0.044
(2.14)*
-0.033
(0.78)
-0.102
(2.18)*
EXP 19596 0.197
(6.26)**
0.177
(6.94)**
0.080
(6.38)**
0.110
(3.57)**
0.058
(2.24)*
EEVj 9596 0.002
(0.76)
-0.003
(E14)
-0.001
(1.65)+
0.003
(1.74)+
-0.001
(0.64)
IMDEPj 9596 0.071
(2.47)*
0.048
(2.13)*
0.057
(5.23)**
0.018
(0.67)
-0.040
(1.73)+
PCI2li9s96(a) -0.407
(2.02)*
-0.622
(4.70)**
0.668
(7.55)**
-1.054
(4.84)**
-0.318
(3.03)**
PSI2.j 9 5 9 6 -0.029
(3.23)**
-0.029
(3.87)**
-0.035
(5.35)**
-0.003
(0.28)
-0.024
(2.37)*
GR4j 9596 -0.044
(0.16)
-0.073
(0.30)
-0.380
(3.66)**
0.385
(E38)
0.511
(1.90)+
IMPj 9 5 9 6 0.008
(2.28)*
0.011
(3.19)**
0.004
(2.91)**
0.004 
(E l 6)
-0.002
(0.29)
E R P j .9 5 (a) -0.277
(1.32)
-0.287
(1.70)+
0.021
(0.30)
-0.347
(1.74)+
-0.222
(0.80)
Mills ratio -0.039
(0.39)
0.302
(3.76)**
0.221
(4.96)**
-0.268
(2.64)**
-0.257
(3.13)**
Year dummy 1998 -0.215
(11.92)**
-0.195
(13.83)**
-0.065
(8.87)**
-0.149
(8.34)**
-0.012
(0.84)
Year dummy 1999 -0.240
(11.17)**
-0.347
(20.59)**
-0.066
(7.30)**
-0.173
(8.08)**
-0.025
(E35)
Year dummy 2000 -0.147
(5.75)**
-0.244
(12.23)**
-0.064
(5.86)**
-0.082
(3.17)**
-0.027
(1.28)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.356
(1.64)
-0.149
(0.86)
0.379
(4.82)**
-0.019
(0.08)
0.023
(0.11)
R-squared 
F-statistics 
Specification tests 
Ramsey RESET 
Pregibon LINK test
0.05
14.24
Pass
Pass
0.07
21.34
Not Pass 
Pass
0.07
15.86
Not Pass 
Pass
0.04
11.98
Not Pass 
Pass
0.02
4.50
Not Pass 
Not Pass
Notes:
1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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There is strong evidence on the positive effect of foreign ownership, supporting Hypothesis 
3B and confirming the finding from the descriptive analysis that plants with a higher foreign 
share responded better to the crisis. The coefficients of FOT?9596 are positive and statistically
significant across all equations. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests the 
effect of foreign ownership is economically important. A 10 per cent increase in foreign 
share leads to a smaller performance contraction by 12 per cent in real gross output, 12 per 
cent in real value added, 11 per cent in employment, 11 per cent in labour productivity and 8 
per cent in profitability.
These results provide support for the theoretical explanation concerning the positive effect of 
foreign ownership. It was argued that multinationals might have responded better than 
domestic firms because they could have been provided with financial assistance by their 
parents or were able to take advantage of the boost in competitiveness from the sharp 
exchange rate depreciation. However, at this stage it is not clear whether only one of these 
explanations dominates or both are important. An attempt to shed some light on this issue is 
provided in Section 8.4.
As for government ownership, the results provide some evidence consistent with the notion 
of limited support from government in protecting these companies. The coefficients of 
GOV9 5 9 6  indicate the contraction in profitability and labour productivity was larger for plants
with a high government ownership share. Despite this, the results indicate that to some extent 
the government exercised its power to ensure firms shed less labour. The coefficient of 
GOV9 5 9 6  is positive in the equation for employment which suggests the contraction in 
employment was lower for plants with a high government ownership share.
However, the indication contradicts the results of the equation for real gross output, which 
show a positive and statistically significant GOV9596 coefficient. This ambiguous finding
perhaps reflects the low government ownership share in many Indonesian manufacturing 
plants in the mid 1990s. As described in Chapter 2, some major investment deregulations had 
been undertaken since the early part of the decade.
The results show a robust finding that export oriented plants performed better than domestic 
oriented ones, supporting Hypothesis 4. The coefficients of EXP9596 are consistently positive
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and statistically significant across the equations. As with foreign ownership, the effect of 
sales orientation is economically important. A 10 per cent increase in exported output (as a 
ratio to total output) lowers the performance contraction by 9 per cent in real gross output, 10 
per cent in real value added, 11 per cent in employment, 7 per cent in labour productivity and 
4 per cent in profitability.
The finding agrees with the theoretical prediction on the positive impact of exchange rate 
depreciation and supports similar findings from other studies (e.g. Forbes 2000b; Bappenas 
2000; Blalock and Gertler 2005).
Even so, the positive impact of sales orientation is expected to be different between the peak 
of the crisis and the early recovery period. As described in Chapter 3, the increase in 
competitiveness in 1998 did not last long, as a nominal appreciation took place in 1999 and 
2000 .
Plants that use large imported input are demonstrated to have responded well to the crisis. 
The coefficients of IMDEP9596 are positive in the equation for output, employment and labour
productivity and most are statistically significant. These results do not support Hypothesis 6 
and the theory that a high share of imported input outweighs the increased competitiveness 
from exchange rate depreciation. It is only in the equations for profitability that the 
coefficient supports the hypothesis: it is negative and very statistically significant.
There are two possible reasons for this. First, the effect of IMDEP9596 might have been
captured by the variables that represent factor intensity, since capital-intensive firms 
commonly intensively use imported inputs. However, the results presented in Appendix 8.2 
do not support this explanation. The sign of the coefficients does not change when the 
equations are specified without the factor intensity variables. Second, the effect of import 
dependency might have varied between the peak of the crisis and early recovery and/or 
depended on sales orientation. As noted, some nominal exchange rate appreciation took place 
in 1999-2000. Meanwhile, the interrelationship between sales orientation might have been 
possible because higher costs for imported input due to the exchange rate depreciation could 
be matched by higher export revenues.
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The results do not provide a clear picture on the effect of firm financial leverage and whether 
it was important in shaping the firms’ responses. The coefficients of LEV9596 are evenly
divided between positive and negative across the equations and only a few are statistically 
significant, not to mention only at the 10 per cent level. Therefore, the results do not support 
the theoretical explanation on the negative impact of leverage that works through the balance 
sheet effect and bank lending channel. Moreover, they do not support the results from 
previous studies. For example Claessens et al. (2000) found a negative relationship between 
leverage and profit margin during the peak of the crisis for firms in the crisis-affected 
countries.
There are at least four explanations for the mixed results. First, the proxy for leverage used in 
this study is very approximate. Second, the proxy is not able to differentiate between short- 
and long-term debt. Long-term debt might change the results as it might increase the 
possibility for postponing increased interest payments. Third, much of the effect of leverage 
might have been taken by other variables, namely size and age. Larger and older firms are 
likely to have been more successful in arranging debt or interest repayment with lenders, 
because they have more reputation and credibility in the view of lenders compared with small 
or younger firms. Finally, the effect of leverage might have depended on the other firm 
characteristics. The test of this general hypothesis is presented in Section 8.4.
The results support the earlier observations in the descriptive analysis on the importance of 
factor intensity. PCI29596 and PSI29596 are negatively related to the difference in output,
labour productivity and profitability, and most of the variable coefficients are statistically 
significant. Thus, the results indicate the contraction in output, labour productivity and 
profitability was higher for plants which are capital intensive and employ high levels of 
skilled labour. This finding strongly supports Hypothesis 7B and 7C.
The negative coefficients of PCI29596 agree with the theory that exchange rate depreciation 
improves the competitiveness of firms in depreciating countries by lowering relative labour 
costs. Meanwhile, the positive coefficient of PCI29596 in the equation for employment is
consistent with the labour hoarding hypothesis (Oi 1962). It implies the contraction in 
employment was lower for plants which are capital intensive. This finding is also consistent 
with those from previous studies. Manning (2000) indicated that adjustment to the crisis in
2 See the discussion on the proxy for financial leverage in Section 7.3.
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the Indonesian labour market works through the adjustment in wages rather than in 
employment. Meanwhile, Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000) found there were manufacturing firms 
that experienced a large fall in capacity utilisation rate during the peak of the crisis but was 
accompanied by only a small contraction rate in employment.
A similar conclusion can be derived when the factor intensity variables are represented by 
industry-level variables ( DRJ9596, DLI9596 and DCI9596) (see specification 8.2, 8.6, 8.10, 8.14
and 8.18 in Table 8.2). After controlling for other plant characteristics, on average, plants in 
capital intensive industries contracted more than plants in resource-intensive industries. This 
is shown by the negative coefficients of DCI9596 in all equations, even though only a few are
statistically significant (DRJ9596 here is used as the base dummy variable). The positive 
coefficients of DLI9596 in the equations suggest plants in labour-intensive industries
performed better than plants in resource-intensive industries. Nevertheless, none of them is 
statistically significant, which suggests performance of plants in these two industries was 
relatively similar.
The results provide inconsistent estimates regarding the CR49596 variable. The coefficients are
negative in the equations for output and employment but positive in the equations for labour 
productivity and profitability. Despite these inconsistent estimates, the negative coefficients 
point to a suggestion that firms did not, or perhaps were not able to, exercise market power in 
responding to the crisis. This provides support for the theory that collusive agreements tend 
to break down during low demand situations.
It is important to note that the positive CR49596 coefficient in the equation for profitability
might have been brought about by the weakness of price-cost margin as a proxy for 
profitability. As discussed in Chapter 6, price-cost margin is more appropriate for use in 
models explaining market power, and in these models, theory predicts that industry 
concentration and price-cost margin is positively related. Thus, what was observed might not 
reflect the true relationship between concentration and the difference in profitability, and 
instead might reflect the relationship between concentration and market power.
In contrast to the inference derived in the descriptive analysis, there is now a clearer picture 
on the effect of competition from imports. First, the performance of plants in industries with
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low import competition is indicated to have been adversely affected by the crisis. IMP9596 is
positively related to the performance difference in all equations except that for profitability, 
and most of these coefficients are statistically significant.
Second, the results suggest the performance of plants in protected industries was more 
adversely affected by the crisis than those in less protected industries. The coefficients of 
ERP95 are negative in all equations but only two are statistically significant (in the equation 
for real value added and real value added per labour), even though only at the 10 per cent 
level. This finding is consistent with the previous finding on IMP9596 and hence supports the
X-inefficiency hypothesis which predicts that firms in less competitive industries tend to 
operate less efficiently as a result of high managerial slackness.
Table 8.4 presents the results of alternative specifications using the dummy ownership 
variables ( DPRJi , DFORt and D S O E Two specifications have been used for every
difference equation: first, all continues ownership-variables are replaced by dummy 
ownership-variables and second, an interaction variable between dummy for foreign plants 
(DFORj) and the share of foreign ownership ( FOR() is added to the first specification.
DPRIj is used as the base dummy variable. In the first specification, the coefficients of 
DFOR: and DSOE: give the difference in the average performance expansion (contraction)
of foreign and government plants, respectively, relative to domestic-private plants for the 
1998-2000 period. The first specification serves as a kind of robustness test for the results 
presented earlier in Table 8.3 while the second specification serves as a test for Hypothesis 
3C. The coefficients of the interaction variable in the second specification give estimates of 
the large relative differences in the expansion (contraction) across plants with different 
foreign ownership shares.
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Table 8.4 The determinants of performance impact of the crisis: regression results
using dummy ownership variables
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le % A R V A it % A R O U T it % A E M P F it
S p e c if ic a t io n 8 . 2 1  8 . 2 2 8 .2 3 8 .2 4 8 .2 5  8 .2 6
lo g (S IZ E j 9596) - 0 . 0 2 1
(1 .5 5 )
-0 .0 1 9
(1 .4 3 )
0 .0 2 5
(2 .4 8 )*
0 .0 2 6
(2 .5 6 )*
-0 .0 2 9
(4 .9 5 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(4 .9 6 )* *
lo g ( A G E i)9 5 96) -0 .0 7 8
(7 .8 0 )* *
-0 .0 7 7
(7 .6 6 )* *
-0 .0 4 5
(5 .7 1 )* *
-0 .0 4 4
(5 .5 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(8 .8 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(8 .9 0 )* *
D F O R i9596 0 .1 4 4
(4 .7 8 )* *
- 0 . 2 2 1
(2 .6 4 )* *
0 .1 2 4
(5 .5 9 )* *
-0 .1 8 1
(2 .6 2 )* *
0 .0 5 3
(4 .9 8 )* *
-0 .0 3 2
( 1 . 1 2 )
D F O R j  9596* F O R i 9596 0 .5 3 5
(4 .5 8 )* *
0 .4 4 8
(4 .6 6 )* *
0 .1 2 6
(3 .0 2 )* *
D G O V i9596 0 .0 5 3
(1 .5 5 )
0 .0 5 0
(1 .4 7 )
0 .1 0 8
(4 .5 7 )* *
0 .1 0 5
(4 .4 7 )* *
0 .0 3 7
(2 .0 9 )*
0 .0 3 7
(2 .0 6 )*
E X P  J9596 0 . 2 1 0
(6 .6 9 )* *
0 .1 9 1
(6 .0 6 )* *
0 .1 8 9
(7 .4 3 )* *
0 .1 7 2
(6 .7 4 )* *
0 .0 8 5
(6 .7 5 )* *
0 .0 8 0
(6 .3 2 )* *
L E V ii9 5 9 6 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .7 2 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .8 1 )
-0 .0 0 3
( 1 .1 7 )
-0 .0 0 3
( 1 . 1 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 1
(1 .7 0 )+
- 0 . 0 0 1
(1 .6 3 )
I M D E P j  9596 0 .0 8 1
(2 .8 0 )* *
0 .0 7 8
( 2 .6 8 )* *
0 .0 5 7
(2 .4 8 )*
0 .0 5 4
(2 .3 6 )*
0 .0 5 9
(5 .3 8 )* *
0 .0 5 8
(5 .3 0 )* *
P C I 2 j 9596<a) -0 .4 1 2
(2 .0 4 )*
-0 .3 7 0
(1 .8 3 )+
-0 .6 2 0
(4 .7 0 )* *
-0 .5 8 9
(4 .4 4 )* *
0 .6 6 5
(7 .4 9 )* *
0 .6 7 5
(7 .6 0 )* *
P S I 2 j 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 2 9
(3 .3 0 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(3 .2 6 )* *
-0 .0 3 0
(4 .0 3 )* *
-0 .0 3 0
(3 .9 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 5
(5 .4 1 )* *
-0 .0 3 5
(5 .3 9 )* *
E R 4 j i9596 -0 .0 3 6
(0 .1 3 )
-0 .0 3 7
(0 .1 3 )
-0 .0 6 4
(0 .2 6 )
-0 .0 6 1
( 0 .2 5 )
-0 .3 8 2
(3 .6 8 )* *
-0 .3 7 8
(3 .6 4 )* *
I M P j ,9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 8
(2 .2 8 )*
0 .0 0 8
(2 .2 6 )*
0 . 0 1 1
(3 .1 8 )* *
0 . 0 1 1
(3 .1 6 )* *
0 .0 0 4
(2 .9 0 )* *
0 .0 0 4
(2 .8 9 )* *
E R P i.m *3' -0 .2 8 1
(1 .3 3 )
-0 .2 5 6
( 1 .2 2 )
-0 .2 9 1
( 1 .7 2 ) +
-0 .2 7 0
(1 .6 0 )
0 .0 1 7
(0 .2 5 )
0 .0 2 3 4
(0 .3 4 )
M il ls  ra tio -0 .0 4 3
(0 .4 4 )
-0 .0 4 8
(0 .4 9 )
0 .2 9 8
(3 .7 3 )* *
0 .2 9 2
(3 .6 4 )* *
0 .2 2 4
(5 .0 3 )* *
0 .2 1 9
(4 .9 3 )* *
Y e a r  d u m m y  1998 -0 .2 1 4
(1 1 .9 1 )* *
-0 .2 1 4
(1 1 .8 9 )* *
-0 .1 9 4
(1 3 .8 2 )* *
-0 .1 9 4
(1 3 .7 7 )* *
-0 .0 6 5
(8 .9 2 )* *
-0 .0 6 5
(8 .8 5 )* *
Y e a r  d u m m y  19 9 9 -0 .2 4 0
(1 1 .1 8 )* *
-0 .2 3 9
(1 1 .1 4 )* *
-0 .3 4 7
(2 0 .6 1 )* *
-0 .3 4 6
(2 0 .5 3 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(7 .3 5 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(7 .2 8 )* *
Y e a r  d u m m y  2 0 0 0 -0 .1 4 6
(5 .7 4 )* *
-0 .1 4 6
(5 .7 1 )* *
-0 .2 4 3
(1 2 .2 3 )* *
-0 .2 4 2
(1 2 .1 6 )* *
-0 .0 6 4
(5 .9 1 )* *
-0 .0 6 4
(5 .8 4 )* *
D u m m y  v a r ia b le s  
fo r  p ro v in c e s In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d
D u m m y  v a r ia b le s  
fo r  in d u s tr ie s In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d
C o n s ta n t 0 .3 6 5
( 1 .6 8 )+
0 .3 5 9
( 1 .6 6 )+
-0 .1 4 0
(0 .8 1 )
-0 .1 4 4
(0 .8 3 )
0 .3 7 9
(4 .8 2 )* *
0 .3 8 0
(4 .8 4 )* *
R -s q u a re d
F - s ta t is t ic s
0 .0 5
1 4 .1 7
0 .0 5
1 4 .1 5
0 .0 7
2 1 .3 6
0 .0 7
2 1 .2 6
0 .0 7
15 .9
0 .0 7
15 .7 6
Table 8.4 continued
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Table 8.4 concluded
Dependent variable %ARVLit %APCMi>t
Specification 8.27 8.28 8.29 8.30
log(SIZEi9596) 0.005
(0.38)
0.007
(0.49)
0.015
(1.82)+
0.016
(1.85)+
log(AGEi9596) -0.044
(4.35)**
-0.042
(4.22)**
-0.015
(1.87)+
-0.015
(1.85)+
DFOR; 9596 0.091
(3.11)**
-0.187
(2.38)*
0.081
(3.95)**
0.025
(0.44)
DFOR; 9596*FORi 9596 0.407
(3.74)**
0.082
(1.02)
DGOV; 9596 -0.009
(0.26)
-0.012
(0.33)
-0.076
(2.00)*
-0.077
(2.00)*
EXP j9596 0.119
(3.89)**
0.104
(3.39)**
0.061
(2.37)*
0.058
(2.22)*
LEVi9596 0.003
(1.71)+
0.003
(1.80)+
-0.001
(0.67)
-0.001
(0.65)
IMDEPi9596 0.027
(0.97)
0.024
(0.87)
-0.040
(1.72)+
-0.041
(1.75)+
PCI2i,95%<a) -1.058
(4.85)**
-1.025
(4.68)**
-0.324
(3.09)**
-0.321
(3.04)**
PSI2i>9596 -0.003
(0.28)
-0.003
(0.27)
-0.024
(2.36)*
-0.024
(2.36)*
CR4jj95% 0.393
(1.41)
0.388
(1.40)
0.511
(1.90)+
0.511
(1.90)+
IMPj 9596 0.004
(1.17)
0.004
(1.15)
-0.002
(0.28)
-0.002
(0.28)
ERPj,95(a) -0.347
(1.74)+
-0.329
(1.66)+
-0.228
(0.82)
-0.224
(0.80)
Mills ratio -0.275
(2.72)**
-0.275
(2.72)**
-0.258
(3.13)**
-0.259
(3.15)**
Year dummy 1998 -0.148
(8.31)**
-0.148
(8.31)**
-0.012
(0.83)
-0.012
(0.82)
Year dummy 1999 -0.172
(8.05)**
-0.172
(8.05)**
-0.025
(1.34)
-0.024
(1.33)
Year dummy 2000 -0.080
(3.13)**
-0.080
(3.13)**
-0.027
(1-27)
-0.027
(1.26)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.011
(0.05)
-0.017
(0.08)
0.024
(0.12)
0.023
(0.11)
R-squared
F-statistics
0.04
11.91
0.04
11.9
0.02
4.5
0.02
4.46
Notes:
1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10% 
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 10 to improve presentation.
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The first specification gives a similar picture to that illustrated by Table 8.3. The average 
expansion (contraction) in performance over the period 1998-2000 was higher (lower) for 
foreign plants relative to domestic-private plants, as the coefficients of DFOR9596 are positive
in all equations. The mixed finding concerning government ownership can also be observed. 
For government plants, the average contraction in output is suggested to have been lower 
than the average contraction in employment. Nevertheless, the finding remains that suggests 
government plants contracted more in terms of profitability.
For the second specification, the positive coefficients of the DFOR9596* FOR9S9() and the 
negative coefficients of FOR9596 across all equations provide support for Hypothesis 3C. All
of these coefficients, apart from those of the equation for profitability, are statistically 
significant. This finding supports the argument that parent companies might restrict their 
affiliates access to knowledge, either in technology or global market network.
The parameter estimates of the second specification are used to estimate the minimum 
foreign share required to have at least zero percentage difference in performance (i.e. 
%Ay// = 0 ). The computational results are given in Table 8.5. The table shows the estimates
are quite large, i.e., about 50 per cent or greater. Based on these estimates, it can be 
concluded that foreign plants did not necessarily perform better than other plants. Only those 
with a very high share of foreign ownership are indicated to have performed well compared 
with other plants.
Table 8.5 The estimates of foreign share for which %Ay, , = 0 is equal to zero
Performance measures
Real
value added
Real
output
Employment Real value added 
per labor
41 40 25 46
Note: The estimates were computed based only on the significant coefficients
of FOR9596 and DFOR9596*FOR9596 
Source: Regression results in Table 8.4 .
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Table 8.6 reports the probit regression results relating to the determinants of survival during 
the period 1997-2000. They correspond to the OLS regression results presented in Tables 8.3 
and 8.4. The probit regressions are the first step in the Heckman selection model.
The equations pass the overall significance test (Wald Chi ) at the 1 percent level and the 
specification test (Pregibon’s link-test). At the experimental stage, SIZE9596 and AGE9596
were specified in their linear form. However, this specification is not used at the end because 
introducing the variables in their natural logarithm form produces a significantly better model 
fit (Pseudo R2). Using the non-linear specifications, the pseudo R2 increase in the range of 7 
to 14 percentage points across the equations presented in Table 8.6.
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Table 8.6 The determinants of survival: regression results
Dependent variable S i ,
Specification 8.31 8.32 8.33 8.34 8.35 8.36
log(SIZEi9596) 0.405
(35.81)**
0.403
(35.66)**
0.406
(34.96)**
0.406
(34.97)**
0.406
(34.81)**
0.406
(34.83)**
log(AGEj 9596) 0.203
(24.95)**
0.204
(25.03)**
0.199
(24.21)**
0.199
(24.21)**
0.199
(24.17)**
0.199
(24.21)**
F O R i , 9 5 9 6 0.087
(1.92)+
0.091
(2.37)*
0.079
(2.16)*
0.080
(2.16)*
GOVi 9 5 9 6 -0.025
(0.34)
-0.023
(0.32)
-0.047
(0.64)
-0.046
(0.64)
DFORj 9 5 9 6 0.044
(1.65)+
-0.097
(1.26)
DFORj 9596*FORj 9 5 9 6 0.204
( 1 .8 8 )+
DGOVi 9 5 9 6 -0.005
(0.08)
-0.005
(0.09)
EXP i,9596 0.028
(1.58)
0.017
(1.59)
0.017
(1.57)
0.028
(1.57)
0.023
(1.56)
0.030
(1.59)
L E V j i9596 0.009
(0.69)
0.009
(0.43)
0.009
(0 . 1 0 )
0.009
(0.13)
0.009
(0.03)
0.009
(0 .2 0 )
IMDEP j 9 5 9 6 0.034
(0.85)
0.035
(0.89)
0.036
(0.89)
0.036
(0.90)
0.040
( 1 .0 0 )
0.040
( 1 .0 0 )
PCI2i.»5, 6,*) -0.139
(0.57)
-0.142
(0.58)
-0.048
(0.18)
-0.049
(0.18)
-0.048
(0.18)
-0.041
(0.15)
PSI2i 9 5 9 6 -0.051
(3.94)**
-0.050
(3.87)**
-0.052
(4.15)**
-0.052
(4.17)**
-0.053
(4.21)**
-0.053
(4.19)**
DLIj 9 5 9 6 0.265
(3.05)**
0.435
(2.40)*
DGTj 9 5 9 6 - 0 . 1 1 1
(0.56)
0.183
(0.79)
C R 4 j>95% -2.687
(7.01)**
-2.704
(7.15)**
-2.699
(7.13)**
-2.698
(7.13)**
I M P j 9596 -0.004
(0.49)
-0.003
(0.46)
-0.003
(0.47)
-0.003
(0.47)
E R P j,« * ” -0 . 0 0 1
(2.73)**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.56)*
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.56)*
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.55)*
Year dummy 1998 -0.333
(13.77)**
-0.333
(13.77)**
-0.336
(13.74)**
-0.336
(13.74)**
-0.336
(13.74)**
-0.336
(13.74)**
Year dummy 1999 -0.454
(19.02)**
-0.454
(19.02)**
-0.457
(18.92)**
-0.457
(18.92)**
-0.457
(18.92)**
-0.457
(18.92)**
Year dummy 2000 -0.581
(24.56)**
-0.581
(24.56)**
-0.581
(24.29)**
-0.581
(24.29)**
-0.581
(24.29)**
-0.581
(24.29)**
Dummy variables for provinces Included Included Included Included Included Included
Dummy variables for industries Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -1.727
(10.72)**
-1.711
(10.61)**
-0.062
(0 .2 2 )
-0.054
(0.19)
-0.056
(0 .2 0 )
-0.061
(0 .2 1 )
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chi2 
Specification test 
Pregibon LINK test
0.14
3737.7
Pass
0.14
3774.3
Pass
0.14
3657.0
Pass
0.14
3648.5
Pass
0.14
3637.8
Pass
0.14
3642.5
Pass
Notes:
1) Robust Z statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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The table shows that size and age are important in increasing plant survival probability 
during the 1997-2000 period. The coefficients of log(SIZE9596) and log(^G£9596) are
positive, large and statistically very significant. This finding is in line with findings in the 
literature on the determinants of firm survival. As is often argued in this literature, the finding 
supports the argument that larger firms are less financially constrained and closer to the 
industry’s optimal efficient size.
In the context of this period where many firms were experiencing financial difficulties, the 
finding suggests banks were willing to bear the risk in allowing large firms to keep operating. 
This suggestion is based on the argument that the extent of credit rationing is significantly 
lower in large firms (Petersen and Rajan 1994). As explained, this is likely because banks 
have better information on the investment opportunities of large firms relative to those of 
small ones.
The finding on age provides supporting evidence for the importance of experience. As with 
the finding on size, it is also in line with the findings in most general studies that examine the 
determinants of firm survival. In particular, it supports the theory of passive learning 
(Jovanovic 1982) which posits that firms over time learn their costs and decide whether to 
expand, contract or exit. The firms which do survive are older firms that have accumulated 
experience and assets, making them stronger and lowering the probability of failure in the 
event of economic shocks. The finding also supports the hypothesis that credit rationing is 
less severe for older firms (Diamond 1991).
The probability of survival was higher for foreign and export-oriented firms. The coefficients 
of variables that represent foreign ownership ( FOR9596 and DFOR9596) are positive and
statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the previous results on performance 
difference equations (i.e. Table 8.3 and 8.4). A consistently positive effect is also found for 
the interaction variable of FOR9596 * DFOR9596, albeit only statistically significant at the 10 per
cent level. This finding supports the comment made earlier that the success of foreign firms 
in responding to the crisis depended on the degree of the foreign share.
Unlike the finding on foreign ownership, the positive coefficients of EXP959b are only
statistically significant at the 12 per cent level. Thus, export oriented plants were not more 
likely to survive than domestic-oriented ones. Perhaps the finding reflects the effect of many
190
factors contributing to the sluggish export performance during the crisis. As reviewed in 
Chapter 4, these factors include the seasonal weak demand in 1995 and 1996, depreciation of 
Japanese yen against US dollars, contraction of credit supply during the period and some 
structural- and political-related factors (political turmoil which resulted in cancellation of 
export orders, rejection of letters of credit from Indonesian banks and a lack of supply of 
containers).
Factor intensity is another important factor that determines survival. The results indicate that 
firm survival during the period was lower for firms that employed many skilled workers, as 
PSI29596 is negative and statistically significant. This finding supports earlier comment and 
other studies (Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Manning, 2000) which indicate labour hoarding.
The coefficient of DLI9596 is positive and statistically significant, indicating that plants in
labour-intensive industries survived better than firms in resource-intensive industries. This 
finding is in line with our earlier finding on the performance difference equation, which 
points to a positive impact on competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. 
The higher survival chance perhaps reflects the success of these firms in mitigating the extent 
of financial distress with large sales revenue from exports. As described in Chapter 2, many 
plants in labour intensive industries are also export-oriented.
Finally, the coefficients of C/?49596 and ERP95 are negative and statistically significant, 
indicating the survival chance was lower for firms in concentrated and protected industries. 
While the finding on CR49596 is in line with the earlier finding from the performance
difference equation, the finding on ERP95 now provides even more convincing evidence on 
the importance of industry protection in determining the success of the plants in responding 
the crisis. Earlier in Table 8.3 ERP95 was only weakly, negatively related to differences in
performance. Accordingly, the finding provides more evidence for the X-inefficiency 
hypothesis. A conclusion thus can be drawn that more exposure to import competition prior 
to the crisis contributed positively to the success of firms in responding to the crisis.
8.3.1 Do the effect of the characteristics change over time?
This section examines whether the effect of the characteristics observed earlier changed 
during the 1997-2000 period. It is natural to expect some of the effects might have changed
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as the economy began to recover in 1999. Indeed, the descriptive analysis has shown that 
some of the observed patterns changed over this period.
Table 8.7 compares of the regression results for every year within the period 1998-2000. The 
results for 1997 are not presented as the crisis only began in the last quarter of that year. The 
results were derived by regressing equation 8.2 separately instead of using the dummy- 
variables approach (i.e. by having many interaction variables between the time dummy 
variables and explanatory variables). The separate-regression approach was employed 
because it was revealed at the experimental stage that the variances of the separate 
regressions are statistically different, and in such a situation regressing the equation by the 
dummy-variable approach would result in inefficient estimates (Gujarati 1995). Except for 
the difference in employment, the Chow tests presented in Appendix 8.3 conclude that the 
regression lines across the years are statistically different, providing another justification for 
examining the equation separately.
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Table 8.7 The determinants of performance impact of the crisis: separate regression
results
D ependen t variab le % A R V A l t % A R O U T l t
Y ear 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
S pecification 8.37 8.38 8.39 8.40 8.41 8.42
log(SIZEj 9596) -0 .030
(0 .98)
0 .050
(1 .76)+
0 .049
(1 .5 1 )
0 .027
(1 .17 )
0.051
(2 .11)*
0.083
(3 .09)**
log(A G Ej 9596) -0 .092
(3 .76)**
-0 .052
(2 .39)*
-0 .049
(2 .03)*
-0 .045
(2 .37)*
-0 .032
(1 .74)+
-0 .028
(1 .37)
FOR; 9 5 9 6 0.245
(2 .62)**
0 .304
(3 .63)**
0 .420
(5 .01)**
0 .192
(2 .84)**
0.241
(3 .60)**
0 .356
(5 .52)**
G O V i 9 5 9 6 0.095
(1 .23)
-0 .010
(0 .12)
0 .018
(0 .20)
0 .092
(1-67)+
0.108
(1 .79)+
0 .126
(2 .01)*
E X P i<95 9 6 0 .314
(4 .90)**
0 .226
(3 .40)**
0 .142
(2 .01)*
0 .328
(6 .39)**
0.183
(3 .25)**
0 .112
(1 .89 )+
L E V ii9 5 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 0
(0 .09)
0 .004
(1 .00)
0 .004
(0 .80)
-0 .005
(0 .82)
-0 .002
(0 .37)
-0 .002
(0 .34)
I M D E P j  9 5 9 6 0.016
(0 .26)
0 .062
(1 .03)
0 .137
(2 .20)*
0 .016
(0 .34)
0 .014
(0 .29)
0 .084
(1 .64)
PCI2i,9596(a) -0 .574
(1 .39)
-0 .683
(1 .54)
-0 .637
(1 .53)
-0 .579
(2 .28)*
-0 .739
(2 .63)**
-0 .729
(2 .58)**
PSI2j 9 5 9 6 -0 .029
(1 .57)
-0 .037
(1 .82 )+
-0 .058
(2 .97)**
-0 .026
(1 .66 )+
-0 .045
(2 .32)*
-0 .044
(2 .66)**
GR4j 9 5 9 6 0.047
(0 .08)
-0 .425
(0 .64)
-0 .316
(0 .47)
0 .040
(0 .08)
-0.461
(0 .84)
-0 .213
(0 .34)
I M P j  9 5 9 6 0.015
(1 .84)+
0.011
(1 .29)
0 .010
(1 .11)
0 .016
(2 .41)*
0.011
(1 .51)
0 .005
(0 .59)
E R P j . , 5 0 0 -0 .119
(0 .26)
-0.551
(1 .25)
-0 .258
(0 .56)
-0 .082
(0 .28)
-0.381
(0 .97)
-0 .380
(0 .87)
M ills  ra tio -0.091
(0 .41)
0 .310
(1 .64)
0.431
(2 .10)*
0 .305
(1 .70 )+
0.491
(2 .98)**
0 .622
(3 .49)**
D um m y variab les 
for p rov inces Included Included Inc luded Included Included Included
D um m y variab les 
for industrie s Included Included Inc luded Included Included Included
C o n stan t 0 .234
(0 .52)
-0 .316
(0 .64)
-0 .647
(1 .35)
-0 .088
(0 .26)
-0 .635
(1 .65)+
-1 .315
(3 .05)**
R -squarcd
F -sta tistics
0 .06
4 .26
0.08
5.71
0.07
5.07
0 .09
7.38
0.09
6.65
0.08
5.69
Table 8.7  continued
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D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le % A E M P L j t % A R V L U
Y e a r 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
S p e c if ic a t io n 8 .4 3 8 .4 4 8 .4 5 8 .4 6 8 .4 7 8 .4 8
l0 g (S IZ E 1,9596) -0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 4 6 -0 .0 4 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 9 3 0 .0 8 8
(2 .6 9 )* * (2 .9 7 )* * (2 .6 2 )* * (0 .0 8 ) (3 .1 6 )* * (2 .6 1 )* *
lo g (A G E j<9596) -0 .0 3 0 -0 .0 4 9 -0 .0 6 1 -0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 0 6 0 .0 1 0
(2 .9 2 )* * (4 .6 1 )* * (5 .5 6 )* * (2 .5 5 )* (0 .2 7 ) (0 .3 9 )
F O R i.9 5 9 6 0 .1 0 4 0 .0 7 2 0 .0 9 6 0 .1 4 2 0 .2 3 3 0 .3 2 4
(3 .3 5 )* * (2 .2 3 )* (2 .7 8 )* * (1 -5 4 ) (2 .9 4 )* * (4 .0 6 )* *
G O V j 9596 0 .0 9 5 0 .0 6 8 0 .0 5 9 -0 .0 2 4 -0 .1 0 4 -0 .0 6 7
(2 .2 6 )* (1 .5 4 ) (1 .2 8 ) (0 .3 0 ) (1 .1 0 ) (0 .6 8 )
E X P  i 9 596 0 .0 8 9 0 .1 2 2 0 .1 1 0 0 .2 1 9 0 .0 9 8 0 .0 2 5
(3 .5 6 )* * (4 .4 1 )* * (3 .7 1 )* * (3 .4 4 )* * (1 .5 3 ) (0 .3 7 )
L E V i(9596 -0 .0 0 1 -0 .0 0 2 -0 .0 0 2 0 .001 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 6
(0 .6 5 ) (1 .0 6 ) (0 .9 6 ) (0 .1 4 ) (1 .9 2 )+ (1 .6 1 )
IM D E P j 9596 0 .0 4 9 0 .0 3 3 0 .0 6 4 -0 .0 2 8 0 .0 3 3 0 .0 7 9
(2 .2 2 )* (1 .3 8 ) (2 .4 8 )* (0 .4 8 ) (0 .5 9 ) (1 .3 4 )
P C I 2 ,959(,,a) 0 .8 0 0 0 .7 1 9 0 .7 8 2 -1 .3 5 4 -1 .3 8 0 -1 .3 9 4
(4 .2 4 )* * (3 .6 6 )* * (3 .9 5 )* * (3 .0 3 )* * (2 .8 2 )* * (3 .0 1 )* *
P S I2 ; 9596 -0 .0 4 6 -0 .0 3 6 -0 .0 3 1 0 .0 0 8 -0 .0 1 0 -0 .0 3 6
(3 .5 8 )* * (2 .4 2 )* (2 .3 4 )* (0 .3 2 ) (0 .3 5 ) (1 .3 9 )
CR-4jj9596 -0 .5 2 7 -0 .4 7 5 -0 .2 2 3 0 .6 2 6 0 .0 9 7 -0 .0 3 2
(2 .5 2 )* (2 .1 1 )* (0 .8 1 ) (1 .1 0 ) (0 .1 5 ) (0 .0 5 )
I M P j9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 8 0 .011 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 2
(1 .4 9 ) (1 .7 5 )+ (1 .9 3 )+ (1 .3 2 ) (0 .6 2 ) (0 .1 7 )
E R P j,« '* ' -0 .0 6 1 0 .151 0 .1 3 5 -0 .0 9 9 -0 .7 5 6 -0 .4 4 3
(0 .4 5 ) (0 .9 8 ) (0 .7 7 ) (0 .2 3 ) (1 .9 1 )+ (1 .0 5 )
M il ls  r a t io 0 .1 9 5 0 .1 3 7 0 .1 4 8 -0 .2 9 9 0 .171 0 .2 7 2
(1 .8 9 )+ (1 .3 4 ) (1 .4 0 ) (1 .2 8 ) (0 .8 8 ) (1 .2 9 )
D u m m y  v a r ia b le s  
fo r  p ro v in c e s In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d
D u m m y  v a r ia b le s  
fo r  in d u s t r ie s In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d In c lu d e d
C o n s ta n t 0 .4 3 4 0 .6 2 0 0 .391 -0 .1 9 1 -0 .9 3 4 -1 .0 3 3
(2 .8 2 )* * (3 .6 0 )* * (1 .9 2 )+ (0 .4 1 ) (1 .8 6 )+ (2 .1 5 )*
R -s q u a re d 0 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 7
F -s ta t is t ic s 5 .7 2 4 .9 8 4 .8 9 3 .3 4 5 .8 4 5 .0 0
Table 8.7  continued
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Table 8.7 concluded
Dependent variable %APCMj t
Year 1998 1999 2000
Specification 8.49 8.50 8.51
log(SIZEi)9596) 0.012
(0.79)
-0.011 
(0.42)
0.048
(2.26)*
log(AGEj 9596) -0.048
(2.74)**
-0.010
(0.43)
0.015
(0.75)
F O R i ,9 5 9 6 0.098
(1.68)+
0.126
(1.89)+
0.149
(2.35)*
GOVj 9596 0.030
(0.41)
-0.226
(1.82)+
-0.193
(1.85)+
EXP i9596 0.023
(0.46)
0.093
(1.54)
0.060
(1.03)
LEVi>9596 0.000
(0.14)
- 0.000
(0.04)
-0.001
(0.69)
IMDEPi9596 -0.091
(2.00)*
-0.024
(0.45)
0.011
(0.22)
PCI2li9596(a) -0.460
(2.14)*
-0.215
(0.94)
-0.141
(0.62)
P S I2 i;9596 -0.033
(1.15)
-0.030
(1-47)
-0.046
(2.98)**
CR4ji9596 0.522
(1.06)
0.270
(0.41)
0.660
(1.02)
IM Pj 9596 0.001
(0.10)
-0.001
(0.05)
- 0.000
(0.03)
E R P J,95<a) -0.158
(0.27)
-0.327
(0.65)
-0.107
(0.17)
Mills ratio -0.430
(2.80)**
-0.254
(1-30)
0.033
(0.19)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included
Constant -0.242
(0.56)
0.191
(0.41)
-0.164
(0.39)
R-squared
F-statistics
0.02
1.95
0.03
2.46
0.02
1.79
Notes:
1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10' 
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 10' to improve presentation.
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Comparison of the results reveals several interesting findings. First, there is some evidence of 
a positive and substantial effect for firm size in the early recovery period. The coefficients of 
log(S7Z£9596) in the equations for output, labour productivity and profitability are positive,
larger and statistically significant in the results for 1999 and 2000 compared with those for 
1998.
This finding somewhat contradicts the findings from some previous studies (e.g. Forbes 
2000b; Berry et al. 2001) that smaller firms performed better than larger ones during the 
crisis. For example, using firm-level data from the Indonesian Ministry of Cooperative and 
SMEs (Small- and Medium-scale Enterprise) (MOCSME), Berry et al. found that small firms 
expanded their value added by about 35 per cent in 1998 against a contraction by about 5 and 
27 per cent experienced by large firms. Nevertheless, the finding is in line with previous 
studies which examined the relationship using other performance measures and a different 
data source. Using The World Bank firm level survey, Dwor-Frecaut et al. (2000) found the 
firms that expanded exports in Thailand and Malaysia during the period 1998-99 were mostly 
large (about 60 per cent of firms in the sample). Meanwhile, Claessens et al. (2000) found 
that the 1998 sales margin of some publicly listed companies in some crisis affected countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Thailand) and two other Asian countries (Singapore and 
Hong Kong) is positively related to firm size, proxied by the log of the firms’ sales in 1996.
Despite the finding, there is no clear explanation for the results. Several possible explanations 
are suggested from the discussion in Chapter 4, including economies of scale, market power 
and more access to financing. To be able to answer this question more definitively, a 
methodology that goes deeper into detailing the strategic behaviour of large firms should be 
applied, which is a task beyond this thesis.
The second key finding is that the positive effect of foreign ownership became more 
important in the recovery period. The coefficients of FOR9596 increase and become more
statistically significant over the period across all equations except those for employment. 
This finding is predicted in the context of higher competitive struggle. With the low demand
' However, it is important to bear in mind that the data used in this study (i.e. SI data) are different to those of 
MOCSME in three respects: first, SI data do not include plants with more than 20 employees, second, 
MOCSME data define size in terms of size -  rather than in terms of employment -  and finally, MOCSME data 
include all types of commercial activities, not only manufacturing.
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situation and lower trade protection in this period, it is likely to expect foreign firms would 
be the winner in responding to the crisis.4 This is most likely because of their internal 
financial support (from parent companies) and higher opportunities for export expansion.
The results on government ownership provide more support for the inference that the 
government tended to bail out its companies for social reasons. The positive coefficient of 
GOV9596 in the equation for employment is only statistically significant in the regression for
1998, the peak of the crisis. As this year was marked by social and political turmoil, this 
finding indicates job loss was minimised in the SOEs.
The fourth key finding is that the effect of sales orientation was less important in the early 
recovery. The coefficients of EXP9596 and their statistical significances decrease over the
years in almost all equations. This finding suggests the export response to the crisis was 
significantly lower over this period. Some reasons put forward in the literature, which were 
mentioned earlier, are likely to have been the main factors contributing to this finding.
The declining pattern in the effect of sales orientation provides more evidence for the earlier 
speculation that the negative effect of firm age on performance might have been caused by 
the fact that many younger firms are exporters. The results show that the negative effect of 
firm age is largest and most importantly occurred at the peak of the crisis, which is when the 
effect of sales orientation was the largest. The evidence is also clear in the equations for 
output and labour productivity.
Table 8.8 presents the corresponding results of the probit regression for the determinants of 
survival separately for every year during the period 1998-2000.
Comparing the results across years, the general picture does not really change from the one 
presented in the previous table. There is no change in terms of which variables determine 
survival or the direction of the effect. Nevertheless, a few additional findings are evident. 
First, the results on FOR9596 suggest the positive effect of foreign ownership was highest and
most importantly occurred during the peak of the crisis. Although this is not in line with the 
finding from the difference equations, this finding provides more evidence to support the
4 See Chapter 3 which describes the acceleration in the trade and investment reforms originating from the IMF 
structural reform programs.
197
hypothesis that foreign firms tend to support struggling affiliates. It reflects, for example, the 
observation made by Fukao (2001) that Japanese parent companies financially assisted their 
crisis-affected affiliates and helped them switch from local to export sales.
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Table 8.8 The determinants of survival: separate regression results
Dependent variable S i , t
Specification 8.52 8.53 8.54
Year 1998 1999 2000
l0g(SIZEj(9596) 0.416
(17.69)**
0.443
(19.37)**
0.422
(19.62)**
log(AGEi>9596) 0.235
(14.19)**
0.213
(13.33)**
0.203
(13.11)**
F O R i , 9 5 9 6 0.093
(1.87)+
0.076
(1.69)+
0.026
(0.46)
GOVj 9 5 9 6 0.084
(0.52)
-0.169
(1.22)
-0.045
(0.34)
E X P  i,9 5 9 6 0.024
(0.77)
0.015
(1.08)
0.008
(0.86)
LEVi9596 0.010
(0.12)
0.009
(0.19)
0.009
(0.11)
IMDEPi9596 0.038
(0.48)
0.060
(0.76)
0.034
(0.44)
PCI2i9596,a) 0.089
(0.15)
-0.163
(0.36)
0.074
(0.14)
PSI2j 9596 -0.059
(2.30)*
-0.048
(1.94)+
-0.047
(1.98)*
C R 4 j i9 5 9 6 -2.876
(3.82)**
-2.938
(3.81)**
-3.039
(4.05)**
I M P j  9596 -0.020
(1.21)
-0.002
(0.11)
0.014
(1.05)
E R P j . 9 5 <a) -1.139
(1.96)+
-0.089
(1.53)
-0.482
(0.88)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included
Constant -0.303
(0.54)
-0.458
(0.81)
-0.335
(0.60)
Pseudo R2 
Wald Chi2
0.14
923.21
0.14
987.94
0.14 
1033.1 1
Notes:
1) Robust Z statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 1( 
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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The positive effect of sales orientation for survival was lower in the early recovery, suggested 
by the declining coefficients of EXP9596 over the years. This finding supports the earlier 
suggestion that export response to the crisis tended to be weaker during the early recovery.
Finally, the results show that the negative effect of trade protection on survival was lower in 
the early recovery as the statistical significance of ERP95 declines over the years. There is no
clear explanation for this. It might just reflect the removal of most of the trade protection that 
still persisted at the beginning of the crisis.
8.4 Some interaction effects
8.4.1 Hypotheses
The previous section found that the impact of some firm characteristics are either ambiguous 
or do not accord with the predictions posted earlier in the chapter. As noted, this might be the 
result of the interaction effects of some characteristics. The analysis now progresses to test 
some of these interrelationships. Based on the discussion in Chapter 4, the following 
interaction effects and their hypotheses are considered.
Sales orientation and foreign ownership
The impact of sales orientation is likely to depend on foreign ownership. At a given level of 
export propensity, the contraction in performance is expected to have been lower in firms 
with a high foreign share (.Hypothesis 9). This positive relationship might have occurred 
because foreign exporting firms were more able to realise the higher incentive to export due 
to an established marketing network in international markets and a lower likelihood of 
financial constraint. As indicated by other studies (e.g. Desai et al. 2004; Blalock and Gertler 
2005), the lower likelihood of financial constraint helped these firms keep on a high growth 
of investment in response to the improved competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate 
depreciation.
Sales orientation and financial leverage
The positive effect of export orientation might have also depended on the debt burden carried 
by exporting firms. This interrelationship is expected to be negative (Hypothesis 10). The 
boost to competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation might be mitigated if a
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firm has large debt denominated in foreign currency. The exchange rate depreciation inflates 
the domestic value of the debt and therefore might lower the firms’ ability to increase 
investment.
Sales orientation and size
The success of export oriented firms in responding to the crisis might have been more 
significant in large firms {Hypothesis 11). The hypothesis is based on the literature on firm 
exporting which posits a positive relationship between size and exporting behaviour (e.g. 
Bonacorsi 1992; Calof 1994). The rationale is that large firms are better able to compete in 
competitive international markets because they have lower costs from economies of scale, are 
able to hire managers skilled in selling their product in international markets and are often 
less financially constrained.
Financial leverage and size
The impact of financial leverage might also depend on size. This relationship, however, is 
difficult to predict a priori {Hypothesis 12). On the one hand, large firms are likely to have 
been severely affected by the collapse of the domestic financial system. Several studies, e.g. 
Claessens et al. (2000), have shown that large firms in East Asian countries heavily depend 
on financial markets -  particularly from banks -  to finance investments. On the other hand, 
theory and some previous empirical studies suggest the potential for credit rationing is 
expected to be lower for large firms, as banks are usually not able to obtain as much pertinent 
information in the case of small firms.
Financial leverage and foreign ownership
The impact of firm financial leverage is expected to be lower in firms with high foreign 
ownership {Hypothesis 13). This hypothesis is derived from the argument that foreign firms 
have access to international capital markets, mostly through parent companies which provide 
support when financial difficulties are experienced.
Import dependence and sales orientation
The expected negative impact of import dependence might have been lower in export 
oriented firms {Hypothesis 14). Higher imported-inputs cost as a result of the sharp exchange 
rate depreciation could have been matched by higher expected revenue from export sales.
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8.4.2 Econometric results
To test the above hypotheses, interaction variables representing them were added one by one 
to equation 8.2 and the equations were then regressed separately for every year for the period 
1998-2000. To save space, the regression results presented in Table 8.9 are only a summary 
and the complete results are given in Appendix 8.4. In the table, the coefficients that 
correspond to the interaction variables are also displayed. It is important to note that all 
results which have LEV9596 in the interaction variables may give unclear results because of 
the limitation of the variable.
Sales orientation and foreign ownership
The results provide strong support for Hypothesis 9 and show that the effect of sales 
orientation was higher for plants with a high foreign ownership share. The coefficients of 
EXP9596 * FOR9596 are positive across all equations and are mostly statistically significant. The 
magnitude of the coefficients also suggests the interrelationship is economically important.
The finding highlights the superiority of foreign exporters over domestic in respect to access 
to international markets. Blalock and Gertler (2005) argued that one form of this superiority 
is the ability of parent companies to assist with access to credit which ensures the affiliates 
against a liquidity problem. They support this argument by demonstrating that only foreign 
exporters in Indonesian manufacturing increased investment during and shortly after the 
crisis.5
5 A similar finding was also found by Krueger and Tornell (1999) in the case of Mexican foreign exporters 
during the currency crisis in the 1990s.
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Table 8.9 Summary of the regression results for the test of interaction effects:
performance difference equations
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le % A R V A j t % A R O U T j t
Y e a r 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
S p e c i f ic a t io n 8.55 8.56 8.57 8.58 8.59 8.60
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * F o r e ig n  o w n e r sh ip
F O R j ,9596 -0.093
(0 .7 7 )
0.075
(0 .7 0 )
0 .158
( 1.4 6 )
0 .029
(0 .3 1 )
0 .079
(0 .9 0 )
0.153
( 1.7 8 )+
E X P  i>959 6 0.175
(2 .58 )**
0 .127
( 1.7 9 )+
0 .028
( 0 .3 7 )
0 .264
(4 .9 0 )**
0 .114
( 1.9 0 )+
0.025
(0 .3 8 )
E X P j 9596*F O R j 9596 0 .936
(4 .4 1 )**
0 .637
( 3 . 14)**
0 .722
( 3 .5 4 )**
0.445
(2 .7 8 )**
0 .449
(2 .7 4 )**
0.561
(3 .5 3 )**
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * le v e r a g e  
L E V ; 9596 -0.001
(0 .2 1 )
0 .005
( 1.0 0 )
0 .003
( 0 .6 3 )
-0 .005
(0 .6 7 )
-0.001
(0 .2 3 )
-0 .002
(0 .2 3 )
E X P  ^ 9596 0.315
(4 .91 )**
0 .228
( 3 .4 2 )**
0.141
(2 .0 0 )*
0.333
(6 .5 0 )**
0.187
(3 .3 3 )**
0.115
( 1.9 4 )+
E X P j 9596*LEVi 9596 0.002
(0 .2 9 )
-0.001
(0 . 13)
0 .002
(0 .2 6 )
-0 .004
(0 .3 7 )
-0.003
(0 .5 4 )
-0 .002
(0 .3 9 )
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * S iz e  
l o g ( S lZ E i 959 6) -0 .049
( 1.3 6 )
0 .042
( 1.3 2 )
0 .0 4 9
( 1.3 5 )
0 .012
(0 .4 3 )
0.041
( 1.4 5 )
0 .080
(2 .5 6 )*
E X P  jj9596 -0.018
(0 .0 6 )
0 .094
(0 .3 3 )
0 .142
(0 .4 6 )
0 .086
(0 .3 6 )
0 .036
(0 . 15)
0 .059
(0 .2 3 )
E X P j 9 5 9 6 * l0 g (S IZ E it9596) 0 .064
( L 18)
0.025
(0 .4 9 )
- 0.000
(0 .0 0 )
0 .047
( 1.0 7 )
0 .028
(0 .6 4 )
0 .010
(0 .2 1 )
L e v e r a g e * S iz e  
lo g (S lZ E j  9596) -0.031
( 1.0 3 )
0 .047
( 1.6 6 )+
0 .0 4 4
( 1.3 7 )
0.025
( 1.0 8 )
0 .048
(2 .0 0 )*
0 .080
(2 .9 5 )**
L E V  (9596 -0.021
( L 13)
-0.005
(0 .3 4 )
-0 .012
(0 .6 2 )
-0 .017
(0 .7 1 )
-0 .012
(0 .5 8 )
-0.018
(0 .7 5 )
L E V j 9596*log(SIZ E j 9 596) 0 .004
( L 3 4 )
0 .002
(0 .7 9 )
0 .003
(0 .9 5 )
0 .002
(0 .6 0 )
0 .002
(0 .6 0 )
0.003
(0 .8 2 )
L e v e r a g e * F o r e ig n  o w n e r sh ip
F O R j .9596 0.243
(2 .6 1 )**
0 .297
( 3 .5 5 )**
0 .413
(4 .9 2 )**
0 .188
(2 .8 1 )**
0.235
(3 .5 1 )**
0 .350
( 5 .4 2 )**
L E V j 9596 -0.001
(0 . 12)
-0 .0 0 2 (a)
(0 .0 0 )
-0.001
(0 .0 9 )
-0 .006
(0 .8 8 )
-0 .006
(0 .82 )
-0 .006
(0 .7 2 )
L E V i,9596*FO R j 9596 0 .399 (a)
(0 .0 1 )
0 .028
( 1.7 8 )+
0 .028
(2 .0 0 )*
0 .004
(0 . 12)
0.023
( 1.0 8 )
0 .024
( 1.3 0 )
Im p o rt d e p e n d e n c e * S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n
E X P j 9596 0.241
(3 .56 )**
0 .177
(2 .4 5 )*
0 .085
( 1.0 9 )
0.281
( 5 . 11)**
0 .134
(2 . 19)*
0 .057
(0 .8 8 )
IM D E P j 9596 -0 .060
(0 .9 2 )
0 .014
(0 .2 2 )
0 .083
( 1.2 2 )
-0 .034
(0 .6 4 )
-0 .034
(0 .6 1 )
0 .030
(0 .53 )
IM D E P j 9596*E X P 19596 0 .440
(2 . 14)*
0 .285
( 1.4 8 )
0 .314
( 1.6 4 )
0 .289
( 1.8 2 )+
0 .289
( 1.8 6 )+
0 .308
( L 9 5 )+
Table 8.9 continued
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D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le % A E M P L j t % A R V L ijt
Y e a r 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
S p e c i f ic a t io n 8.61 8.62 8.63 8.64 8.65 8 .66
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * F o r e ig n  o w n e r sh ip
FORi,9596 0 .086
( 2 . 15) *
0 .052
( 1.3 0 )
0.043
( 0 .9 6 )
- 0 .175
( 1 .4 6 )
0 .028
( 0 .2 7 )
0 .122
( 1 . 15)
E X P  i 9596 0.082
( 2 .9 5 ) * *
0 .114
( 3 .6 8 ) * *
0.087
( 2 .6 6 ) * *
0 .089
( 1 .3 2 )
0 .0 1 0
( 0 . 14)
- 0.063
( 0 .8 5 )
E X P i,9596*FO R j 9596 0.049
( 0 .7 2 )
0 .057
( 0 . 7 4 )
0 .146
( 1. 81 ) +
0 .876
( 4 .2 5 ) * *
0 .5 7 0
( 3 .0 0 ) * *
0 .560
( 2 .8 8 ) * *
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * le v e r a g e
E E V ij9596 - 0.002
( E 0 2 )
- 0.003
( 1.2 4 )
- 0.003
( 1.2 7 )
0.001
( 0 .2 4 )
0 .008
( 1.9 8 ) *
0 .006
( 1 .5 6 )
E X P  19596 0.088
( 3 .5 3 ) * *
0.121
( 4 .3 4 ) * *
0 .108
( 3 .6 5 ) * *
0.221
( 3 .4 7 ) * *
0.101
( 1. 5 8 )
0 .026
( 0 .3 8 )
E X P  j>9596*LE V 19596 0.003
( 1.58 )
0.004
( 1.2 5 )
0.005
( 1.3 5 )
- 0.001
( 0 . 12)
- 0 .005
( 0 .9 7 )
- 0.003
( 0 .6 7 )
S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n * S iz e  
lo g (S IZ E i9 5 9 6) - 0.035
( 2 .4 6 ) *
- 0 .049
( 3 . 11 ) * *
- 0 .040
( 2 .4 0 ) *
- 0 .017
( 0 .4 5 )
0 .089
( 2 .7 3 ) * *
0 .0 8 6
( 2 .3 1 ) *
E X P j 9596 0 .110
( 1.0 6 )
0 .056
( 0 .5 2 )
0.141
( 1- 14)
- 0 .124
( 0 .4 4 )
0.045
( 0 . 17)
0 .004
( 0 .01 )
E X P 1 959 6 * lo g (S IZ E i 9596) - 0 .004
( 0 .2 0 )
0.013
( 0 .6 0 )
- 0 .006
( 0 .2 6 )
0 .067
( 1 .2 3 )
0 .010
( 0 .2 0 )
0 .004
( 0 .0 7 )
L e v e r a g e * S iz e  
lo g (  S IZ E ; 9596) - 0 .036
( 2 .6 7 ) * *
- 0 .044
( 2 .8 8 ) * *
- 0.041
( 2 .5 0 ) *
0.001
( 0 .0 3 )
0 .089
( 3 .0 2 ) * *
0.081
( 2 .4 1 )*
E E V j  9596 0.002
( 0 .4 8 )
0 .012
( 1 .6 8 ) +
0.011 
( 1. 53 )
- 0 .023
( 1 .4 5 )
- 0 .017
( 1. 17)
- 0 .024
( 1 .2 3 )
L E V j;9596*l0g(SIZ E i,9596) - 0.001
( 0 .86 )
- 0.003
( 2 .0 0 ) *
- 0.003
( 1.8 7 ) +
0.005
( 1 . 73 ) +
0 .005
( 1.6 7 ) +
0 .006
( 1 .61 )
L e v e r a g e * F o r e ig n  o w n e r sh ip  
FO R j 9596 0.101
( 3 .2 8 ) * *
0 .0 6 9
( 2 . 15 ) *
0 .092
( 2 .6 7 ) * *
0 .142
( 1 .5 5 )
0 .229
( 2 .8 9 ) * *
0.321
( 4 .0 2 ) * *
E E V i;9596 - 0.003
( 1 .4 5 )
- 0 .004
( 1.6 4 )
- 0 .004
( 1.7 1 ) +
0 .002
( 0 .8 8 )
0 .004
( 1- 14)
0 .004
( 0 .8 1 )
E E V ii9596*FO R i 9596 0 .012
( 2 .52 ) *
0.013
( 2 .5 3 ) *
0 .016
( 3 . 15) * *
- 0 .012
( 0 .4 6 )
0.015
( 1. 17)
0 .012
( 1 .0 9 )
Im p o rt d e p e n d e n c e * S a le s  o r ie n ta t io n  
E X P  19596 0 .056
( 2 .0 0 )*
0 .0 8 6
( 2 .7 0 ) * *
0 .079
( 2 .3 1 ) *
0 .175
( 2 .5 9 ) * *
0.083
( 1. 19)
- 0 .003
( 0 .0 4 )
IMDEPj.9596 0 .016
( 0 .65 )
- 0.003
( 0 . 10 )
0 .034
( 1.2 0 )
- 0 .074
( 1 .2 1 )
0 .019
( 0 .3 0 )
0 .052
( 0 .8 3 )
I M D E P 1 9596*E X P 1 9596 0.188
( 2 .6 9 ) * *
0 .2 0 9
( 2 .8 3 ) * *
0 .170
( 2 .2 3 ) *
0.268
( 1.3 3 )
0.091
( 0 .5 0 )
0.153
( 0 . 84 )
Table 8.9 continued
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Table 8.9 concluded
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le % APCM j t
Y e a r 1998 1999 2000
S p e c i f ic a t i o n 8.67 8.68 8.69
S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n * F o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip
FOR i,9596 -0 .010
(0.15)
0.015
(0 .18)
0.037
(0 .47)
E X P i,9596 -0.021
(0.37)
0.047
(0 .66)
0.011
(0 .16)
E X P  j,9596*FORj,9596 0.295
(2.10)*
0.303
(1 .73)+
0.304
(1 .95)+
S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n * le v e r a g e  
LEV; 9596 0 .340(a)
(0.18)
0 .1 4 0 (a)
(0 .05)
0.001
(0 .48)
E X P  jj9596 0.019
(0.38)
0.091
(1 .50)
0.061
(1 .05)
E X P j 9596*L E V i 9596 0.007
(1.44)
0 .002
(0 .28)
-0 .006
(1 .09)
S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n * S iz e
lo g ( S lZ E j 9 5 9 6) 0.003
(0.19)
-0 .018
(0 .71)
0.034
(1 .50)
E X P it9596 -0.235
(1 .15)
-0 .110
(0 .49)
-0 .269
(1 .23)
E X P  j 9 5 9 6 * lo g (S IZ E j 9596) 0.050
(1.33)
0 .039
(0 .95)
0.062
(1 .53)
L e v e r a g e * S iz e
l 0 g ( S l Z E i,9596) 0.010
(0.65)
-0 .013
(0 .50)
0.048
(2 .22)*
LEV;,9596 -0 .026
(2.22)*
-0 .020
(2 .08)*
-0 .012
(0 .98)
L E V ; 9 5 9 6 * lo g ( S I Z E ;  9596 ) 0.006
(2.54)*
0.005
(2 .54)*
0.003
(1 .16)
L e v e r a g e * F o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  
FORj 9596 0.099
(1 .70)+
0 .124
(1 .86)+
0 .146
(2 .31)*
E E V i9596 0.005
(1 .79)+
0 .004
(1 .54)
0.002
(0 .85)
E E V i>9596*FORj 9596 -0.002
(0.26)
0 .009
(1 .57)
0.008
(1 .61)
Im p o r t  d e p e n d e n c e * S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n
E X P J9596 0.036
(0.61)
0.085
(1 .13)
0.054
(0 .80)
IMDEPj,9596 -0.078
(1.67)+
-0.031
(0 .55)
0.007
(0 .13)
I M D E P i  9596*E X P i 9596 -0 .074
(0.52)
0.045
(0 .24)
0 .026
(0 .18)
Note: 1) See Appendix 8.4 for the complete results.
2) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
3a) The coefficient was multiplied by 10' to improve presentation.
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Sales orientation and financial leverage
There is only very weak evidence for an interrelationship between sales orientation and 
financial leverage. Although mostly negative, as hypothesised, almost all of EXP9596 * LEV9596
coefficients are statistically insignificant. This finding does not support Hypothesis 10 and 
suggests having a high debt does not necessarily mitigate the positive impact from exporting. 
The finding is surprising, particularly given the fact that many exporters in developing 
countries borrow abroad (Kawai et al. 2000; Krueger and Tornell 1999; Aguiar 2005). 
Moreover, it does not accord to the general finding from Latin America’s experience in the 
context of currency crises which show a negative relationship (e.g. Aguiar 2005; Krueger and 
Tornell 1999). As highlighted by Krueger and Tornell, one possible explanation might be that 
export oriented firms are more likely to be able to provide collateral in the form of 
receivables denominated in dollars.
Sales orientation and size
There is only weak evidence supporting Hypothesis 11. Although most of the 
EXP9596 * \og(SIZE9596) coefficients show the expected sign (i.e. positive), all are statistically
insignificant. Therefore, not only large exporters were able to successfully respond to the 
crisis. While the finding tends to contradict the theoretical prediction, it is consistent with the 
behavioural characteristic of small and medium size exporters in Indonesian manufacturing. 
As shown in several studies (e.g. Thee 1994; Berry et al. 2001), many of these firms have 
been successful in exporting because they are often involved in the sub-contracting schemes 
of much larger firms that are committed to export and able to find niche export markets as 
well as facilitated by either traders or foreign buyers. Despite this suggestion, the finding 
might have been affected by strong collinearity between SIZE9596 and EXP9596. Indeed,
EXP9596 becomes highly insignificant after the introduction of the interaction variable, which
indicates a severe collinearity problem (Gujarati 1995). A cleaner test for this hypothesis is 
accommodated in the next chapter, where the issue of export supply response is specifically 
addressed.6
6 The other alternative would be excluding one of the corresponding variables, either EXP9596 or
log(S1ZE)959(>. While appealing, this method tends to contradict theory, since each of these variables is
believed to have its direct effect to the dependent variables. In fact, this is what has been shown in the two 
previous tables.
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Leverage and size
The results provide some evidence to suggest the negative effect of financial leverage 
affected smaller plants more adversely than larger ones. The coefficients of 
LEV9596 *log(SIZE9596), although positive in all equations, are seldom statistically significant.
Despite providing only weak support, the positive coefficient agrees with the hypothesis that 
credit rationing varies across firms with different size (Petersen and Rajan 1994), and hence 
provides more evidence for the suggestion made earlier that banks were more willing to bear 
risk in allowing large firms to keep operating during the crisis. This finding also supports the 
suggestion made by other studies using macro and banking financial data (Gosh and Gosh 
1999; Ding et al. 1998).
Leverage and foreign ownership
The results show a positive relationship for the interaction variable LEV9596 *FOR9596 ,
although the coefficients are statistically significant only in about half of the equations. 
Therefore they provide some support for Hypothesis 13 and suggest the negative effect of 
financial leverage was lower for foreign firms. This agrees with the argument that foreign 
firms have more access to international capital and is also in line with observations made by 
Fukao (2001) and Desai et al. (2004). Desai et al. in particular observed that the responses of 
US leveraged affiliates in the crisis affected countries was significantly less limited than 
those of locally leveraged firms.
The coefficients of the interaction variable also increase over the period in almost all of the 
equations. As highly leveraged firms are also likely to be highly bank-dependent firms, this 
finding provides even stronger evidence for the involvement of parent companies in 
supporting their financially constrained affiliates. The increasing trend perhaps also reflects 
the situation described by Pardede (1999) that banks, particularly the domestic ones, tended 
to be more selective in giving loans to companies. It is natural to expect banks prefer to lend 
to foreign rather than to domestic firms, because of the presumption that foreign firms are 
likely to be assisted financially by their parent companies, if they are in difficulty, and more 
likely to be exporters, which are able to offer banks a better cash flow projection from their 
foreign-currency denominated revenues.
It is worth mentioning here that the set of results in the last two hypothesis tests now show a 
consistently predicted sign (i.e. negative) of LEV959(). Although mostly statistically
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insignificant, they at least provide some support for the theoretical explanation on the 
negative impact from the balance sheet effect. This finding is now in line with the general 
finding from other studies, particularly that of Claessens et al. (2000) in the context of the 
1997/98 Asian crisis.
Import dependence and sales orientation
The results provide some support for Hypothesis 14. The negative effect of higher imported- 
input cost is indicated to have been lower for export oriented plants, as IMDEP{’596 * EXP9596
coefficients are mostly positive across the equations. This finding supports the positive 
significant impact of sales orientation observed earlier. It also confirms earlier findings on the 
other interaction effect involving sales orientation (i.e. sales orientation-foreign ownership 
and sales-orientation-financial leverage) which in principal reflects the argument that 
exporters are less likely to be financially constrained.
It is also important to mention that some coefficients of IMDEP9596 now show the expected
sign (i.e. negative), albeit all are statistically insignificant. Earlier in Table 8.3 it was found 
that the coefficients are positive. Therefore, it can be concluded that, while the share of 
imported input in total input negatively affected performance, the extent to which it affected 
performance could have depended on sales orientation.
Table 8.10 presents the corresponding probit regression results for the testing on the 
interaction variables. As with the previous table, it is only a summary. The complete results 
are given in Appendix 8.5
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Table 8.10 Summary of the regression results for the test of interaction effects: survival
equations
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le S i ,
Y e a r 1998 1999 2000
S p e c i f ic a t io n 8.73 8.74 8.75
S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n * F o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  
FOR; 9 5 9 6 0.166
(1.25)
0.120
(0.95)
-0.003
(0.17)
EXPj 9596 0.037
(E21)
0.019
(0.80)
0.002
(E03)
E X P  j,95% *FO Rj 9 5 9 6 -0.193
(1.08)
-0.115
(0.86)
0.079
(1.25)
S a le s  o r ie n t a t io n * le v e r a g e
E E V j 9 5 9 6 -0.002
(0.38)
-0.002
(0.41)
-0.002
(0.46)
E X P i 9596 0.004
(0.84)
-0.023
(E09)
-0.016
(1.01)
E X P i 9596*L E V j 9596 -0.091
(2.56)*
-0.098
(2.72)**
-0.087
(2.53)*
S a le s  o r i e n t a t io n * S iz e  
l o g ( S I Z E i 9 5 96) 0.438
(16.42)**
0.459
(17.81)**
0.433
(18.14)**
E X P  j 9 5 9 6 0.731
(2.22)*
0.497
(1.53)
0.369
(1.21)
E X P i,9 5 9 6 * l o g ( S I Z E i 9596) -0.154
(2.21)*
-0.110
(1.60)
-0.080
(1.26)
L e v e r a g e * S iz e
l0 g ( S lZ E j 9 5 9 6) 0.417
(17.72)**
0.444
(19.40)**
0.423
(19.64)**
E E V j9596 0.057
(1.50)
0.056
(1.54)
0.048
(E46)
E E V i 9 5 9 6 * lo g (S I Z E i 9596) -0.009
(1.58)
-0.009
(E61)
-0.007
(E44)
L e v e r a g e * F o r e ig n  o w n e r s h ip  
FORj 9 5 9 6 0.094
(0.87)
0.076
(0.72)
0.025
(0.26)
E E V j<9596 0.005
(0.65)
0.005
(0.74)
0.005
(0.87)
E E  V i,9596*F O R j 9596 0.052
(E21)
0.051
(E19)
0.044
( El l )
Im p o r t  d e p e n d e n c e * S a l e s  o r ie n t a t io n  
E X P  j 9 5 9 6 0.053
(0.59)
0.037
(0.43)
0.006
(0.07)
I M D E P i9596 -0.251
(1.10)
-0.321
(1-45)
-0.087
(0.41)
1 M D E P j 9596*E X P j 9596 0.075
(0.85)
0.107
(1.24)
0.047
(0.56)
Note: 1) See Appendix 8.5 for the coimplete results
2) Robust Z statistics in parentheses.
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Unlike the results from the difference equations, the probit regression results are less 
satisfactory. Many coefficients of the interaction variables are statistically insignificant and 
some of them, such as those of LEV9596 *\og(SIZE9596) and LEV9596 * FOR959(), have very 
small Z-statistics. These unsatisfactory results might be due to collinearity between the 
corresponding interactions variables. For example, the coefficients of FOR'9596 and EXP95%
across the regressions now becomes less statistically significant compared to the earlier 
results (see Table 8.6 and 8.8).
Nevertheless, several points are worth mentioning. First, the importance of foreign ownership 
in moderating the positive effect of sales orientation on survival was only clear in the early 
recovery period. The coefficients of EXP9596 * FOR'9596 change their sign from negative to
positive in the regressions of 2000. This finding is in line with that of Blalock and Gertler 
(2005) mentioned earlier and therefore supports their argument that affiliates were less 
financially constrained due to more access to an alternative credit source.
Second, the coefficients of EXP9596 * LEV9596 show the expected signs. For the result of 1998,
the negative coefficient implies the positive effect of sales orientation to survival was lower 
at highly leveraged plants. This finding supports Hypothesis 10, but is in contrast to the 
earlier finding from the difference equation (see Table 8.9). It might share a similar situation 
as in Latin America during the currency crisis of the 1990s. Many exporters in the region, 
although were able to increase sales, were not able to increase investment. Aguiar (2005), for 
example, showed that many of these exporters actually were financially constrained, because 
a large portion of the increase in sales was used to service their foreign-denominated debt, 
since many of them borrow abroad.
Finally, the negative coefficient of EXP9596 *log(S1ZE9596) supports the earlier suggestion that
small and medium size exporters might have also been successful in responding to the crisis. 
While it is consistent with the characteristics of small and medium exporters in Indonesian 
manufacturing, the negative coefficient might have been the result of the decline in export 
participation of many exporters, particularly during the peak of the crisis. Supporting this 
argument, the coefficients indeed are statistically significant only for the regression of 1998, 
implying that the importance of being a large exporter was only evident when the economy 
began to recover.
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8.5 Summary
The purpose of Chapter 7 and 8 was to investigate which firm characteristics were important 
in shaping the performance response of plants in Indonesian manufacturing to the crisis. 
Some characteristics, namely size, age, ownership, sales orientation, financial leverage, 
import dependency, factor intensity and industry competition, were examined in their 
relationship to the crisis impact on performance and survival. The major findings are 
summarised below.
First, the results suggest foreign ownership and sales orientation significantly determined the 
performance response. Foreign firms are shown to have performed better than domestic- 
private and state-owned firms. However, the extent to which foreign firms performed better 
greatly depends on the level of foreign share in the firms. The results indicate the share 
required for better performance was quite large. The econometric results show that the 
positive effect of foreign ownership increased over the years during the 1998-2000 period, 
suggesting the role of parent companies in shaping performance was most important during 
the early recovery period. This observation is consistent with the view that domestic banks 
were more selective in providing external financing after the crisis and the more competitive 
environment after the crisis.
Export-oriented firms are indicated to have been able to benefit from the boost of 
competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. The results indicate that many 
plants with high export propensity expanded their performance. However, the positive effect 
of sales orientation is suggested to have been weaker in the early recovery. While there are 
many explanations for this, the declining pattem is consistent with the exchange rate 
appreciation which took place in 1999 and 2000.
The positive effect of sales orientation is found to depend on other plant characteristics. The 
positive effect of sales orientation is found to have been higher for plants with a high foreign 
ownership share. The results show this interrelationship was higher and particularly 
important in the early recovery, suggesting that foreign plants were not financially 
constrained, which allowed them to take advantage of the lower real exchange rate after the 
crisis.
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The results also found, although only weakly, evidence for the interrelationship between sales 
orientation and financial leverage. In particular, that having a high debt does not necessarily 
mitigate the positive impact from being export oriented. This finding is similar to that found 
in Latin America’s experience during the currency crisis of the 1990s.
Second, the results show a positive effect for size in shaping the performance response, but 
only in the early recovery. This is another important finding in respect to the common view 
that small firms weathered the crisis better than larger ones.
Third, the results suggest the government was not able to protect its companies. Contraction 
in profitability and labour productivity was larger at plants with high government ownership 
share. This is consistent with the tight state budget situation during and after the crisis. 
Despite this, the results suggest that to some extent the government exercised its power to 
ensure these companies shed less labour. The contraction in employment is lower for plants 
with a high government ownership share.
Fourth, the results provide evidence on the importance of factor intensity in determining 
performance response. On average, during the period 1998-2000 plants in capital intensive 
industries contracted more relative to plants in resource intensive industries. In contrast, 
performance contraction in labour intensive industries on average during the period was 
higher than that in resource intensive industries. A similar conclusion can be derived based 
on factor intensity variables at the plant-level. In particular, the performance contraction was 
higher for more capital intensive plants employing higher skilled workers. The latter is 
consistent with the labour hoarding hypothesis and other studies which indicate labour 
hoarding behaviour.
Fifth, the econometric results show that plants in less concentrated industries performed 
better than plants in more concentrated industries during the peak of the crisis. This finding 
suggests non-competitive behaviour, particularly collusive behaviour, tended to break down 
during the period. The finding is also consistent with studies which found a negative 
relationship for concentration over the business cycle.
Sixth, the econometric results also show that plants in industries with high exposure to import 
competition performed better than plants in protected industries or facing less import
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competition. This finding suggests managerial slackness contributes to a poorer performance 
response.
Seventh, the results show financial leverage is negatively related to the contraction in the 
performance, but only when interrelated with some other characteristics. However, the 
coefficients of the variable representing the characteristic are mostly statistically 
insignificant, suggesting highly leveraged plants did not necessarily perform poorly during 
the crisis. The results indicate the negative effect of financial leverage tended to have been 
lower in large, foreign and export oriented plants, although in most cases the coefficients 
were not statistically significant.
Eighth, the econometric analysis found that plant survival during the period 1997-2000 was 
determined by size, age, foreign ownership, sales orientation, factor intensity and industry 
competition. Of these determinants, the results show that size, age, factor intensity and 
industry competition were the most important. Foreign ownership and sales orientation, 
although positively related to a higher chance of survival, were not particularly important 
since the statistical significance of the variables representing them is only moderate. In 
general these findings are consistent with those of the determinants of the performance 
response. Nevertheless, the results do not indicate that the effect of the determinants changed 
substantially across the years during the period.
As for the hypothesis testing on the interaction effects in the determinants of survival, the 
results are less satisfactory, since many of the variables representing the effects are 
statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, two key observations are worth mentioning: first, the 
importance of foreign ownership in moderating the positive effect of sales orientation is 
only clear in the early recovery period and, second, the positive effect of sales orientation 
was lower for highly leveraged plants.
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Appendix 8.1 Classification of manufacturing sector according to factor intensity (1SIC)
IS IC D e s c r ip t io n
3 1 1 -2
A g r ic u l tu r e  R e s o u r c e  I n te n s iv e  
F o o d
3 1 3 B e v e r a g e s
3 1 4 T o b a c c o
3 2 3 L e a th e r  a n d  le a th e r  p r o d u c ts
3 3 1 1 1 -3 S a w m il ls  a n d  o th e r  w o o d  m ills
3 5 5 2 1 -3 P u lp ,  p a p e r  a n d  p a p e r b o a r d
3 5 1 2
M in e r a l  R e s o u r c e  I n te n s iv e  
F e r t i l i s e r s  a n d  p e s t ic id e s
3 5 4 P e t r o le u m  a n d  c o a l  p r o d u c ts
361 P o r c e la in
3 6 3 -9 C e m e n t  a n d  n o n - m e ta l l ic  m in e ra ls
3 7 2 N o n  f e r ro u s  m e ta l  p r o d u c ts
321
U n s k i l le d  L a b o u r  I n te n s iv e  
T e x t i le s
3 2 2 W e a r in g  A p p a re l
3 2 4 F o o tw e a r
331 W o o d  a n d  w o o d  p r o d u c ts
3 3 2 F u r n i tu r e
3 5 2 2 D r u g s  a n d  m e d ic in e
3 5 6 P la s t ic s  p ro d u c ts
3 6 2 G la s s  a n d  g la s s  p r o d u c ts
3 8 1 1 G e n e ra l  h a r d w a re
3 8 1 2 F u r n i tu r e ,  f ix tu re s  o f  p r im a r y  m e ta l
3 8 3 2 E le c t r o n ic s  c o m p o n e n ts ,  c o m m u n ic a t io n
3 8 4 1 S h ip  b u i ld in g  a n d  r e p a i r in g
3 8 4 5 T r a n s p o r t  e q u ip m e n t
3 9 0 O th e r  m a n u f a c tu r in g
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ISIC Description
351
3529
3813
382
3831
3839
3849
3851
3852
Technology Intensive
The rest of industrial chemical, except 3512
Chemical products
Structural metal products
Non-electrical machinery
Electrical industrial machinery
Electrical apparatus
Aircraft
Scientific equipment 
Photographic and optical goods
341
342 
352
3551/3559
371
3814-9
38321-8
3833
3842-4
3853
3901
Human Capital Intensive
The rest of paper products
Printing and publishing
The rest of chemical products, excl. 3522
Rubber products
Iron and basic steel
Fabricated metal products
Radio, television and communication equip.
Electrical appliances and housewares
Railroad equipment, vehicles
Watched and clocks
Jewellery and related articles
Source: Ariff and Hill (1985)
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Appendix 8.2 The determinants of performance impact of the crisis: some regression
results from econometric experiments
D e p e n d e n t v a riab le
% A R V A
S p ec ifica tio n (A 7 .1 ) (A 7 .2 ) (A 7 .3 ) (A 7 .4 ) (A 7 .5 ) (A 7 .6 ) (A 7 .7 )
lo g (S IZ E 9596) -0 .0 1 7
(1 .3 4 )
-0 .0 1 7
(1 .4 9 )
-0 .0 1 7
(1 .3 0 )
-0 . 0 2 0
(1 .4 9 )
-0 .0 2 4
(1 .9 1 )+
-0 .0 2 4
(1 .9 0 )+
-0 . 0 2 0
(1 .5 4 )
lo g (A G E 9596) -0.071 
(7 .1 1 )* *
-0 .0 7 2
(7 .2 5 )* *
-0 .0 7 3
(7 .2 8 )* *
-0 .0 7 6
(7 .5 3 )* *
-0 .0 7 7
(7 .9 2 )* *
-0 .0 7 7
(7 .8 8 )* *
-0 .0 7 3
(7 .2 3 )* *
m n c 9 5 9 6 0 .2 6 6
(6 .1 7 )* *
0 .2 3 6
(5 .7 6 )* *
0 .2 6 2
(6 .0 9 )* *
0 .2 5 0
(5 .9 8 )* *
0 .2 2 9
(5 .6 1 )* *
0 .2 2 9
(5 .6 2 )* *
0 .2 4 6
(5 .8 9 )* *
g o v 9 5 9 6 0 .0 3 4
( 0 .8 8 )
0 .0 3 2
(0 .8 1 )
0 .0 3 8
(0 .9 7 )
0 .0 3 6
(0 .9 1 )
0 .0 3 8
(0 .9 7 )
0 .0 3 9
(0 .9 8 )
0 .0 2 6
( 0 .6 6 )
e x p 9 5 9 6 0 .1 7 8
(5 .9 0 )* *
0 .1 8 5
(6 .1 6 )* *
0 .175
(5 .7 9 )* *
0 .1 9 8
(6 .2 8 )* *
0.181
( 6 .0 2 )**
0.181
( 6 .0 1 )**
0 .1 9 9
(6 .3 2 )* *
L E V 9596 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .7 5 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .8 0 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .7 8 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .7 6 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .8 1 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .8 1 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .7 7 )
i m d e p 9 5 9 6 0 .0 8 5
(2 .9 2 )* *
0 .0 6 9
(2 .4 3 )*
0 .0 8 5
(2 .9 2 )* *
0 .0 7 2
(2 .4 9 )*
0 .0 6 9
(2 .4 3 )*
0 .0 7 0
(2 .4 4 )*
0 .0 6 7
(2 .3 4 )*
PC I 19 5 9 6 - 0.000
(2 .2 4 )*
- 0.000
(2 .3 2 )*
P S I 19596 - 0.000
(2 .9 9 )* *
- 0.000
(3 .0 2 )* *
P C I2 9 596 - 0.000
(1 .5 9 )
- 0.000
( 2 .0 1 )*
- 0.000
(1 .9 4 )+
- 0.000
(1 .9 3 )+
P S I2 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 3 3
(3 .7 2 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(3 .2 1 )* *
-0 .0 2 8
(3 .1 3 )* *
-0 .0 2 8
(3 .1 3 )* *
D L I9596 0 .0 5 8
( 1 . 1 1 )
0 .0 5 2
( 1 .0 1 )
0 .0 5 2
( 1 .0 1 )
0 .3 7 0
(1 .8 7 )+
0 .0 4 2
(0 .8 1 )
0 .0 4 2
(0 .8 2 )
DCI9596 -0 .1 8 0
(1 .3 4 )
-0 .1 8 7
(1 .3 9 )
-0 .1 8 5
(1 .3 7 )
0 .0 5 4
(0 .2 6 )
-0 .2 2 3
(1 .6 3 )
-0 .241
(1 .7 4 )+
IM P 9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 8
( 2 . 1 0 )*
0 .0 0 8
(2 .1 7 )*
0 .0 0 8
(2 .1 9 )*
0 .0 0 8
(2 .2 7 )*
N R P 9 5 9 6 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .9 4 )
0 . 0 0 2
(0 .9 9 )
H H I9 5 9 6 0 .3 6 7
( 0 .6 8 )
0 .5 0 7
(0 .9 5 )
C R 4 9 5 9 6 0 . 1 0 2
(0 .3 5 )
-0 .0 6 3
( 0 .2 2 )
E R P 9 5 9 6 - 0.000
(1 .6 9 )+
- 0.000
(1 .3 4 )
M ills  ra tio -0 .0 1 5
(0 .1 5 )
-0 .0 0 8
(0 .0 8 )
-0 .0 2 4
(0 .2 5 )
-0 .0 4 2
(0 .4 2 )
-0 .0 6 7
(0 .7 0 )
-0 .0 6 6
(0 .6 9 )
- 0 . 0 1 1  
( 0 . 1 1 )
Y e a r d u m m y  1998 -0 . 2 1 0
(1 2 .0 5 )* *
-0 . 2 1 2
(1 2 .1 3 )* *
- 0 . 2 1 0  
(1 1 .9 7 )* *
-0 .2 1 4  
(1 1.91)**
-0 .2 0 5  
(1 1 .7 9 )* *
-0 .2 0 5  
(1 1 .8 0 )* *
-0 .2 1 7
(1 2 .0 6 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  1999 -0 .2 3 9  
(1 1 .4 5 )* *
-0 .2 4 0  
(1 1 .5 2 )* *
-0 .2 3 6  
(1 1 .3 2 )* *
-0 .2 4 0
(1 1 .1 7 )* *
-0 .2 3 0
(1 1 .1 3 )* *
-0 .2 3 0  
(1 1 .1 4 )* *
-0 .2 4 4  
(1 1 .3 6 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  2 0 0 0 -0.151
(6 .0 6 )* *
-0 .1 5 2  
( 6 . 1 1 )**
-0 .1 4 8
(5 .9 5 )* *
-0 .1 4 7
(5 .7 4 )* *
-0 .1 4 0
(5 .7 0 )* *
-0 .1 4 0
(5 .7 1 )* *
-0 .1 5 3
(5 .9 7 )* *
D u m m y  v a riab le s  
fo r p ro v in ces In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
D u m m y  v a riab le s  
fo r in d u stries In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
C o n s ta n t 0 .2 8 7
(1 .5 9 )
0 .291
(1 .6 1 )
0 .3 2 6
(1 .8 1 )+
0 .2 9 0
(1 .6 3 )
0 .2 7 2
(1 .2 5 )
0 .2 7 3
(1 .5 6 )
0 .3 2 5
(1-49)
R -sq u ared
O b se rv a tio n s
0 .05
3 1 4 1 9
0 .05
3 1 3 9 6
0 .05
3 1 4 5 9
0 .05
3 0 3 2 7
0 .05
3 1 4 5 9
0 .05
3 1 4 5 9
0 .05
3 0 3 5 0
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D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le
% A R O U T
S p ec ifica tio n (A 7 .8 ) (A 7 .9 ) (A 7 .1 0 ) ( A 7 . l l ) (A 7 .1 2 ) (A 7 .1 3 ) (A 7 .1 4 )
lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .0 2 4
(2 .5 4 )*
0 .023
(2 .3 8 )*
0 .0 2 8
(2 .9 2 )* *
0 .0 2 4
(2 .3 9 )*
0 .0 2 3
(2 .4 9 )*
0 .0 2 3
(2 .4 3 )*
0 .0 2 4
(2 .3 9 )*
lo g (A G E 9596) -0 .0 4 2
(5 .4 4 )* *
-0 .0 4 4
(5 .6 9 )* *
-0 .0 4 3
(5 .5 8 )* *
-0 .0 4 4
(5 .5 6 )* *
-0 .0 4 7
(6 .1 5 )* *
-0 .0 4 7
(6 .1 9 )* *
-0 .0 4 0
(5 .0 8 )* *
m n c 9596 0 .2 3 4
(7 .3 7 )* *
0 .2 1 6
(7 .1 7 )* *
0 .2 2 8
(7 .1 7 )* *
0.211
(6 .8 6 )* *
0 .2 1 4
(7 .1 3 )* *
0 .2 1 4
(7 .1 2 )* *
0 .2 0 6
(6 .6 9 )* *
g o v 9596 0 .0 8 3
(3 .0 8 )* *
0 .0 9 0
(3 .3 5 )* *
0 .0 8 2
(3 .0 2 )* *
0 .0 9 3
(3 .4 3 )* *
0 .0 9 0
(3 .3 4 )* *
0 .0 9 0
(3 .3 5 )* *
0 .0 7 9
(2 .9 2 )* *
E X P 9596 0 .1 6 6
(6 .8 2 )* *
0 .1 6 9
(6 .9 5 )* *
0.161
(6 .5 7 )* *
0 .1 7 8
(7 .0 1 )* *
0 .1 6 2
(6 .6 5 )* *
0 .1 6 2
(6 .6 3 )* *
0 .1 8 0
(7 .0 8 )* *
L E V 9596 -0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 8 )
-0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 6 )
-0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 5 )
-0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 5 )
-0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 5 )
-0 .0 0 3
(1 .1 5 )
-0 .003
(1 .1 4 )
i m d e p 9596 0 .0 4 0
(1 .7 5 )+
0 .0 3 0
(1 .3 6 )
0 .041
(1 .8 0 )+
0 .0 4 8
(2 .1 2 )*
0 .0 3 5
(1 .5 6 )
0 .0 3 5
(1 .5 4 )
0 .0 4 2
(1 .8 5 )+
PC I 19596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(2 .1 6 )*
- 0 . 0 0 0
(2 .2 6 )*
PSI 1 9 5 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 0
(2 .9 8 )* *
- 0 . 0 0 0
(2 .1 4 )*
P C I2 9596 -0 .001
(4 .8 9 )* *
-0 .001
(4 .6 9 )* *
-0 .001
(4 .6 6 )* *
-0 .001
(4 .6 6 )* *
P S I2 9596 -0 .0 3 5
(4 .7 4 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(3 .8 1 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(3 .8 0 )* *
-0 .0 2 8
(3 .7 9 )* *
D L I9596 0 .0 3 7
(0 .8 6 )
0.031
(0 .7 0 )
0 .0 3 3
(0 .7 5 )
0 .5 2 4
(2 .5 7 )*
0 .0 2 2
(0 .5 1 )
0 .0 2 2
(0 .5 1 )
D C I9596 -0 .2 6 5
(2 .3 8 )*
-0 .273
(2 .4 5 )*
-0 .2 7 0
(2 .4 2 )*
0 .1 3 5
(0 .6 7 )
-0 .271
(2 .4 9 )*
-0 .2 6 8
(2 .4 5 )*
i m p 9596 0 .0 1 0
(3 .0 3 )* *
0 .0 1 0
(3 .0 1 )* *
0 .0 1 0
(3 .1 4 )* *
0.011
(3 .2 0 )* *
N R P 9596 -0 .0 0 2
(0 .7 0 )
-0 .001
(0 .5 8 )
H H I9596 -0 .0 4 9
(0 .1 0 )
0 .0 9 6
(0 .1 9 )
C R 4 9596 0 .1 1 6
(0 .4 8 )
-0 .0 8 4
(0 .3 5 )
ERP9596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(2 .4 5 )*
- 0 . 0 0 0
(1 .7 4 )+
M ills  ra tio 0 .2 8 9
(3 .6 9 )* *
0.281
(3 .6 0 )* *
0 .2 9 7
(3 .7 8 )* *
0 .2 8 7
(3 .5 5 )* *
0 .2 6 2
(3 .4 0 )* *
0 .2 5 8
(3 .3 3 )* *
0 .3 2 9
(4 .0 9 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  1998 -0 .1 8 8
(1 3 .7 4 )* *
-0 .1 8 7
(1 3 .7 1 )* *
-0 .1 8 8
(1 3 .7 5 )* *
-0 .1 9 3
(1 3 .7 1 )* *
-0 .1 8 5
(1 3 .5 6 )* *
-0 .1 8 4
(1 3 .5 2 )* *
-0 .1 9 8
(1 4 .0 1 )* *
Y ea r d u m m y  1999 -0 .3 3 8
(2 0 .7 4 )* *
-0 .3 3 7
(2 0 .7 1 )* *
-0 .3 3 8
(2 0 .7 5 )* *
-0 .3 4 5
(2 0 .4 3 )* *
-0 .3 3 4
(2 0 .6 2 )* *
-0 .3 3 3
(2 0 .5 8 )* *
-0 .351
(2 0 .8 0 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  2 0 0 0 -0 .2 3 7
(1 2 .2 8 )* *
-0 .2 3 6
(1 2 .2 4 )* *
-0 .2 3 9
(1 2 .3 4 )* *
-0 .2 4 2
(1 2 .0 7 )* *
-0 .2 3 2
(1 2 .1 4 )* *
-0 .2 3 2
(1 2 .0 9 )* *
-0 .2 4 9
(1 2 .4 8 )* *
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r p ro v in ces In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r in d u s trie s In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
C o n stan t -0 .2 1 9
(1 .6 7 )+
-0 .1 9 7
(1 .5 0 )
-0 .1 7 8
(1 .3 6 )
-0 .1 6 8
(1 .2 6 )
-0 .171
(1 .0 1 )
- 0 . 1 1 1
(0 .8 6 )
-0 .1 8 4
(1 .0 6 )
R -sq u ared
O b se rv a tio n s
0 .0 7
31411
0 .0 7
313 8 8
0 .0 7
31451
0 .0 7
3 0 3 2 0
0 .07
31451
0 .0 7
31451
0 .0 7
3 0 3 4 3
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D e p e n d e n t v a ria b le
% A E M P L
S p e c if ic a tio n (A 7 .1 5 ) (A 7 .1 6 ) (A 7 .1 7 ) (A 7 .1 8 ) (A 7 .1 9 ) (A 7 .2 0 ) (A 7 .2 1 )
lo g (S IZ E 9596) -0 .0 3 2
(6 .2 2 )* *
-0 .0 2 5
(4 .7 6 )* *
-0 .0 3 2
(6 .1 8 )* *
-0 .0 2 9
(4 .9 9 )* *
-0 .0 2 5
(4 .7 7 )* *
-0 .025
(4 .8 0 )* *
-0 .0 3 0
(5 .1 6 )* *
lo g (A G E 9596) -0 .0 3 7
(9 .2 8 )* *
-0 .0 3 7
(9 .3 0 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(9 .1 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(8 .7 5 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(9 .2 0 )* *
-0 .0 3 6
(9 .1 3 )* *
-0 .0 3 7
(8 .8 2 )* *
m n c 9596 0 .0 4 0
(2 .5 9 )* *
0 .0 8 6
(5 .7 9 )* *
0 .0 4 3
(2 .7 5 )* *
0 .0 8 4
(5 .4 7 )* *
0 .0 8 4
(5 .6 8 )* *
0 .0 8 4
(5 .6 8 )* *
0 .0 8 4
(5 .5 0 )* *
g o v 9596 0 .0 1 6
(0 .7 8 )
0 .0 4 0
(2 .0 0 )*
0 .0 1 7
(0 .8 4 )
0 .0 4 4
(2 .1 3 )*
0 .0 4 2
(2 .0 8 )*
0 .0 4 2
(2 .0 7 )*
0 .0 3 2
(1 .5 4 )
E X P 9 5 9 6 0.091
(7 .4 3 )* *
0 .0 7 9
(6 .5 1 )* *
0 .0 9 0
(7 .3 8 )* *
0.081
(6 .4 1 )* *
0 .0 7 9
(6 .5 9 )* *
0 .0 7 9
(6 .6 1 )* *
0 .0 8 2
(6 .4 6 )* *
L E V 9596 -0 .001
(1 .5 3 )
-0 .001
(1 .5 9 )
-0 .001
(1 .5 6 )
-0 .001
(1 .6 5 )+
-0 .001
(1 .6 2 )
-0 .001
(1 .6 2 )
-0 .001
(1 .6 9 )+
i m d e p 9596 0 .0 3 7
(3 .4 1 )* *
0 .0 5 8
(5 .3 4 )* *
0 .0 3 5
(3 .2 5 )* *
0 .0 5 8
(5 .2 7 )* *
0.051
(4 .7 6 )* *
0 .0 5 2
(4 .8 0 )* *
0 .0 6 3
(5 .7 6 )* *
P C I1 9596 0 . 0 0 0
(1 .6 7 )+
0 . 0 0 0
(2 .8 5 )* *
PSI 19596 0 . 0 0 0
(8 .8 6 )* *
0 . 0 0 0
(8 .1 2 )* *
PCI29596 0 . 0 0 0
(4 .3 9 )* *
0 .001
(7 .5 5 )* *
0 .001
(7 .6 1 )* *
0.001
(7 .6 1 )* *
P S I2 9596 -0 .0 2 7
(4 .3 5 )* *
-0 .0 3 5
(5 .3 5 )* *
-0 .0 3 5
(5 .4 8 )* *
-0 .035
(5 .4 8 )* *
D L I9 5 9 6 0 .0 4 4
(1 .9 2 )+
0 .0 4 2
(1 .8 4 )+
0 .0 4 2
(1 .8 1 )+
0 .1 0 8
(1 .5 7 )
0 .0 3 8
(1 .6 6 )+
0 .0 3 7
(1 .6 2 )
D C I 9596 -0 .1 2 3
(2 .3 1 )*
-0 .1 2 2
(2 .2 0 )*
-0 .1 2 6
(2 .3 7 )*
-0 .0 4 0
(0 .5 0 )
-0 .0 8 7
(1 .6 0 )
-0 .0 8 3
(1 .5 1 )
i m p 9596 0 .0 0 4
(2 .4 8 )*
0 .0 0 4
(2 .7 4 )* *
0 .0 0 4
(2 .4 5 )*
0 .0 0 4
(2 .9 1 )* *
N R P 9 5 9 6 -0 .001
(1 .6 3 )
-0 .0 0 2
(2 .1 9 )*
H H I9596 -0 .581
(3 .0 0 )* *
-0 .5 8 7
(3 .1 4 )* *
C R 4 9596 -0 .3 5 2
(3 .5 1 )* *
-0 .3 8 2
(3 .6 8 )* *
E R P 9596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(0 .2 1 )
0 . 0 0 0
(0 .1 7 )
M ills  ra tio 0 .2 1 2
(5 .0 8 )* *
0 .2 1 3
(5 .1 6 )* *
0 .2 1 8
(5 .2 1 )* *
0 .2 2 2
(5 .0 1 )* *
0 .2 3 6
(5 .6 6 )* *
0 .235
(5 .6 5 )* *
0 .2 0 5
(4 .5 7 )* *
Y ea r d u m m y  1998 -0 .0 6 3
(8 .9 6 )* *
-0 .063
(8 .9 9 )* *
-0 .0 6 3
(9 .0 2 )* *
-0 .0 6 5
(8 .9 1 )* *
-0 .0 6 5
(9 .2 9 )* *
-0 .065
(9 .2 9 )* *
-0 .0 6 3
(8 .6 1 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  1999 -0 .0 6 3
(7 .3 4 )* *
-0 .063
(7 .3 9 )* *
-0 .0 6 4
(7 .4 2 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(7 .3 4 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(7 .7 4 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(7 .7 4 )* *
-0 .0 6 4
(7 .0 2 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  2 0 0 0 -0 .061
(5 .9 4 )* *
-0 .061
(5 .9 9 )* *
-0 .0 6 3
(6 .0 4 )* *
-0 .0 6 4
(5 .9 0 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(6 .4 1 )* *
-0 .0 6 6
(6 .4 1 )* *
-0 .061
(5 .5 5 )* *
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r p ro v in c e s In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed Inc lu d ed
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r  in d u s tr ie s In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed Inc lu d ed
C o n stan t 0 .1 3 2
(2 .0 4 )*
0 .1 3 8
(2 .1 4 )*
0 .1 2 9
(2 .0 1 )*
0 .2 1 2
(3 .1 9 )* *
0 .3 5 9
(4 .8 0 )* *
0 .2 2 2
(3 .6 1 )* *
0 .3 8 3
(4 .8 9 )* *
R -sq u ared
O b se rv a tio n s
0 .07
3 1 4 1 9
0 .0 6
3 1 3 9 6
0 .0 7
3 1 4 5 9
0 .0 7
3 0 3 2 7
0 .0 7
3 1 4 5 9
0 .07
3 1 4 5 9
0 .0 6
3 0 3 5 0
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D ep e n d e n t v a riab le
% A R V L
S p e c if ic a tio n (A 7 .2 2 ) (A 7 .2 3 ) (A 7 .2 4 ) (A 7 .2 5 ) (A 7 .2 6 ) (A 7 .2 7 ) (A 7 .2 8 )
lo g (S lZ E 9596) 0 .0 1 3
(0 .9 6 )
0 .0 0 4
(0 .2 7 )
0 .0 1 3
(0 .9 9 )
0 .0 0 6
(0 .4 5 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .1 3 )
-0 . 0 0 1
( 0 . 1 0 )
0 .0 0 5
(0 .3 9 )
lo g (A G E 9596) -0 .0 3 7
(3 .6 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 8
(3 .8 1 )* *
-0 .0 3 9
(3 .8 9 )* *
-0 .0 4 2
(4 .1 6 )* *
-0 .0 4 4
(4 .5 1 )* *
-0 .0 4 4
(4 .4 9 )* *
-0 .0 3 9
(3 .8 3 )* *
M N C 9 5 9 6 0.231
(5 .5 8 )* *
0 .1 5 0
(3 .7 8 )* *
0 .2 2 5
(5 .4 4 )* *
0 .1 6 7
(4 .1 3 )* *
0 .1 4 5
(3 .6 5 )* *
0 .1 4 5
(3 .6 6 )* *
0 .161
(3 .9 9 )* *
G O V 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 0 8
(0 .1 9 )
-0 .035
(0 .8 3 )
-0 .0 0 5
( 0 . 1 2 )
-0 .0 3 3
(0 .7 7 )
-0 .0 2 9
(0 .7 0 )
-0 .0 2 9
(0 .6 9 )
-0 .0 3 3
(0 .7 7 )
E X P 9 5 9 6 0 .0 8 0
(2 .7 1 )* *
0 . 1 0 0
(3 .4 1 )* *
0 .0 7 8
(2 .6 5 )* *
0 . 1 1 0
(3 .5 8 )* *
0 .0 9 6
(3 .2 6 )* *
0 .0 9 5
(3 .2 4 )* *
0 . 1 1 0
(3 .6 0 )* *
L E V 9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 3
( 1 .6 6 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 8 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 0 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 4 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 8 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 9 )+
0 .0 0 3
(1 .7 7 )+
i m d e p 9 5 9 6 0 .0 5 5
( 2 .0 1 )*
0 .0 1 6
(0 .5 9 )
0 .0 5 7
(2 .0 6 )*
0 .0 1 8
(0 .6 7 )
0 . 0 2 2
(0 .8 2 )
0 . 0 2 2
(0 .8 1 )
0 .0 0 8
(0 .3 1 )
P C I 1 9596 - 0.000
(2 .2 6 )*
- 0.000
(2 .4 1 )*
P S H 9 5 9 6 - 0.000
(7 .6 1 )* *
- 0.000
(7 .2 0 )* *
P C I2 9 5 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 1
(2 .8 9 )* *
-0 . 0 0 1
(4 .8 3 )* *
- 0 . 0 0 1
(4 .7 8 )* *
- 0 . 0 0 1
(4 .7 7 )* *
P S I2 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 1 4
( 1 .2 0 )
-0 .0 0 3
(0 .2 6 )
-0 . 0 0 2
(0 .1 5 )
-0 . 0 0 2
(0 .1 5 )
d l i 9 5 9 6 0 .0 1 7
(0 .3 4 )
0 .0 1 3
(0 .2 6 )
0 .0 1 4
(0 .2 8 )
0 .2 6 9
(1 .6 2 )
0 .0 0 6
(0 .1 3 )
0 .0 0 8
(0 .1 6 )
D C I 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 1 6
( 0 . 1 1 )
-0 .0 2 7
(0 .1 8 )
-0 .0 1 8
( 0 . 1 2 )
0 .1 3 4
(0 .7 3 )
-0 .1 0 4
(0 .7 0 )
-0 .1 2 6
(0 .8 3 )
IM P 9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 4
(1 .1 7 )
0 .0 0 4
( 1 . 1 2 )
0 .0 0 5
(1 .2 6 )
0 .0 0 4
(1 .1 5 )
N R P 9 5 9 6 0 .0 0 4
(1 .5 4 )
0 .0 0 4
(1 .7 6 )+
H H I 9 5 9 6 0 .9 7 6
(1 .8 4 )+
1.134
(2 .1 6 )*
C R 4 9 5 9 6 0 .4 9 0
(1 .7 4 )+
0 .3 7 4
(1 .3 4 )
E R P 9 5 9 6 - 0.000
(1 .9 0 )+
- 0.000
(1 .7 3 )+
M ills  ra tio -0 .2 4 2
(2 .4 6 )*
-0 .2 2 8
(2 .3 3 )*
-0 .2 5 7
(2 .6 2 )* *
-0 .2 7 0
(2 .6 7 )* *
-0 .311
(3 .2 1 )* *
-0 .3 0 9
(3 .1 9 )* *
-0 .231
(2 .2 6 )*
Y e a r  d u m m y  1998 -0 .1 4 6
(8 .5 0 )* *
-0 .1 4 8
(8 .5 9 )* *
-0 .1 4 5
(8 .4 0 )* *
-0 .1 4 8
(8 .3 3 )* *
-0 .1 3 9
( 8 . 1 2 )**
-0 .1 4 0
(8 .1 3 )* *
-0 .1 5 2
(8 .5 3 )* *
Y e a r  d u m m y  1999 -0 .1 7 4
(8 .4 1 )* *
-0 .1 7 6
(8 .5 0 )* *
-0 .1 7 0
(8 .2 5 )* *
-0 .1 7 3
(8 .0 7 )* *
-0 .163
(7 .9 4 )* *
-0 .1 6 3
(7 .9 6 )* *
-0 .1 7 9
(8 .3 1 )* *
Y e a r d u m m y  2 0 0 0 -0 .0 8 6
(3 .4 7 )* *
-0 .0 8 9
(3 .5 7 )* *
-0 .0 8 3
(3 .3 2 )* *
-0 .081
(3 .1 6 )* *
-0 .0 7 3
(2 .9 5 )* *
-0 .0 7 3
(2 .9 7 )* *
-0 .0 8 9
(3 .4 5 )* *
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r  p ro v in ces In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
D u m m y  v a ria b le s  
fo r  in d u s trie s In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed In c lu d ed
C o n s ta n t 0 .1 9 2
(1 .0 3 )
0 .1 8 4
(0 .9 9 )
0 .2 3 4
(1 .2 6 )
0 .1 0 6
(0 .5 7 )
-0 .0 8 4
(0 .3 8 )
0 .0 6 8
(0 .3 7 )
-0 .0 5 2
(0 .2 4 )
R -sq u a red
O b se rv a tio n s
0 .04
3 1 4 1 9
0 .0 4
3 1 3 9 6
0 .0 4
3 1 4 5 9
0 .0 4
3 0 3 2 7
0 .0 4
3 1 4 5 9
0 .0 4
3 1 4 5 9
0 .0 4
3 0 3 5 0
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Appendix 8.2 concluded
Dependent variable
%APCM
Specification (A7.29) (A7.30) (A7.31) (A7.32) (A7.33) (A7.34) (A7.35)
log(SIZE9596) 0.013
(1.66)+
0.016
(2.00)*
0.015
(1.86)+
0.017
(2.00)*
0.016
(2.02)*
0.017
(2.08)*
0.014
(1.71)+
log(AGE9596) -0.011
(1.30)
-0.010
(1.22)
-0.012
(1.40)
-0.014
(1.71)+
-0.013
(1.62)
-0.013
(1.56)
-0.015
(1.73)+
MNC9 59 6 0.096
(3.20)**
0.108
(3.79)**
0.091
(3.06)**
0.115
(3.92)**
0.101
(3.53)**
0.101
(3.56)**
0.112 
(3.82)**
g o v 9596 -0.112 
(2.39)*
-0.105
(2.27)*
-0.112
(2.41)*
-0.101
(2.16)*
-0.102
(2.20)*
-0.102
(2.20)*
-0.105
(2.23)*
EXP9596 0.053
(2.14)*
0.052
(2.08)*
0.054
(2.15)*
0.058
(2.22)*
0.052
(2.08)*
0.051
(2.06)*
0.058
(2.21)*
LEV9596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(0.51)
-0.001
(0.56)
- 0 . 0 0 0
(0.47)
-0.001
(0.64)
- 0 . 0 0 0
(0.55)
- 0 . 0 0 0
(0.55)
-0.001
(0.66)
im d e p 9596 -0.034
(1.46)
-0.028
(1.22)
-0.033
(1-43)
-0.040
(1.73)+
-0.030
(1.29)
-0.030
(1.30)
-0.042
(1.78)+
PCI 19596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(1.95)+
- 0 . 0 0 0
(1.94)+
PSI 1 9 5 9 6 0 . 0 0 0
(1.19)
0 . 0 0 0
(0.99)
PCI29596 - 0 . 0 0 0
(4.92)**
- 0 . 0 0 0
(3.04)**
- 0 . 0 0 0
(2.69)**
- 0 . 0 0 0
(2.70)**
PSI29596 -0.024
(2.48)*
-0.024
(2.37)*
-0.024
(2.35)*
-0.024
(2.36)*
d l i9596 0.075
(1.65)+
0.073
(1.63)
0.075
(1.65)+
0.059
(0.43)
0.068
(1.50)
0.070
(1.56)
d c i9596 -0.208
(1.08)
-0.209
(1.09)
-0.207
(1.07)
-0.284
(1.49)
-0.303
(1.64)
-0.324
(1.75)+
im p 9596 -0.002
(0.24)
-0.002
(0.33)
-0.002
(0.23)
-0.002
(0.30)
n r p 9596 0.004
(1.27)
0.005
(1.51)
HHI9596 1.231
(2.22)*
1.240
(2.22)*
CR49596 0.566
(2.06)*
0.511 
(1.90)+
E R P 9 5 9 6 - 0 . 0 0 0
(0.74)
- 0 . 0 0 0
(0.80)
Mills ratio -0.203
(2.53)*
-0.190
(2.39)*
-0.214
(2.65)**
-0.254
(3.09)**
-0.243
(3.05)**
-0.234
(2.94)**
-0.257
(3.12)**
Year dummy 1998 -0.015
0 .07 )
-0.017
(1.15)
-0.015
(1.01)
-0.013
(0.86)
-0.012
(0.81)
-0.013
(0.87)
-0.012
(0.84)
Year dummy 1999 -0.032
(1.79)+
-0.033
(1.88)+
-0.030
(1.70)+
-0.025
(1.38)
-0.026
(1.47)
-0.027
(1.54)
-0.025
(1.36)
Year dummy 2000 -0.039
(1.89)+
-0.041
(2.00)*
-0.037
(1.78)+
-0.028
(1.31)
-0.032
(1.53)
-0.033
(1-61)
-0.028
(1.29)
Dummy variables 
for provinces Included Included Included Included Included Included
Dummy variables 
for industries Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.272
(1.72)+
0.266
(1.70)+
0.282
(1.80)+
0.188
(1.18)
-0.107
(0.54)
0.069
(0.43)
0.015
(0.08)
0.02
29339
R-squared
Observations
0.02
30443
0.02
30420
0.02
30420
0.02
29316
0.02
30420
0.02
30420
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Appendix 8.4 Complete regression results of Table 8.9
Table A8.1 Dependent variable: %ARVA
E X P *M N C E X P * L E V E X P * S IZ E
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
lo g (S IZ E 9596) -0 .0 2 0
(0 .6 5 )
0 .055
(1 .9 6 )+
0 .055
(1 .7 0 )+
-0 .0 3 0
(1 .0 0 )
0 .049
(1 .7 4 )+
0 .042
(1 .31 )
-0 .049
(1 .3 6 )
0 .0 4 2
(1 .3 2 )
0 .0 4 9
(1 .3 5 )
log (A G E 9596) -0 .0 8 9
(3 .65 )**
-0.051
(2 .33 )*
-0 .048
(1 .99)*
-0 .0 9 2
(3 .77 )**
-0 .052
(2 .38 )*
-0 .052
(2 .18 )*
-0 .100
(3 .86 )**
-0 .055
(2 .3 9 )*
-0 .0 4 8
(1 .9 3 )+
F O R 9596 -0 .093
(0 .7 7 )
0 .075
(0 .7 0 )
0 .158
(1 .46)
0 .2 4 4
(2 .60 )**
0 .304
(3 .62 )**
0 .4 1 9
(4 .99 )**
0 .237
(2 .5 1 )*
0 .302
(3 .60 )**
0 .4 2 0
(5 .0 0 )* *
g o v 9596 0 .093
(1 .2 0 )
-0 .010
(0 .1 2 )
0 .018
(0 .19 )
0 .095
(1 .2 3 )
-0 .009
(0 .1 0 )
0.021
(0 .2 3 )
0 .102
(1 .3 0 )
-0 .005
(0 .0 5 )
0 .0 1 9
(0 .2 1 )
E ^ ^ 9 5 9 6 0 .175
(2 .5 8 )* *
0 .127
(1 .7 9 )+
0 .028
(0 .37 )
0 .315
(4 .91 )**
0 .228
(3 .42 )**
0.141
(2 .0 0 )*
-0 .018
(0 .0 6 )
0 .094
(0 .33 )
0 .1 4 2
(0 .4 6 )
E X P 9596*FOR9596 0 .9 3 6
(4 .41 )**
0 .637
(3 .14 )**
0 .722
(3 .54 )**
e x p 9596*l e v 9596 0 .0 0 2
(0 .2 9 )
-0.001
(0 .13 )
0 .002
(0 .26 )
E X P 9596* lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .064
(1 .1 8 )
0 .025
(0 .4 9 )
-0 .0 0 0
(0 .0 0 )
LEV9596 -0 .0 0 0
(0 .0 6 )
0 .005
(1 .0 3 )
0 .0 0 4
(0 .83 )
-0.001
(0 .2 1 )
0 .005
(1 .00 )
0 .003
(0 .6 3 )
-0.001
(0 .1 1 )
0 .004
(1 .0 0 )
0 .0 0 4
(0 .8 0 )
i m d e p 9596 0 .0 1 0
(0 .1 7 )
0 .058
(0 .9 7 )
0 .133
(2 .14 )*
0 .015
(0 .2 5 )
0 .063
(1 .0 4 )
0 .137
(2 .19 )*
0 .014
(0 .2 2 )
0.061
(1 .0 1 )
0 .1 3 7
(2 .1 9 )*
P C I2 9596 -0 .0 0 0
(1 .1 9 )
-0.001
(1 .3 9 )
-0.001
(1 .3 7 )
-0.001
(1 .3 9 )
-0.001
(1 .53 )
-0.001
(1 .53 )
-0.001
(1 .3 4 )
-0.001
(1 .51 )
-0.001
(1 .5 2 )
P S I2 9596 -0 .023
(1 .2 5 )
-0 .032
(1 .6 3 )
-0 .053
(2 .74 )**
-0 .028
(1 .5 4 )
-0 .036
(1 .8 1 )+
-0 .057
(2 .93 )**
-0 .027
(1-49)
-0 .036
(1 .8 3 )+
-0 .058
(2 .9 9 )* *
C R 4 9596 0.091
(0 .1 6 )
-0.231
(0 .3 5 )
-0 .142
(0 .21 )
0 .0 6 0
(0 .1 0 )
-0 .273
(0 .4 0 )
-0 .143
(0 .2 1 )
0.131
(0 .2 3 )
-0 .254
(0 .37 )
-0 .2 0 8
(0 .3 0 )
i m p 9596 0 .0 1 4
(1 .7 D +
0 .0 1 0
0 .1 7 )
0 .0 0 9
(1 .02 )
0 .0 1 4
(1 .7 4 )+
0 .0 1 0
(1 .1 8 )
0 .009
(0 .99)
0 .015
(1 .8 3 )+
0 .010
(1 .20 )
0 .0 0 9
(1 .0 3 )
E R P 9 5 9 6 -0 .0 0 0
(0 .5 4 )
-0.001
(1 .4 2 )
-0 .0 0 0
(0 .58 )
-0 .000
(0 .6 5 )
-0.001
(1 .5 3 )
-0 .000
(0 .6 5 )
-0 .000
(0 .54 )
-0.001
(1 .49 )
-0 .0 0 0
(0 .6 7 )
M ills  ra tio -0 .0 7 0
(0 .3 2 )
0 .3 1 0
(1 .6 4 )
0 .428
(2 .1 0 )*
-0 .0 9 4
(0 .4 2 )
0 .3 0 6
(1 .6 2 )
0 .384
(1 .8 8 )+
-0 .175
(0 .7 5 )
0 .283
(1 .43 )
0 .4 3 4
(2 .0 2 )*
C onstan t 0 .1 6 4
(0 .3 6 )
-0 .447
(0 .91 )
-0 .764
(1 .5 9 )
0 .2 2 9
(0 .5 0 )
-0 .402
(0 .80 )
-0 .679
(1 .40 )
0.331
(0 .70 )
-0 .366
(0 .73 )
-0 .717
(1 .4 5 )
R -squared 0 .07 0.08 0 .08 0 .0 6 0 .08 0 .07 0 .06 0.08 0 .07
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LEV*SIZE LEV*MNC 1MDEP*EXP
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
log(SIZE9596) -0.031
(1.03)
0.047
(1.66)+
0.044
(1.37)
-0.030
(0.99)
0.050
(1.79)+
0.049
(1.53)
-0.027
(0.87)
0.051
(1.81)+
0.048
(1.48)
log(AGE9596) -0.091
(3.77)**
-0.053
(2.42)*
-0.051
(2.11)*
-0.091
(3.77)**
-0.052
(2.36)*
-0.049
(2.02)*
-0.090
(3.67)**
-0.051
(2.32)*
-0.049
(2.05)*
FOR9596 0.246
(2.62)**
0.304
(3.63)**
0.421
(5.01)**
0.243
(2.61)**
0.297
(3.55)**
0.413
(4.92)**
0.210
(2.16)*
0.282
(3.31)**
0.395
(4.64)**
gov9596 0.096
(1.24)
-0.007
(0.09)
0.021
(0.23)
0.095
(1.22)
-0.012
(0.14)
0.016
(0.18)
0.096
(1.24)
-0.009
(0.10)
0.021
(0.23)
EXP9596 0.316
(4.93)**
0.226
(3.41)**
0.141
(2.00)*
0.317
(4.94)**
0.226
(3.41)**
0.142
(2.01)*
0.241
(3.56)**
0.177
(2.45)*
0.085
(1.09)
LEV9596 -0.021
(1.13)
-0.005
(0.34)
-0.012
(0.62)
-0.001
(0.12)
-0.000
(0.00)
-0.001
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.11)
0.004
(0.98)
0.004
(0.78)
lev9596*for9596 0.000
(0.01)
0.028
(1.78)+
0.028
(2.00)*
LEV9596*log(SlZE9596) 0.004
(1.34)
0.002
(0.79)
0.003
(0.95)
im dep9596 0.016
(0.26)
0.062
(1.03)
0.137
(2.19)*
0.016
(0.26)
0.064
(1.05)
0.139
(2.22)*
-0.060
(0.92)
0.014
(0.22)
0.083
(1.22)
im dep9596*exp9596 0.440
(2.14)*
0.285
(1.48)
0.314
(1.64)
PC129596 -0.001
(1.39)
-0.001
(1.54)
-0.001
(1.53)
-0.001
(1.39)
-0.001
(1.62)
-0.001
(1.61)
-0.001
(1.40)
-0.001
(1.56)
-0.001
(1.54)
PSI29596 -0.028
(1.53)
-0.036
(1.79)+
-0.057
(2.93)**
-0.028
(1.55)
-0.036
(1.81)+
-0.057
(2.97)**
-0.026
(1.43)
-0.035
(1.73)+
-0.055
(2.85)**
CR49596 0.060
(0.10)
-0.260
(0.38)
-0.169
(0.24)
0.058
(0.10)
-0.288
(0.42)
-0.211
(0.31)
0.050
(0.09)
-0.276
(0.41)
-0.173
(0.25)
im p9596 0.014
(1.74)+
0.010
(1.18)
0.009
(1.00)
0.014
(1.74)+
0.010
(1.18)
0.009
(1.03)
0.014
(1.73)+
0.010
(1.18)
0.009
(1.02)
ERP9596 -0.000
(0.67)
-0.001
(1.53)
-0.000
(0.67)
-0.000
(0.65)
-0.001
(1.48)
-0.000
(0.63)
-0.000
(0.53)
-0.001
(1.42)
-0.000
(0.57)
Mills ratio -0.093
(0.42)
0.295
(1.56)
0.404
(1.98)*
-0.091
(0.42)
0.310
(1.65)+
0.428
(2.10)*
-0.077
(0.35)
0.316
(1.66)+
0.415
(2.02)*
Constant 0.231
(0.50)
-0.392
(0.78)
-0.692
(1.42)
0.227
(0.50)
-0.402
(0.80)
-0.708
(1.46)
0.207
(0.45)
-0.420
(0.84)
-0.715
(1-47)
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Table A8.2 Dependent variable: %AROUT
E X P * M N C E X P * L E V E X P * S IZ E
1998 1999 20 0 0 1998 1999 2 0 0 0 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .030
(1 .3 2 )
0 .0 5 4
(2 .2 5 )*
0 .0 8 8
(3 .2 9 )* *
0 .0 2 6
(1 .1 1 )
0.051
(2 .14 )*
0 .0 8 2
(3 .0 5 )* *
0 .012
(0 .4 3 )
0.041
(1 .4 5 )
0 .0 8 0
(2 .56 )*
lo g (A G E 9596) -0 .045
(2 .34 )*
-0.031
(1 .6 9 )+
-0 .0 2 6
(1 .3 3 )
-0 .046
(2 .41 )*
-0.031
(1 .6 8 )+
-0 .0 2 8
(1 .4 0 )
-0 .052
(2 .59 )**
-0 .035
(1 .8 4 )+
-0 .029
(1 .3 7 )
F O R 9596 0 .0 2 9
(0 .3 1 )
0 .0 7 9
(0 .9 0 )
0 .153
(1 .7 8 )+
0 .1 8 9
(2 .81 )**
0 .2 4 0
(3 .59 )**
0 .3 5 5
(5 .5 0 )* *
0 .1 8 4
(2 .7 3 )* *
0 .2 3 8
(3 .5 4 )* *
0 .355
(5 .4 9 )* *
g o v 9596 0.091
(1 .6 7 )+
0 .108
(1 .8 0 )+
0 .1 2 6
(1 .9 9 )*
0 .092
(1 .6 8 )+
0 .108
(1 .7 9 )+
0 .1 2 7
(2 .0 2 )*
0 .0 9 8
(1 .7 6 )+
0 .115
(1 .8 8 )+
0 .1 2 9
(2 .0 2 )*
E X P 9596 0 .2 6 4
(4 .9 0 )* *
0 .1 1 4
(1 .9 0 )+
0 .0 2 5
(0 .3 8 )
0 .333
(6 .5 0 )* *
0 .187
(3 .33 )**
0 .1 1 5
(1 .9 4 )+
0 .0 8 6
(0 .3 6 )
0 .0 3 6
(0 .1 5 )
0 .0 5 9
(0 .2 3 )
E X P 9596*F O R 9596 0 .445
(2 .78 )**
0 .4 4 9
(2 .7 4 )* *
0.561
(3 .5 3 )* *
e x p 9596*l e v 9596 -0 .004
(0 .3 7 )
-0 .003
(0 .5 4 )
-0 .0 0 2
(0 .3 9 )
E X P 9596* lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .0 4 7
(1 .0 7 )
0 .028
(0 .6 4 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .2 1 )
l e v 9596 -0 .005
(0 .8 1 )
-0 .002
(0 .3 6 )
-0 .002
(0 .3 2 )
-0 .005
(0 .67 )
-0.001
(0 .2 3 )
-0 .0 0 2
(0 .2 3 )
-0 .006
(0 .8 4 )
-0 .0 0 2
(0 .3 8 )
-0 .002
(0 .3 4 )
IM D E P 9s96 0 .013
(0 .2 8 )
0 .0 1 2
(0 .2 4 )
0 .0 8 0
(1 .5 8 )
0 .0 1 7
(0 .3 6 )
0 .0 1 6
(0 .3 2 )
0 .0 8 5
(1 .6 6 )+
0 .0 1 4
(0 .3 0 )
0 .013
(0 .2 6 )
0 .0 8 3
(1 .6 2 )
P C I2 9596 -0.001
(2 .1 3 )*
-0.001
(2 .46 )*
-0.001
(2 .3 9 )*
-0.001
(2 .27 )*
-0.001
(2 .6 1 )* *
-0.001
(2 .5 7 )*
-0.001
(2 .23 )*
-0.001
(2 .5 8 )* *
-0.001
(2 .5 6 )*
P S I2 9596 -0 .023
(1 .4 6 )
-0 .0 4 2
(2 .18 )*
-0 .0 4 0
(2 .4 6 )*
-0 .025
(1 .6 2 )
-0 .045
(2 .31 )*
-0 .043
(2 .6 4 )* *
-0 .025
(1 .6 2 )
-0 .045
(2 .34 )*
-0 .0 4 4
(2 .6 8 )* *
C R 4 9596 0 .118  
(0 .2 5 )
-0 .282
(0 .5 2 )
-0 .0 7 9
( 0 . \3 )
0 .103
(0 .2 2 )
-0 .326
(0 .5 9 )
-0 .1 0 9
(0 .1 8 )
0 .1 5 7
(0 .3 3 )
-0 .276
(0 .5 0 )
-0 .1 0 4
(0 .1 7 )
i m p 9596 0 .015
(2 .2 7 )*
0 .0 1 0
(1-34)
0 .005
(0 .4 9 )
0 .015
(2 .2 8 )*
0 .0 1 0
(1 .3 5 )
0 .0 0 5
(0 .4 8 )
0 .0 1 6
(2 .3 9 )*
0 .0 1 0
(1 .3 9 )
0 .005
(0 .4 9 )
E R P 9596 - 0.000
(0 .7 9 )
- 0.000
(1 .2 9 )
- 0.000
(1 .0 8 )
- 0.000
(0 .89 )
- 0.000
(1 .3 9 )
- 0.000
(1 .1 6 )
- 0.000
(0 .7 3 )
- 0.000
(1 .3 2 )
- 0.000
(1 .1 4 )
M ills  ra tio 0 .3 0 2
(1 .6 9 )+
0 .488
(2 .96 )**
0 .623
(3 .5 2 )* *
0 .2 9 4
(1 .6 5 )+
0 .4 9 7
(3 .03 )**
0 .6 1 2
(3 .4 5 )* *
0 .2 3 0
(1 .2 2 )
0 .447
(2 .56 )*
0 .6 0 7
(3 .22 )**
C o n s tan t -0 .139
(0 .4 3 )
-0 .749
(1 .9 8 )*
-1 .4 1 0
(3 .3 4 )* *
- 0.111
(0 .3 4 )
-0 .727
(1 .9 0 )+
-1 .363
(3 .2 2 )* *
-0 .032
(0 .0 9 )
-0 .6 6 8
(1 .7 2 )+
-1 .354
(3 .14 )**
R -sq u a red 0 .0 9 0 .09 0 .08 0.09 0 .09 0 .08 0 .09 0 .09 0.08
Table A 8.2 continued
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Table A 782 concluded
LEV*SIZE LEV*MNC 1MDEP*EXP
1998 1 1999 1 2000 1998 1 1999 1 2000 1998 1 1999 1 2000
log(SlZE9596) 0.025
(1.08)
0.048
(2 .0 0 )*
0.080
(2.95)**
0.025
( 1 . 1 0 )
0.050
(2 . 1 1 )*
0.084
(3.13)**
0.028
( 1 .2 0 )
0.052
(2.15)*
0.083
(3.07)**
log(AGE9596) -0.046
(2.40)*
-0.032
(1.76)+
-0.029
(1.43)
-0.046
(2.43)*
-0.031
(1.73)+
-0.027
(1.36)
-0.045
(2.35)*
-0.031
(1.67)+
-0.028
(1.38)
FOR9 5 9 6 0.190
(2.83)**
0.240
(3.60)**
0.357
(5.52)**
0.188
(2.81)**
0.235
(3.51)**
0.350
(5.42)**
0.167
(2.47)*
0.217
(3.18)**
0.331
(5.07)**
g o v 9 5 9 6 0.093
(1.69)+
0 . 1 1 0
(1.83)+
0.129
(2.04)*
0.092
( 1 .6 8 )+
0.106
(1.77)+
0.124
(1.97)*
0.093
(1.69)+
0.109
(1.82)+
0.128
(2.03)*
EXP9 5 9 6 0.331
(6.47)**
0.184
(3.28)**
0 . 1 1 2
(1.89)+
0.331
(6.47)**
0.184
(3.28)**
0.113
(1.90)+
0.281
(5.11)**
0.134
(2.19)*
0.057
(0 .8 8 )
LEV9 5 9 6 -0.017
(0.71)
-0 . 0 1 2
(0.58)
-0.018
(0.75)
-0.006
(0 .8 8 )
-0.006
(0.82)
-0.006
(0.72)
-0.006
(0.84)
-0 . 0 0 2
(0.39)
-0 . 0 0 2
(0.36)
LEV9 5 9 6 *FOR9 5 9 6 0.004
(0 . 1 2 )
0.023
(1.08)
0.024
(1.30)
LEV9 5 9 6 *log(SIZE9596) 0 . 0 0 2
(0.60)
0 . 0 0 2
(0.60)
0.003
(0.82)
1MDEP95% 0.016
(0.34)
0.014
(0.29)
0.083
(1.64)
0.016
(0.34)
0.016
(0.31)
0.085
( 1 .6 6 )+
-0.034
(0.64)
-0.034
(0.61)
0.030
(0.53)
IMDEP 9 5 9 6 *EXP9 5 9 6 0.289
(1.82)+
0.289
( 1 .8 6 )+
0.308
(1.95)+
PC129 5 9 6 -0 . 0 0 1
(2.28)*
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.62)**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.58)**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.30)*
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.71)**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.67)**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.33)*
-0 . 0 0 1
(2 .6 8 )**
-0 . 0 0 1
(2.65)**
PSI29 5 9 6 -0.025
(1.60)
-0.044
(2.28)*
-0.043
(2.61)**
-0.025
(1.61)
-0.045
(2.30)*
-0.043
(2.65)**
-0.024
(1.52)
-0.043
(2 .2 2 )*
-0.041
(2.53)*
CR49 5 9 6 0 . 1 0 1
(0 .2 1 )
-0.304
(0.55)
-0.099
(0.16)
0.105
(0 .2 2 )
-0.321
(0.58)
-0.130
(0 .2 2 )
0.098
(0 .2 1 )
-0.312
(0.57)
-0.098
(0.16)
IMP 9 5 9 6 0.015
(2.28)*
0 . 0 1 0
(1-35)
0.004
(0.48)
0.015
(2.29)*
0 . 0 1 0
(1.36)
0.005
(0.49)
0.015
(2.28)*
0 . 0 1 0
(1.35)
0.005
(0.49)
ERP9 5 9 6 - 0.000
(0.89)
- 0.000
(1.38)
- 0.000
(1.16)
- 0.000
(0 .8 6 )
- 0.000
(1-33)
- 0.000
( 1 . 1 2 )
- 0.000
(0.75)
- 0.000
(1.25)
- 0.000
(1.04)
Mills ratio 0.293
(1.65)+
0.478
(2.90)**
0.604
(3.39)**
0.289
(1.63)
0.486
(2.97)**
0.621
(3.51)**
0.301
( 1 .6 8 )+
0.492
(2.97)**
0.611
(3.41)**
Constant -0.109
(0.33)
-0.711
( 1 .8 6 )+
-1.354
(3.19)**
-0.107
(0.33)
-0.715
(1.87)+
-1.366
(3.22)**
-0.123
(0.38)
-0.734
(1.93)+
-1.375
(3.25)**
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Table A8.3 Dependent variable: %AEMPL
E X P * M N C E X P *L E V E X P * S IZ E
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
lo g (S IZ E 95%) -0 .0 3 6
(2 .6 7 )* *
-0 .045
(2 .93 )**
-0.041
(2 .48)*
-0 .0 3 6
(2 .68 )**
-0 .046
(3 .01 )**
-0 .042
(2 .62 )**
-0 .035
(2 .46 )*
-0 .0 4 9
(3 .1 1 )* *
-0 .0 4 0
(2 .40 )*
log (A G E 9596) -0 .0 3 0
(2 .89 )**
-0 .0 4 8
(4 .57 )**
-0 .060
(5 .48 )**
-0 .0 3 0
(2 .88 )**
-0 .049
(4 .63 )**
-0.061
(5 .55 )**
-0 .029
(2 .84 )**
-0 .0 4 9
(4 .7 7 )* *
-0 .060
(5 .4 6 )* *
F O R 9596 0 .0 8 6
(2 .15 )*
0 .052
(1 .3 0 )
0 .043
(0 .96 )
0 .104
(3 .35 )**
0 .072
(2 .24 )*
0 .0 9 6
(2 .78 )**
0 .104
(3 .32 )**
0.071
(2 .1 9 )*
0 .0 9 6
(2 .7 7 )* *
g o v 9596 0 .095
(2 .26 )*
0 .068
(1 .5 4 )
0 .0 5 9
(1 .2 6 )
0 .095
(2 .26 )*
0 .068
(1 .5 5 )
0 .0 5 9
(1 .27 )
0 .094
(2 .26 )*
0 .0 7 0
(1 .6 0 )
0 .0 5 8
(1 .2 5 )
e x p 9596 0 .0 8 2
(2 .9 5 )* *
0 .114
(3 .68 )**
0 .0 8 7
(2 .66 )**
0 .088
(3 .53 )**
0.121
(4 .34 )**
0 .108
(3 .65 )**
0 .1 1 0
(1 .06 )
0 .0 5 6
(0 .5 2 )
0.141
(1 .1 4 )
e x p 9596*f o r 9596 0 .0 4 9
(0 .7 2 )
0 .0 5 7
(0 .7 4 )
0 .1 4 6
(1 .8 D +
E X P 9596* lo g (S IZ E 9596) -0 .004
(0 .2 0 )
0 .0 1 3
(0 .6 0 )
-0 .006
(0 .2 6 )
e x p 9596*l e v 9596 0 .003
(1 .5 8 )
0 .004
(1 .25 )
0 .005
(1 .3 5 )
l e v 9596 -0 .001
(0 .6 5 )
-0 .002
(1 .0 5 )
-0 .002
(0 .9 4 )
-0 .002
(1 .0 2 )
-0 .003
(1 .2 4 )
-0 .003
(1 .2 7 )
-0.001
(0 .6 5 )
-0 .002
(1 .0 7 )
-0 .002
(0 .9 5 )
i m d e p 9596 0 .0 4 8
(2 .2 1 )*
0 .033
(1 .3 7 )
0 .063
(2 .46 )*
0 .0 4 9
(2 .22 )*
0.033
(1 .3 7 )
0 .063
(2 .47 )*
0 .049
(2 .22 )*
0 .0 3 3
(1 .3 7 )
0 .0 6 4
(2 .49 )*
P C I2 9596 0.001
(4 .2 8 )* *
0.001
(3 .69 )**
0.001
(4 .04 )**
0.001
(4 .25)**
0.001
(3 .66 )**
0.001
(3 .95 )**
0.001
(4 .24 )**
0.001
(3 .6 7 )* *
0.001
(3 .9 5 )* *
P S \2 9596 -0 .046
(3 .5 4 )* *
-0 .035
(2 .39 )*
-0 .030
(2 .27 )*
-0 .046
(3 .57 )**
-0 .036
(2 .41 )*
-0.031
(2 .33 )*
-0 .046
(3 .58 )**
-0 .0 3 6
(2 .4 0 )*
-0.031
(2 .3 5 )*
C R 4 95% -0 .483
(2 .38 )*
-0 .422
(1 .9 0 )+
-0 .182
(0 .6 7 )
-0 .489
(2 .42 )*
-0 .422
(1 .9 1 )+
-0 .188
(0 .6 9 )
-0 .492
(2 .45)*
-0 .415
(1 .8 9 )+
-0 .202
(0 .7 5 )
IM P 9596 0 .0 0 4
(1 .4 0 )
0 .005
(1 .6 7 )+
0 .0 0 8
(1 .8 5 )+
0 .0 0 4
(1 .4 0 )
0 .005
(1 .6 8 )+
0 .0 0 8
(1 .8 5 )+
0 .004
(1 .41 )
0 .0 0 5
(1 .7 0 )+
0 .008
(1 .8 6 )+
E R P 9596 - 0.000
(0 .5 8 )
0.000
(0 .8 8 )
0 .0 0 0
(0 .6 1 )
- 0.000
(0 .6 0 )
0.000
(0 .8 8 )
0.000
(0 .5 9 )
- 0.000
(0 .6 2 )
0.000
(0 .9 0 )
0.000
(0 .5 5 )
M ills  ratio 0 .1 9 7
(1 .9 1 )+
0 .1 3 9
(1 .3 6 )
0 .155
(1 .4 7 )
0 .2 0 0
(1 .9 5 )+
0 .135
(1 .33 )
0 .1 5 0
(1 .4 3 )
0 .203
(1 .9 9 )*
0 .1 2 7
(1 .2 6 )
0 .1 6 2
(1 .5 5 )
C o nstan t 0 .4 0 4
(2 .6 6 )* *
0.583
(3 .40 )**
0 .3 5 2
(1 .7 2 )+
0 .405
(2 .67 )**
0 .590
(3 .45 )**
0 .3 6 6
(1 .8 0 )+
0 .400
(2 .59 )**
0 .605
(3 .5 0 )* *
0 .353
(1 .7 2 )+
R -sq u ared 0 .0 9 0 .08 0 .08 0 .09 0.08 0 .08 0 .09 0 .08 0 .08
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Table A8.3 concluded
LEV*SIZE LEV*MNC IMDEP*EXP
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
l°g(SIZE9596) -0.036
(2.67)**
-0.044
(2 .8 8 )**
-0.041
(2.50)*
-0.034
(2.59)**
-0.044
(2.91)**
-0.040
(2.50)*
-0.036
(2.73)**
-0.047
(3.05)**
-0.043
(2.61)**
log(AGE9596) -0.030
(2.89)**
-0.048
(4.55)**
-0.060
(5.48)**
-0.029
(2.80)**
-0.048
(4.55)**
-0.060
(5.47)**
-0.031
(2.96)**
-0.049
(4.66)**
-0.061
(5.54)**
FOR9596 0.103
(3.33)**
0.071
(2.19)*
0.094
(2.73)**
0.101
(3.28)**
0.069
(2.15)*
0.092
(2.67)**
0.089
(2.74)**
0.055
( 1.6 6 )+
0.082
(2.31)*
GOV9596 0.094
(2.26)*
0.067
(1.51)
0.058
(1.25)
0.093
(2.23)*
0.066
(1.50)
0.057
(1.23)
0.096
(2.29)*
0.070
(1.59)
0.060
(1-29)
EXP 9596 0.089
(3.58)**
0.123
(4.44)**
0.111
(3.74)**
0.089
(3.57)**
0.122
(4.40)**
0 .110
(3.71)**
0.056
(2 .0 0 )*
0.086
(2.70)**
0.079
(2.31)*
EEV9596 0.002
(0.48)
0.012
(1.6 8 )+
0.011
(1.53)
-0.003
(1.45)
-0.004
(1.64)
-0.004
(1.7D+
-0.001
(0.69)
-0.002
(MO)
-0.002
(0.99)
EEV9596*FOR9596 0.012
(2.52)*
0.013
(2.53)*
0.016
(3.15)**
LEV9596*log(SIZE9596) -0.001
(0 .86 )
-0.003
(2 .0 0 )*
-0.003
(1.87)+
im d e p 9596 0.049
(2.23)*
0.033
(1.39)
0.064
(2.49)*
0.049
(2.26)*
0.034
(1.42)
0.065
(2.52)*
0.016
(0.65)
-0.003
(0 .10)
0.034
( 1.2 0 )
IMDEP9596*EXP9596 0.188
(2.69)**
0.209
(2.83)**
0.170
(2.23)*
PCI29596 0.001
(4.25)**
0.001
(3.67)**
0.001
(3.96)**
0.001
(4.20)**
0.001
(3.60)**
0.001
(3.89)**
0.001
(4.10)**
0.001
(3.52)**
0.001
(3.84)**
PSI29596 -0.046
(3.58)**
-0.036
(2.44)*
-0.031
(2.36)*
-0.046
(3.59)**
-0.036
(2.43)*
-0.031
(2.36)*
-0.045
(3.47)**
-0.034
(2.31)*
-0.030
(2.25)*
GR49596 -0.487
(2.40)*
-0.432
(1.96)+
-0.201
(0.74)
-0.504
(2.49)*
-0.437
(1.98)*
-0.209
(0.77)
-0.470
(2.32)*
-0.401
(1.82)+
-0.175
(0.64)
IMP9596 0.004
(1.40)
0.005
( 1.6 8 )+
0.008
(1.8 6 )+
0.004
(1.38)
0.005
( 1.6 8 )+
0.008
(1.87)+
0.004
(1.43)
0.005
(1.67)+
0.008
(1.84)+
ERP 9596 - 0.000
(0.59)
0.000
(0.89)
0.000
(0.59)
- 0.000
(0.59)
0.000
(0.90)
0.000
(0.62)
- 0.000
(0.41)
0.000
(1.05)
0.000
(0.70)
Mills ratio 0.198
(1.92)+
0.143
(1-41)
0.159
(1-51)
0.210
(2.06)*
0.145
(1-43)
0.162
(1.55)
0.186
(1.80)+
0.123
( 1.2 0 )
0.145
(1.37)
Constant 0.406
(2.67)**
0.582
(3.39)**
0.358
(1.75)+
0.400
(2.64)**
0.584
(3.41)**
0.359
(1.76)+
0.409
(2.70)**
0.591
(3.44)**
0.363
(1.77)+
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Table A8.4 Dependent variable: %ARVL
E X P * M N C E X P * L E V E X P * S IZ E
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .0 1 2
(0 .3 9 )
0 .098
(3 .32 )**
0 .092
(2 .72 )**
0 .002
(0 .0 7 )
0 .092
(3 .16 )**
0.081
(2 .43 )*
-0 .017
(0 .4 5 )
0 .0 8 9
(2 .73 )**
0 .0 8 6
(2 .3 1 )*
lo g (A G E 9596) -0 .062
(2 .46 )*
-0 .005
(0 .2 3 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .4 0 )
-0 .064
(2 .58 )*
-0 .006
(0 .2 5 )
0 .0 0 6
(0 .24 )
-0 .073
(2 .74 )**
-0 .007
(0 .3 0 )
0 .0 0 9
(0 .3 6 )
FOR9596 -0 .175
(1 .46 )
0 .028
(0 .27 )
0 .122
(1 .1 5 )
0 .1 4 0
(1 .5 2 )
0 .232
(2 .92 )**
0 .323
(4 .05 )**
0 .133
(1 .44)
0 .232
(2 .91 )**
0 .3 2 4
(4 .0 5 )* *
G O V 9596 -0 .0 2 6
(0 .3 3 )
-0 .104
(1 .1 0 )
-0 .067
(0 .6 8 )
-0 .024
(0 .3 0 )
-0 .103
(1 .0 9 )
-0 .064
(0 .6 4 )
-0 .017
(0 .22 )
-0.101
(1 .07 )
-0 .0 6 5
(0 .6 6 )
E X P 9596 0 .0 8 9
(1 .3 2 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .1 4 )
-0 .063
(0 .8 5 )
0.221
(3 .47)**
0.101
(1 .58 )
0 .0 2 6
(0 .3 8 )
-0 .124
(0 .44 )
0 .045
(0 .1 7 )
0 .0 0 4
(0 .0 1 )
E X P 9596*F O R 9596 0 .8 7 6
(4 .25 )**
0 .5 7 0
(3 .00 )**
0 .5 6 0
(2 .88 )**
E X P 9596* lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .067
(1-23)
0 .0 1 0
(0 .2 0 )
0 .0 0 4
(0 .0 7 )
e x p 9596*l e v 9596 -0.001
(0 .1 2 )
-0 .005
(0 .9 7 )
-0 .003
(0 .6 7 )
l e v 9596 0.001
(0 .1 8 )
0 .0 0 6
(1 .9 5 )+
0 .0 0 6
(1 .6 4 )
0.001
(0 .2 4 )
0 .008
(1 .98 )*
0 .0 0 6
(1 .5 6 )
0.001
(0 .12 )
0 .0 0 6
(1 .9 2 )+
0 .0 0 6
(1 .6 1 )
i m d e p 9596 -0 .033
(0 .5 7 )
0 .0 3 0
(0 .5 3 )
0 .075
(1 .2 9 )
-0 .028
(0 .4 9 )
0 .035
(0 .6 1 )
0 .0 7 9
(1 .3 4 )
-0 .030
(0 .51 )
0 .033
(0 .58 )
0 .0 7 8
(1 .3 4 )
P C I2 9596 -0.001
(2 .84 )**
-0.001
(2 .69 )**
-0.001
(2 .88 )**
-0.001
(3 .03 )**
-0.001
(2 .81 )**
-0.001
(3 .00 )**
-0.001
(2 .98 )**
-0.001
(2 .81 )**
-0 .001
(3 .0 0 )* *
P S \2 9596 0 .0 1 4
(0 .5 5 )
-0 .006
(0 .2 2 )
-0 .033
(1 .2 5 )
0 .0 0 9
(0 .3 4 )
-0 010 
(0 .3 5 )
-0 .036
(1 .3 6 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .3 9 )
-0 .0 1 0
(0 .3 5 )
-0 .0 3 6
(1 .4 0 )
C R 4 9596 0 .615
(1 .0 8 )
0 .2 2 6
(0 .3 4 )
0 .0 9 0
(0 .1 3 )
0 .5 9 0
(1 .0 2 )
0 .183
(0 .2 7 )
0 .0 9 4
(0 .1 4 )
0.661
(1 .1 4 )
0 .1 9 4
(0 .2 9 )
0 .041
(0 .0 6 )
IM P 9596 0 .0 1 0
(1 .2 2 )
0 .004
(0 .5 4 )
0.001
(0 .1 4 )
0 .0 1 0
(1-26)
0 .004
(0 .5 5 )
0.001
(0 .1 1 )
0.011
(1 .3 5 )
0 .005
(0 .5 6 )
0 .001
(0 .1 5 )
E R P 9596 - 0.000
(0 .4 5 )
-0.001
(2 .06 )*
- 0.000
(0 .9 7 )
- 0.000
(0 .5 5 )
-0.001
(2 .1 7 )*
- 0.000
(1 .04 )
- 0.000
(0 .44 )
-0.001
(2 .14 )*
- 0.000
(1 .0 4 )
M ills  ra tio 0 .0 6 8
(0 .5 8 )
0 .063
(0 .3 9 )
0 .3 8 6
(2 .72 )**
0.081
(0 .69 )
0 .058
(0 .37 )
0 .3 8 4
(2 .7 3 )* *
0.035
(0 .29)
0.031
(0 .20 )
0.331
(2 .3 2 )*
C o n stan t -0 .226
(0 .4 9 )
-1 .022
(2 .04 )*
-1 .1 0 2
(2 .28 )*
-0 .162
(0 .3 5 )
-0 .985
(1 .9 3 )+
-1 .034
(2 .12 )*
-0 .058
(0 .12 )
-0 .967
(1 .8 8 )+
-1.061
(2 .1 5 )*
R -sq u ared 0 .05 0 .08 0 .07 0 .05 0 .08 0 .07 0.05 0 .08 0 .0 7
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Table A8.4 concluded
LEV*SIZE LEV*MNC IMDEP*EXP
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
log(SIZE9596) 0.001
(0.03)
0.089
(3.02)**
0.081
(2.41)*
0.001
(0.02)
0.092
(3.15)**
0.086
(2.56)*
0.006
(0.19)
0.095
(3.24)**
0.087
(2.57)*
log(AGE9596) -0.064
(2.57)*
-0.007
(0.33)
0.007
(0.27)
-0.065
(2.62)**
-0.006
(0.28)
0.008
(0.34)
-0.062
(2.45)*
-0.004
(0.18)
0.009
(0.36)
F O R 9 596 0.143
(1.55)
0.234
(2.95)**
0.327
(4.09)**
0.142
(1.55)
0.229
(2.89)**
0.321
(4.02)**
0.120
(1.26)
0.226
(2.80)**
0.312
(3.83)**
g o v 9596 -0.023
(0.29)
-0.100
(1.06)
-0.063
(0.63)
-0.023
(0.29)
-0.104
(1.10)
-0.067
(0.67)
-0.024
(0.30)
-0.104
(1.11)
-0.065
(0.66)
EXP9596 0.221
(3.46)**
0.097
(1.52)
0.023
(0.34)
0.221
(3.48)**
0.098
(1.54)
0.025
(0.36)
0.175
(2.59)**
0.083
(1.19)
-0.003
(0.04)
LEV9596 -0.023
(1.45)
-0.017
(1.17)
-0.024
(1.23)
0.002
(0.88)
0.004
(1.14)
0.004
(0.81)
0.001
(0.13)
0.006
(1.92)+
0.006
(1.59)
l e v 9596*fo r9596 -0.012
(0.46)
0.015
(1.17)
0.012
(1.09)
LEV9596*log(SIZE9596) 0.005
(1.73)+
0.005
(1.67)+
0.006
(1.61)
IMDEP9596 -0.028
(0.48)
0.033
(0.59)
0.078
(1.34)
-0.029
(0.49)
0.034
(0.60)
0.079
(1.35)
-0.074
(1.21)
0.019
(0.30)
0.052
(0.83)
IMDEP9596*EXP 9596 0.268
(1.33)
0.091
(0.50)
0.153
(0.84)
PCI29596 -0.001
(3.03)**
-0.001
(2.82)**
-0.001
(3.01)**
-0.001
(3.00)**
-0.001
(2.85)**
-0.001
(3.03)**
-0.001
(3.05)**
-0.001
(2.83)**
-0.001
(3.03)**
PSI29596 0.009
(0.35)
-0.009
(0.33)
-0.035
(1.35)
0.009
(0.35)
-0.010
(0.35)
-0.036
(1.38)
0.010
(0.38)
-0.010
(0.34)
-0.035
(1.35)
C R 495% 0.590
0-02)
0.209
(0.31)
0.084
(0.12)
0.605
(1-05)
0.187
(0.28)
0.050
(0.07)
0.563
(0.98)
0.162
(0.24)
0.054
(0.08)
IMP9596 0.010
(1.25)
0.004
(0.55)
0.001
(0.11)
0.010
(1.26)
0.004
(0.55)
0.001
(0.13)
0.010
(1.23)
0.004
(0.55)
0.001
(0.14)
ERP9596 - 0.000
(0.57)
-0.001
(2.17)*
- 0.000
(1.06)
- 0.000
(0.56)
-0.001
(2.13)*
- 0.000
(1.03)
- 0.000
(0.49)
-0.001
(2.13)*
- 0.000
(0.99)
Mills ratio 0.061
(0.52)
0.050
(0.31)
0.376
(2.66)**
0.087
(0.75)
0.068
(0.43)
0.385
(2.75)**
0.080
(0.68)
0.063
(0.39)
0.381
(2.67)**
Constant -0.160
(0.34)
-0.965
(1.90)+
-1.037
(2.13)*
-0.157
(0.34)
-0.977
(1.92)+
-1.055
(2.17)*
-0.187
(0.40)
-1.002
(1.97)*
-1.066
(2.19)*
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Table A8.5 Dependent variable: %APCM
E X P * M N C E X P * L E V E X P * S 1Z E
1998 1999 2000 1998  1999  2000 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
l o g ( S I Z E 9596) 0.011
( 0 .7 3 )
- 0 .0 0 9
( 0 .3 4 )
0.051
( 2 .3 8 ) *
0 .013
( 0 .8 5 )
- 0.011
( 0 .4 2 )
0 .0 4 9
( 2 .2 9 ) *
0.003
( 0 . 19 )
- 0 .018
( 0 .7 1 )
0 .0 3 4
( 1. 5 0 )
l o g ( A G E 9596) - 0 .047
( 2 .7 0 ) * *
- 0 .0 0 9
( 0 .4 1 )
0 .014
( 0 .7 1 )
- 0 .0 4 8
( 2 . 7 6 ) * *
- 0.011
( 0 .4 9 )
0.011
( 0 . 5 4 )
- 0 .053
( 2 .9 7 ) * *
- 0 .012
( 0 .5 5 )
0 .0 0 9
( 0 .4 3 )
F O R .9596 - 0 .0 1 0
( 0 . 15 )
0 .015
( 0 . 18 )
0 .0 3 7
( 0 .4 7 )
0 .0 9 8
( 1 .6 9 ) +
0 .125
( 1. 8 8 ) +
0 .147
( 2 .3 2 ) *
0 .093
( 1.6 0 )
0.123
( 1. 8 5 ) +
0 .1 4 5
( 2 .2 9 ) *
G O V 9 5 9 6 0.031
( 0 .4 2 )
- 0 .225
( 1.8 1 ) +
- 0.191
( 1.8 3 ) +
0.031
( 0 .4 2 )
- 0 .223
( 1.7 9 ) +
- 0 .1 8 9
( 1. 8 1 ) +
0 .036
( 0 .4 9 )
- 0.221
( 1.7 8 ) +
- 0 .1 8 3
( 1 . 7 6 ) +
E X P 9596 - 0.021
( 0 .3 7 )
0 .047
( 0 .6 6 )
0.011
( 0 . 16)
0 .0 1 9
( 0 .3 8 )
0.091
( 1 .5 0 )
0.061
( 1. 0 5 )
- 0 .235
( 1 . 15 )
-0 .1 1 0
( 0 .4 9 )
- 0 .2 6 9
( 1.2 3 )
E X P 9 5 9 6* F O R 9596 0 .295
( 2 . 10 ) *
0 .303
( 1.7 3 ) +
0 .3 0 4
( 1.9 5 ) +
e x p 9596* l e v 9596 0 .007
( 1.4 4 )
0 .002
( 0 .2 8 )
- 0 .0 0 6
( 1 .0 9 )
E X P 9596* l o g ( S I Z E 9596) 0 .0 5 0
( 1.3 3 )
0 .039
( 0 .9 5 )
0 .0 6 2
( 1. 5 3 )
L E V 9596 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 14 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .0 2 )
- 0.001
( 0 .6 7 )
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 18 )
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .0 5 )
0.001
( 0 .4 8 )
0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 11 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .0 6 )
- 0 .0 0 2
( 0 . 7 2 )
i m d e p 9596 - 0 .092
( 2 .0 2 ) *
- 0 .024
( 0 .4 6 )
0.011
( 0 .2 1 )
- 0 .093
( 2 . 0 3 ) *
- 0 .024
( 0 .4 6 )
0 .012
( 0 . 2 4 )
- 0 .092
( 2 .0 1 ) *
- 0 .024
( 0 .4 5 )
0 .0 1 0
( 0 .2 1 )
P C I 2 9596 - 0 . 0 0 0
( 2 . 16 ) *
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 8 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 5 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 2 . 13 ) *
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .9 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .6 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 2 . 10) *
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .9 0 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .5 4 )
P S \ 2 9596 - 0.031
( 1.0 7 )
- 0 .027
( 1.3 7 )
- 0 .0 4 4
( 2 .7 8 ) * *
- 0 .033
( 1. 14 )
- 0 .0 2 9
( 1.4 5 )
- 0 .045
( 2 .9 3 ) * *
- 0 .032
( 1. 12 )
- 0 .029
( 1.4 7 )
- 0 .0 4 6
( 2 .9 4 ) * *
C R 4 9596 0 .5 9 6
( 1.2 0 )
0 .434
( 0 .6 5 )
0 .9 1 9
( 1 .4 0 )
0.591
( 1. 18 )
0 .4 4 0
( 0 .6 5 )
0 .945
( 1.4 4 )
0 .632
( 1.2 7 )
0 .434
( 0 .6 5 )
0 .9 4 2
( 1.4 3 )
i m p 9596 0.001
( 0 .0 8 )
- 0.001
( 0 .0 9 )
- 0.001
( 0 .0 9 )
0.001
( 0 . 0 9 )
- 0.001
( 0 .0 9 )
- 0 .002
( 0 . 10 )
0.001
( 0 . 12 )
- 0.001
( 0 .0 8 )
- 0 .0 0 2
( 0 . 0 9 )
E R P 9596 - 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .2 4 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .6 5 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 17 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 2 6 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .6 7 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .2 0 )
- 0.000
( 0 .2 1 )
- 0.000
( 0 .6 5 )
- 0.000
( 0 . 15 )
M i l l s  r a t io - 0 .428
( 2 . 7 9 ) * *
- 0 .2 5 9
( 1.3 2 )
0.011
( 0 .0 6 )
- 0 .4 3 8
( 2 .8 6 ) * *
- 0 .278
( 1-4 4 )
- 0 .0 2 6
( 0 . 15 )
- 0 .487
( 3 . 12 ) * *
- 0 .284
( 1.4 6 )
- 0 .035
( 0 .2 0 )
C o n s t a n t - 0 .295
( 0 .6 8 )
0 .094
( 0 .2 0 )
- 0 .292
( 0 .6 8 )
- 0 .275
( 0 .6 3 )
0 .123
( 0 .2 6 )
- 0 .247
( 0 . 5 7 )
- 0 .205
( 0 .4 7 )
0 .157
( 0 .3 3 )
- 0 .1 9 7
( 0 .4 5 )
R - s q u a r e d 0 .02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 .02 0.02 0.03 0 .02
Table A8.5 continued
230
Table AS.5 concluded
L E V * S IZ E L E V * M N C IM D E P * E X P
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
log(SIZE9596) 0.010
(0.65)
-0.013
(0.50)
0.048
(2.22)*
0.014
(0.90)
-0.009
(0.36)
0.050
(2.33)*
0.012
(0.78)
-0.010
(0.38)
0.049
(2.27)*
log(AGE9596) -0.049
(2.82)**
-0.011
(0.48)
0.013
(0.64)
-0.046
(2.67)**
-0.009
(0.39)
0.014
(0.71)
-0.047
(2.71)**
-0.009
(0.40)
0.013
(0.68)
F O R 9596 0.101
(1.72)+
0.128
(1.92)+
0.149
(2.36)*
0.099
(1.70)+
0.124
(1.86)+
0.146
(2.31)*
0.104
(1.69)+
0.122
(1.83)+
0.146
(2.26)*
gov9596 0.033
(0.45)
-0.222
(1.78)+
-0.189
(1.81)+
0.030
(0.41)
-0.227
(1.82)+
-0.192
(1.84)+
0.030
(0.41)
-0.225
(1.81)+
-0.191
(1.83)+
EXP9596 0.022
(0.43)
0.091
(1.52)
0.058
(1.00)
0.023
(0.46)
0.092
(1.53)
0.058
(1.01)
0.036
(0.61)
0.085
(1.13)
0.054
(0.80)
L E V 9596 -0.017
(3.16)**
-0.021
(2.63)**
-0.010
(0.69)
- 0.000
(0.07)
-0.001
(0.62)
-0.003
(0.90)
0.000
(0.22)
- 0.000
(0.04)
-0.002
(0.69)
L E V 9596* F O R 9596 -0.002
(0.26)
0.009
(1.57)
0.008
(1.61)
L E V 9596* Io g (S IZ E 9596) 0.006
(2.54)*
0.005
(2.54)*
0.003
(1.16)
im dep9596 -0.091
(1.99)*
-0.023
(0.45)
0.012
(0.23)
-0.091
(1.98)*
-0.023
(0.43)
0.012
(0.24)
-0.078
d.67)+
-0.031
(0.55)
0.007
(0.13)
IM D E P 9596* E X P 9596 -0.074
(0.52)
0.045
(0.24)
0.026
(0.18)
P C I 2 9596 - 0.000
(2.14)*
- 0.000
(0.94)
- 0.000
(0.62)
- 0.000
(2.14)*
- 0.000
(0.98)
- 0.000
(0.66)
- 0.000
(2.07)*
- 0.000
(0.95)
- 0.000
(0.63)
PSI29596 -0.032
(1.12)
-0.029
(1.44)
-0.045
(2.92)**
-0.033
(1.15)
-0.030
(1.47)
-0.046
(2.95)**
-0.034
(1.16)
-0.029
(1.46)
-0.046
(2.93)**
CR495% 0.611
0.22)
0.441
(0.65)
0.915
(1.39)
0.572
(1.15)
0.405
(0.60)
0.889
(1.35)
0.580
(1.16)
0.412
(0.61)
0.902
(1.37)
im p9596 0.001
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.09)
-0.002
(0.09)
0.001
(0.07)
-0.001
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.08)
0.001
(0.08)
-0.001
(0.09)
-0.001
(0.09)
ERP9596 - 0.000
(0.27)
- 0.000
(0.69)
- 0.000
(0.21)
- 0.000
(0.28)
- 0.000
(0.67)
- 0.000
(0.19)
- 0.000
(0.28)
- 0.000
(0.67)
- 0.000
(0.19)
M ills  ra t io -0.451
(2.95)**
-0.277
(1-42)
-0.003
(0.02)
-0.417
(2.74)**
-0.252
(1.30)
0.013
(0.08)
-0.427
(2.77)**
-0.255
(1.29)
0.007
(0.04)
C o n s ta n t -0.264
(0.61)
0.125
(0.27)
-0.261
(0.61)
-0.290
(0.67)
0.105
(0.22)
-0.274
(0.64)
-0.281
(0.64)
0.105
(0.22)
-0.271
(0.63)
R -s q u a re d 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
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Appendix 8.5 Complete regression results of Table 8.10
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le Su
E X P * M N C E X P * L E V E X P * S IZ E
1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
lo g (S IZ E 9596) 0 .4 1 4
( 17 .6 1 ) * *
0 .4 4 2
( 19 . 3 2 ) * *
0 .422
( 19 . 5 9 ) * *
0 .415
( 17 . 6 6 ) * *
0 .442
( 19 . 3 4 ) * *
0.421
( 19 . 6 0 ) * *
0 .438
( 16 .4 2 ) * *
0 .4 5 9
( 17 .8 1 ) * *
0 .433
( 18 . 14 ) * *
lo g (A G E 9596) 0 .235
( 14 .2 0 ) * *
0 .213
( 13 . 3 3 ) * *
0.203
( 13 . 11 ) * *
0 .235
( 14 . 19 ) * *
0 .213
( 13 . 3 3 ) * *
0 .203
( 13 . 11 ) * *
0 .237
( 14 .2 9 ) * *
0 .214
( 13 .4 0 ) * *
0 .203
( 13 . 16) * *
FOR-9596 0 .1 6 6
( 1. 15 )
0 .1 2 0
( 0 . 8 5 )
- 0.003
( 0 .0 3 )
0 .097
( 0 .9 1 )
0.081
( 0 .7 6 )
0 .0 3 0
( 0 .3 0 )
0 .110
( 1.0 3 )
0 .0 8 9
( 0 .8 4 )
0 .035
( 0 .3 5 )
g o v 9596 0 .083
( 0 . 5 2 )
- 0 .1 7 0
( 1.2 3 )
- 0.045
( 0 .3 4 )
0 .084
( 0 .5 2 )
- 0 .168
( 1.2 2 )
- 0 .0 4 4
( 0 .3 3 )
0 .075
( 0 .4 7 )
- 0 .173
( 1.2 5 )
- 0 .048
( 0 .3 6 )
E X P 9596 0 .0 3 7
( 0 .4 1 )
0.000
( 0 . 0 0 )
- 0 .019
( 0 .2 3 )
0 .004
( 0 .0 4 )
- 0 .023
( 0 .2 9 )
- 0 .0 1 6
( 0 .2 1 )
0.731
( 2 .2 2 ) *
0 .4 9 7
( 1. 5 3 )
0 .3 6 9
( 1.2 1 )
E X P 9596*F O R 9596 - 0 .193
( 0 . 7 8 )
- 0 .115
( 0 .4 8 )
0 .079
( 0 .3 5 )
EX P9596* lo g (S IZ E 9596) - 0 .154
( 2 .2 1 ) *
- 0 .1 1 0
( 1.6 0 )
- 0 .0 8 0
( 1.2 6 )
e x p 9596* l e v 9596 0.091
( 2 . 5 6 ) *
0 .098
( 2 . 7 2 ) * *
0 .087
( 2 . 5 3 ) *
l e v 9596 0 .0 1 0
( 0 .7 7 )
0 .0 0 9
( 0 .8 6 )
0 .0 0 9
( 1.0 8 )
0 .002
( 0 . 3 8 )
0 .002
( 0 .4 1 )
0 .002
( 0 .4 6 )
0 .0 0 9
( 0 .7 8 )
0 .0 0 9
( 0 .8 6 )
0 .0 0 9
( 1.0 8 )
i m d e p 9596 0 .0 3 8
( 0 .4 8 )
0 .0 6 0
( 0 . 7 6 )
0.033
( 0 .4 4 )
0.041
( 0 . 5 1 )
0 .062
( 0 .7 9 )
0.035
( 0 .4 7 )
0 .033
( 0 .4 1 )
0 .0 5 6
( 0 .7 1 )
0.031
( 0 .4 1 )
P C I29596 0.000
( 0 . 14 )
- 0.000
( 0 .3 7 )
0.000
( 0 . 14 )
0.000
( 0 . 14 )
- 0.000
( 0 .3 7 )
0.000
( 0 . 13 )
0.000
( 0 . 13)
- 0.000
( 0 .3 8 )
0.000
( 0 . 13)
P S I2 9596 - 0 .059
( 2 .3 4 ) *
- 0 .049
( 1.9 6 ) *
- 0 .046
( 1.9 6 ) *
- 0 .059
( 2 . 3 0 ) *
- 0 .0 4 8
( 1.9 4 ) +
- 0 .047
( 1.9 8 ) *
- 0 .060
( 2 . 3 6 ) *
- 0 .0 4 9
( 1. 9 8 ) *
- 0 .047
( 2 . 0 1 ) *
GR-^9596 - 2 .885
( 3 . 8 3 ) * *
- 2.943
( 3 .8 1 ) * *
- 3 .036
( 4 .0 5 ) * *
- 2.871
( 3 . 8 1 ) * *
- 2 .935
( 3 . 8 0 ) * *
- 3 .037
( 4 .0 5 ) * *
- 2 .853
( 3 . 7 9 ) * *
- 2 .9 1 9
( 3 .7 8 ) * *
- 3.022
( 4 .0 2 ) * *
IM P 9596 - 0 .0 2 0
( 1.2 1 )
- 0 .002
( 0 . 11 )
0 .014
( 1.0 5 )
- 0 .0 2 0
( 1. 2 1 )
- 0 .002
( 0 . 11 )
0 .014
( 1.0 5 )
- 0 .0 1 9
( 1. 18 )
- 0.001
( 0 . 10 )
0 .014
( 1.0 6 )
E R P 9596 - 0.001
( 1. 9 7 ) *
- 0.001
( 1.5 4 )
- 0.000
( 0 .8 7 )
- 0.001
( 1.9 5 ) +
- 0.001
( 1. 5 3 )
- 0.000
( 0 .8 7 )
- 0.001
( 1.9 6 ) *
- 0.001
( 1. 5 2 )
- 0.000
( 0 . 8 7 )
C o n s ta n t - 0.291
( 0 .5 2 )
- 0 .452
( 0 .8 0 )
- 0 .3 4 0
( 0 . 6 1 )
- 0 .304
( 0 . 5 4 )
- 0 .4 5 9
( 0 . 8 1 )
- 0 .335
( 0 . 6 0 )
- 0 .399
( 0 .7 1 )
- 0 .5 2 8
( 0 .9 3 )
- 0 .388
( 0 .6 9 )
P s e u d o  R 2 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0.14 0 .14 0.14 0.14 0 .14 0.14
Appendix 8.5 continued
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Appendix 8.5 Concluded
D ependent variable S i ,,
LEV*SIZE L EV *M N C IM D EP*EX P
1998  1999  200 0 1998  1999  200 0 1998  1999  20 0 0
log(SIZ E 9596) 0 .417
( 17 .7 2 ) * *
0 .444
( 19 .4 0 ) * *
0 .423
( 19 .6 4 ) * *
0 .416
( 17 .6 9 ) * *
0 .443
( 19 . 3 7 ) * *
0 .422
( 19 .6 2 ) * *
0 .414
( 17 .6 4 ) * *
0.441
( 19 . 3 1 ) * *
0.421
( 19 .6 1 ) * *
log(A G E 9596) 0.235
( 14 . 19 ) * *
0 .213
( 13 .3 2 ) * *
0 .2 0 2
( 13 . 10 ) * *
0 .235
( 14 .2 0 ) * *
0 .213
( 13 . 3 4 ) * *
0 .203
( 13 . 12 ) * *
0 .235
( 14 . 19 ) * *
0 .213
( 13 . 3 3 ) * *
0 .203
( 13 . 11 ) * *
f o r 9596 0 .092
( 0 .8 6 )
0 .075
( 0 .7 1 )
0 .0 2 4
( 0 .2 5 )
0 .094
( 0 . 8 7 )
0 .0 7 6
( 0 .7 2 )
0 .025
( 0 .2 6 )
0.121
( 1 . 11 )
0 .112
( 1. 0 3 )
0 .035
( 0 .3 5 )
g o v 9596 0 .083
( 0 . 5 2 )
- 0 .169
( 1 .2 3 )
- 0 .0 4 6
( 0 . 3 4 )
0 .082
( 0 . 5 1 )
- 0.171
( 1.2 4 )
- 0 .0 4 7
( 0 .3 5 )
0.081
( 0 .5 1 )
- 0 .172
( 1. 2 5 )
- 0 .0 4 6
( 0 . 3 4 )
E X P 9 5 9 6 0 .010
( 0 . 12 )
- 0 .015
( 0 . 19 )
- 0 .0 0 8
( 0 . 11 )
0.011
( 0 . 13 )
- 0 .0 1 4
( 0 . 18 )
- 0 .008
( 0 . 10 )
0.053
( 0 .5 9 )
0 .037
( 0 .4 3 )
0 .0 0 6
( 0 .0 7 )
l e v 9596 0 .057
( 1. 5 0 )
0 .056
( 1. 5 4 )
0 .048
( 1 .4 6 )
0 .005
( 0 .6 5 )
0 .005
( 0 .7 4 )
0 .005
( 0 . 8 7 )
0 .009
( 0 . 78 )
0 .009
( 0 . 8 8 )
0 .0 0 9
( 1.0 9 )
L F ^ 9 5 9 6 * F O R 959 6 0 .052
( 1. 2 1 )
0.051
( 1 . 19 )
0 .0 4 4
( 1 . 11 )
LE V9596=f!log(SIZE9596) - 0 .009
( 1.5 8 )
-0 .009
( 1 .6 1 )
- 0 .0 0 7
( 1.4 4 )
1MDEP9596 0 .038
( 0 .4 7 )
0 .059
( 0 . 7 5 )
0 .033
( 0 .4 4 )
0 .0 3 9
( 0 .4 9 )
0.061
( 0 .7 7 )
0 .0 3 4
( 0 .4 5 )
0 .075
( 0 . 8 5 )
0 .107
( 1. 2 4 )
0 .047
( 0 . 5 6 )
i m d e p 9596*e x p 9596 - 0.251
( 1 . 10 )
- 0.321
( 1 .4 5 )
- 0 .0 8 7
( 0 .4 1 )
PC I29596 0.000
( 0 . 15 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 .3 6 )
0.000
( 0 . 14 )
0.000
( 0 . 14 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 3 8 )
0.000
( 0 . 13 )
0.000
( 0 . 15)
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 3 5 )
0.000
( 0 . 14 )
P SI29596 - 0 .059
( 2 . 3 1 ) *
- 0 .048
( 1.9 5 ) +
- 0 .0 4 7
( 1. 9 8 ) *
- 0 .059
( 2 .2 9 ) *
- 0 .0 4 8
( 1 .9 3 ) +
- 0 .0 4 6
( 1 .9 7 ) *
- 0 .059
( 2 .3 4 ) *
- 0 .049
( 1. 9 9 )*
- 0 .047
( 1.9 9 ) *
C R 4 9 596 - 2 .874
( 3 . 8 1 ) * *
- 2 .936
( 3 . 8 0 ) * *
- 3 .037
( 4 .0 5 ) * *
- 2.881
( 3 . 8 2 ) * *
- 2 .943
( 3 . 8 1 ) * *
- 3 .043
( 4 .0 5 ) * *
- 2 .879
( 3 . 8 2 ) * *
- 2 .944
( 3 . 8 2 ) * *
- 3 .039
( 4 .0 5 ) * *
i m p 9596 - 0 .020
( 1.2 1 )
- 0 .002
( 0 . 11 )
0 .0 1 4
( 1 .0 6 )
- 0 .0 2 0
( 1.2 1 )
-0 .0 0 2
( 0 . 11 )
0 .0 1 4
( 1 .0 5 )
- 0 .019
(1.21)
- 0 .002
( 0 . 11 )
0 .014
( 1.0 6 )
ERP 9596 - 0.001
( 1 .9 6 ) +
- 0.001
( 1. 5 3 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
(0.88)
- 0.001
( 1.9 5 ) +
-0.001
( 1 . 5 3 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 8 7 )
-0.001
(2.00)*
-0.001
( 1. 5 8 )
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 0 . 8 9 )
C onstant - 0 .309
( 0 . 5 5 )
- 0 .464
( 0 . 8 2 )
- 0 .3 4 0
( 0 . 6 1 )
- 0 .302
( 0 . 5 4 )
- 0 .4 5 7
( 0 . 8 1 )
- 0 .3 3 4
( 0 . 6 0 )
- 0 .295
( 0 . 5 3 )
- 0 .448
( 0 .7 9 )
- 0 .333
( 0 .6 0 )
Pseudo R2 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14 0 .14
N ote: 1) Robust Z statistics in parentheses.
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5% ; + significant at 10%
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Chapter 9
Firms’ export supply response during the crisis
9.1 Introduction
The sharp exchange rate depreciation that was a feature of the 1997/98 Asian crisis was 
expected to have improved export performance of countries affected by the crisis. As 
reviewed, several studies (e.g. Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000; Duttagupta and Spilimbergo 2004) 
have demonstrated that the evidence conflicts with this prediction. For Indonesia, export 
growth in terms of value contracted in 1998 by 4 per cent. Although explanations have been 
offered in the literature, those which focus on firm or plant behaviour are scarce. This chapter 
aims to fill the gap by examining the export supply response of plants in Indonesian 
manufacturing. In particular, two questions are asked. First, what is the picture of plants’ 
export-supply response to the crisis? To date, very little is known about the response of firms 
in Indonesia and other crisis affected countries. Second, which characteristics determined this 
export-supply response of plants.
This chapter attempts to answer these questions and examines the export participation and 
adjustment in export propensity of manufacturing plants during the period 1997-2000. In 
addition, the chapter explores the general hypothesis concerning the impact of credit 
contraction on export supply response.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 briefly reviews relevant literature. Section 
9.3 presents the hypotheses related to the determinants of plant export supply response to the 
crisis. Section 9.4 describes the statistical framework, measurements of variables and 
discusses the data base. Section 9.5 presents the empirical analysis, while the last section 
summarises the main findings of the chapter.
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9.2 Theoretical consideration and literature review
In the empirical literature, the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model has long been adopted to 
explain the determinants of international trade across countries or industries. It was not until 
recently that research expanded to topics related to company export behaviour or 
performance, as a result of a greater accessibility to firm- or plant-level data.
One of the key findings from the empirical literature on micro export behaviour is that 
exporters are superior to non-exporters in some respects. For developed countries, Bernard et 
al. (1995) and Bernard and Jensen (1999), for example, documented that exporters in US 
manufacturing are larger, more productive, more capital intensive, pay higher wages, and 
employ more skilled workers. A similar finding was observed by Aw and Hwang (1995) and 
Berry (1992) for developing countries. For Indonesian manufacturing, Sjoholm and Takii 
(2003) observed that exporting plants are larger and more productive. They found that labour 
productivity of these plants was about twice as high as non-exporting plants and this 
difference seems to have increased over time during the 1990s.
The finding is attributed to the difference in productivity between exporters and non­
exporters. However, the exact mechanism linking exporting and productivity is not clear. 
Two explanations have been put forward. The first, which is commonly referred to as the 
‘self-selection’ hypothesis, argues that only the most productive firms are able to survive in 
the highly competitive export markets. The hypothesis is based on the presumption that there 
are additional costs involved in participating in export markets. These costs, which usually 
involve high fixed costs, include transport costs and expenses related to establishing 
distributional channels and production costs in adapting products for foreign tastes (Bernard 
and Jensen 1999). The alternative explanation argues that there is a learning effect from 
participating in exporting activities which will result in productivity improvement. One 
example is that exporters are often argued to be able to gain access to technical expertise, 
including product design and method, from their foreign buyers (Aw et al. 2000, p.67). This 
explanation is often termed as a Teaming-by-exporting’ hypothesis. According to Aw et al., 
this kind of explanation might be particularly relevant for East Asian exporters.
While there has not been a consensus, some empirical studies (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1999; 
Clerides et al. 1998; Aw et al. 2000; Hallward-Driemeier et al. 2002) give some support for 
the self-selection hypothesis. Bernard and Jensen found that exporters in US manufacturing
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are more efficient, larger and grow faster several years before they become exporters. Aw et 
al. found for manufacturing industry in Taiwan and Korea that the average productivity of 
continuing exporters and new entrants as exporters are significantly higher than exiting 
exporters and non-exporters. Nevertheless, for several industries, they were not able to 
strongly conclude there was a wide gap in productivity difference between exporters and 
non-exporters. Using firm-level data of manufacturing industries in some South East Asian 
countries, Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2002, p.25) observed a substantial productivity 
difference between domestic firms that were established as exporters and domestic firms that 
were not. They interpret this finding as indicating that firms participating in export markets 
make a conscious decision to operate differently from ones that focus on the domestic 
market. Supporting this interpretation, they show that domestic exporters indeed bear a 
resemblance to foreign exporters. In particular, they are more capital intensive and use more 
equipment of recent vintage than domestic non-exporters.
The presumption that exporting requires additional costs, which can naturally be thought of 
as sunk costs (Bernard and Wagner 1998), has an important implication. That is, it produces 
persistence in export participation. Once a firm decides to service an export market in a 
period of time, it tends to stay an exporter in the next period of time. To illustrate this, a 
variant model of decision to export with sunk entry-costs, first developed by Roberts and 
Tybout (1997) is presented below, borrowing from Campa (2004).' The expected profits of a 
rational, profit-maximising firm i at time t , fcit, are given by
where nit is gross profit from exporting, which is not adjusted for entry costs and depends on 
X r and Zit, which denote exogenous factors that affect profitability (e.g. exchange rate) and 
firm-specific factors, respectively. Nu is the entry cost faced by the firm and Yit is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm exports in t and 0 otherwise. The value 
of 7ZU depends on whether the firm exported or not in the previous year (i.e. whether Yit_x = 1
or Yit__x =0). If the firm exported in the previous year, nit = nu, but if the firm did not export 
in the previous year, it must pay entry cost, nit -  nu -  Nu .
1 This model is similar to that of Bernard and Wagner (1998) regarding the specification of entry costs.
2 In Roberts and Tybout (1997), the entry costs are allowed to be the function of exporting history.
(9.1)
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The firm is assumed to plan the sequence of its export participation to maximise expected 
current and discounted future profits net of entry costs,
K (Q t) ~ max Et
f  00 \
2X'£|(ß„)
v S=t )
(9.2)
where Et is an expectation operator conditioned on the set of information at time t ( Q;7) and 
ö is a time discount rate. Firm i chooses the current value of Yit that satisfies the Bellman’s 
equation :
= max(^, +SE, [^ ,+l(n „ +I) | y„]) (9.3)
Solving the first-order condition of 9.3, firm i will decide to export when
K„(x„ziy s [ E , [ v IM + i ( n M ) | i i  = \ ) Y E , [ v iM + i(n „ tI) |} ;  = o]
(9.4)
From equation 9.4, it is clear how the sunk entry-costs produce persistence in export 
participation. Positive sunk entry costs (i.e. Nit >0) implies that the decision to export is 
dependent on time. This can clearly be seen by supposing there are no sunk entry-costs (i.e. 
Nit =0) which collapses equation 9.4 to nu ( Xt,Zt) > 0 and leaves the decision to export as 
a purely static process (i.e. independent of time).
The role of sunk costs in affecting a firm’s decision to export has been another important 
topic in the empirical literature. While there has not been much study on this topic, a few 
studies do agree that sunk costs are a large and significant source of persistence in exporting. 
For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) found that exporting experience in the previous year 
had a strong and positive effect in determining export participation in the current year for 
plants in Colombian manufacturing. Similar findings can also be observed in Campa (2004) 
and Bernard and Jensen (2004) for Spain and US manufacturing plants, respectively.
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If entering foreign markets is costly, there might be localised spillovers associated with 
exporting by one firm that reduces the cost of foreign market access for nearby firms. This 
idea was put forward by Aitken et al. (1997). In particular, they test the hypotheses that any 
exporting activity, and especially exporting activities by multinationals, generates export 
spillovers. The first hypothesis is based on the argument that the geographic concentration of 
exporters may make it feasible to construct facilitates that are able to support export 
activities. The second hypothesis is based on the presumption that foreign firms are the 
natural conduit for information about foreign markets, export marketing channels and 
technology. The extent to which foreign firms provide this information may enhance the 
likelihood of domestic firms becoming exporters. Using plant-level data for Mexican 
manufacturing for 1986-1990 they found robust results supporting the second hypothesis. 
The probability of a domestic plant exporting is positively correlated with the proximity of 
multinationals. As for the first hypothesis, they found that the probability of exporting is 
positively correlated with the local concentration of overall export activity. However, this 
finding is not robust to changes in sample size. Their results suggest the lack of robustness is 
related to large differences in specific industry characteristics. The positive export spillovers 
effect from multinationals was confirmed by Greenaway et al. (2004) using a panel of firms 
in the UK. They found that multinationals not only increase the decision of domestic firms to 
export, but also export intensity.
The review so far considers the general literature on micro export behaviour performance. 
The rest of this section reviews the literature to gain some knowledge on the export supply 
response to a crisis. A substantial part of the review was undertaken in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.3.4). Nonetheless, several points were not addressed and will now be discussed, after firstly 
summarising the review done in Section 4.3.4.
The main point from the review is that there was puzzling evidence on the export response of 
the countries affected by the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The aggregate export response was not 
as expected, given the significant increase in competitiveness due to the sharp exchange rate 
depreciation. Three explanations for this puzzle were put forward in the literature. The first is 
the region wide export shock in the years immediately before the crisis (1995-96). The shock 
was attributed to weakened demand, as many Asian countries specialised in trading amongst 
themselves, and depreciation of the Japanese yen against the US dollar during the period, as 
many Asian currencies were effectively being pegged to the US dollar. The second 
explanation is credit contraction to the private sector during the crisis, i.e., the so-called credit
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crunch hypothesis. However, the empirical evidence does not lend strong support to this 
explanation. Another explanation for the evidence is that many exporters were actually 
foreign firms and therefore likely to have been supported by parent companies and less likely 
to have experienced liquidity constraint. The third explanation emphasises the effect of 
competitive depreciation; for this there is some supporting evidence. Finally, and specifically 
for Indonesia, the sluggish export performance can be attributed to structural problems. As 
mentioned, these included the cancellation of export orders, lack of container supply and 
rejection of Indonesia’s letter of credit, owing to the political uncertainties.
Empirical studies examining how firms or exporters responded to an economic crisis have 
been sparse, but two are worth reviewing -  Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) and Lipsey (2001). 
Both examine the export response of US affiliates in some Latin America countries to the 
1980’s debt crisis. Lipsey (2001) extended the analysis in the context of the Asian 1997/98 
crisis.
The studies focus on the role of foreign ownership as an important determinant in a 
successful response to the crises. They argue that it is easier for multinationals to redirect 
sales from domestic to export markets (Blomstrom and Lipsey 1993, p. 109). The capacity to 
switch from domestic to external markets, being well connected to the latter through global 
distribution channels and better knowledge than local firms in terms of international 
marketing skills, are the reasons behind the argument.
Blomstrom and Lipsey showed that both export growth and the propensity of US affiliates in 
some Latin American countries increased dramatically during the 1980’s crisis. However, 
they noted that these increases could partly be attributed to the decrease in domestic sales 
rather than an increase in production. Any increase from production is suggested to have 
happened over a longer time period after the crisis.
Lipsey (2001) shows that exports of US and Japanese affiliates increased at a higher rate than 
the rate of the total host countries’ export in 1997 and 1998, resulting in an increase in the 
affiliates’ share in the countries’ exports. Providing more evidence on sales redirection, 
Lipsey shows the ratio of exports to total sales of US manufacturing affiliates in East Asia 
increased significantly in 1998. For the crisis-affected countries, the largest change is
3 The figure for Japanese manufacturing was limited only until 1997.
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observed for Indonesia and Malaysia. Between 1997 and 1998, the ratio increased from 17 to 
32 per cent for Indonesia and from 68 to 85 per cent for Malaysia.
9.3 Hypotheses
This section identifies and presents the hypotheses related to the determinants of the export- 
supply response of firms in Indonesian manufacturing during the crisis period, drawing on 
the discussion of the previous section and the general literature on Indonesian manufacturing. 
The crisis period is defined as 1997-2000.
Exporting history
Exporting history is hypothesised to positively increase the probability to export in the crisis 
period. Models of probability to export with sunk-export costs postulate that a current 
decision to export affects future decision or, in other words, there is a “persistence” in export 
participation. Export history is captured by introducing a dummy variable for exporting status 
during the period 1995-96 (EP9596 ).
Plant level labour productivity and factor intensity
Fiercer competition in export markets means firms need to be efficient in order to survive, 
i.e., “self-selection hypothesis”. This suggests a positive relationship between plant level 
labour productivity ( L P ) and export supply response. Plant level factor intensity, capital 
intensity ( PCI) and skill intensity ( P SI), are also expected to be positively related to export 
response. The argument is that plants using advanced technology and employing skilled 
workers are able to be more cost-efficient. Despite this, a negative relationship might be 
observed for skill intensity. Along with high inflation, higher labour quality implies higher 
wage expenses which could have mitigated the increase in competitiveness unless labour was 
willing to take lower real wages and salary during the crisis. The findings from Chapter 7, 8 
and previous studies that some plants in the manufacturing industry hoarded labour supports 
this suggestion.
In addition to reflecting differences in costs, plant level factor intensity is also able to capture 
the difference in product quality. Product quality is another important factor as it is often 
asserted that the foreign market requires a more sophisticated quality of goods than domestic 
markets.
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Firm Size
Size of firm ( SIZE) is expected to affect the export-supply response, although the direction 
of the relationship is unclear. For a given industry, only larger firms have a higher survival 
chance in competitive foreign markets if economies of scale exist (Bonacorsi 1992). This 
argument suggests a positive relationship between SIZE and the export-supply response. In 
addition, it is often asserted that the more sophisticated management and better resources of 
large firms allow them to be more responsive than small firms in responding to any increase 
in export demand (Calof 1994). Despite this, a negative relationship may also occur. This is 
because there are some channels that allow some small and medium firms in Indonesian 
manufacturing to successfully perform in export markets, including sub-contracting schemes, 
clustering, trading in foreign market niches and access to informal sources of financing 
(Berry et al. 2001; Sandee and van Diermen 2004).
Firm Age
The effect of firm age ( AGE) on the export-supply response is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
older firms tend to be more experienced. Related to this, the theory on firm learning (e.g. 
Jovanovic’s (1982) selection model) suggests older firms are likely to be more productive 
and larger. On the other hand, adjustment is also likely to be more difficult for older firms. 
The learning theory also suggests younger firms have more dynamism. Apart from this, a 
positive relationship might also be observed simply because younger firms in Indonesia tend 
to be export more oriented than older ones, owing to the liberalized export oriented trade and 
investment policies from the mid 1980s (Ramstetter 1999).
Foreign ownership
Foreign ownership ( FOR ) is expected to be positively related to the export-supply response. 
As argued by Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993), it is easier for multinationals to redirect sales 
from domestic and foreign markets. The expected difference, however, may depend on the 
extent of the foreign share in MNEs. It is often argued that parent companies may not 
completely transfer the full extent of specific assets if the ownership share of the parent 
companies is small (Ramstetter 1999). To take this argument into account, an interaction 
variable DFOR* FOR is introduced.1 It is hypothesised that the extent to which 
multinationals responded better is higher for those multinationals with a higher foreign share.
4 See Chapter 7 for more details on the definition of FOR.
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Share of imported input
The extent to which exchange rate positively affects the profitability of exporting firms 
depends on the share of imported input they use in production. The positive impact is only 
minimal if production involves a large share of imported input, since higher expenditure on 
imported input counteracts the relative lower labour costs (Forbes 2002a). Accordingly, the 
share of imported input to total input (1MDEP) is expected to be negatively related to 
export-supply response.
Export spillovers
This study considers two forms of export spillover: industry-specific and region-specific. The 
latter is introduced because exporters are usually concentrated in a region with export­
supporting facilities. Guided by the theory reviewed in the previous section, both forms of 
spillover are expected to positively affect the export-supply response. Two variable 
specifications are considered for each form of export-spillover: on the basis of the number of 
exporting plants ( INEXPj and RNEXPk), and exported output ( IEXPi and REXPk). j  and k
denote industry and region, respectively.
Industry competitiveness prior to the crisis
If export expansion can be thought of as an activity introducing a new product to a market, 
industry competitiveness should be important in determining export response during the 
crisis. The natural choice to proxy this effect would be some variables reflecting an 
industry’s factor intensity. Two variable specifications are considered. First, it is specified 
based on some categorisation of industrial sectors by their factor intensity. Included in this 
specification are dummy variables for resource intensive sectors ( DRI), labour intensive 
sectors ( D LI) and capital intensive sectors ( DCI). The definition of these variables has been 
presented in Chapter 7. The second specification is based on some continuous-variable 
measures. These are industry resource intensity ( IR1), industry capital intensity ( IC I) and 
industry skilled-labour intensity ( ISI). The second specification was introduced mainly to 
reflect industry in Indonesian manufacturing that relate to export.5
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, plants in resource- and labour-intensive industries 
should have responded better in terms of export than plants in capital-intensive industries. 
The coefficients of DRI and DLI are expected to be positive in the regressions, with DCI
5 See the discussion in Chapter 2.
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as the base dummy variable. As for the second specification, IRI is expected to be positively 
related to the export-supply response while ICI and ISI are expected to be negatively 
related.
The factor intensity variables, although useful, may not perfectly capture the industry 
competitiveness effect. This is because there is a large variation over time before the crisis in 
the trade competitiveness within groups of industries classified by their factor intensity. The 
variation is illustrated in Table 9.1 which gives the dynamics of a Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) index in Indonesian manufacturing over the period 1985-1996. First, some 
sectors in these industries experienced a decline in comparative advantage over the last few 
years prior to the crisis. Included are a few sectors which propelled the export boom in the 
1980s. For example, the RCA index for wood and wood products (ISIC 331) and wearing 
apparel (ISIC 322) declined during the period 1989-1996. For this period, exports of these 
industries alone accounted for about 30 percent of Indonesia’s manufacturing export. Second, 
it was also revealed that some other resource- and labour- intensive sectors had actually 
moved up to the class of high RCA sectors during the same period.
To deal with this dynamism, a dummy variable indicating industry competitiveness before 
the crisis (COMP) was introduced interchangeably with the factor intensity variables. The 
hypothesis is that plants in competitive industries before the crisis are expected to have 
performed better than plants in other industries.
Other determinants
The inclusion of the determinants outlined above does not necessarily mean it has 
incorporated all factors deemed important for explaining the export supply response of firms 
in Indonesian manufacturing during the crisis period. Other determinants may significantly 
affect the response. The first group of these determinants are those related to external factors. 
As suggested by the literature review, some of the most important are the sharp exchange rate 
depreciation, the downward cycle in demand of some of Indonesia’s major export products 
and the trade financing problem during the crisis. In principle these factors should have 
affected all Indonesian firms equally, although some may have been affected differently 
across industries. In the regressions, these factors are accounted for by including dummy 
variables for years and industries.
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The other group of determinants is the group of unobserved firm-level characteristics. 
Included in these characteristics are those such as managerial capability, product attributes 
and special access to production input. Specification issues related to these characteristics are 
discussed in the next section.
Table 9.1 Dynamics in Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index of Indonesian 
manufacturing, 1985-1996
a. The 1985-1989 period
RCA 1985 ISIC Industry Change in RCA, 
1985-89
High 331 Wood and wood products (+)
322 Wearing apparel (+)
321 Textiles (+)
314 Tobacco (+)
353 Petroleum refineries (-)
372 Nonferrous metal (-)
311 Food (-)
Low 351 Industrial chemical (+)
371 Iron and steel (+)
355 Rubber products (+)
381 Fabricated metal product (+)
341 Paper and paper product (+)
390 Other manufacturing (+)
356 Plastic products (+)
323 Leather and leather products (+)
362 Glass and glass products (+)
369 Non-metallic mineral products (+)
384 Transport equipment (+)
332 Furniture (+)
385 Profesional and scientific equipment (+)
361 Porcelain (+)
342 Printing and publishing (+)
382 Non-electrical machinery (+)
324 Footwear (+)
313 Beverages (+)
383 Electrical machinery (-)
352 Other chemical products (-)
312 Other food products (-)
Table 9.1 continued
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Table 9.1 (concluded) 
b. The 1989-1996 period
RCA 1989 ISIC Industry Change in RCA, 
1989-1996
High 321 Textiles (+)
311 Food (+)
355 Rubber products (+)
356 Plastic products (+)
390 Other manufacturing (+)
332 Furniture (+)
361 Porcelain (+)
324 Footwear (+)
331 Wood and wood products (-)
322 Wearing apparel (-)
353 Petroleum refineries (-)
372 Nonferrous metal (-)
314 Tobacco (-)
Low 383 Electrical machinery (+)
351 Industrial chemical (+)
381 Fabricated metal product (+)
341 Paper and paper product (+)
382 Non-electrical machinery (+)
384 Transport equipment (+)
385 Profesional and scientific equipment (+)
342 Printing and publishing (+)
371 Iron and steel products (-)
352 Other chemical products (-)
362 Glass and glass products (-)
312 Other food products (-)
323 Leather products (-)
369 Other non-metallic mineral products (-)
313 Beverages (-)
Source: Aswicahyono and Pangestu (2000)
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9.4 Statistical framework, measurements of variables and data
9.4.1 Statistical framework
The determinants of export supply response to the crisis are examined by way of some 
statistical regressions. Two dependent variables are considered to represent the response: (1) 
change in export participation, and (2) change in export propensity. The choice of the 
variables is motivated by the empirical literature, where export supply response is often 
examined by evaluating the change in some measures of export performance between two 
points of time. The measures used most often are the value or volume of exports and the 
propensity to export. Calculating these measures is straightforward at the aggregate level, but 
not at the firm level. This is because aggregate change in export is a result from two different, 
but related, firm behaviours. First, existing exporters can increase or decrease their exported 
output. They may increase by redirecting output to foreign markets or by expanding exports. 
Included in this mechanism are exporters that switch from exporting to non-exporting. The 
second behaviour is where non-exporters that have been domestically oriented switch to 
participate in foreign markets. The second mechanism can also be achieved by new firms 
entering the industry.
The two points of time are the crisis (1997-2000) and the pre-crisis (1995-96) periods. There 
are four points of observation for the crisis period, i.e., 1997, ..., 2000, since the data base are 
enumerated annually. As for the pre-crisis period, the point of observation is considered to be 
one, and is defined slightly differently for the export participation and propensity variables. 
The former is defined as the exporting status in 1995 or 1996, while the latter is defined as 
the average of the export propensity in 1995 and 1996. The use of ‘or’ in the pre-crisis export 
participation definition is motivated by the empirical regularity that exporting is not a once- 
and-forever phenomenon. Overall, the change in the dependent variables is defined broadly 
as of the change in export participation or export propensity between the crisis and pre-crisis 
periods.
The empirical models in their general form are given as the following:
EPit -  a0 + a x' X + a 2' Y/ + eit (9.5)
(9.6)
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where 9.5 and 9.6 are export participation and export propensity adjustment equations, 
respectively, i represent plant i, t represents the crisis period (i.e. t= 1997, ...,2000). EPit is 
a binary variable which takes the value of 1 if the plant was exporting in the crisis period and 
0 otherwise. EXPit is a plant’s export intensity and is defined as the ratio of exports to total
output.6 X n and Y. are sets of explanatory variables capturing the pre-crisis plant and
industry characteristics, respectively. Unless otherwise stated, all explanatory variables are 
defined as their average value between 1995 and 1996, in recognition that 1996 may not be a 
‘normal’ year to represent the pre-crisis period. Year, industry, and regional dummies are 
included to control for differences across years, industries and region, respectively. The year 
dummy variables should capture the other determinants which exogenously affect the 
dependent variables.
While useful, the models are unable to take into account some unobserved determinants. 
Essentially, this is the same as the limitation in the models of the previous chapter. As 
explained in that chapter there is computational limitation to proceeding with the ideal 
approach (i.e. dummy variable approach to control for fixed effect). This chapter follows the 
same approach as the previous one, which is to take no action. Accordingly, one needs to 
take into account that the estimates might be biased.
Equation 9.5 was estimated within the framework of a binary choice model (i.e. probit or 
logit), instead of a linear probability model (LPM). This is mainly because the predicted 
probability derived from LPM may lie outside the 0-1 region, which is clearly not reasonable 
in practice. Despite this, a binary response model also has a number of shortcomings. One 
important one is that the potential for bias arising from neglected heterogeneity (i.e. omitted 
variables) is larger in a binary choice model than in a linear model. Nevertheless, Wooldridge 
(2002) points out that estimating a binary response model by a binary choice model still gives 
reliable estimates, particularly if the estimation purpose is to obtain the direction of the effect 
of explanatory variables.
The estimations use pooled cross-section data drawn from the data base of continuously 
operating plants during the period 1997-2000. The sample is balanced and therefore different 
to the one used in the previous chapter (i.e. unbalanced pooled-cross-section). The balanced
6 See Chapter 7 for further details on the definition of EXPjt .
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form was used because plant survival during the crisis period, the subject for which an 
unbalanced panel is needed, was addressed in the previous chapter.
To facilitate hypothesis testing and organise the empirical analysis, estimations were done in 
three steps. In the first step, equation 9.5 was estimated for the full sample, which consists of 
exporting and non-exporting plants in the pre-crisis period. The emphasis here is on export 
participation response and the hypothesis testing on exporting history. In the second step, 
equation 9.5 was estimated for two different samples. The first includes only exporting plants 
while the second includes only non-exporting plants. For the purpose of discussion, these 
samples are labelled exporting and non-exporting sample, respectively. Finally in the third 
step, equation 9.6 was estimated only for the exporting sample. The emphasis here is on 
export propensity response.
Two reasons motivate the estimations in the second step. First, the estimation is necessary 
because the assumption imposed by the estimation for the full sample, of no fundamental 
difference between exporters and non-exporters, is too strong. As reviewed, the empirical 
literature has shown that they are indeed different. Second, the crisis provides a suitable 
experiment to learn more about switching behaviour from non-exporting to exporting.
For the estimation in the first step, the empirical model can be rewritten as
EPit = a0 + a xEP9596 + a 2'X i + a3 ’ Yj + eit (9.7)
There is a potential endogeneity problem in estimating equation 9.7, with exporting history 
( EP9596 ) being the endogenous variable. EP9596 is likely endogenous because there is strong
persistence in the variable correlates with s it. As was reviewed, previous studies (e.g.
Roberts and Tybout 1997; Campa 2004) found a very strong effect from the previous years’ 
exporting status on the current decision to export. To correct for this problem, the 
instrumental variable approach was adopted.
In this situation, two alternative estimation methods can be used: joint estimation and two- 
step procedure. The two-step procedure is more attractive because of its computational 
advantage. The equation for endogenous variable (as a function of the instrumental variables) 
is not estimated jointly with the equation of interest (i.e. equation 9.7), which
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computationally can be very complicated. Mimicking the standard 2SLS approach, the two- 
step procedure firstly estimates the endogenous variable, by LPM, before estimating equation 
9.7 by the binary choice model. Despite the advantage, the two-step procedure often gives 
less consistent and efficient estimates than maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) estimates 
(Wooldridge 2002, p.476). For this reason, the equation was estimated using the joint 
estimation method.
It is important to note the assumption of strong persistence in equation 9.7 might not be 
relevant for the later years of the crisis period (i.e. 1998-2000). In other words, a plant 
decision to participate in export during, for example, 1999-2000 would not necessarily have 
been affected by the plant’s exporting history in 1995 or 1996, as modelled in equation 9.7. 
The reason being that the impact of the previous exporting experience can depreciate once 
exporters cease participating in export markets. For example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
found for Colombian manufacturing that the previous year’s exporting status strongly and 
positively affected the current year’s export participation, but the exporting status of two or 
three years earlier only had small a positive affect on current export participation.
It can nevertheless be argued that the assumption is still relevant, at least in the context of this 
study. This is because the crisis period was definitely not a ‘normal’ period, in contrast to the 
Roberts and Tybout finding that should be more appropriately applied in the context of a 
normal business cycle. With such a deep contraction in 1998, it is possible to observe that an 
exporter discontinued exporting during the peak of the crisis but resumed exporting during 
the early recovery period. Thus, being out of the export market in 1998 or 1999 does not 
necessarily mean the plant would permanently be in a non-exporting state.
An important statistical issue regarding estimation of equation 9.6 is “sample censoring”. The 
dependent variables, %AEXPjt, can only be calculated for pairs of plants that remained as
exporters in 1995 or 1996 and in any year between 1997 and 2000. About 50 percent of 
exporting plants in the period 1995-96 were no longer recorded as exporters in any year 
between 1997 and 2000 except for 1998. Therefore the sample is truncated and estimating 
equation 9.6 on the selected sample may lead to biased estimates. As with the estimations in 
the previous chapter, Heckman’s (1976) two-step estimation method was used to correct this 
problem. In the first step, equation 9.5 was estimated using the probit model and the inverse 
Mills ratio was computed for every observation. In the second step, equation 9.6 was
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estimated on the selected sample, adding the computed inverse Mills ratio as another 
explanatory variable.
9.4.2 Data and measurements of variables
Data for the estimation were drawn from the data base described in Chapter 5. Plants 
recorded in 1996 but not recorded in any year between 1997 and 2000 were excluded. 
Retaining these plants would complicate an analysis required to model firm survival during 
the crisis period. The subject of firm survival was addressed in the previous chapter. 
Meanwhile, new recorded plants during the period 1997-2000 were retained, because export 
response may involve a group of new firms. The sample consists of 7,962 plants, 2,316 of 
which are exporting plants in 1995-96.
Many of the independent variables have been defined in the previous chapter. Therefore, the 
definition of independent variables presented here covers only those not previously 
discussed.
As mentioned, this chapter considers two specifications for each of the two export spillovers 
(i.e. industry- and region-specific): on the basis of number of plants (INEXP/ and RNEXPk)
and industry export intensity ( IEXP/ and REXPk). INEXP/ and RNEXPk are defined as the 
ratio of exporting to total plants of industry j  and region k , respectively. IEXP/ and REXPk 
are defined as the ratio of exports to total output of industry j  and region k , respectively. 
Output is defined in terms of value added, j  is defined at the four digit ISIC level and k at 
the district (kabupaten) level.7
Following Koo and Martin (1984), industry resource intensity (IRI) is measured by the ratio 
of direct and indirect purchases of input from agriculture, fisheries, forestry and mining 
industries to the total value of purchased input. This study uses the 1995 Input-Output Table.
In principal, the definition of industry capital and skilled-labour intensity (1C1 and ISI) 
follows that of plant capital and skilled-labour intensity. The only difference is in the level of 
aggregation. ICI and ISI are defined at industry level while PCI and PSI are defined at
7 As was noted in Chapter 7, the definition of industry j  also applies to other industry level variables used in this 
thesis.
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plant level. The industry level is defined at the four digit ISIC level. As in the plant level 
variables, ICI and ISI are defined in two ways. For ICI in industry j  , these are
^  (non -  wage value added) j 
1 (total number of employee) .
(value of output) -(inputs) -(wages and salary).
--------------------- ------------ ------- --------------------- and
(total number o f employee)
ICI 2,
(energy costs)j
(total numbers o f production employee) .
(fuel cos ts) + (electricity cos t) .
(total numbers o f production employee) j
while for ISI in industry j ,
(total exp enditure on wages and salary)
ISI\ =----------------------------------------------------  and
(total numbers of employee) .
ISI 2 num^ers ° f  non ~ production employee) j
(total numbers o f production employee) f
COMP} 89 is defined to be equal to 1 if the corresponding three-digit ISIC industry of an
industry j  is classified with a high RCA index in 1989 and zero otherwise. This study uses the 
RCA index computed by Aswicahyono and Pangestu (2000), presented in Table 9.1. In the 
table, an industry with a high RCA index is defined as an industry with a RCA index greater 
than unity, implying Indonesia has a comparative advantage in the industry product.
The complete list of variables included in the models is given in Table 9.2, together with their 
description and expected signs.
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Table 9.2 Variable description and the expected signs
V a r i a b l e D e s c r i p t i o n E x p e c t e d
s i g n
FP i,9596 Dummy variable for exporting history o f plant i during 1995-96 +
FP i,9596 Labour productivity o f plant i , average 1995-96 +
CIi,9596 Capital intensity o f plant i , average 1995-96 +
SIj,9596 Skill intensity o f plant i ,  average 1995-96 +/-
SIZE.9596 Size of plant i , average 1995-96 +/-
AGEj 9 6 Age of plant i in 1996 +/-
DFORj.9596 Dummy variable for MNE status of plant i in 1996 +
DFORj 95 9 6 !t!FORi 9596 Interaction variable between DMNE9596 and FOR9596.
FOR 9 5 9 6  is the share of foreign ownership in plant i , average 1995-96
+
IMPORTj 9596 Share o f imported input for production in plant / ,  average 1995-96 -
INEXPJ;9596 Relative number of exporting firms in industry j , average 1995-96 +
IEXPj 9 5 9 6 Export intensity of industry j , average 1995-96 +
RNEXPk9596 Relative number of exporting firms in region k ,  average 1995-96 +
REXPk 9596 Export intensity of region k ,  average 1995-96 +
IR Ij.95 Resource intensity o f industry j  in 1995 +
IC I1 j,9596 Capital intensity o f industry j , average 1995-96 -
I S I 2 j  9 5 9 6 Skill intensity of industry j , average 1995-96 -
DRIj,9596 Dummy variable for resource intensive industry in 1995 and 1996 +
DLIj9596 Dummy variable for labour intensive industry in 1995 and 1996 +
COMPj 8 9 Dummy variable for competitive industry in 1989-96 +
9.5 Empirical analysis
9.5.1 The plant export supply response to the crisis: a descriptive analysis
The empirical analysis starts with a descriptive analysis to gauge the picture of the export- 
supply response of firms in Indonesian manufacturing between 1997 and 2000. To assist the 
discussion, some descriptive tables are presented in Tables 9.3 to 9.13. Unless otherwise 
stated, they have been computed by the author from the data base.
Before analysing the response at plant level, it is useful to get a perspective on the response at
o  #
the aggregate level. This is given in Table 9.3. Focusing first on industry export intensity 
and participation rate, the table does not seem to show any positive effect for the response. In 
2000, both export intensity and participation rates were about the same as the pre-crisis rates. 
One possible explanation is that it simply reflects a ‘time-lag’ effect where the structure of 
firm and industry were adjusted. Thus, a substantial increase in intensity and participation
s In this table, the export participation rate is proxied by the ratio of exporting plants over total plants in the 
industry for the corresponding year. The pre-crisis rates are defined by the average of the rates over the period 
1993-96.
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rate -  if any -  should be observed in more recent years. Unfortunately this study does not 
cover any of these years. Despite this, the finding shares a similarity to the pattern of Latin 
America’s debt crisis experience in the mid 1980s. Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) pointed out 
that the increase in export propensities of US affiliates in the countries only began to come 
from rising production -  rather than from a reduction in domestic sales -  in a longer time 
period after the crisis. Turning to the annual growth rates of export intensity and export 
participation rate, the extent of recovery is very clear. First, export intensity and participation 
rate recovered almost immediately in 1999 after severely contracting in 1998. The growth 
rates were about 106 and 487 per cent, respectively. The magnitude of the growth rates seems 
to suggest a kind of ‘catching-up’. This continued in 2000, albeit at a much slower rate and 
the growth rates in this year were significantly higher than the pre-crisis rates. This finding is 
consistent with a region wide recovery in 2000, since intra-regional exports accounted for a 
large share of the region’s total exports (World Bank 2000).
Table 9.3 Summary of Indonesian manufacturing export, 1993-2000
1 9 9 3 -9 6 1997 1998 1999 2 0 0 0
N o m in a l  v a lu e  o f  e x p o r t1 (m il lio n  $ , in d e x e d , 1 9 9 3 = 1 0 0 ) 1 1 7 .3 7 124 .9 116.7 140.5 186.4
A n n u a l  g r o w th  (% ) 0 .1 2 - 8 .4 -6 .5 2 0 .4 3 2 .7
E x p o r t in te n s i ty 2 0 .2 5 0 .2 6 0 .0 9 0 .1 9 0 .2 4
A n n u a l  g r o w th  (% ) 0 .1 2 - 2 .0 - 6 3 .0 1 0 5 .6 2 2 .8
E x p o r t p a r t ic ip a tio n  ra te 2 0 .1 8 0 .1 4 0 .0 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 7
A n n u a l  g r o w th  (% ) 0 .0 2 - 2 8 .3 - 8 3 .0 4 8 6 .8 2 1 .2
R e a l E ffe c tiv e  E x c h a n g e  R a te  (R E E R ) in d e x 4 1 1 5 .2 4 114 .4 5 7 .2 8 1 .8 7 6 .0
Notes:
1. Source: BPS, Trade statistics, 1993-2000.
2. The ratio of exports to total output.
3. The ratio of exporting to total plants.
4. Source: Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Statistics, various issues.
Table 9.3 also indicates the deep export contraction in 1998 originated from a large number 
of exporters discontinuing exports. The export participation rate in the year was virtually zero 
and can perhaps be attributed to the large cancellation of export orders due to the political 
and social turmoil.
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The first micro-level fact is given in Table 9.4, which puts together transition matrices that 
describe the movement of the exporting status of continuously operating plants between the 
pre-crisis and crisis period. The matrices strongly indicate a persistence in the change of 
export participation. About 95 per cent of total non-exporting plants in the pre-crisis period 
stayed as they were in 1999 and 2000. The remaining 5 per cent are plants that were able to 
switch to exporting in 1999 and 2000. This picture is also shown by the firm-level survey 
conducted by the World Bank (Dwor-Frecaut et al. 2000, p. 148). In particular, they found 
that about five per cent of Indonesian manufacturing exporters in 1998 were newcomers to 
the category. They interpreted this as evidence that a few firms were able to shift sales from 
domestic to international markets.
Table 9.4 Distribution of plants by exporting status (%), the period 1995-96 to 2000
1995-96 1997 1998
N o n  ex p o rtin g E x p o rtin g N o n  e x p o rtin g E x p o rtin g
N o n  e x p o rtin g 95 .7 4.3 9 9 .6 0 .4
E x p o rtin g 4 8 .7 51.3 90 .9 9.1
Table 9.4 continued
Table 9.4 concluded
1995-96 1999 2 0 0 0
N o n  ex p o rtin g E x p o rtin g N o n  e x p o rtin g E x p o rtin g
N o n  e x p o rtin g 95 .6 4 .4 94 .8 5 .2
E x p o rtin g 50 .9 49.1 4 3 .7 56 .3
However, the persistence is less for the other direction of the response. About half of the 
plants exporting in the pre-crisis period were no longer recorded as exporting in 1999 and 
2000. Compared to related studies on firm export participation, this is a striking result as a 
large number of firms tend to remain exporting in a short period of time. While they might 
have been caused by a poor quality of the BPS survey response during the peak of the crisis, 
these statistics might simply point to the severity of the crisis and subsequent recovery. This 
argument is supported by looking at the relative frequency of the number of exporting plants 
in the crisis period that remained exporting in 1999 and 2000, which increased from 49.1 to 
56.3 per cent. The increase implies the number of exporting plants in the pre-crisis period 
that returned to exporting had been increasing during those years.
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Within the group of plants that become exporters in the crisis period, there is a strong 
indication that these firms became export oriented plants. This is shown in Table 9.5 which 
describes the export intensity distribution of these plants by classes of export intensity. The 
table shows about 60 to 70 percent were classified as plants with high export intensity (export 
intensity of greater than 0.5) and only 10 percent or less were classified as plants with low 
export intensity (plant export intensity less than 0.1).9 This finding supports the observation 
from The World Bank’s study mentioned earlier on the success of some firms in switching 
their sales orientation.
Table 9.5 Distribution of the new exporting plants in the crisis period (%) by
exporting status
1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0
E x p o r t  in te n s i ty  c la s s :  
L o w 7 .6 8 .5 1 1 .4 1 1 .8
M e d iu m 15.5 2 1 .3 3 0 .1 2 7 .7
H ig h 7 6 .9 7 0 .2 5 8 .5 6 0 .6
Notes:
1. EXP| is defined as the ratio of exports to output in plant i .
2. Definition of export intensity groups:
Low: 0<  EXP, <0.1 
Medium: 0.1 < EXP, <0.5 
High: EXP, >0.5
The next two tables derive the facts related to the change in export intensity of existing 
exporters in the crisis period. In these tables, the sample of plants that exported continuously 
for every two points of time (e.g. 1996 and 1999 or 1996 and 2000) was assembled. 
Therefore, the numbers of plants for each pair of years are different to the number of plants 
continuously exporting during the period 1997-2000.
Table 9.6 gives the transition matrices that describe the movement in export intensity of these 
plants. It suggests large numbers of exporting plants in the pre-crisis period increased export 
intensity in the crisis period. About 70 percent of plants with low export intensity in the pre­
crisis period moved to the class of plants with higher export intensity in 1999 and 2000. 
Similarly, almost 50 percent of plants with medium export intensity in 1996 moved to the 
class of plants with high export intensity. Table 9.6 also suggests that, for a given export
9 The definition of the export intensity classification is given in Table 9.5.
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intensity class, there is some degree of persistence in which plants are unlikely to have been 
downgraded to lower export intensity classes. For example, less than 10 percent of exporting 
plants with high export intensity in the pre-crisis period were downgraded to medium class 
export intensity in all years between 1997 and 2000.
Table 9.6 Distribution of continuously operating plants (%) by export intensity
classes, the period 1995-96 to 2000.
1995-96 1997 1998
E xport in tensity  class: E xport in tensity  class:
Low M ed ium H igh L ow M edium L arge
E xport in tensity  class: 
L ow 59.1 27 .0 13.9 65.5 31.0 3.4
M ed ium 10.7 54.8 34 .4 4.3 46 .4 49.3
H igh 0.6 8.4 91 .0 0.6 8.3 91.2
Table 9.6 continued
Table 9.6 concluded
1995-96 1999 2000
E xport in tensity  class: E xport in tensity  class:
L ow M edium L arge L ow M edium L arge
E xport in tensity  class: 
L ow 30.0 34.0 36 .0 26 .2 38.9 34.9
M ed ium 10.4 41 .7 47 .9 8.4 45.3 46.3
H igh 1.4 8.3 90.3 0.9 7.8 91.2
Note: See Table 9.5 for the definition of export intensity classes.
Table 9.7 shows the percentage difference in export intensity of continuously exporting 
plants during the crisis and pre-crisis periods. Plants with all output exported in the periods 
(i.e. plants with export intensity equal to 1) were excluded from the sample because retaining 
them would have been likely to understate the statistics. The mean and median of the 
difference are -14 and -10 per cent for the peak of the crisis (period 1997-98), reflecting the 
severity of the impact on exports. However, the average becomes positive for the early 
recovery period (1999-2000). This positive average mostly reflects the rapid export recovery 
in this period referred to above.
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Table 9.7 Percentage difference in plant export propensity (%AEXPjt) between
periods 1997-2000 and 1995-96: descriptive statistics
Statistics Percentage differences in plant export intensity (%AEXPit)
Between 1997-98 and 1995-96 
(Peak of the crisis)
Between 1999-2000 and 1995-96 
(Early recovery)
Mean -14.5 3.8
Median -9.8 1.0
Standard deviation 69.1 89.5
Interquartile range 50.3 44.3
Percentiles:
10% -73.4 -84.2
25% -43.1 -21.3
75% 7.3 22.9
90% 44.4 91.6
The table shows very a large variation in the difference, even in the early recovery period. 
The percentage difference for about 50 percent of the observations is bounded between -21 
and 23 percent (i.e. the difference between the 75th and 25th percentiles). The bounding 
spread widens significantly, to between -84 and 92 percent, when another 30 percent of 
observations are added (i.e. the difference between the 90lh and 10th percentiles). The 
description that many exporting plants sharply contracted their exported output is in line with 
the general perception that an export-led recovery did not materialise despite the large boost 
to competitiveness. The other part of the picture, which indicates a large expansion in export 
performance, suggests there are factors which allowed some plants to avoid the constraints of 
the export-led recovery. As indicated at the beginning, the results from the econometric 
analysis should shed some light on this.
Finally, the response of new plants entering the industry is outlined in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. 
Table 9.8 compares the share of exporting plants to total new entrants between the crisis and 
pre-crisis periods. The table suggests more export-oriented plants entered the industry after 
the crisis. The proportion of exporting entrants to total entrants increased from 14 per cent 
before the crisis to 21 per cent in 2000. This suggestion is supported by Table 9.9 which 
shows that the relative frequency of exporting entrants classified as plants with high export 
intensity increases in 2000 compared to before the crisis.
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Table 9.8 Distribution of entrants (%) by type of exporting plants, 1995-2000
1995-96 1997 1998 1999 2000
Non exporting 86.3 85.5 100.0 87.0 78.7
Exporting 13.7 14.5 0.0 13.0 21.3
Table 9.9 Distribution of exporting entrants (%) by the classes of export intensity,
1995-2000
1995-96 1997 1998 1999 2000
Export intensity classes: 
Low 6.8 5.7 0.0 5.8 3.3
Medium 16.7 9.0 0.0 9.9 13.3
High 75.0 85.2 0.0 84.3 83.3
Note: see Table 9.5 for the definition o f export intensity classes.
In summary, all tables seem to point to five basic facts about the export supply response of 
firms in the crisis period.
First, in contrast to the unclear indication on a positive export supply response to the crisis, 
the extent of the recovery in micro export behaviour is very clear. The export participation 
rate recovered immediately in 1999 and continued in the following year. As suggested by 
other studies, one important factor that propelled the recovery in 2000 was the demand 
recovery of other Asian countries from the region wide crisis of 1997/98.
Second, while there is evidence of switching status from exporting to non-exporting, the 
number of plants that switched was very small relative to the total non-exporting plants.
Third, there is evidence to suggest a large number of exporting plants increased their 
propensity to export during the crisis period. Moreover, exporting plants are unlikely to have 
been less export oriented.
Fourth, there is a large variation in the impact of the crisis on export performance across 
plants. This indicates there are some factors which allowed some plants to overcome the 
constraints of an export-led recovery.
258
Finally, there is evidence to suggest more export-oriented plants entered the industry after the 
crisis.
9.5.1.1 Did foreign plants in the industry respond better than their domestic 
counterparts?
As noted, Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) demonstrated that multinationals in Latin America 
responded better to the debt crisis in the region in terms of export performance. It is useful to 
examine whether the same picture can be found for Indonesia in the case of the 1997/98 
crisis. Therefore the analysis is extended based on several tables presented earlier.
Table 9.10 presents the distribution of the number of non-exporting plants in the pre-crisis 
period that switched to exporting during the crisis period by ownership status (foreign, 
private domestic and government).10 The table seems to suggest an increased importance of 
foreign ownership in determining switching behaviour. Excluding the distribution of 1998, 
the table shows an increasing trend in the number of foreign plants -  relative to the total -  
that switched during this period. Confirming this suggestion, it is observed that there was a 
declining trend in the relative number of switching domestic-private plants in this period.
Table 9.10 Distribution of new exporting plants during the crisis period (%) by status
of plant ownership
1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign 9.4 23.4 12.5 14.6
Domestic-private 83.2 72.3 81.3 77.6
Government 7.4 4.3 6.2 7.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: See Chapter 7 for the definition of the ownership groups.
However, the picture painted by Table 9.10 does not perfectly match the other direction of 
switching, i.e., from exporting to non-exporting. This is shown in Table 9.11, which presents 
the distribution of the number of exporting plants in the pre-crisis period that became non­
exporting plants in the crisis period by the plants’ ownership status. To strongly confirm the 
suggestion from Table 9.10, a robust indication of declining trend in the relative number of 
foreign plants that became non-exporting plants over the period should be expected. Table 
9.11 either does not show this trend, or only weakly supports it. The relative number of
10 See Section 7.3 for the definition of the ownership status.
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foreign exporting plants becoming non-exporting ones in this period exhibits an inverted U- 
shaped pattern, which peaked in 1999.
Table 9.11 Distribution of the switched plants from exporting to non-exporting during
the crisis period (%) by status of plant ownership
1997 1998 1999 2000
Foreign 19 20.7 22.9 22.6
Domestic-private 75.3 73.9 72.6 72.3
Government 5.7 5.4 4.5 5.1
Total 100 100 100 100
Note: See Chapter 7 for the definition of the ownership groups.
To get a picture regarding the change in export intensity, Tables 9.6 and 9.7 were 
disaggregated by plant ownership status with the results presented in Tables 9.12 and 9.13. 
First, consider Table 9.12, which displays the transition matrices of export intensity of the 
continuously exporting plants by plant ownership status. There is a picture that foreign plants 
were more successful in increasing export intensity during the crisis period, particularly 
compared with domestic private plants. The percentage of plants able to move to a higher 
class of export intensity during the period in general is higher for the group of foreign plants, 
relative to the group of domestic private plants. For example, focusing on the transition 
matrix of 1999, about 57 per cent of foreign plants in the pre-crisis period moved from the 
medium export intensity class, to the high export intensity class compared with 43 per cent 
for the group of domestic private plants.
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The superior response of foreign plants can also be observed in Table 9.13, which displays 
the summary statistics of the percentage difference in export intensity between the crisis and 
pre-crisis periods of the continuously exporting plants. The average contraction in export 
intensity during the peak of the crisis is lowest for the group of foreign plants. As for the 
early recovery period, the average expansion in export intensity is higher for the group of 
foreign plants.
However, the statistics for the variation in the differences do not really suggest a superiority 
of foreign plants. While the variation during the peak of the crisis is similar across the group 
of plants, it changes significantly in the early recovery. The variation is significantly higher 
for the group of foreign plants, relative to the other groups of plants. This picture suggests 
foreign plants did not necessarily respond better than other plants in terms of export intensity.
Table 9.13 Percentage difference in plant export intensity (%AEXPjt) between periods
1997-2000 and 1995-96 by status of plant ownership: descriptive statistics
S ta tis tic s
P e rc e n ta g e  d iffe re n c es  in p la n t e x p o rt in ten sity  (% A E X P it)
B e tw een  1997-98  and  1995 -96  
(P e a k  o f  the  c ris is )
B e tw een  1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 0  a n d  1995-96  
(E a rly  re c o v e ry )
M ean
F o re ig n -6 .97 2 1 .8 0
P riv a te  d o m e s tic -1 7 .0 3 -1 .2 6
G o v e rn m e n t -1 2 .6 0 8 .00
M e d ia n
F o re ig n -7 .6 9 5 .13
P riv a te  d o m e s tic -1 0 .5 0 0 .0 0
G o v e rn m e n t -1 0 .9 7 1.00
S ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n
F o re ig n 6 7 .1 0 102 .10
P riv a te  d o m estic 7 0 .2 8 8 7 .8 9
G o v e rn m e n t 6 0 .6 4 6 5 .3 0
In te rq u a r tile  ran g e
F o re ig n 5 4 .9 0 4 8 .9 0
P riv a te  d o m e s tic 4 9 .1 0 4 4 .6 2
G o v e rn m e n t 6 8 .0 0 2 8 .8 7
All in all, the last five tables give an impression that foreign ownership is one of the 
important determinants of the export response supply in Indonesian manufacturing. In 
particular, the extent of switching to exporting increased during the crisis period and the 
expansion in export intensity is highest for foreign owned plants. This picture is consistent
262
and supports the findings from the previous chapter which show a positive relationship 
between foreign ownership and export supply response in the early recovery period. 
However, the inference needs to be considered with caution, simply because there are no 
available studies which can be used to compare the results.
9.5.2 Regression results and discussion
9.5.2.1 Regression results"
Export participation equations
Table 9.14 reports the maximum likelihood estimation results of the export participation 
equation (i.e. equation 9.5) for the full sample, which consists of all continuously operating 
plants during the period 1997-2000. Some experimented specifications were reported in the 
table. The table reports the robust standard error since data examination revealed that the 
variance is heteroscedastic. The Wald test for overall significance in all specifications passes 
at the 1 per cent level. The Wald test for exogeneity of EP9596 was rejected at the 1 percent 
level in all specifications, confirming the prediction that the variable is endogenous. The 
instruments used were two year lags of the EP variable, EP93 and EP94, and a one year lag 
of all explanatory variables representing plant characteristics.
To be consistent with the previous chapter, PCI29596 and PSI29596 were used instead 
PCI 19596 and PSI 19596 . The industry factor intensity variables /C/2 and ISI1 yielded similar
results to /C/1 and ISI2 . Based on overall significance tests (the Wald test), only /C/1 and 
ISI2 based estimates are reported.
11 Unless otherwise state, the regression results were computed by author from the data base.
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Three variables, LP9596 , SIZE9596 and AGE96, were experimented with in logarithmic forms
to capture the possible non-linear relationship to the dependent variables. Based on the 
overall significance test, we decided to specify the variables in their logarithmic forms. 
Industry and region dummy variables were defined at four-digit ISIC level and provinces.
The coefficients on year dummy variables reconfirm much of what was derived from the 
descriptive results. The probability to export was significantly low at the peak of the crisis 
(i.e. 1998) but began to improve in 2000. The statistical insignificance of the coefficients for 
the year dummy variable 1999 suggests that year marked the early stage of the recovery.
In specification 9.1, the export participation response in the crisis period is specified only as a 
function of all firm level variables.
The coefficient of EP9596 is large, positive and statistically very significant. Therefore, being
exporting plants in the pre-crisis period had a strong and positive impact on the likelihood of 
continuing to export. This confirms the earlier observation in the descriptive analysis where 
only a very small fraction of non-exporting plants in the crisis period switched to exporting. 
The magnitude of the variable suggests exporting history is economically important. 
Exporting before the crisis increased the probability of continuing to export during the crisis 
period by 35 per cent.
In addition, EP9596 is one of the strongest variables affecting export participation. Examining 
the correlation matrix in Appendix 9.1, the partial correlation coefficient between EP9596 and
EP is 0.4. This is substantially large compared with the correlation coefficient of the other 
explanatory variables.
All in all, the findings support the theoretical models of export decision with sunk-export 
costs.
The coefficients of log(LP9596), PCI29596, PSI29596 are positive and statistically significant, 
although PSI29596 is only moderately significant at the 10 per cent level. This finding 
strongly supports the self-selection hypothesis, where firms need to be efficient to compete in 
competitive export markets. Despite this, the coefficients of PCI29596 , PSI29596 are very
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small, indicating that the positive effect of plant level factor intensity is not economically 
important.
Although positive, the coefficient of FOR9596 is not statistically significant (even at the 10
per cent level). Thus, foreign ownership does not guarantee a positive response in export 
participation. This is a surprising finding, particularly in light of the earlier results, and those 
from other studies (e.g. Blomstrom and Lipsey 1993). One possible explanation is that the 
positive effect might have applied only to plants with a very high foreign ownership share. In 
other words, it essentially implies the hypothesis that parent companies could restrict the flow 
of their firm-specific resources, depending on the foreign share in the affiliates. Therefore, 
testing this hypothesis means seeking validity for this possible explanation. This was done in 
specification 9.2, by substituting FOR596 for DFOR9596 and DFOR9596 * FOR596 . The
coefficient of the interaction variable is positive but is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the results only weakly validate the possible explanation, despite providing some support for 
the hypothesis. Before speculating further, it is important to examine whether the results 
would change if the equation was estimated on the separate sample of exporting and non­
exporting plants. The insignificant coefficient, both on FOR)596 and DFOR9596 * FOR)596, 
may have been affected simply by the structure of the sample.
The results show that the specification of foreign ownership in specification 9.2 can be used 
as an alternative specification to FOR9596 in specification 9.1. The coefficients of the other
variables in these two specifications are the same. However, based on the overall 
specification test, only the latter is considered as the basis of estimation in the other 
specifications.
The coefficient of log(SIZE9596) is positive and statistically very significant, suggesting
. . 1 7larger plants had a higher probability of participating in export during the crisis period. In 
addition, the correlation matrix in Appendix 9.1 shows the positive relationship was strong in 
comparison to those of the other explanatory variables. The finding supports the general 
hypothesis that the probability of being an exporter increases with size. More importantly, it 
provides additional evidence to support the self-selection hypothesis, since one possible
12 Linear specification of SIZE9596 was experimented with at the experimental stage, but did not perfonn very 
well compared to its logarithm specification in terms of the overall significance test.
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reason for the observed positive relationship is the cost advantage derived from economies of 
scale.
It is worth commenting here on the experimental result with the quadratic term of SIZE9596
(specification 9.3). The quadratic specification is of particular interest to an established 
proposition in the exporting literature, namely that the effect of size on firms’ exporting 
behaviour and performance may be positive but diminishes (Bonaccorsi 1992). The results 
only weakly support this proposition. The coefficient of the quadratic term, although negative 
as proposed, was statistically insignificant. Further, this specification performed less well in 
terms of the overall significance test compared with specification 9.1. For this reason, the log 
specification is the preferred specification.
The result indicates younger firms had a higher chance of participating in export during the 
crisis period. The coefficient of log(AGE96) is negative and statistically significant, not only
in specifications 9.1 to 9.3, but also in the other specifications. The finding points to the 
‘dynamism’ argument of younger firms and the assertion that younger firms in Indonesia 
tend to be more export orientated than older firms.
IMDEP959() is negatively related to export participation during the crisis period. This finding
supports the theoretical prediction that the positive impact of exchange rate depreciation on 
performance can be mitigated if a firm uses a large share of imported input in their input mix 
(Forbes 2002a). It also supports the finding from The World Bank’s firm-level survey (as 
reported in Bappenas et al. (2000), that manufacturing exporters in Indonesia rated the rising 
costs caused by the sharp exchange rate depreciation as one of the major causes for their 
declining performance during the crisis. Despite the relationship, the coefficients are often 
statistically insignificant across the specifications. Therefore, being dependent on imported 
inputs does not necessarily mean a low'er chance of participating in export during the crisis 
period.
Specifications 9.4 and 9.5 introduced the variables representing the export spillover effect. 
The results of these specifications clearly point to the importance of spillovers, either for 
industry or region. All export spillover variables (INEXP9596 ,RNEXP959(),IEXP9596 and
REXP959b) are positive and statistically very significant. Thus, a plant’s export participation 
response is likely to have been higher if located in either an export oriented industry or a
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region with a high density of exporters. The finding supports the theoretical prediction that 
externalities arising from local export activities help to reduce the cost of entry into export 
markets.
Specifications 9.6, 9.7 and 9.8 introduce the variables representing industry competitiveness 
prior to the crisis. DC/9596 was used as the base dummy variable (in specification 9.6). The
export spillover variables included in these specifications were INEXP9596 and RNEXP9596 , 
based on the overall significant test.
Of all the variables used to proxy factor intensity, only the coefficient of IRI959b was
statistically significant -  albeit only at the 10 per cent level. However, this does not mean 
industry competitiveness prior to the crisis was not important. As mentioned, the factor 
intensity variables may hide much over time variation in industry competitiveness. For this 
reason, COMP^9 was introduced, substituting for the other factor intensity variables (i.e. 
specification 9.8).14 This specification gives a better result as now the coefficient of 
COMPw is very statistically significant.
Therefore, the results support the hypothesis of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The coefficient 
of all considered industry factor intensity variables shows the expected sign. From the results, 
it is suggested that the probability of participating in the export market during the crisis 
period may have been higher for plants in industries which had a high RCA index previously 
and, to some extent, resource intensive industries.
Table 9.15 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results of equation 9.5 for the 
exporting sample. Obviously, EP9596 was not included because the sample contains only 
exporting plants,.
13 At the experimental stage, specifications with IEXP959b and REXP959b were tried and the results were 
similar.
14 Industry dummy variables were not included in the specifications where the industry factor intensity variables 
are the dummy variables (i.e. DRI9596 and DLI9596 ) and COMPw. This is to minimise the collinearity 
problem between the industry factor intensity variables and the industry dummies.
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Although most of the results derived from the estimation for the full sample hold, a few 
differences are observed. First, there seems to be weaker evidence for the self-selection 
hypothesis. In the first specification, only PSI29596 is statistically significant among the
relevant variables ( log(L/^596) , PCI29596, PSI29596). Moreover, PCI29596 shows a negative
sign. While this might be showing the underlying behaviour, these results may have been 
affected by strong collinearity between the relevant variables. Because of this, each of the 
variables was included separately in specifications 9.11 to 9.13 and the results improved. 
Now log(LP9596) is statistically significant and PCI29596 shows the expected sign, although it
is statistically insignificant. Therefore in conclusion, the results still provide some support for 
the self-selection hypothesis.
Much stronger evidence is observed for the positive effect of foreign ownership. The 
coefficients of FOT^596 are positive across all specifications and very statistically significant.
Therefore, foreign plants are likely to have continued to export during the crisis. A 10 per 
cent increase in foreign share increases the probability of survival in exporting during the 
crisis by 27 per cent.
The coefficient of DFOl^ 596 * FOR9596 is now statistically significant (see specification 9.10). 
Along with a positive sign, the coefficient shows the probability of surviving as exporters 
during the crisis period was higher for foreign plants with a higher foreign share. This 
suggests the channels provided by parent companies that allowed affiliates to continue 
exporting, such as marketing networks and financial support, could only have been beneficial 
if there was a substantial degree of foreign control in the affiliates. Therefore, this finding 
gives more convincing evidence on the hypothesis that parent companies might restrict the 
transfer of their firm specific assets (Ramstetter 1999), since the channels are usually part of 
the firm specific assets transferred to affiliates.
Finally, more convincing evidence is also observed for the impact of industry factor intensity. 
//?/9596 and COMPw are now more statistically significant compared with the results for the
full sample. Moreover, ISI29596 is negatively related to export participation during the crisis
period, suggesting that the probability to remain exporting in the period was higher for plants 
in low-skilled labour intensive industries.
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Table 9.16 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results for the export participation 
equation for the non-exporting sample. As with the previous estimations, there are only a few 
differences compared to the results for the full sample. First, there is much stronger evidence 
supporting the self-selection hypothesis. The coefficients of log(LP9596) and PCI29596 are 
very statistically significant. These results hold even when the variables are included 
individually to minimize collinearity between log(ZJ^596) , PCI29596 , PSI29596 (specifications 
9.21 to 9.23).
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Second, as with the estimation for the exporting sample, stronger evidence for the positive 
effect of foreign ownership is also observed. The coefficients of FOR9596 are statistically
very significant across all specifications. Moreover, the coefficients suggest an economically 
important effect for foreign ownership. Based on specification 9.19, a 10 per cent increase in 
foreign share increases by 29 per cent the probability of non-exporting plants before the crisis 
becoming exporting plants in the crisis period.
The third difference is that the coefficients of IMDEP9596 are positive and often statistically
significant across all specifications. This is in contrast to the earlier finding for full and 
exporting samples and hence does not support our earlier comment. Despite this, the results 
are consistent with the self-selection hypothesis. The intensive use of imported inputs is often 
thought to be positively related to product quality. As mentioned, it is often asserted in the 
literature that one factor determining success in the export market is the ability to produce 
high quality products.
Finally, similar to the results for the exporting sample, there is more convincing evidence on 
the effect of industry factor intensity. COMPw and DRI9596 become statistically significant,
although the opposite is observed for IRI959(). This finding supports the earlier comment 
made based on the results for the full sample.
Export propensity adjustment equation
Table 9.17 reports the results from the OLS estimations of some alternative specifications for 
the export propensity adjustment equation (i.e. equation 9.6). The corresponding results of 
the maximum likelihood estimations for the export participation equation were presented and 
discussed earlier in Table 9.15. The estimated coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are 
positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting a positive correlation in the 
disturbance between the export participation equation and the export propensity adjustment 
equation. Therefore, neglecting this correlation would likely give biased estimates in the 
export propensity adjustment equation.
Specification 9.29 in the table includes all plant level variables. Two coefficients of variables 
representing superior characteristics ( \og(LP9596) ,PS129596) have the expected signs and the
coefficient of PSI29596 was statistically very significant. In contrast, the coefficient of
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PCI29596 does not show the expected sign. Again, this may be due to collinearity between the 
three variables. Therefore, each of these variables was introduced individually in 
specifications 9.31 to 9.33 and the result improved. The coefficient of PCI29596 in 
specification 9.32 changes to positive and is now statistically very significant.
The results show the importance of foreign ownership. The coefficients of FO/^596 are
positive, large and statistically very significant across all specifications. This finding 
confirms the earlier observation in the descriptive analysis and is in line with the finding 
from the estimation of export participation equations for both exporting and non-exporting 
samples. The results in specification 9.30 also show a positive coefficient of 
DFOR9596 * FO/?9596 , providing more support for the hypothesis that parent companies might
restrict the transfer of firm specific assets to affiliates. This finding is also consistent with the 
finding from the export participation equation.
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To be consistent with earlier estimations, the variable that represents foreign ownership in the 
other specifications is specified by FOR9596 instead of DFOR9596 and DFOR9596 * FOR9596 .
The result in specification 9.29 also found a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
log(SIZE9596) . The coefficient suggests the effect of firm size is large. A 10 percent increase 
in plant size causes export intensity in the crisis period to increase by 6.5 percentage points.
A clearer picture on the hypothesised diminishing marginal effect of size is given by the 
result of specification 9.34. The quadratic term is positive and statistically significant, 
implying the elasticity of A EXP with respect to SIZE9596 decreases as size increases. 
However, the coefficient is very small which suggests that for all practical purposes the 
quadratic term can be ignored. Nevertheless, as the underlying relationship of SIZE9596 was
non-linear in this sample, the logarithm specification of SIZE9596 as in specification 9.29 was 
adopted.
For the other firm level variables in specification 9.29, which are log(AGE96) and
IMDEP959b, the results show results similar to those of the estimation of the export
participation equation for the full sample. Therefore, exporting plants which were old and use 
large imported inputs tend to have exported less in the crisis period.
The coefficients of export spillover variables in specifications 9.35 and 9.36 are positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficients of INEXP959b and RNEXP959b show the effect of
industry-specific export spillovers is much larger than the effect of region-specific export 
spillovers. This suggests that, for any exporting plant, having similarities in product is more 
important than being located in a region with good export-supporting facilities.
The results from the last three specifications show the importance of industry 
competitiveness in determining export performance during the crisis period and support the 
prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The coefficients of variables that represent industry 
factor intensity show the expected signs and are statistically very significant. Exporting 
plants in resource- and labour- intensive industries are suggested to have been more 
successful in increasing export performance during the crisis period, compared with exporters 
in other industries.
280
9.5.2.2 Discussion
While the above results have provided a picture of the determinants of the export supply 
response, several other points are worth discussing.
First, the strong and positive effect for exporting history ( EP9596 ) highlights the presumption
that exporting is a costly and sometimes slow commercial activity to initiate. This is also 
confirmed by the strong and positive effect of export spillover variables 
( INEXP9596 , RNEXP9596 , IEXP9596 and REXP9596 ). If exporting was not costly, we should have 
been observed an insignificant effect for these variables.
This implication is important. The increase in competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate 
depreciation is likely to have been captured only by plants which had been exporting prior to 
the crisis. In Indonesian manufacturing, these plants are relatively small compared with the 
entire population of plants. This inference can perhaps explain the low switching rate from 
non-exporting to exporting as observed in the descriptive analysis. The inference further 
implies the common view that firms in crisis affected countries should have been able to 
redirect sales to the export market should be treated with caution. The finding suggests it is 
reasonable to observe a quick adjustment for firms that have had some exporting experience, 
but this is not necessarily so for firms that sell their entire output to the domestic market. For 
the latter, while the redirection is still possible, it is likely to happen with a lag.
Differences in efficiency and ability to produce export quality are also the key factors in 
shaping export response. This is implied by the results related to the log(LP9596) , C/9596 ,
SJ9596 and log(SIZE9596) variables. They strongly support the self-selection hypothesis that
firms need to have some cost advantages to be able to survive in competitive international 
markets. The strongest evidence supporting these factors is given by the estimation results of 
the export participation equation for the non-exporting sample. In this respect, non-exporting 
plants in industry that were able to switch to exporting in the crisis period are large, more 
productive, more capital intensive and use a higher share of imported inputs.
This finding also provides another reason for the low switching rate from non-exporting 
plants to exporting. The low switching rate might be because most non-exporting plants were
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either not ready or not prepared to switch. In the empirical literature on the self-selection 
hypothesis, it is often observed that new exporters exhibit similar characteristics to 
established exporters. Bernard and Jensen (1999) found that new US exporters show similar 
characteristics two or three years before they actually begin to export. Hallward-Driemeier et 
al. (2002) found many domestic-private exporters in some Asian countries closely resembled 
foreign exporters, which was interpreted as an indication that the focus of exports is the likely 
intent right from when firms are first created.
While it is reasonable to observe efficiency differences for the group of non-exporting plants, 
it is rather puzzling that the results indicate the differences for the group of exporting plants. 
From the perspective of the self-selection hypothesis, similar behaviour should not have been 
observed, as those joining export markets are presumed to be efficient and therefore there 
should not be large differences in efficiency across exporters. Nonetheless, the differences 
might be related to market characteristics in developing countries. As argued by Hallward- 
Driemeier et al. (2002), less integrated product markets -  as a result of poor economic 
infrastructure -  and, in some cases, trade protection, could allow the co-existence of 
productive and non-productive producers.
The last important point to consider is the strong and positive effects of foreign ownership in 
determining export response. This finding strongly supports the argument made by 
Blomstrom and Lipsey (1993) that it is easier for foreign firms to redirect sales. The results 
also show that the positive impact of foreign ownership is not limited to exporting plants. In 
particular, the probability of non-exporting plants switching during the crisis period was 
higher for the group of non-exporting plants with a high foreign ownership share.
This finding supports the results in Chapter 7 and 8. Therefore, it reinforces the view that 
foreign firms are likely to have been financially supported by their parent companies and 
were able to take advantage of the increase in competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate 
depreciation. As also noted earlier, the former reflects the observation made by several other 
studies (e.g. Fukao 2001; Urata, 2002). In particular, Urata observed that Japanese parent 
companies increased capital subscription to many foreign affiliates in crisis affected 
countries. For the latter, the finding highlights the strong export orientation of FDI in Asian 
countries and the ability of parent companies to provide market access for their affiliates. The 
evidence of easier sales redirection by foreign plants further implies they paid much lower 
costs for export expansion compared with the other plants. To a large extent, if, as is
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considered likely, the plants were established with an export focus, or were provided with 
access to foreign markets through their parent companies, this explains why their costs would 
have been lower.
The results from the field survey undertaken by Feridhanusetyawan et al. (2000) give an 
excellent example for the discussion above. They found that some private-domestic firms in 
the consumer and component electronics industry, which were domestically oriented, quickly 
entered a joint-venture agreement to gain access to export and intermediate input markets. A 
similar example was also found in the automotive component industry, where firms with 
some foreign ownership share were rescued, either in terms of financial support or market 
access.
This field survey also highlights the comment made earlier about the readiness of non­
exporting plants. In particular, firms in the electronics industry that had established trade and 
production networks -  irrespective of their ownership status -  could easily redirect output to 
export markets when domestic demand was low. Thus, for these firms, access to export 
markets had been achieved long before the crisis, despite their domestic orientation. 
Furthermore, these networks tend to discipline firms, to force them to always produce to 
international standards. This discipline mechanism should make the process of sales 
redirection a lot easier. The experience of PT Great River International (GRI) -  one of the 
largest garment producers in Indonesia -  highlights this point. The fact that GRI had long 
been producing garments under licence from some 20 international fashion brands seems to 
have smoothed its sales redirection. This is reflected in a sharp increase in export earnings 
share from 25 per cent in 1997 to 70 per cent in 1999 (Tanudjaja 1999).
9.5.3 Did liquidity constraints affect the export supply response?
We have argued that the credit contraction to the private sector was one possible explanation 
for the sluggish export performance in crisis affected countries. The usual argument is that 
the lack of loanable funds increases this financial constraint, reduces investment and hence 
undermines the boost to competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation. To date, 
there is no clear evidence to support this theory and very a few studies address this issue. 
Accordingly, it is worthwhile examining the data to shed some light on the issue. In 
particular, this section asks whether the extent of financial constraint negatively affects the 
export response.
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Equations 9.5 and 9.6 were re-estimated for the exporting and non-exporting sample by 
adding two variables representing a plant’s liquidity position. The first variable is interest 
coverage (LEV9596 ), which is included to proxy a plant’s financial leverage. The definition of
this variable was given in Chapter 7. Higher LEV9596 means higher financial leverage. 
LEV9596 is expected to be negatively related to the export supply response during the crisis.
Higher financial leverage implies lower net worth, lower ability to obtain a loan and hence a 
higher likelihood of financial constraint. The second variable is the percentage change in 
investment financed by bank loans between the crisis and pre-crisis period 
( %ALOAN _ IN V ). For plant i , it is defined as
%ALOAN _INVit
(LOAN _ 1NV„ ) -  (W A N  _ I N V ^ J  ^  QQ
(LOAN _INVi95%)
where LOAN INVi t is loan investment financed by plant /' in time t, t -  1997,...,2000 and 
LOAN _INVt 9596 is the average investment in 1995 and 1996.
LOAN INV is included to proxy the size of the loan the plant was able to obtain. Low 
LOAN INV implies a high extent of financial constraint and hence LOAN INV is 
expected to be positively related to the export supply response.
Table 9.18 presents the maximum likelihood estimation results of equation 9.5 for the 
exporting sample. The results of the two groups of specifications were reported, each consist 
of three specifications that use different variables for industry factor intensity. All 
specifications use INEXP9596 and RNEXP9596 as export spillover variables. The first group
includes only LEV9596 while the second adds %ALOAN INV .
Financial leverage does not seem to have increased the probability of exporting plants 
switching from the exporting state in the crisis period. The coefficients of LEV9596 , although 
showing the expected sign, were statistically insignificant across all specifications.
In contrast, a clearer picture can be obtained from the coefficients of %ALOAN INV . They 
are positive and statistically very significant across the specifications with this variable.
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Therefore, exporting plants which were able to obtain external financing were likely to 
continue exporting during the crisis period. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
financial constraints negatively affected the export supply response.
Table 9.19, which presents the MLE results of equation 9.5 for the non-exporting sample, 
displays a similar picture. The only difference is that the magnitude of the negative impact of 
financial constraint is shown to have been higher for non-exporting plants. The coefficients 
of %ALOAN _INV  are almost two times higher than those of the previous estimations, 
implying substantially higher additional credit needed by non-exporting plants if they were to 
enter export markets during the crisis period. Krueger and Tomell (1999) observed a similar 
pattern for Mexican exporters during the 1990s crisis. As they argued, the difference in the 
magnitude is likely because exporters are able to offer banks a more certain cash flow 
projection owing to their involvement in export markets.
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Table 9.18 Test for liquidity constraint hypothesis: regressions results, export
participation equation, exporting only
D e p e n d en t  variable E P ,,
S p ec if ica t ion 9 .4 0  9.41 9 .4 2 9 .4 3  9 .4 4 9 .4 5
log(LPj 9596) 0 .011
(0 .7 4 )
0 .031
(2 .0 6 )*
0 .0 1 3
( 0 .8 7 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .6 9 )
0 .0 3 0
(2 .0 1 )*
0 .0 1 2
(0 .8 2 )
P C I2 Ii9596w 0 .0 0 2
( 0 .0 9 )
0 .0 0 9
(0 .3 0 )
0 .011
( 0 .4 2 )
-0 .0 2 5
(0 .0 2 )
- 0 .0 2 0
( 0 .2 3 )
- 0 .0 1 5
(0 .3 5 )
P S I2 ii9596 0 .0 0 2
(2 .3 1 )*
0 .0 0 2
(2 .1 4 )*
0 .0 0 2
(2 .5 5 )*
0 .0 0 2
(2 .2 7 )*
0 .0 0 2
(2 .0 9 )*
0 .0 0 2
(2 .5 1 )*
FORj 9596 0 .121
( 2 .5 8 )* *
0.121
(2 .5 2 )*
0 . 1 2 0
( 2 .5 6 )*
0 .1 2 2
( 2 .6 0 )* *
0 .1 2 3
(2 .5 5 )*
0 .121
(2 .5 7 )*
log(SIZE j 9596) 0 .0 9 2
( 8 .3 4 )* *
0 .0 9 8
(8 .5 1 )* *
0 .0 8 8
( 7 .9 5 ) * *
0 .0 9 2
( 8 .2 7 )* *
0 .0 9 8
(8 .4 6 )* *
0 .0 8 7
( 7 .8 8 ) * *
lo g (A G E i 96) - 0 .0 4 3
( 2 .8 3 )* *
- 0 .0 3 6
(2 .2 9 )*
- 0 .0 3 9
( 2 .6 1 ) * *
- 0 .0 4 2
( 2 .8 2 )* *
- 0 .0 3 6
(2 .2 6 )*
-0 .0 3 9
(2 .5 9 )* *
IM DEPj 9596 - 0 .0 9 5
(1 .9 1 ) +
-0 .0 2 0
(0 .3 7 )
-0 .0 7 7
( 1 .5 5 )
-0 .091
( 1 .8 3 )+
- 0 .0 1 6
(0 .2 9 )
- 0 .0 7 3
0 . 4 6 )
IN E X Pj 9 5 9 6 0 .8 1 9
( 8 .7 5 )* *
0 .9 2 2
(5 .8 5 )* *
0 .7 7 8
( 8 .2 9 )* *
0 .8 1 9
(8 .7 4 )* *
0 . 9 2 0
( 5 .8 4 )* *
0 .7 7 7
( 8 .2 8 ) * *
R N E X P j .9596 0 .2 4 7
(2 .0 7 )*
0 .3 0 2
(2 .4 4 )*
0 .251
(2 .1 1 )*
0 .2 4 8
(2 .0 8 )*
0 .3 0 2
(2 .4 3 )*
0 .2 5 2
(2 .1 2 )*
D R Ij,9596 0 .0 6 7
(1 .5 0 )
0 .0 6 8
(1 -5 2 )
D L I j  9 5 9 6 0 .0 4 8
( 1 .1 6 )
0 .0 4 9
(1 .1 9 )
I R I j .95 0 .6 3 9
(2 .3 3 )*
0 .6 4 5
(2 .3 6 )*
I C I 1 j,9596 ( 1 -0 .2 8 6
(1 .9 2 )+
-0 .2 .1 4
(1 .9 2 ) +
tSI2j 9 5 9 6 -0 .2 9 9
(2 .6 7 )* *
-0 .3 0 0
(2 .6 7 )* *
C O M P Ji89 0 .1 0 6
( 3 .2 6 ) * *
0 .1 0 8
( 3 .3 0 ) * *
LE V | 9596 ,b) -0 .011
(0 .5 7 )
-0 .001
(0 .6 9 )
-0 .0 0 1
( 0 .6 6 )
-0 .001
(0 .3 7 )
-0 .001
(0 .4 7 )
-0 .001
( 0 .4 5 )
% A L O  A N I N V j  t 0 .0 2 7
( 1 .9 6 )+
0 .031
(2 .1 8 )*
0 .0 2 8
(2 .0 2 )*
Y ea r  D u m m y  1998 -1 .4 1 3
(3 5 .2 9 )* *
- 1 .4 1 9
(3 5 .3 3 )* *
- 1 .4 1 5
( 3 5 .3 1 ) * *
- 1 .4 1 8
(3 5 .3 1 )* *
-1 .4 2 4
(3 5 .3 7 ) * *
- 1 .4 1 9
(3 5 .3 4 ) * *
Y ea r  D u m m y  1999 - 0 .0 4 7
(1 .4 8 )
- 0 .0 4 7
(1 .4 8 )
-0 .0 4 7
( 1 .4 8 )
-0 .0 5 3
( 1 .6 8 )+
-0 .0 5 4
(1 .7 0 ) +
- 0 .0 5 4
(1 .6 8 ) +
Y e a r  D u m m y  2 0 0 0 0 .1 3 5
( 4 .2 7 )* *
0 .1 3 6
( 4 .3 0 )* *
0 .1 3 5
( 4 .2 7 )* *
0 .1 2 7
(3 .9 8 )* *
0 .1 2 7
( 3 .9 7 )* *
0 .1 2 7
( 3 .9 7 ) * *
D u m m y  variables for industr ies N o t  inc lu ded Included N o t  inc lu ded N ot  inc lu ded Included N o t  in c lu d e d
D u m m y  variab les for p ro v in ces Included Included Included Included Included Included
C on stant -1 .2 2 6
(5 .0 3 )* *
- 1 .5 5 8
(5 .0 0 )* *
- 1 .2 2 5
(5 .0 8 )* *
- 1 .2 2 2
( 5 .0 1 )* *
-1 .5 5 6
( 5 .0 0 )* *
-1 .221
(5 .0 6 ) * *
P se u d o  R-squared  
W a ld  ch i2
0 .1 6
1934 .5
0 .1 6
1 9 8 4 .7
0 .1 6
1 9 4 5 .2
0 .1 9
6 6 1 .9
0 .1 9
7 1 3 .0
0 .1 9
673 .1
Notes: 1) Robust Z statistics in parentheses
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 100 to improve presentation
b) The coefficient was multiplied by 10' to improve presentation
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Table 9.19 Test for liquidity constraint hypothesis: regressions results, export
participation equation, non-exporting only
D ep en d en t v ariab le EPj,t
Specification 9.46  9 .47  9 .48  9 .49  9 .50  9.51
lo g (L P j9 5 9 6) 0 .037
(2 .50)*
0 .044
(2 .94 )**
0 .0 3 7
(2 .53 )*
0 .037
(2 .53 )*
0.045
(2 .96 )**
0 .037
(2 .56)*
P C I 2 i 9596 0 . 0 0 1
(1 .8 4 )+
0 . 0 0 1
(2 .14 )*
0 . 0 0 1
(2 .16 )*
0 . 0 0 1
(1 .7 9 )+
0 . 0 0 1
(2 .08)*
0 . 0 0 1
(2 .13)*
p s k , , « « , 1' 1 -0 .005
(0 .37 )
-0 .006
(0 .44 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .1 6 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .4 0 )
-0 .003
(0 .46 )
-0 .003
(0 .18 )
FOR] ,9596 0 .318
(3 .47)**
0 .326
(3 .52)**
0 .325
(3 .55 )**
0 .316
(3 .45 )**
0.323
(3 .49 )**
0 .323
(3 .53 )**
l0 g(SIZEj 9596) 0 .268
(21 .27 )**
0 .272
(20 .34 )**
0 .265
( 2 1 .0 1 )**
0 .268
( 2 1 .2 1 )**
0 .272
(20 .30 )**
0 .265
(20 .95 )**
log(A G E j 96) -0 .084
(5 .36)**
-0 .087
(5 .52 )**
-0 .082
(5 .2 6 )* *
-0 .083
(5 .31 )**
-0 .086
(5 .48 )**
-0.081
(5 .21)**
I M D E P j 9596 0 .0 6 0
(0 .96 )
0 .132
( 2 .0 0 )*
0 .0 5 6
(0 .8 9 )
0 .056
(0 .89 )
0 .129
(1 .9 5 )+
0 .052
(0 .82 )
IN EX Pj 9596 1 . 6 8 6
(17 .44 )**
1.519
(9 .04 )**
1.628
(16 .3 8 )* *
1.685
(1 7 .4 2 )* *
1.521
(9 .06)**
1.625
(16 .33 )**
R N E X P j>9596 1.301
(8 .38)**
1.351
(8 .49 )**
1.259
(8 .14 )**
1.309
(8 .41 )**
1.360
(8 .53 )**
1.266
(8 .17 )**
D R J.i,9596 0 .104
(2 .57)*
0 .108
(2 .67 )**
DLIj 9596 0 .050
(1 .27 )
0 .053
(1 .34 )
lW j.9 S 0 .039
(0 .13)
0 .064
( 0 .2 1 )
i c n j.,596(b) -0 .027
(1 .6 9 )+
-0 .064
(1 .7 1 )+
lS12j 9 5 9 6 0 .127
(1 .17 )
0.131
( 1 . 2 1 )
C O M P j.89 0 .0 6 9
( 2 .2 1 )*
0 .072
(2 .29 )*
l e v , , 5, 6 (W -0 .003
(0 .73 )
- 0 . 0 0 2
(0 .80 )
-0 . 0 0 2
(0 .6 5 )
-0 .005
(0 .3 4 )
-0 .007
(0 .41 )
-0 . 0 0 2
(0 .24 )
% A L O A N _IN V iit 0 .056
(2 .43 )*
0 .057
(2 .48)*
0.055
(2 .41)*
Y ear D um m y 1998 -0 .990
(15 .55 )**
-0 .9 9 6
(15 .60)**
-0 .9 8 9
(1 5 .5 9 )* *
-0 .997
(15 .63 )**
-1 .003
(15 .69 )**
-0 .996
(1 5 .6 8 )* *
Y ear D u m m y  1999 -0 .094
(2 .65 )**
-0 .096
(2 .71)**
-0 .0 9 4
(2 .65 )**
-0 .103
( 2 .8 8 )**
-0 .105
(2 .94)**
-0 . 1 0 2
( 2 .8 8 )**
Y ear D um m y 2000 0 .014
(0 .42)
0 .013
(0 .37)
0 .015
(0 .4 3 )
0 .003
(0 .0 9 )
0 . 0 0 1
(0 .04 )
0 .004
(0 . 1 1 )
D um m y v ariab les  for industries N ot included Included N ot included N ot included Included N ot inc lu d ed
D u m m y  v ariab le  for p rov inces Inc lu d ed Included In c lu d ed In c lu d ed Inc luded Inc luded
C o n stan t -3 .584
(16 .82 )**
-3 .569
(11 .97 )**
-3 .513
(1 6 .7 7 )* *
-3 .587
(16 .81 )**
-3 .587
( 1 2 .0 0 )**
-3 .514
(16 .74 )**
Pseudo R -squared  
W ald  ch i2
0 .16
1361.3
0.17
1450
0 .16
1323.6
0 .16
1365.7
0.18
1453.6
0 .16
1326.6
Notes: 1) Robust Z statistics in parentheses
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 100 to improve presentation
b) The coefficient was multiplied by 105 to improve presentation
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Table 9.20 presents the estimation results of equation 9.6 for the exporting sample, after 
taking into account the possible selection bias (i.e. by including the inverse Mills ratio 
produced by the estimations reported in Table 9.18).
The relationship regarding the relevant variables does not change in principle. LEV9596 and 
%ALOAN _INV  are negatively and positively related to the adjustment in export propensity, 
respectively. The notable difference is that now the coefficients of LEV959(> are statistically
significant. This finding provides stronger support for a negative impact from financial 
constraints on the export response.
Overall, the results suggest financial constraints negatively affected plants’ export supply 
response during the crisis. Despite this, it does not necessarily mean the sluggish export 
performance during the crisis was caused by a contraction in credit. There are two reasons for 
this. First, the empirical analysis can not cleanly test this proposition as it only reflects the 
demand side of credit. Second, even if a contraction did occur, the impact is likely to have 
been different on exporters and non-exporters. In general, exporters tend to be favoured by 
banks, for the reason argued by Krueger and Tomell (1999), and hence would have been less 
financially constrained. The results indeed support this argument. In particular, the negative 
impact of financial constraints on export participation during the crisis period was higher for 
non-exporting plants. Access to credit is therefore another key factor for successful switching 
by non-exporters, in addition to being efficient and ready for competition in the international 
market. Exporters could also more easily find alternative sources of fund in the presence of a 
credit contraction. This is mainly because many of them have some share of foreign 
ownership. As pointed out by Blalock and Gertler (2005) and Krueger and Tomell (1999), 
exporters were likely to have been able to obtain trade financing from the international 
capital market, through the access provided by their parent companies.
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Table 9.20 Test for liquidity constraint hypothesis: regressions results, export
propensity adjustment equation, exporting only
Dependent variable AEXPiit
Specification 9.52 9.53 9.54 9.55 9.56 9.57
log(LPj 9 5 9 ( j) 0.111
(4.88)**
0.231
(9.29)**
0.122
(5.35)**
0.105
(4.64)**
0.225
(9.11)**
0.116
(5.12)**
P C 1 2 i,9 5 9 6 0.001
(1.67)+
0.001
( 1 . 2 1 )
0.001
(2.67)**
0.001
(1.34)
0.001
(0.85)
0.001
(2.34)*
P S 1 2 j 9596 0.017
(13.03)**
0.015
(11.77)**
0.018
(13.39)**
0.017
(13.00)**
0.015
(11.70)**
0.017
(13.39)**
F O R i , 9 5 9 6 0.549
(6.42)**
0.558
(6.55)**
0.547
(6.43)**
0.560
(6.57)**
0.575
(6.76)**
0.557
(6.57)**
log(SlZEj 9596) 0.604
(17.29)**
0.651
(18.46)**
0.583
(17.38)**
0.601
(17.52)**
0.648
(18.66)**
0.580
(17.60)**
log(AGEi96) -0.216
(7.54)**
-0.177
(6.37)**
-0.196
(7.01)**
-0.216
(7.58)**
-0.174
(6.31)**
-0.195
(7.03)**
IMDEPj 9 5 9 6 -0.562
(6.52)**
-0.183
(2.09)*
-0.500
(5.92)**
-0.531
(6.19)**
-0.143
(1.64)
-0.465
(5.54)**
I N E X P j  9 5 9 6 4.462
(14.37)**
5.370
(14.06)**
4.261
(14.35)**
4.487
(14.62)**
5.367
(14.18)**
4.278
(14.60)**
R N E X P j ,9 5 9 6 1.066
(5.18)**
1.329
(6.13)**
1.041
(5.08)**
1.082
(5.26)**
1.327
(6.14)**
1.059
(5.17)**
D R I j , 9 5 9 6 0.368
(4.98)**
0.378
(5.13)**
D U j , 9 5 9 6 0.166
(2.48)*
0.178
(2.65)**
I R I j .9 5 4.546
(10.69)**
4.607
(10.87)**
ICI1 j >959 6 (a> -0.002
(7.11)**
-0.002
(7.18)**
IS12j 9 5 9 6 -2.172
(11.00)**
-2.185
(11.08)**
C O M P j .89 0.478
(7.58)**
0.495
(7.86)**
LEVwW -0.094
(3.70)**
-0.110
(4.40)**
-0.101
(3.92)**
-0.055
(2.61)**
-0.106
(3.19)**
-0.061
(2.82)**
%ALOANJNVit 0.231
(9.74)**
0.252
(10.57)**
0.235
(9.89)**
Mills ratio 8.913
(19.12)**
8.704
(19.94)**
8.889
(19.27)**
8.966
(19.53)**
8.735
(20.28)**
8.938
(19.68)**
Year Dummy 1998 -11.143
(22.59)**
-10.958
(23.60)**
-11.124
(22.77)**
-11.236
(23.06)**
-11.032
(23.99)**
-11.215
(23.25)**
Year Dummy 1999 -0.283
(5.26)**
-0.277
(5.17)**
-0.282
(5.24)**
-0.340
(6.21)**
-0.338
(6.21)**
-0.340
(6.21)**
Year Dummy 2000 1.021
(16.28)**
1.009
(16.49)**
1.019
(16.34)**
0.955
(15.55)**
0.935
(15.59)**
0.952
(15.58)**
Dummy variables for industries Not included Included Not included Not included Included Not included
Dummy variable for provinces Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -17.352
(20.18)**
-19.634
(20.64)**
-17.259
(20.28)**
-17.399
(20.55)**
-19.670
(20.94)**
-17.300
(20.64)**
R-squared
F-statistics
0.18
105.1
0.19
65.4
0.18
109.46
0.18
53.25
0.19
36.28
0.18
55.06
Notes: 1) Robust t statistics in parentheses
2) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) The coefficient was multiplied by 100 to improve presentation
b) The coefficient was multiplied by lO' to improve presentation
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9.6 Summary
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the export-supply response of plants in 
Indonesian manufacturing. It shows a picture of the response and investigates which 
characteristics determined the success of plants in responding to the crisis in terms of export. 
The empirical analysis provides some insights into the observed aggregate export 
performance during the crisis period and indicates the importance of plant and industry 
characteristics in determining the response.
The descriptive analysis shows some evidence of sales redirection. First, some plants 
changed status from non-exporting to exporting, albeit only a very small number relative to 
the total number of non-exporting plants in the industry. Second, a large number of exporting 
plants became more export oriented while those which had been export oriented were 
unlikely to have become less export oriented. Despite this evidence, the analysis shows a 
large variation in impact of the crisis on export performance, suggesting some exporting 
plants were able to exploit the increase in competitiveness while others were not.
The main findings from the econometric analysis can be summarised as follows. First, 
exporting history significantly determined export participation in the crisis period. Exporting 
before the crisis significantly increased the probability of continuing to export during the 
crisis. The finding emphasises the presumption that exporting is a costly economic activity to 
initiate. This indicates that most of the increase in competitiveness from the sharp exchange 
rate depreciation is likely to have been captured only by plants which had been exporting just 
prior to the crisis.
Second, the ability to compete in the international market -  by being efficient and able to 
produce international-standard goods -  is another key factor. The results show the effect of 
this factor was particularly large for non-exporting plants. This suggests the low switching 
rate from non-exporting to exporting observed is likely to have been because most non­
exporting plants were not ready to compete in the international market. While this factor is 
evidently important for the group of non-exporting plants, the results also suggest it was 
important for the group of exporting plants.
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Third, the role of foreign ownership in affecting the response is clear. It is positively related 
to both the change in export propensity and export participation. Foreign ownership is also 
suggested to have played an important role in helping non-exporting plants become exporters 
during the crisis.
Finally, the results show the export-supply response was negatively affected by the extent of 
financial constraint faced by plants. The negative relationship is observed for both exporting 
and non-exporting plants. Nevertheless, the results suggest the magnitude of the impact is 
likely to have been higher for non-exporting ones.
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Chapter 10
The determinants of firm entry during 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods
10.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 showed that the pattern of plant entry did not seem to recover in 1999 and 2000. 
This raises the question as to why a contrasting pattern is observed as compared to other 
performance measures.
This chapter attempts to provide some answers to this question. Although it might simply 
reflect the lag in entry recovery, there could be some systematic forces driving the pattern. 
The descriptive analysis in Chapter 6 showed there was substantial variation across industries 
in the difference of entry rate between the crisis and pre-crisis periods. Accordingly, the main 
purpose of this chapter is to examine whether there are some changes in the determinants of 
firm entry over these periods. In addition, the differences in determinants within the period 
1997-2000 are also examined. Chapter 6 also demonstrated a substantial change in the over 
time pattern of plant entry within this short period of time.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.2 briefly reviews the literature on 
firm entry. Section 10.3 specifies the empirical models and spells out the hypotheses. Section 
10.4 describes the measurement of variables. Section 10.5 reports and discusses the 
estimation results. Section 10.6 summarises and concludes.
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10.2 Theoretical Background
10.2.1 Prevailing views about firm entry
There are two major approaches to the analysis of the determinants of entry. These are the 
limit-price model and the stochastic-replacement process.
Limit Price Model
This approach assumes entry is an equilibrating process which is attracted by, and serves to 
bid away, the excess profit. Entry is hypothesised to occur whenever the expected post-entry 
profit exceeds the level of profit in the long-run. The approach adopts the concept of a limit- 
price model (Bain 1949), which posits that there exists a limit price which is low enough for 
incumbents to be able to deter entry.
The extent to which the limit price deters entry is determined by two factors, the size of the 
market and the entrant's average costs curve. The latter gives rise to a cost advantage for 
incumbents over new entrants who may have to pay a substantial fixed entry cost. This 
implies the average cost curves of entrants and incumbents are not the same. According to 
Bain (1956), the cost advantages of incumbents over entrants are determined mainly by 
economies of scale, product differentiation and some absolute cost advantages.
Stochastic Replacement View
This approach considers entry is a stochastic process which does not necessarily respond to 
profit and may happen even if price equals marginal cost (Baldwin and Gorecki 1987). 
Baldwin and Gorecki argue two situations in which profit is irrelevant to the entry process. 
The first is related to how easily entrants can enter and capture a market share. This is 
captured by market demand growth. In a growing market, additional firms entering the 
market are unlikely to depress the market price. Hence incumbents are less threatened by 
entrants and are therefore less likely to act aggressively. The second is a situation where 
entrants simply replace some existing firms, even when long-run profits are zero.
10.2.2 Interdependence between entry and exit1
As in the limit price approach, entry takes place when profit is positive. Accordingly, exit 
should occur when profit is negative and entry-exit is expected to be negatively correlated. In
1 A useful review o f the interdependence is provided by Fotopoulus and Spence (1998).
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contrast, several studies found the correlation to be positive (e.g. Dunne et al. 1988; Dunne 
and Roberts 1991; Austin and Rosenbaum 1991; Lay 2003). For example, Dunne and 
Roberts found that entry and exit are positively correlated with the price-cost margin for US 
manufacturing, implying that higher profit encourages both entry and exit. Lay documented 
that the correlation coefficient of instantaneous entry and exit for Taiwan manufacturing was 
positive and relatively high (about 0.5).
The literature records several explanations for the positive correlation, often termed as 
“interdependence”. Geroski (1995) argues that entry and exit seem to be part of an 
evolutionary process in which a large number of new firms displace a large number of 
existing firms without much changing the total number of firms in an industry. This argument 
is similar to the ‘stochastic-replacement’ view of entry (Baldwin and Gorecki 1987) which 
posits that entry can still be expected even when industry’s profitability is zero. Entry in this 
view simply replaces some existing firms.
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) offer two reasons for the interdependence. First, to the extent 
that cost heterogeneity exists, there might be some high-cost incumbents who can be 
displaced by low-cost entrants. Second, to the extent that barriers to entry are barriers to exit 
(Caves and Porter 1976; Eaton and Lipsey 1980), potential displacement is limited and 
incumbents are deterred from exiting. The symmetrical relationship between entry and exit 
barriers arises from investment with sunk cost characteristics (i.e. investment in durable and 
specific assets). Sunk cost creates barriers to entry because it represents a higher opportunity 
cost that has to be met by entrants and higher risk owing to large losses associated with 
unsuccessful entry. At the same time, sunk cost also creates barriers to exit because 
incumbents are limited by inability to divest, owing to the non-recoverable nature of the 
assets (Shapiro and Khemani 1987, p. 16).
Shapiro and Khemani’s displacement effect implies entry is responsible for exit. Fotopoulus 
and Spence (1998) consider the process could be the other way around. That is, exit creates 
room for new entry. If the two directions hold, entry and exit are causally related and the 
interdependence may be due to some ‘displacement-replacement’ effect.
10.2.3 Firm entry over the business cycle
The focus of this chapter is on entry behaviour during economic expansion and contraction. 
Accordingly, it is important to examine the prevailing views about entry and business cycles.
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Highfield and Smiley (1987) offer two scenarios in which the business climate could lead to 
new business formation. The first is based on entrepreneurs making a rather naive assumption 
about the current macroeconomic condition and assuming the condition will continue. It is 
also assumed entrepreneurs prefer favourable economic conditions to start a new business. In 
this scenario, new business formation is expected to increase with high economic growth, 
low real interest rate, a higher inflation rate, high new plant and expenditure growth and 
decreasing unemployment rate. This scenario is often termed the ‘pull1 hypothesis.
The alternative scenario is the so called ‘opportunistic’ scenario. In this scenario, new 
business is formed when there is a vacuum in current economic activity. One example 
provided by Highfield and Smiley (1987) relates to decreasing rates of new plant and 
equipment expenditure, which may provide an opportunity for newly equipped firms. In this 
case, the entry barrier emanating from the level of capital required is decreased. This scenario 
expects new business formation to be associated with low economic growth, a low inflation 
rate and a high real interest rate. This scenario is often termed the ‘push’ hypothesis. In 
addition to Highfield and Smiley’s reasoning, others (e.g. Storey and Jones 1987; Storey 
1991) have argued that a period of high unemployment ‘pushes’ an individual to undertake 
an entrepreneurial initiative owing to fear of unemployment. However, bear in mind this 
reasoning must be associated more with small rather than large firms (Fotopoulus and Spence 
1997).
All in all, the relationship between entry and economic growth is positive under the ‘pull’ 
hypothesis and negative under the ‘push’ hypothesis. Relating these hypotheses to the issue 
of interdependence between entry and exit, there is a question as to whether the positive 
entry-exit correlation holds under each hypothesis.
According to Fotopoulus and Spence (1997), it is possible that the positive correlation occurs 
in both hypotheses. For the ‘push’ hypothesis, it is reasonable to assume a negative 
relationship between exit and economic growth. Intuitively, there is little justification for why 
exit should be hindered in the case of recession. This situation is depicted in Figure 10.1.
The situation is slightly different for the ‘pull’ hypothesis. Under a strictly ‘pull’ hypothesis 
scenario, it is hard to assume exit should be positively related to economic growth. There is 
no reason why large exit should be facilitated during a period of fast growth. However, 
Fotopoulus and Spence (1997, p.245) argue that the reasoning of a strictly ‘pull’ hypothesis
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ignores the possibility that increasing entry during favourable economic demand conditions 
can create a tendency towards exit. That is, there is a limit where an increasing supply of 
firms can not be digested by an economy, even if that economy is expanding. This scenario is 
termed as a ‘modified puli’ hypothesis, which assumes exit to be positively related to 
economic growth and is depicted in Figure 10.2.
Figure 10.1 The relationship of entry and exit to economic growth: ‘push’ hypothesis
Number of 
Firms
Economic growth
Source: Fotopoulus and Spence (1997)
There is not a consensus in the empirical literature on which hypothesis holds. Using a long 
time series data of about 40 years, Highfield and Smiley (1987) found that new business 
formation in the US economy tended to occur when macroeconomic conditions were not so 
favourable. Therefore, their study lends some support for the ‘push’ hypothesis. In examining 
the net entry of firms in Greek manufacturing, Fotopoulus and Spence (1997) found some 
evidence of a ‘modified pull’ hypothesis. Potential entrants in manufacturing industry seem 
to have overreacted to improved economic conditions, resulting in an over supply of new 
firms, which in turn sped up exits in response to the over supply.
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Figure 10.2 The relationship of entry and exit to economic growth: ‘modified-pull’ 
hypothesis
Number of 
Firms
Economic growth
Source: Fotopoulus and Spence (1997)
Some other studies have even questioned whether there should be any non-random 
relationship at all between firm entry behaviour and business cycles. For example, Yamawaki 
(1991) found the pattern of firm entry over time is very sensitive to the cyclical disturbance 
in Japanese manufacturing while Dunne and Roberts (1991) found the opposite for US 
manufacturing.
10.3 Model Specification and hypotheses
10.3.1 Model specification
This study follows the specification of entry model similar to those in the literature. An exit 
model is also specified for the reason that entry and exit might be causally related, as 
discussed in Section 10.2. Ignoring industry and time subscripts, these are
EN = f  \(X\,Y\,Z\,REPL) (10.1)
EX = f i ( X  2, Yi, Zi, D/SP) (10.2)
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where, EN ( EX)  is entry (exit) rate, X \ ( X i )  is a vector of incentives for entry (exit), 
Y\(Yi)  is a vector of entry (exit) barriers, Zi (Z 2 ) is a vector of other relevant variables, 
REPL is replacement entry and DISP is displacement entry. DISP and REPL are included 
to represent displacement and replacement behaviour, respectively.
As is commonly done in the literature, REPL and DISP are assumed to be a function of exit 
and entry, respectively. Thus, equations 10.1 and 10.2 can be expressed as
EN = f\(X\,Y\,Z\,EX) (10.3)
EX = f i ( X  2, Yi, Z 2, EN)  (10.4)
Having specified displacement and replacement behaviour, the discussion now turns to the 
specification of other vectors. Consider, first, X \ . The specification of X\  is derived from 
Orr’s (1974) model, which posits that entry (E)  is expected to occur whenever expected post 
entry profits (;f ) are above the entry-precluding level (/r*). The entry-precluding level 
refers to profits which would be earned by incumbents in the long-run after all entry has 
ceased. Orr’s model is
E = f ( K e- K *) (10.5)
Adopting the concept of a limit-price model (Bain 1949 and 1956), Orr assumes n * depends 
on a vector of entry barriers ( ENB) and market risk ( R ), that is
7T* = f(ENB,R)  (10.6)
Substituting 10.6 into 10.5, Orr’s model becomes
E = f(7Te,ENB,R) (10.7)
To incorporate the stochastic replacement view of entry, industry growth ( GR ) is added to 
equation 10.7.2 So that it becomes
2 Baldwin and Gorecki (1987) introduced market size to capture replacement entry. This chapter does not follow 
this approach since replacement entry has been assumed to depend on exit.
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E = f(7re,GR,ENB,R) ( 10.8)
This thesis uses pre-entry profitability to proxy n e and price-cost margin to proxy 
profitability ( PCM<-\). Market risk is proxied by the variability in industry profitability, 
defined as the standard deviation of PCM ( SDPCM). Following Shapiro and Khemani 
(1987), GR is deflated by the minimum efficient scale ( MES) to reflect a situation that there 
must be sufficient growth to justify additional capacity in an industry. The deflation is 
defined as ROOM variable.
The use of pre-entry profitability as a proxy for n e has been the usual procedure in empirical 
studies. However, the procedure is unlikely to proxy n e properly. The (naive) entrants 
neglect the effect their entry may have on profits because profitability between post- and pre­
entry is assumed to be the same (Geroski 1991). Moreover, employing the naive expectation 
may open up the possibility for incumbents to manipulate pre-entry profit and hence could 
discourage entry. An alternative approach is to assume entrants form rational expectations to 
make the entry decision. The rational expectation assumption leads to the procedure of 
forecasting profit based on an autoregressive model of profit. Several studies, e.g. Highfield 
and Smiley (1987) and Jeong and Masson (1991), provide evidence that using forecasted 
profits performed better than pre-entry profits. Although the alternative approach is more 
reasonable, it is not possible in this thesis because there are not enough time-series 
observations in the data base.
Two variables are included to represent barriers to entry: economies of scale (ES)  and 
capital requirement ( KR ). In addition to advertising intensity, these variables represent the 
entry barriers considered by Bain (1956). This study did not include advertising intensity 
because the advertising expenditure data required to construct this variable are only available 
until 1996. Moreover, the data on advertising expenditure could be unreliable because they 
were first reported only in 1993.
Economies of scale acts as an entry barrier if industry output accounted for by minimum 
efficient scale ( MES) constitutes a significant part of the quantity demanded at a competitive 
price. Potential entrants could enter on a large scale but would trigger retaliation by 
incumbents. Capital requirement is included to capture the extent of cost disadvantages faced 
by entrants. According to Bain (1956), borrowers’ lack of information about potential
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entrants provides incumbents with an absolute cost advantage over entrants, which results in 
difficulties for entrants in raising investment funds.
Seller concentration is included in Y\ to capture the strategic deterrence actions by 
incumbents. These are likely to occur in the post-entry period. Examples of these actions 
include predatory pricing, aggressive advertising campaigns and credible threats to compete 
hard against new rivals (Evans and Siegfried 1992). However, seller concentration may also 
attract entry. It facilitates collusion that in turn provides a higher survival chance given that 
entry has occurred. Chamberlin’s (1933) model predicts that once concentration levels reach 
a certain point, oligopolies recognise their interdependence and that together they produce a 
monopoly output for the market.
The specification of vector Xi  in equation 10.4 follows earlier empirical work on the 
determinants of exit (e.g Deutsch 1984; MacDonald 1986; Shapiro and Khemani 1987; Flynn 
1990; Doi 1999) and is similar to that of vector X\ and Y\ in the entry equation.
According to models of firm bankruptcy (e.g. Schary 1991), a firm decision to shut down 
depends on a short-term cash flow problem and assessment of long term prospects. 
Therefore, profitability ( PCM) and industry growth ( GR ) are included in X2.
As noted earlier, exit barriers arise from sunk costs. The relationship between sunk costs and 
the probability of exit relates to the ‘duration’ view of sunk costs (Rosenbaum and Lamort 
1992, p.299). That is, a longer production time is needed to recover sufficient returns from 
investment as the resale value of the non-recoverable assets can not be added to the stream of 
income generated by these assets. The implication is that firms with high sunk-capital costs 
are forced to stay in an industry longer than firms with low sunk-capital costs.
Therefore, the ideal proxies for exit barriers are those that can represent the extent of sunk 
costs. The strategy commonly applied in empirical studies is to create some proxies based on 
characteristic sunk costs, which are durability and specifity in assets. The only problem here 
is that it is often difficult to obtain such proxies as a result of the specifity characteristics. 
Despite this, Caves and Porter (1976, p.44) argue that each source of entry barrier identified 
by Bain can also be erected as a barrier to exit. In this argument, the durability and specifity 
of assets can to some extent be captured by Bain’s entry barriers. For example, it is often 
argued that incumbents must have some resources which are at least temporarily specific to
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allow them to create some cost advantages over potential entrants. Otherwise, potential 
entrants could easily duplicate the resources and enter. Following Caves and Porter, Yi is 
specified to be identical to barriers to entry.
CR4 is also included in Yi.  Seller concentration facilitates collusion which could increase 
the probability of survival and hence may discourage exit. Despite this, low exit in highly 
concentrated industry may also be possible simply because firms are likely to be the 
established firms (Flynn 1990).
Vectors Zi and Z 2 are specified to include variables related to trade and international 
competition. The first is export orientation {EXP). The greater profit opportunities provided 
by the export market are likely to attract entry and hinder exit. In contrast, a higher degree of 
export orientation could also discourage entry and encourage exit, because it signals a greater 
intensity of competition in the industry. Nevertheless, the pressure for higher exit is likely to 
be weak since established firms must have paid substantial costs for participating in export 
markets.
This thesis includes import penetration {IMP) and trade protection {TARIFF) to represent 
the effect of international competition on entry. It is often argued in the literature that greater 
trade protection tends to facilitate non-competitive behaviour, such as collusion, and protects 
less efficient firms. Therefore, incumbents in a protected industry could collude and deter 
entry. However, entry could also be encouraged because the trade protection which allows 
incumbents to behave non-competitively could also be a more important incentive than the 
profit incentive.
Meanwhile, the effect of import competition on entry and exit is ambiguous. Higher import 
competition could be expected to reduce entry unless it widens the domestic market. 
However, it could also encourage exit as more firms increase competition and reduce the 
survivability of incumbents.
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To sum up, the entry and exit equations can be specified as follows
EN = f(PCM, ROOM, SDPCM, ES, KR, CR4, EXP, IMP, TARIFF, EX) (10.9)
EX = f(PCM, GR, ES, KR, CR4, EXP, IMP, TARIFF, EN) (10.10)
The definition of the variables in these equations is given in Section 10.4.3.
10.3.2 Hypotheses
This section discusses how the determinants of entry would have changed over the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. As in the other chapter, pre-crisis and crisis are defined as the period 1995- 
96 and 1997-2000, respectively. Based on the views of entry during business cycles, it can be 
expected that factors determining entry in Indonesian manufacturing will not be the same 
between these two periods. This is the general hypothesis to be tested, and can be re-stated in 
more detail with respect to the key determinants of entry summarised by equation 10.9.
Symmetrical relationship between entry and exit
The symmetrical relationship between entry and exit might not hold in the crisis period. For 
potential entrants, the opportunity cost of any new investment is likely to have been higher in 
this period. This is because the deep demand contraction and generally more competitive 
business environment should have lowered the profitability of doing business. For established 
firms, the role of sunk costs as exit barriers may not have been as important if firms suffered 
so severely from the crisis that they had gone into receivership.
Displacement and replacement entry
Displacement entry should have been more important than replacement entry in the crisis 
period. Due to the greater competition in this period, arguably only efficient firms were able 
to survive. This situation would have allowed some low-cost potential entrants to enter and 
successfully compete over the incumbents. This argument shares the same rationale as the 
‘push’ hypothesis.
Demand situation
Profitability ( PCM) and market growth ( ROOM ) are expected to have been more important 
in attracting entry during the crisis period.
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Although expected to be positively related to entry, profitability and market growth may not 
have been so important in determining entry before the crisis. In a developing country like 
Indonesia, a situation that warrants a stable expected profit -  instead of the expected profit 
itself -  may have been the determining factor. It is often argued in the literature that the 
existence of imperfect markets, low levels of competition, and trade protection are the major 
source of this situation.
Based on this argument, it can be expected that profitability might have been more important 
in attracting entry during the crisis period. After the crisis, firms could no longer rely on a 
situation where a stable profit expectation was warranted.
In addition, the effect of market risk ( SDPCM ) in determining entry can be expected to have 
been more important in this period. The reason is that greater competitive pressure should 
have significantly increased the risk of doing business.
Entry barriers
The effect of economies of scale ( ES ) in deterring entry may not have changed between the 
crisis and pre-crisis periods. It is difficult to find any reason why market size and production 
technology, the factors that determines economies of scale, should have changed in such a 
short period of time.
In a similar vein, the effect of capital requirement ( KR ) on entry can also be expected to 
have been the same between the two periods. The amount of capital required to build a plant 
at a minimum efficient scale is likely to be industry specific and therefore unlikely to have 
changed. Nevertheless, a stronger negative effect might be observed for the crisis period 
because potential entrants could have had difficulty raising investment funds as the extent to 
which credit was rationed is likely to have been higher for potential entrants.
The difference in the effect of strategic entry deterrence behaviour, proxied byC7?4, is 
difficult to predict a priori. Before the crisis, strategic behaviour might have been positively 
related to entry (i.e. it encouraged entry). Retaliatory behaviour is unlikely to occur when 
demand is growing, which was the situation prior to the crisis.
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During and after the crisis, both positive and negative relationship can be observed. 
Theoretical models of oligopoly behaviour discussed in Chapter 4 (e.g. Rotemberg and 
Saloner 1986; Rotemberg and Woodford 1992) hypothesise that the probability of collusion 
is lower in a high demand situation. This hypothesis thus implies that the effect of industry 
concentration can be expected to have been negative during the crisis period. However, some 
foreign and large entrants may not have been affected by strong retaliatory behaviour, and 
may even have been attracted to enter because of the higher survival chance facilitated by 
possible collusive behaviour. Therefore, a positive relationship may also be observed.
Other determinants
Export orientation (EXP) is expected to have strongly attracted entry during and after the 
crisis, although its effect before the crisis is rather unclear.
The reasoning is clear. To some extent, entry in the crisis period should have been 
encouraged in export oriented industries. As explained in Chapter 4, the boost in 
competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation should have increased the 
expected profits from exporting.
While the effect of trade protection ( TARIFF) in attracting entry might not have been clear 
before the crisis, it can be expected to have been less important during the crisis period. The 
extent to which incumbents engaged in non-competitive behaviour is likely to have been low 
in this period due to higher potential competition from imports, the latter as a result of the 
accelerated trade liberalisation.3 Therefore, incentive to enter stemming from trade protection 
is unlikely to have been important in this period. This reasoning also suggests import 
competition ( IMP) may have been negatively related to entry in the crisis period.
10.4 Statistical framework, data and measurement of variables
10.4.1 Statistical framework
Equations 10.9 and 10.10 form the basic equations to be estimated. Before outlining the 
estimating equations, it is important to discuss several relevant issues.
3 See the description of the general impact of the crisis on the economy in Chapter 3.
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First, the literature does not clearly indicate whether EX in the entry equation or EN in the 
exit equation should enter as current or lagged variables. Several studies, e.g. Austin and 
Rosenbaum (1991), Evans and Siegfried (1992) and Fotopoulus and Spence (1998), specified 
EX and EN as their current variables. In other words, EX and EN are assumed to be 
endogenous in entry and exit equations, respectively. Other studies, such as Sluewagen and 
Dehandschutter (1991) and Lay (2003), specified EX and EN as their lagged variables, 
treating them as weakly exogenous variables.4 Because the literature is silent on which 
approach is more appropriate, this thesis will experiment with both.
Second, it might not be reasonable to assume the effect of profitability and growth in the 
entry equation is exactly mirrored in the exit equation. Following previous studies, ROOM is 
assumed to have one lag structure in the entry equation while PCM and GR are assumed to 
have no lags in the exit equation.5 This approach follows Shapiro and Khemani (1987), who 
assume exit responds more quickly to profit and growth than entry. However, the approach 
does not mean the exit process is instantaneous. Shapiro and Khemani were aware that there 
are lags between the time when exit is considered and when it actually occurs. The 
assumption simply tries to capture the idea that entry is likely to be a more well-prepared 
action than exit.
The third issue relates to specification of entry and exit barriers. Certain types of barriers are 
likely to be omitted from the regression based on equations 9.9 and 9.10. For example, 
Geroski (1991) noted it is difficult to measure the control of incumbents over some strategic 
resources. Further, and as noted, specifity implied by sunk cost suggests many exit barriers 
are unlikely to be captured in the structural variables in the equations. To solve this problem, 
fixed effects -  in the form of industry dummy variables -  are introduced into equations 10.9 
and 10.10 to capture the unobserved entry and exit barriers. This introduction is justified 
because entry and exit barriers tend to be constant over time, at least in the short and medium 
term.
This study assumes all structural variables are exogenous. To secure this assumption, lagged 
values are used instead of the current ones.
4 In one of their specifications Shapiro and Khemani (1987) include the lagged exit in the entry equation but 
include the current entry in the exit equation, rendering equations 9.3 and 9.4 a recursive system model.
5 Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) also adopt a similar approach.
307
Finally, as entry and exit are measured in relative terms (i.e. proportion), the dependent 
variables in theory and practice are bounded between zero and one. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume the sample is not drawn from normal distribution and this may lead to 
bias and inconsistent least square estimates. To solve this problem, logistic transformation on 
the dependent variables was carried out. With EN and EX (entry and exit rates) as the 
observed variables, the transformations are
EN'=\n(EN/\-EN)  and
EX'=\n(EX/\-EX) ,
where EN ' and EX' are the logistic transformation of EN and E X , respectively. These 
transformations allow the dependent variables in the regression to be drawn from a normal 
distribution and the estimations by a least squares approach.
While useful, this transformation approach has two limitations (Wooldridge 2002, p.662). 
First, it cannot be used when EN and EX take the boundary values, of either zero or one. 
As is commonly done in other cases, this chapter manipulated the boundary values by 
substituting the value zero with 0.1111 and value one with 0.9999. The data manipulation is a 
common approach adopted both in general empirical studies (Wooldridge, 2002) and studies 
on firm entry (e.g. Khemani and Shapiro 1986; Mata 1993).
The second limitation is that the parameters are difficult to interpret. According to 
Wooldridge and Papke (1996), further assumptions on the distribution of errors are needed to 
obtain the expected value of dependent variable conditional on the explanatory variables and, 
even with these assumptions, it is still non-trivial to obtain the expected value. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, this chapter proceeds with the transformation approach, 
because the focus here is on the change in the effect of the explanatory variables between two 
periods of time rather than on the magnitude of the effect.
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The discussion has established two pairs of estimating entry and exit equations, specified as 
follows:
Model I:
EN'j, = axPCM j + a 2ROOMj + a^SDPCM i + a 4ESj + a 5KR/ + 
a6CR4jt_l +a1EXPt_{+a^IMPl_l + a9TARIFFjt_x + 
a mEXJI_l +aj + ^JI
EX'jj = ßiPCMjJ + ß 1GRJJ + ß,ESJJ_i +ß4KRJj_l +ßsCR4J,_i +ß6EXPjl_l +
+ßJARIFF]J_,+ßgENu _t
Model II:
EN'j, = a xPCMt + a 2R O O M j + a^SDPCM\ + a 4ESj + a 5KR/ +
at,CR4jl_i +a1EXPJI_i +ailMPj ,_t +a<)TARlFFJ t _l+
a V>EXjj + + Mjj
EX'j, = ß^PCM jt +ß2GRj, + ß,EStl_, +ßiKR.,_l +ßiCRA)„ + ß tEXPJ„  + 
ßßMPf + ß J ' A R l F F j + / ?, £V’tJ + ßj+ £j,
r 1995, 1996 (pre-crisis period)
' H^
 1997, ..., 2000 (crisis period) 
j  = industry j
EN' = logistic transformation of the entry rate
EX' = logistic transformation of the exit rate
EN = the entry rate
EX = the exit rate
PCM = price-cost margin
ROOM = industry room
GR = annual industry growth
SDPCM = standard deviation of PCM
EOS = economies of scale
( 1 0 . 1 1 )
( 10. 12)
(10.13)
(10.14)
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KR = capital requirement
C/?4 = seller concentration
EXP = export intensity
IMP = import penetration
TARIFF -  trade protection
a I , ß : = industry fixed effect of industry j
Model I and II are different in the way right-hand-side EX and EN are specified.
The equations are estimated for two periods: 1995-1996 and 1997-2000, corresponding to the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. Data for each period are pooled to facilitate 
estimation of the model with fixed effect. The year 1994 was not included because estimating 
Model I for 1994 requires EXJl993 and ENjl993, and therefore data for 1992 are needed.6
However, as described in Chapter 5, the time period for the data base does not begin until 
1993.
The equations in Model I were firstly considered as independent, assuming no 
interdependence between entry and exit, and estimated by OLS. Next, the equations were 
estimated by the SURE method to account for the interdependence. The SURE method is 
considered because it is able to take into account the non-zero contemporaneous correlation 
in the error terms between the two equations. The equations in Model II were estimated by 
the 2SLS method. This is because ENjt and EX. can be thought to be determined
simultaneously.
10.4.2 Data
The sample consists of 72 manufacturing industries at the four digit level. The number of 
industries is smaller than the number of industries available in the data base. Oil and gas 
industries (ISIC 353 and 354) were dropped because they are largely monopoly state-owned 
companies. Some other industries were also dropped because of the difficulty in matching the 
ISIC code with SITC (the classification used in trade statistics) and because of the 
unavailability of average tariff rates. Nevertheless, the sample still represents a large variety 
of industries in Indonesian manufacturing.
6 See Section 6.4 in Chapter 6 for the formula to calculate ENj r and E X . t .
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10.4.3 Measurement of variables
Dependent variables (entry and exit rates)
The dependent variables, i.e. entry and exit rates, were discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.4). 
This chapter uses the same two alternative measures of entry which are based on the number 
and size of plants, where size is proxied by employment (number of employees). The entry 
and exit rates in terms of number of plants are labeled EN\ and EX 1, respectively, while 
entry and exit rates in terms of employment are labeled EN2 and EX2, respectively.
Independent Variables
Some independent variables, namely price-cost margin (PCM), seller concentration (C/M) 
and import penetration ( IMP), have been defined in the previous chapters. Accordingly, the 
definition of the independent variables presented here covers those not previously defined. 
All of the variables are defined for industry j  , which is defined at the four digit level.
• Industry growth ( GR )
GR is measured as the percentage change in real value added of industry j  between t and 
/ - I
GR
R V ^ - R V A ^
where VA is the value added of industry j . The industry value added is deflated by the 
wholesale price index (WPI) at the three digit ISIC level.
• Industry room ( ROOM )
ROOM is measured as GR divided by MES. MES is defined as the average plant size 
accounting for 50 percent of industry output (Caves et al. 1975). Plant size is measured by 
total number of workers.
• Standard deviation of profitability ( SDPCM )
SDPCM is measured by the standard deviation of PCM , defined at the three digit level of 
ISIC.
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• Economies of Scale (ES)
ES is defined following (Caves et al. 1975) as a compound variable using MES and cost- 
disadvantages ratio (CDR), that is
ES = (\-CDR)*MES 
CDR is defined as
CD/ ? _ (yA/L)Sma"esl 
(VA/L)'argest
where (VA/Z,)smallest is the value added per labour for the smallest plants accounting for 50% 
of industry output and (VA / L)]argest is the value added per labour for the largest plants 
accounting for the largest 50% of industry output.
• Capital requirement ( KR )
KR is measured following Caves et al. (1980) as
KR = — * MES
Q
where K / Q is the ratio of capital to labour. In the absence of reliable capital stock estimates, 
K IQ is proxied by the ratio of energy expenditure to production labour. This proxy follows 
the approach taken by Globerman et al. (1994), which was motivated by some previous 
studies which show that capital and energy are complementary inputs in production. Thus,
KR = energy expenditure » M£S
j^prod
where Lprwd is the number of production workers.
• Export intensity ( EXP)
EXP is measured as the ratio of export to industry output.
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e x p  = 2 E22L
output
• Trade protection ( TARIFF)
In the absence of ERP estimates for the period 1998-200, this chapter uses the average 
nominal tariff rate to proxy TARIFF. The data for the tariff rate are derived from the TPR 
series published by the WTO. For the pre-crisis period (1995-96), the tariff rates are derived 
from TPR 1994 (WTO 1995) and for the crisis period (1997-2000), the tariff rates are derived 
from TPR 1998 and 2003 (WTO 1998, 2003).
10.5 Estimation Results and Discussion
10.5.1 Estimation results
Our regressions employ the dummy variables method instead of the first differencing method 
for the fixed effect regression. The dummy variable method is adopted for the practical 
reason that data on tariff rates for the pre-crisis period do not vary over time. The TARIFF 
variable would have to be dropped from estimation if the differencing method were used. 
Time dummy variables are included to control for the differences that affect all sectors but 
change over time.
Equations in Models I and II are estimated using entry and exit rates in terms of number of 
plants and employment (ENI, EX1, EN2 and EX2). Despite this, the main analysis is based 
on EN\ and EX \ . This approach is theoretically justified since measures of market 
structure, which is one of the key determinants of entry, often stress the significance of the 
number of firms (Baldwin 1998, p.12).
Model II was dropped from the analysis because the estimation results of model II using 
2SLS method, presented in Appendix 10.1, render almost all the variables in the equations 
insignificant. Although this is obviously not a good result, several studies have obtained 
similar results (e.g. Shapiro and Khemani 1987; Austin and Rosenbaum 1991; Fotopoulus 
and Spence 1998).
Several industries were identified as outliers using the Hadi (1992) method. The list of these 
outliers is given in Appendix 10.2. This chapter controls the outliers by removing them from
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the sample. The usual approach of introducing dummy variables that identifies them was not 
adopted because it results in a perfect collinearity with the fixed industry effects (the industry 
dummy variables).
Tables 10.1 and 10.2 present the estimation results for Model I using OLS and SURE 
methods, respectively, with ENV and EXV as the dependent variable.7 The OLS results 
were tested for equation misspecifications employing Ramsey’s RESET test. The results in 
general did not indicate a specification problem, apart from the exit equation for the crisis 
period. The inability of the exit equation to pass the RESET test suggests the lack of 
explanatory power in the model. Nonetheless, it is still acceptable as industry characteristics 
might not be the only important variables shaping plant exit behaviour. Indeed, Chapter 8 
showed some plant characteristics significantly affected the probability of plant survival 
during the crisis period. In the experimental stage, the residuals from the OLS estimations 
were examined graphically to detect heteroscedasticity. Again, apart from the exit equation in 
the crisis period, the examination revealed only a mild heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the 
standard t-statistics were used instead of White’s robust t-statistics.
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics are employed to test whether the 
error terms of the entry and exit equation in Model I are contemporaneously correlated (the 
statistics are presented in Table 10.2). The null hypothesis of equal error terms in the entry 
and exit equation is rejected at the 1 and 5 per cent significance level for the pre-crisis and
o
crisis period, respectively. Therefore, it can be concluded that entry and exit in both periods 
were correlated. Accordingly, the results obtained by the SURE method provide the basis for 
the analysis (Table 10.2). The coefficients produced by the SURE method are similar to those 
obtained by OLS and have the same signs. However, the t-statistics improve in some 
estimated coefficients, which indicates the improvement in efficiency and justify the 
reference to the SURE results.
The estimation results of equations in Model I, without the inclusion of industry dummies, 
are presented in Appendix 10.3. Comparing the appendix and Table 10.2, it suggests that
7 Three alternative specifications of entry were experimented with. The first is as in equations 10.11 or 10.13, 
the second is where ROOM was replaced by GR and the third is where ROOM was retained but ES was 
dropped. The specifications are motivated by the way ROOM is generated, which raises possible colinearity 
with ES. As presented in Section 10.4.2, ES is measured as ES=(1-CDR)*MES, where CDR is the cost 
disadvantage ratio. The experiment shows the results did not differ greatly from one specification to the other. 
But because the first specification performed better in terms of F-statistics, it was chosen as the basis for the 
analysis.
* The degree of freedom for the LM tests is one.
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inclusion of the fixed industry effect to capture unobserved variables seems to be the correct 
approach. The overall significance tests (F-test) for the industry dummies of the estimations 
in Table 10.2 favour the inclusion of the dummies.9 Moreover, some of the coefficient signs 
presented in Appendix 10.3, such as the C7?4,_, and EXPt_x variables in the entry equations,
are different to the corresponding coefficients in Table 10.2. The changes in sign point to the 
potential bias as a result of ignoring the fixed industry effect. Similar results have been 
reported in other studies (e.g. Dunne and Roberts 1991; Fotopoulus and Spence 1998). For 
example, Dunne and Roberts found the relationship between profitability and exit to be 
negative before the industry fixed effects were introduced, but positive when the fixed effect 
was included.
Despite these supporting arguments, inclusion of the fixed effect seriously affects the 
significance of the estimated coefficients other than the industry dummies. With a quite 
large/?2, this is a rather puzzling result. The only possible explanation is that large variations 
in the dependent variables can in fact be explained by industry effects. In other words, much 
of the factors that determine entry and exit in both periods can be explained by differences 
which are industry specific.
This chapter employs an analysis based on the fixed effect approach (i.e. Table 10.2).10 This 
approach assures a large portion of the unobserved variables are taken into account and hence 
were are more confident that the results are unbiased, although it does not give satisfactory 
results in terms of statistical significance. Adopting this approach is particularly important 
because large variables representing entry and exit barriers can be unobserved or industry 
specific (Geroski 1991).
9 The tests are reported in Appendix 10.3.
111 This is different for other studies (e.g. von de Fehr 1991; Fotopoulus and Spence 1998) who based the 
analysis on results without inclusion of Fixed industry effects.
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Table 10.1 The determinants of entry and exit, pre-crisis and crisis periods: regression
results of Model I
M ethod : O LS
T im e period P re-crisis C risis P re-crisis C risis
D ependen t variab le E N l'u E N l'i., E X l'u E X l ', ,
PC M jt.j -3 .365 -0 .706
(1 .32) (1 .00 )
SD PC M jt.j 0.388 -0 .014
(1 .23) (0 .41 )
P C M j  t 1.525 -0 .160
(0 .37) (0 .20)
r o o m , , , -0 .699 0 .629
(0 .95) (2 .75)**
G R Jlt 0 .256 -0 .138
(0 .56) (1 .22)
E S , , (b) -0.011 -0 .017 -0 .246 0 .070
(0 .10) (0 .23 ) (1 .31 ) (0 .92)
KR,.-| 0.001 -0 .002 0.001 0.001
(1 .38) (1 .8 3 )+ (1 .18 ) (1 .01)
C R 4j t_. 4 .788 2 .098 5.531 0 .157
(2 .46)* (1 .56 ) (1 .35 ) (0 .14 )
E X P ,, , 1.318 1.116 0.521 -1 .274
(1 .37) (1 .6 5 )+ (0 .27 ) (1 .39)
T A R IF F ,,, 0 .064 0 .005 0 .014 0.011
(4 .10)** (0 .23 ) (0 .49 ) (0 .47 )
IM P ,, , -0 .027 0.011 -0 .046 0 .026
(1 .73 )+ (0 .70 ) (2 .23)* (1 .86 )+
E N  1 j „ 3 .809 0 .974
(1 .73 )+ (0 .52)
E X 1 ,„ 11.556 -1 .455
(1 .87 )+ (0 .51)
Y ear dum m y 1996 -0.052 0 .522
(0 .32) (1 .51 )
Y ear dum m y 1998 0.303 -0.211
(1 .30 ) (0 .79)
Y ear dum m y 1999 -0 .195 -2 .107
(0 .49 ) (5 .05)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -1 .100 -1 .125
(2 .94)** (2 .73)**
F-tests 7.45** 25.14** 10.23** 5.10**
R am sey R E SE T  te s t1
F -statis tics (p -value) 0 .50  (0 .68) 1.33 (0 .27 ) 1.89 (0 .14) 4 .20  (0 .01)
R -squared 0.82 0.76 0.67 0.58
Notes: 1) Fixed industry effects are included.
2) t-statistics in parentheses.
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) F-test with the null of no ommited variables.
b) The coefficients were multiplied by 10 to improve presentation.
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Table 10.2 The determinants of entry and exit, pre-crisis and crisis period: regression
results of Model 1
M ethod : S U R E
T im e period P re-crisis C risis P re-crisis C risis
D ep en d en t variab le E N l ’u E N l'j.t E X l'i,, E X l'i.,
PC M j t_j -3 .689 -0 .996
(1 .38) (1 .4 9 )
S D P C M j t_, 0 .437 -0 .023
(1 .13) (0 .29 )
PC M j t 2 .463 -2 .763
(0 .89) (1 .98)*
R O O M ,,., -0 .496 0 .655
(1 .09) (3 .07)**
GRi., 0 .143 0 .064
(0 .67) (0 .67)
ESj,,.,<c) -0.003 -0 .016 -0 .268 0 .106
(0 .04) (0 .2 5 ) (1 .54 ) (1 .48)
K Rj,t-i 0.001 -0 .002 0 .002 0.001
(1 .23 ) (2 .68)** (1 .55 ) (0 .80)
C R 4 ,„ 4 .714 2 .127 4 .140 0 .429
(3 .96)** (1 .57 ) (1 .64 ) (0 .37)
EX Pj t_, 1.418 1.110 0 .669 -1 .496
(1 .48) (2 .03)* (0 .51 ) (2 .40)*
T A R IF F ,,., 0 .057 -0.001 -0.031 -0 .004
(4 .00)** (0 .0 2 ) (1 .8 8 )+ (0 .17 )
IM P ,,., -0 .026 0 .0 1 0 -0 .033 0 .029
(1 .8 4 )+ (0 .8 4 ) (1 .8 3 )+ (0 .73)
E N lj ,. , 1.459 1.889
(0 .9 7 ) (1 .79 )+
EX1 j)t_, 9 .965 -0 .105
(2 .28)* (0 .06 )
Y ear dum m y 1996 -0 .100 0 .646
(1 .04) (3 .38)**
Y ear dum m y 1998 0 .263 -0 .117
(1 .28 ) (0 .49)
Y ear dum m y 1999 -0 .319 -2 .195
(0 .9 1 ) (6 .33)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -1 .117 -1 .198
(3 .18)** (3 .19)**
F -sta tis tics 18.05** 36.33** 24.60** 5.65**
B reu sch -P ag an  (L M ) 6 .67  (0 .0 1 )a 4 .05  (0 .0 4 )b
sta tis tics  (p -value) 
R -squared 0.82 0 .76 0 .67 0.58
Notes: 1) Fixed industry effects are included.
2) t-statistics in parentheses.
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the pre-crisis period.
b) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the crisis period.
c) The coefficients were multiplied by 10 to improve presentation.
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The results are now examined to see whether the determinants of entry and exit in the crisis 
period differ to those in the pre-crisis period. The examination is divided into two parts. 
Firstly, the structural determinants of entry and exit, followed by examination of the 
determinants of interdependence between entry and exit.
10.5.1.1 The structural determinants of entry and exit 
Entry
For the pre-crisis period, none of the demand incentive variables appears to explain entry. 
The coefficient of ROOMtA is statistically insignificant and the variable sign of PCMt_x
does not accord with theoretical predictions. As explained, the negative effect of PCMt_x 
might have been caused by a weakness of this variable in predicting expected profitability.11
CR4l_l is the only important entry barrier variable. However, its positive coefficient implies
seller concentration induced, rather than impeded, entry. This finding supports the argument 
that concentrated industries provide a higher survival chance once entry has occurred. This 
comment is further supported by the coefficient of which also shows a positive
correlation, although it is statistically insignificant.
Of the trade-related variables, TARIFFJ_, is positively related to entry and is statistically 
significant. Therefore, trade protection seems to have attracted entry in this period. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of lMPt , shows a negative sign but is only moderately significant
(i.e. significant at the 10 per cent level). This result is consistent with an earlier finding by 
Anagnostaki and Louri (1995) that import penetration is negatively related to entry and exit.
The picture is completely different for the crisis period. First, demand conditions appears to 
explain entry, as the coefficient of ROOMl X is now positive and statistically significant.
Second, Kr.Rt X is negatively related to entry and its effect is statistically significant. 
Meanwhile, industry concentration does not now seem to explain entry, since the coefficient 
of CR4t , is statistically insignificant, although it remains positively related to entry. Finally,
11 See discussion in Section 10.3.1.
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export orientation now seems to encourage entry, as the positive coefficient of EXPt_x 
becomes statistically significant. In contrast, trade protection no longer seems to explain 
entry as the coefficient of TARIFFlX has a considerably smaller t-ratio.
Exit
For the pre-crisis period, all exit-inducing variables ( PCMt and GRr ) do not seem to explain 
exit. The estimates of these variables have considerably smaller t-ratios. Similarly, none of 
the coefficients of exit barriers variables (ESt_x, KRt_x and CR4t_x) is statistically significant.
Only the coefficient of ES,_X displays the expected sign, but its effect is only marginally 
supported as it is significant only at the 20 per cent level.
Of the trade-related variables, lMPt_x and TARlFFt_x demonstrate a negative relationship
with exit. However, this relationship seems only moderate since the estimated coefficients are 
only significant at the 10% level. This finding suggests the exit decision in this period was 
less encouraged by the extent of international competition. Meanwhile, industry sales 
orientation seems to encourage exit. The coefficient of EXPt x is positive although is not 
statistically significant.
The picture is again completely different for the crisis period. Demand conditions now seem 
to induce exit, although the evidence is only shown by PCMt . The coefficient of PCMt ,
which is about -3, suggests the effect of the decline in profitability was substantial. Finally, 
international competition becomes unimportant, while this is not the case for export 
orientation in deterring exit. In contrast to the coefficient of EXPt_x that becomes negative
and statistically significant, the coefficients of TARlFFt_x and IMPt_x are no longer 
statistically significant for this period.
10.5.1.2 The determinants of the interdependence between entry and exit
This section seeks evidence concerning the validity of the displacement-replacement effect 
and the symmetry hypothesis implied by entry and exit determinants.
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Pre-crisis period
The results provide some indications for the symmetry hypothesis. All entry barrier variables 
( ,  KRt and CR4t_x) show the same sign in both the entry and exit equations. The
estimated coefficients are similar across equations, indicating a similar effect from these 
variables in inducing or deterring entry and exit.
It is worth noting that the process involved with the symmetry hypothesis is unlikely to be the 
same as the one originally hypothesised by Caves and Porter (1976). Instead of a 
discouraging effect, entry barriers seem to encourage both entry and exit at the same time. 
Two of the entry barriers variables, CR4t_x and KRt_x, show positive sign in both the entry 
and exit equations.
Some support for the symmetry hypothesis is also displayed by the other variables. lMPt_x
appears to moderately prevent both entry and exit. As argued by Fotopoulus and Spence 
(1997), one reason might be that expansion in markets with high import penetration is not 
enough to ensure new plant creation or capacity expansion at the minimum efficient scale 
while, at the same time, lack of expansion in the domestic market tends to sustain collusive 
behaviour among incumbents. EXPt_x are positively related to entry and exit. This confirms 
earlier findings (e.g. Anagnostaki and Louri 1995; Sleuwagen and Dehandschutter 1991) that 
the extent of external market encourages both entry and exit in domestic industries. While it 
seems to contradict a stylised fact from the micro exporting literature, which suggests exit 
should have been lower in exporting industries -  because firms in these industries tend to be 
more efficient than those in other industries - , the positive relationship on exit might occur if 
there was a co-existence of efficient and inefficient firms in the exporting industries 
(Anagnostaki and Louri, 1995). According to Anagnostaki and Louri, inefficient firms are 
likely to be displaced by more efficient firms entering the industries, which are most likely be 
attracted by the profit opportunity provided by export markets.
Despite these findings, the results do not strongly validate the symmetry hypothesis. For 
example, CR4t_x is only significant in the entry equation and EXPt_x is not statistically 
significant in either the entry or exit equations. The strongest evidence for the symmetry 
hypothesis is provided by IMPt ,, which is statistically significant in both equations.
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The results provide some indication on displacement and replacement entry. Both EN\t_x and 
EX 1,_, in the exit and entry equation, respectively, are positive. Even so, only the 
replacement effect seems to explain the interdependence, since is statistically
insignificant. The estimated coefficient ofEX\t_x, which is about 10, suggests a large effect 
of replacement under a one year adjustment structure.
Crisis period
The results provide a completely different picture to that of the pre-crisis period. There is no 
strong evidence for the symmetry hypothesis. Of the entry barriers variables, only CR4l_l
shows the same sign in both entry and exit equations, albeit insignificant. The absence of 
evidence applies also to the other variables. In the cases where the coefficients do show the 
same sign in entry and exit equations, such as of lMPt X and TARIFFt_{, they are statistically 
insignificant. Moreover, the symmetry hypothesis implied by export orientation in the pre­
crisis period is no longer evident in this period. EXPt_x is positively related to entry but 
negatively related to exit in the crisis period.
Displacement entry seems to have been more important. The positive coefficient of £7V1,_, is 
statistically significant in the exit equation, although only at the 10 per cent level. The 
opposite is observed for replacement entry. The coefficient of EXT,_, changes to negative
and moreover, is very statistically insignificant (i.e. the t-ratio is considerably small). This 
finding suggests that higher entries induced more exits in the crisis period, but higher exits 
did not necessarily attract more entries. The coefficient of EN1,_,, which is about 2, suggests 
the extent of displacement entry is quite substantial.
10.5.1.3 Estimation results using the alternative entry and exit measure
In the preceding analysis, entry and exit rates are measured in terms of the number of plants. 
The equations in Model I are now re-estimated using entry and exit rates measured in terms 
of employment ( ENT  and EXT)  to provide robustness for the earlier findings. The results 
are presented in Table 10.3 and the equations are estimated using the SURE method, as the 
LM tests conclude that the error terms in the entry and exit equations are correlated. In terms 
of model fit, the results are generally satisfactory. In the four equations presented, the R~s'
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do not deviate much from the ones in ENY and EXY equations and the F tests are 
significant at the 1 per cent or better level.
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Table 10.3 The determinants of entry and exit, pre-crisis and crisis period: regression
results of model I with EN2* and EX2' as the dependent variable
M ethod: SU R E
T im e p e rio d Pre-crisis C risis P re-crisis C risis
D ep en d en t variab le E N 2 ’,t E N 2 ',, EX 2',,t EX2'j,t
P C M ,,,, -5.541 -0 .566
(1 .73)+ (0 .8 9 )
SD PC M j t_, -0 .427 -0 .035
(0 .97) (0 .46 )
PCM j t 7.451 -0.448
(2 .77)** (0 .70)
r o o m , , , , -0.851 0 .522
(1 .65) (2 .56 )*
g r m 0.378 0.091
(0 .96 ) (1 .06)
E S „ .,(C) -0 .020 -0 .016 -0 .219 0.078
(0 .23) (0 .26 ) (1 .55 ) (1 .23)
KRi,-. -0 .249c -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0 .41) (2 .06 )* (0 .87 ) (0 .80)
C R 4 „ ., 7 .149 2 .077 4 .178 0.350
(2 .83)** (0 .8 1 ) (1 .29) (0 .34)
E X P j t_, -0 .058 1.1 19 1.881 -0 .949
(0 .07) (2 .17)* (E 5 0 ) (1 .73 )+
T A R IF F ^ , 0 .039 0 .007 -0 .060 -0.018
(2 .45)* (0 .3 4 ) (0 .52) (0 .92)
IM Pj,t., -0 .010 0 .015 -0 .042 0.024
(0 .70) (1 .27 ) (1 .7 2 )+ (0 .80)
E N 2j>t., 2 .684 1.042
(1 .53 ) (0 .82)
E X 2 j t., 2.259 -2 .003
(1 .79)+ (1 .08 )
Y ear dum m y 1996 -0 .219 0 .474
(2 .10)* (2 .83)**
Y ear dum m y 1998 0.133 -0 .219
(0 .70 ) (1 .10)
Y ear dum m y 1999 -0 .394 -2 .310
(1 .21) (7 .63)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -1 .113 -1.372
(3 .37 )** (4.22)**
F -sta tis tics 15.23** 16.39** 12.63** 6.67**
B reu sch -P ag an  (LM ) 11.32 (0 .0 0 )a 6 .70  (0 .0 1 )b
sta tis tics  (p -value) 
R -squared 0.80 0.78 0 .69 0.62
Notes: 1) Fixed industry effects are included
2) t-statistics in parentheses
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) For the estimation o f the entry and exit equation for the pre-crisis period.
b) For the estimation o f the entry and exit equation for the crisis period.
c) The coefficients were multiplied by 10 to improve presentation.
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In regard to the change in importance of structural factors explaining entry and exit, the 
results produce similar findings to the ones produced by the equations with ENY and EXY . 
Nevertheless, a few differences in terms of statistical significance were observed. For the 
entry determinants, lMPt_x becomes statistically significant for the crisis period but remains
insignificant for the pre-crisis period. This supports the earlier finding that entry in the crisis 
period was more affected by demand conditions, because a positive relationship is not 
expected to occur unless there is expansion in the domestic market.
A similar picture can be observed regarding the evidence on the symmetry relationship and 
displacement-replacement entry. A symmetry relationship in entry and exit determinants for 
the pre-crisis period appears less convincing. Of the variables which indicated symmetry in 
the ENY and EXY equations (CR4 ,KR ,IMP and EXP), only CR4 and IMP suggest the 
symmetry relationship. As for the displacement-replacement entry, the replacement effect is 
weakly indicated for the pre-crisis period, as shown by the positive but less statistically 
significant coefficient of EX2,_, in the entry equation. Meanwhile, the displacement entry is
more apparent. The coefficient of EN2t_x in the exit equation has larger t-ratio and the same
positive sign. For the crisis period, there is weaker evidence for displacement entry. The 
coefficient of EN2,_, in the exit equation, although still positive, has a very small t-ratio.
In summary, the earlier findings based on ENY and £ATare fairly robust. The general 
picture from Table 10.3 is similar to that described by the earlier results shown in Table 10.2. 
The main difference is that the statistical significance from the alternative results is weaker in 
general. There is no clear explanation for this. Perhaps it reflects a lower variation in ENT 
and E X T . This is possible because much of the entry was usually by small firms or plants.
10.5.2 Discussion
In summary, the results show substantial differences in the factors determining entry between 
the crisis and pre-crisis periods and provide some support for the hypotheses. In particular, 
seller concentration and tariff protection, which were important in explaining entry before the 
crisis, were no longer important during the crisis period. Industry growth and export intensity 
were the important factors encouraging entry in this period. Entry in this period is also 
suggested to have been discouraged more by higher market risk. The picture on the exit side
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is to a large extent consistent. Export intensity becomes important and acts as a factor that 
deters exit in the crisis period. A change was also observed in the importance of displacement 
and replacement entry. While entry before the crisis was substantially explained by 
replacement entry, it was explained more by displacement entry in crisis period. Meanwhile, 
the symmetry implied by the entry and exit determinants seems to hold only for the pre-crisis 
period.
The results provide some answers to the question of why entry in Indonesian manufacturing 
not had begun to recover in the period 1999-2000. One possible answer is because there was 
an increase in the extent of cost disadvantages faced by potential entrants. This is reflected in 
the importance of capital requirement in deterring entry in this period. The cost disadvantage 
is likely to take the form of higher capital cost, most likely as a result of the collapse of the 
domestic financial system and more cautious banks after the crisis.
Another possible explanation is that there was a dramatic increase in the competitive 
environment. In other words, the competitive struggle is revealed to have been much stronger 
in the crisis period. This is implied by the results, which indicate much of the entry process 
before the crisis was driven by the non-competitive nature of industry. This is likely to be due 
to collusive behaviour, as reflected in the findings that industry concentration (C7M,_,) and
trade protection ( TARIFFt_x) had a large and important effect in attracting entry before the 
crisis.
The stronger competitive process itself is suggested by several results. First, the 
unimportance of industry concentration ( C/M, ,) and trade protection ( TARIFFJ_,) in the
crisis period suggests the likelihood that collusion was reduced substantially. Second, 
demand and profit opportunities became more important to induce entry. If the entry process 
is viewed according to Orr’s (1974) model, and provided there was no large increase in 
expected profitability, this could have indicated some decline in the extent of entry barriers 
across industries. The decline implies a move to the ideal of perfect competition as entry 
became less restricted.
Third, the crisis seems to have pushed out some less efficient firms. This inference is 
supported by the importance of displacement entry in the crisis period. As argued by Shapiro 
and Khemani (1987), displacement entry may occur because some high-cost incumbents can
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be displaced by some low-cost entrants. The importance of displacement entry is consistent
with the conclusion from what happened in Chile after the 1980s recession. Liu (1993) found
firms in Chilean manufacturing were more efficient on average than existing firms before the
recession. This supports the general hypothesis in the literature that a competitive
• 1 2 * •environment is more conducive to higher efficiency. All in all, the importance of 
displacement entry reflects a more competitive process in the crisis period.
Apart from showing the differences in entry and exit determinants, the results also indicate 
that the crisis seems to have provided opportunities for some potential entrants despite the 
unfavourable economic situation. One source of these opportunities was the lack of 
investment funds, which provide opportunities for entrants less dependent on, or unconnected 
to, the domestic financial system. Another source was exchange rate depreciation. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, real exchange rate depreciation improves the competitiveness of 
domestic firms vis-a-vis those in other countries, and increases the demand for exports. 
Accordingly, the sharply depreciated exchange rate depreciation in the crisis period should 
have significantly increased expected profitability and hence entry in export oriented 
industries. This argument is supported by the finding that the positive impact of sales 
orientation was significantly larger and more important in the crisis period compared to the 
pre-crisis period.
An opportunity may also have been provided by the number of exiting firms. Although the 
econometric results do not seem to suggest this, it does not necessarily mean no replacement 
entry occurred in the crisis period. Indeed, the coefficient of EX 1,_, in the entry equation for
the crisis period is positive, although not statistically significant. An example of replacement 
entry was reported by Aswicahyono and Hill (2004), namely that major Korean firms entered 
the consumer electronics industry in the two years following the crisis. These firms were 
reported to be taking over the market left by two former major firms in the industry (Aiwa 
and Sony) which were having financial difficulties during the peak of the crisis.
Given these opportunities, why was there no sign of recovery in entry? It might have been 
because the opportunities were absorbed by only a small number of entrants. To illustrate 
regarding the opportunity provided by the shortage in investment funds, foreign entrants are 
more likely to have taken this opportunity, since they were less connected to the domestic
12 See for example Tybout et al. (1991) and Liu (1993) for empirical studies related to the hypothesis.
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financial system. The share of foreign entry has always been small in Indonesian 
manufacturing, so that any entry by foreign firms is not likely to have been translated in to a 
higher total entry rate.
10.5.3 Do the main findings differ between the crisis peak and the early recovery?
This section focuses more on the crisis period (i.e. the period 1997-2000) and asks whether 
there are differences in the determinants of entry between the peak of the crisis and the early 
recovery period, as Chapter 6 suggests. The pattern of entry rates in 1999 or 2000, although 
not recovered to their pre-crisis level, was substantially lower than that in 1997 and 1998.
Model I was re-estimated for the crisis peak and early recovery period, defined in this chapter 
as the period 1997-98 and 1999-2000, respectively. It is noted that the peak of the crisis is 
defined differently to the definition in Chapter 6 and 7. This is because it was shown in 
Chapter 6 that the crisis immediately affected entry rates in 1997.
The estimation results by the SURE method for the peak of the crisis and the early recovery 
period, with ENV and EXY as the dependent variables, are presented in Table 10.4. For the 
purpose of the discussion, the results from Table 10.2 are re-printed in the table. The overall 
significance (F-tests) is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level across the equations. 
The null hypothesis of equal error terms between the entry and exit equations is rejected only 
for the early recovery period, albeit only at the 10 per cent level. Despite this, the SURE 
method was employed. This is to be consistent with the method used earlier and because the 
earlier results suggested that plant entry and exit in the industry are indeed correlated.
More detailed information can be extracted from the table. First, the importance of the 
demand conditions in attracting entry is clear only during the early recovery period. The 
coefficient of ROOMt A is statistically significant only in the estimation for this period. This
finding highlights the extent of greater competition after the crisis and provides support for 
the view that a stable profit expectation was no longer warranted.
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Table 10.4 The determinants of entry and exit, crisis period: regression results of 
Model 1
M ethoc : S U R E
T im e p e rio d P re -c ris is P eak  c ris is E arly
reco v e ry
P re -c ris is P eak  crisis E arly
reco v ery
D ep en d en t v a riab le ENl'j,, ENl',, ENl), EXl’j, E X l ’j, EXl’j,
PCMj,., -3 .6 8 9
(1 .3 8 )
-0 .1 3 2
(0 .1 7 )
-3 .9 0 9
(2 .50 )*
SD P C M j t_, 0 .437
(1 .1 3 )
0 .1 4 9
(0 .2 7 )
-0 .003
(0 .0 3 )
P C M jt 2 .463
(0 .8 9 )
0 .313
(0 .5 3 )
-1 .520
(0 .73 )
R O O M ,,, -0 .4 9 6
(1 .0 9 )
0 .2 0 8
(0 .5 0 )
1.019
(4 .34 )**
g r m 0 .143
(0 .6 7 )
0 .205
(2 .39)*
0 .117
(0 .66 )
ESj,t. , ,d) -0 .003
(0 .0 4 )
0 .673
(3 .7 3 )* *
-0.101
(1 .2 5 )
-0 .268
(1 .5 4 )
-0 .639
(3 .97)**
0.251
(2 .53)*
KR,.,-, 0.001
(1 .2 3 )
-0 .0 0 2
(2 .1 6 )*
-0 .001
(1 .3 6 )
0 .002
(1 .5 5 )
-0.001
(0 .2 2 )
-0.001
(1 .21 )
CR4j „ 4 .7 1 4
(3 .96 )**
1.334
(1 .0 1 )
5 .075
(2 .81 )**
4 .1 4 0
(1 .6 4 )
-1 .379
(1 .20 )
1.943
(0 .84 )
E X P ,.,, 1.418
(1 .4 8 )
2 .2 1 7
(2 .7 9 )* *
1.518
(2 .13 )*
0 .669
(0 .5 1 )
-0 .642
(0 .8 5 )
-3 .282
(3 .73)**
T A R IF F ^ , 0 .057
(4 .00 )**
-0 .0 4 2
(4 .2 4 )* *
0 .048
(1-13)
-0.031
(1 .8 8 )+
-0 .025
(3 .67)**
-0 .053
(1 .09 )
IMPj „ -0 .0 2 6
(1 .8 4 )+
-0 .2 0 0
(1 .5 4 )
0 .0 1 0
(0 .6 8 )
-0 .033
(1 .8 3 )+
-0 .240
(2 .04 )*
0 .003
(0 .19 )
E N I,,., 1.459
(0 .9 7 )
1.803
(1 .2 7 )
1.016
(0 .33 )
E X lj  „ 9 .965
(2 .2 8 )*
-1 .5 2 6
(0 .6 8 )
-3 .6 0 2
(1 .3 2 )
Y ea r du m m y  1996 -0 .100
(1-04)
0 .6 4 6
(3 .38 )**
Y ear dum m y 1998 0 .2 9 6
(1 .9 8 )*
0 .058
(0 .3 4 )
Y ear dum m y 2 0 0 0 -0 .795
(3 .17 )**
1.002
(4 .15)**
F -sta tis tic s  
B reu sch -P ag an  (L M )
sta tis tic s  (p -v a lu e ) 
R -squared
18.05**
6 .67
(0 .0  l ) a 
0 .82
3 5 .3 8 * *
2 .12
(0 .1 5 )b 
0 .7 6
48 .4 8 * *
2.91
(0 .0 9 )c
0 .79
24 .60**
0 .67
6 .59**
0 .76
5 .18**
0 .69
Notes: 1) Peak crisis: 1997-98
2) Early recovery: 1998-99
3) Fixed industry effects are included
4) t-statistics in parentheses
5) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the pre-crisis period.
b) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the peak of the crisis.
c) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the early recovery.
d) The coefficients were multiplied by 10’ to improve presentation.
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Second, a clearer picture can be obtained of the change in the effect of trade protection on 
entry. Although trade protection ( TARJFFt_x) for the early recovery period is positively
related to entry, it is negatively related to entry at the peak of the crisis. Thus, overall, the 
effect of trade protection had changed considerably from encouraging entry before the crisis 
to discouraging entry during the crisis peak and then becoming significantly less important 
during the early stage of recovery. This finding clearly reflects the effect of greater 
competitive pressure during and after the crisis. Accelerated trade liberalisation and 
contracting demand combined to eliminate any incentive to entry created by non-competitive 
behaviour.
Third, the extent of cost disadvantages faced by potential entrants is indicated to have been 
higher during the peak of the crisis. The negative relationship between capital requirement 
and entry is clearly shown in the results of the crisis peak rather than the early recovery 
period. This finding suggests that the effect of higher capital costs in deterring entry 
weakened as the economy recovered. Nevertheless, the basic finding -  and thus the inference 
-  from the earlier results in respect to this variable persists. That is, the effect of capital 
requirement on entry changed from positive before the crisis to negative during the crisis 
period.
Fourth, the positive effect of industry’s export orientation on entry is shown to have been 
higher during the peak of the crisis. The coefficient of EXPt_x is both higher and statistically
significant in the results for the crisis peak compared to those for the early recovery. This 
finding is consistent with some real exchange rate appreciation in 1999.
Table 10.5 presents the separate regression results based on EN2' and EXT  using the SURE 
method, and the results shown in Table 10.3 are reprinted in the table. Unlike the results 
based on ENY and EXT ,  the use of the SURE method is now more justified. The null 
hypothesis of equal error terms in the entry and exit equation is rejected for both the peak of 
the crisis and the early recovery period, albeit only at 5 and 10 per cent levels, respectively. 
Meanwhile, the results give the same conclusion as previously regarding the overall 
significance test (F-test).
Much of the additional information gained from the previous table can also be derived from 
Table 10.5. Apart from this, a clearer picture can now be seen for the displacement entry in
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the crisis period. The coefficient of EN2,_, in the exit equation is positive, large and
statistically significant for the peak of the crisis. Despite this, the importance of displacement 
entry seems to have been weaker in the early stage of recovery. Although still positive, the 
coefficient of EN2t_x in the exit equation becomes statistically unimportant as the t-ratio of
the estimates is considerably smaller. Overall the finding suggests the extent to which 
potential entrants pushed out less efficient incumbents occurred only when the economy was 
severely contracting.
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Table 10.5 The determinants of entry and exit, crisis period: regression results of
model I with EN2’ and EX2’ as the dependent variable
M ethod: SU R E
T im e period P re-crisis Peak  crisis E arly
recovery
P re-crisis Peak crisis E arly
recovery
D ependen t variab le E N 2’ ,t E N 2’m E N 2 ',t E X 2 'jt E X 2 'jt E X 2 ’,t
P C M jit_, -5.541
(1 .73)+
-0.452
(0 .63)
-1 .829
(1 .20)
SD PCM j -0.427
(0 .97)
0 .067
(0 .13)
-0 .002
(0 .02)
PC M , t 7.451
(2 .77)**
-0.141
(0 .24)
-0 .038
(0 .02)
R O O M jt.j -0.851
(1 .65)
0 .128
(0 .31)
0.831
(3 .55)**
G R j , t 0.378
(0 .96)
0.261
(3 .04)**
-0 .040
(0 .25)
ESj,t. , (d> -0 .020
(0 .23)
0 .570
(3 .29)**
-0 .072
(0 .92)
-0 .219
(1 .55)
-0 .548
(3 .45)**
0.181
(2 .21)*
K V . -0 .249c
(0 .41)
-0 .002
(2 .10)*
-0.001
(0 .76)
0.001
(0 .87)
- 0 .0 0 0
(0 .31)
-0.001
(0 .88)
C R 4 jft_, 7.149
(2 .83)**
0 .614
(0 .49)
6.461
(3 .64)**
4 .178
(1 .29)
-1 .188
(1 .03)
0.721
(0 .35)
E X P j t.j -0 .058
(0 .07)
2.185
(2 .89)**
1.579
(2 .30)*
1.881
(1 .50)
0 .727
(1 .00)
-2.305
(3 .13)**
TA R IFFj 0 .039
(2 .45)*
-0 .040
(4 .23)**
0.058
(E 4 4 )
-0 .060
(0 .52)
-0 .027
(3 .86)**
-0 .089
(2 .13)*
IM Pj.t-t -0 .010
(0 .70)
-0.371
(3 .01)**
0.022
(U 46)
-0 .042
(1 .72 )+
-0.371
(3 .15)**
0 .0 0 0
(0 .01)
EN 2jfM 2.684
(1 .53)
3.053
(2 .65)**
2.048
(0 .49)
E X 2 j  t.j 2.259
(1 .79)+
0.965
(0 .47)
-7 .336
(2 .02)*
Y ear dum m y 1996 -0.219
(2 .10)*
0 .474
(2 .83)**
Y ear dum m y 1998 0.078
(0 .58)
0 .136
(0 .88)
Y ear dum m y 2000 -0.673
(2 .99)**
0 .870
(4 .26)**
F-statistics 
B reusch-P agan  (L M )
sta tistics (p -value) 
R -squared
15.23**
11.325
(0 .0 1 )a
0.80
20.15**
3.98
(0 .05 )b
0.76
15.06**
2.69
(0 .1 0 )c 
0 .76
12.63**
0.69
5.30**
0.74
5.82**
0.72
Notes: 1) Peak crisis: 1997-98
2) Early recovery: 1998-99
3) Fixed industry effects are included
4) t-statistics in parentheses
5) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the pre-crisis period.
b) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the peak of the crisis.
c) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the early recovery.
d) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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The results now show more evidence on the lower importance of replacement entry during 
the crisis period. The negative effect of EX2,_, is statistically significant for the early
recovery estimation. This finding suggests entry would not necessarily have occurred even if 
there had been a large flow of plants exiting an industry.
The findings regarding displacement and replacement entry reflect a clearer picture than the 
process of plant entry during the period 1997-2000 leans more towards the ‘push’ than the 
‘puli’ hypothesis. However, this does not necessarily mean the ‘puli’ hypothesis was not at 
work. The time period covered in this study ends at the beginning of the recovery process and 
it is possible the ‘pull’ hypothesis would have been more important in the later years of the 
recovery. Indeed, the finding where the demand situation became more important in the early 
recovery period supports this argument. The entry of some Korean firms in the electronics 
industry, as reported by Aswicahyono and Hill (2004), also supports the argument. From the 
results, and as noted earlier, plants ‘pulled’ to enter during the early stage of the recovery are 
likely to have been less connected to the domestic financial market and tended to have a 
strong export focus.
10.6 Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to look at why firm entry in Indonesian manufacturing 
does not seem to have started to recover as quickly as the other performance indicators. The 
chapter examines whether there are differences in the factors determining entry over the 
period 1994-2000.
The econometric results show some substantial changes in the determinants. Seller 
concentration and trade protection, which are indicated to have attracted firm entry before the 
crisis, were no longer important during the crisis period. The effect of capital requirement 
changed significantly from encouraging entry before the crisis to discouraging entry during 
the crisis period. However, the negative effect of capital requirement is only clearly shown 
during the peak of the crisis rather than during the early recovery period. Entry in the crisis 
period was largely encouraged in export oriented industries but discouraged in capital 
intensive industries, and the results suggest the effect of sales orientation was economically 
important. Despite this, the positive effect of sales orientation weakened during the early 
recovery period.
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Examining differences in the determinants between the crisis peak and the early recovery 
period reveals more information about entry behaviour during the crisis period (1997-2000). 
The positive effect of the demand situation was clear only in the early stage of recovery, 
indicating that greater competitive pressure after the crisis means that plants were no longer 
able to operate with stable profit expectations. A consistent finding is that the effect of trade 
protection changed dramatically from encouraging entry previously to discouraging entry 
during the peak of the crisis, and continuing to lose importance in the early stage of recovery. 
Meanwhile, the effect of industry export orientation in attracting entry is indicated as having 
been higher during the peak of the crisis.
Apart from this, changes were also observed in the factors that determine interdependence 
between entry and exit. The results indicate displacement was important in explaining entry 
during the crisis period, although its effect declined in the early recovery stage. This suggests 
the extent to which potential entrants pushed out less efficient incumbents occurred only 
when the economy was severely contracting. The results also show that replacement entry 
became less important during the crisis period. This suggests the large flow of exiting firms 
did not necessarily attract substantial entry to fill the vacant room left by those exiting firms.
The results provide two possible insights. First, the declining entry pattern might have been 
caused by an increase in the cost disadvantages faced by potential entrants. The econometric 
analysis found that the effect of capital requirement as a barrier to entry changed from 
positive before the crisis to negative during the crisis period. The most important cost 
disadvantage is likely to have been a higher capital cost, due to the collapse in the domestic 
financial system and more selective banks after the crisis. The other possible explanation is 
that there was a dramatic increase in competitive pressures. This inference is mainly driven 
by the results which indicate the effect of non-competitive behaviour before the crisis became 
significantly less important during the crisis period.
The results also suggest that the crisis provided opportunities for some foreign entrants and 
those which are able to compete in export markets. However, these opportunities are not 
likely to have translated into a higher recovery rate in the entry since the numbers of the 
favoured firms are usually very small relative to total potential entrants in the industry.
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Appendix 10.1 The determinants of entry and exit, pre-crisis and crisis periods:
regression results of the equations in Model II
M ethoc : 2SL S
T im e p eriod Pre-crisis C risis P re -c ris is C risis
D ep en d en t variab le E N l 'j , E N l 'j , E X l 'j , E X l 'j ,
P C M ,,., -2 .197 -0 .465
(0 .81) (0 .6 2 )
SD PC M j 0 .418 -0 .016
(1 .48) (0 .4 9 )
PC M j t 3 .534 -0 .769
(0 .8 2 ) (1 .0 0 )
R O O M ,,., -0 .687 0 .533
(1 .12) (2 .35)*
GRj,, 0.101 0.051
(0 .2 4 ) (0 .41 )
E S j,,.1(a) -0 .019 0 .110 -0 .242 0 .122
(0 .10) (0 .0 9 ) (1 .46 ) (0 .98)
K R J;,-1 0 .2 7 3 a -0.001 0.001 0.176°
(0 .23) (1 .7 0 )+ (1 .30 ) (0 .22 )
CR4j m 4 .837 2 .212 1.782 1.264
(2 .17)* (1 .61 ) (0 .3 8 ) (0 .92)
E X P ,,., 0 .590 0 .840 0 .413 -1 .073
(0 .62) (1 .2 0 ) (0 .2 1 ) (1 .19 )
T A R IF F ,,., 0 .058 0.011 -0 .036 0.011
(4 .12)** (0 .51 ) (1 .1 0 ) (0 .42 )
ITVfPj,., -0 .010 0.011 -0 .017 0 .027
(0 .57 ) (0 .7 0 ) (1 .2 0 ) (2 .11)*
E N 1 ,,., 2 .419 -7.191
(0 .8 1 ) (1 .7 8 )+
E X lj , . , 0 .213 -5 .792
(0 .05) (1 .9 6 )+
Y e a r dum m y 1996 -0.318 0 .808
(1 .11) (2 .23)*
Y e a r dum m y 1998 0 .210 -0 .155
(0 .9 1 ) (0 .66)
Y ea r dum m y 1999 -0 .712 -2.301
(1 .4 6 ) (5 .72)**
Y ear dum m y 2000 -1 .403 -1.521
(3 .35)** (3 .65)**
F -sta tis tic s 7 .47** 25.23** 10.44** 3.95**
R -squared 0 .77 0.65 0 .66 0 .58
Notes: 1) Fixed industry effects are included.
2) t-statistics in parentheses.
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10% 
a) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
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Appendix 10.2 List of outliers
S a m p le O u t l i e r
IS IC  c o d e In d u s t ry
1 9 9 5 -9 6 3 2 1 4 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  c a r p e ts  a n d  ru g s
( P r e - c r i s i s ) 3 5 1 3 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  r e s in s ,  p la s t ic s  a n d  f ib re
3 8 2 4 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  s p e c ia l  in d u s t r ia l  m a c h in e r y  a n d  e q a u ip m e n t
3 8 4 1 S h ip b u i ld in g  a n d  r e p a i r in g
3 8 4 5 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  a i r c r a f t
3 8 5 1 P ro f e s s io n a l  s c ie n t i f ic  a n d  m e a s u r in g  e q u ip m e n t
3 8 5 2 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  p h o to g r a p h ic  a n d  o p t ic a l  g o o d s
1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  d a i ry  p r o d u c ts
(C r is i s ) 3 1 3 1 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  l iq u o r s
3 2 1 4 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  c a r p e ts  a n d  ru g s
3 5 1 2 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  f e r t i l i z e r  a n d  p e s t ic id e s
3 6 9 9 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  n o n - m e ta l l i c  m in e r a l  p r o d u c ts  n .e .c
3 8 2 1 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  e n g in e s  a n d  tu r b in e s
3 8 2 5 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  o f f ic e  a n d  c o m p u t in g  m a c h in e r y
3 8 4 1 S h ip b u i ld in g  a n d  r e p a i r in g
3 8 4 5 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  a i r c ra f t
3 8 5 1 P ro f e s s io n a l  s c ie n t i f ic  a n d  m e a s u r in g  e q u ip m e n t
3 8 5 2 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  p h o to g r a p h ic  a n d  o p t ic a l  g o o d s
3 9 0 3 M a n u f a c tu r e  o f  s p o r t in g  g o o d s
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Appendix 10.3 The determinants of entry and exit, pre-crisis and crisis period:
regression results of model I, without industry fixed effects
M e th o d :  S U R E
T im e  p e r i o d P r e - c r i s i s C r i s i s P r e - c r i s i s C r i s i s
D e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e E N l ’, t E N 1 ’ ,( E X 1 V , E X  l 'p
P C M j t_, 0 .3 8 9
( 0 .4 3 )
- 1 .6 0 8
( 2 .3 5 ) *
S D P C M j  t_, 0 .4 9 4
( 0 .9 0 )
0 .0 7 3
( 0 .7 5 )
P C M j , - 0 .6 4 2
( 0 .4 8 )
0 .1 3 2
( 0 .1 9 )
R O O M j - 0 .4 8 5
( 1 .1 7 )
0 .7 0 7
( 2 .9 1 ) * *
G R j.t -0 .3 5 5
( 1 .9 8 ) *
0 .0 1 8
( 0 .1 8 )
E S j , . / cl 0 .1 3 9
( 2 .9 9 ) * *
0 .0 5 7
( 1 .8 2 ) +
0 .0 7 2
( 1 .0 0 )
0 .0 6 5
( 2 .1 9 ) *
K R , , , i -0 .0 0 1
( 4 .8 2 ) * *
-0 .0 0 1
( 2 .6 3 ) * *
- 0 . 0 0 0
( 1 .0 1 )
- 0 .0 0 1
( 2 .7 8 ) * *
C R V , - 0 .3 8 0
( 1 .0 1 )
- 2 .7 4 2
( 6 .4 3 ) * *
- 1 .3 9 9
( 2 .4 9 ) *
- 2 .5 2 4
( 6 .2 3 ) * *
E X P j , . , - 0 .2 3 9
( 0 .6 3 )
1 .3 4 9
( 2 .7 2 ) * *
0 .8 1 3
( 1 .4 3 )
0 .2 6 8
( 0 .5 4 )
T A R I F F , , , 0 .0 2 3
( 3 .0 6 ) * *
- 0 .0 1 4
( 2 .5 9 ) * *
-0 .0 1 1
( 1 .0 3 )
- 0 .0 0 9
( 1 .6 1 )
I M P , , , , - 0 .0 1 5
( 0 .9 2 )
0 .0 3 2
( 2 .0 9 ) *
- 0 .0 3 7
( 1 .4 1 )
0 .0 3 3
( 2 .2 3 ) *
E N lj , , , 2 .5 9 2
( 2 .3 5 ) *
4 .0 2 5
( 3 .0 3 ) * *
E X 1  j , , 7 .8 0 6
( 4 .7 7 ) * *
3 .2 0 7
( U 7 4 ) +
Y e a r  d u m m y  1 9 9 6 -0 .2 0 1
( 1 .2 0 )
0 .6 4 2
( 2 .4 1 ) *
Y e a r  d u m m y  1 9 9 8 0 .2 9 2
( 1 .0 2 ) 18 8
0 .1 8 3
( 0 .6 4 )
Y e a r  d u m m y  1 9 9 9 - 0 .5 6 2
( 1 .7 9 ) +
0 .1 7 - 1 .7 5 9
( 5 .9 5 ) * *
Y e a r  d u m m y  2 0 0 0 - 1 .1 3 3
( 3 .7 4 ) * *
- 0 .9 4 3
( 3 .1 4 ) * *
F - s t a t i s t i c s
H o :  a l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  e q u a l  to  0 (tl)
H o :  i n d u s t r y  f i x e d  e f f e c t s  a r e  e q u a l  
B r e u s c h - P a g a n  ( L M )  s t a t i s t i c s  ( p - v a lu e )  
R - s q u a r c d
8 .8 4 * *
1 7 .0 4 * * <a)
1 7 .7 7  ( 0 .0 0 ) a 
0 .2 9
1 2 .8 1 * *  
1 3 .7 1 * * (b) 
2 7 .7 4  ( 0 0 0 ) b 
0 .2 8
6 .4 5 * *
0 .1 7
1 2 .8 0 * *
0 .3 1
Notes: 1) Fixed industry effects are excluded
2) t-statistics in parentheses
3) Significance level: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%
a) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the pre-crisis period.
b) For the estimation of the entry and exit equation for the crisis period.
c) The coefficients were multiplied by 103 to improve presentation.
d) From the estimations of Table 10.2.
336
Chapter 11
Summary and Conclusion
11.1 Introduction
This study examines the responses of Indonesian manufacturing firms to the deep economic 
crisis of 1997/98. It utilises a rich annual data set on medium and large plants in the 
manufacturing industry from 1993 to 2000, covering the high-growth pre-crisis period, the 
peak of the crisis and the early recovery. Three aspects of the responses are the focus of this 
study: general performance and survival, export-supply response and firm-entry response.
11.2 Main findings
Chapter 6 derived some basic facts about how the crisis affected the Indonesian 
manufacturing industry and provided the basis for the empirical analysis in the next four 
chapters.
It showed that, after a sharply rising trend in performance before the crisis, industry 
contracted significantly in 1998 but immediately began to recover in 1999, as all the 
performance measures reached the pre-crisis (1995-96) level in 2000.
The results show a large variation across industries, both during peak of the crisis and the 
early recovery period. The magnitude of recovery was observed to have been dramatic in 
several industries. This suggests some characteristics at the industry level -  namely sales 
orientation, factor intensity, the share of imported input and foreign ownership -  might have 
been the determining variables.
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Examining the data at plant-level indicated a large variation across plants, even within the 
industries which expanded during the crisis. This finding indicates the differences across 
industries, or their characteristics, as suggested earlier might not be the only factors 
explaining the variation.
This chapter also showed that the crisis severely affected exit rates. These increased to almost 
double the pre-crisis level during the peak of the crisis but then recovered immediately. The 
impact on entry rates was slightly mixed. After declining significantly in 1998, they did not 
seem to recover in 1999 and 2000. The results also reveal that firms in the industry were 
resilient to the crisis. Most of the employment contraction in 1998 and 1999 was dominated 
by contraction from incumbents, rather than from exited plants. The analysis suggests some 
industry and firm characteristics determined the diversity of the plant-level responses.
Chapters 7 and 8 investigated which firm characteristics were important in shaping the 
performance response.
Foreign ownership and sales orientation were significant determinants and foreign firms were 
revealed to have performed better than domestic-private and state-owned firms, although the 
results greatly depended on the level of foreign share. The results also showed that the 
positive effect of foreign ownership increased over the years during the period 1997-2000, 
suggesting the role of parent companies was most important during the early stage of 
recovery. This observation is consistent with the view that domestic banks were more 
selective in providing external financing after the crisis.
Export-oriented firms were indicated to have been able to benefit from the boost in 
competitiveness from the sharp exchange rate depreciation, and many plants with high export 
propensity expanded output. The positive effect of sales orientation appears to have been 
weaker in the early stage of recovery. While there are many explanations for this, the 
declining pattem is consistent with the exchange rate appreciation which took place in 1999 
and 2000.
The positive effect of sales orientation was also found to depend on other plant characteristics 
and to have been higher at plants with a high foreign ownership share. This interrelationship 
was higher and particularly important in the early recovery period, suggesting foreign plants 
were not financially constrained.
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There was weak evidence for the interrelationship between sales orientation and financial 
leverage. In particular, that having a high debt did not necessarily mitigate the positive 
impact from being export oriented. This is similar to Latin America’s experience during the 
currency crisis of the 1990s.
Contraction in profitability and labour productivity was larger at plants with a high 
government ownership share, which is consistent with the tight state budget situation during 
and after the crisis. Nevertheless, the contraction in employment was lower among these 
plants, suggesting the government exercised its power to ensure these companies shed less 
labour.
Plants in capital intensive industries contracted more relative to plants in resource intensive 
industries. A similar conclusion can be derived based on plant-level factor intensity variables. 
In particular, performance contraction was higher for more capital intensive plants employing 
higher skilled workers. This is consistent with the labour hoarding hypothesis and other 
studies on labour hoarding behaviour.
The results showed the role played by product market and import competition. Plants in less 
concentrated industries performed better than plants in more concentrated industries, while 
plants in industries facing high exposure to import competition performed better than plants 
in industries facing low import competition.
The results showed that highly leveraged plants did not necessarily perform poorly during the 
crisis. The coefficients of the variable representing this characteristic were mostly statistically 
insignificant in the regressions. Despite this, financial leverage was found to have been 
negatively related to the contraction when it was interrelated with some other characteristics. 
The negative effect was indicated to have been lower in large, foreign and export oriented 
plants, although in most cases the coefficients were not statistically significant.
The econometric results found that plant survival during the period 1997-2000 was 
determined by size, age, foreign ownership, sales orientation, factor intensity and industry 
competition. Of these determinants, size, age, factor intensity and industry competition were 
the most important. Foreign ownership and sales orientation, although positively related to a 
higher chance of survival, were not particularly important since the regression estimates for
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the variables representing them are only moderately significant. In general, these findings are 
consistent with those of the determinants of the performance response. The results, however, 
did not indicate that the effect of the determinants changed substantially between years 
during the crisis period.
Chapter 9 examined the export-supply response of plants to the crisis. The analysis provides 
some insights into the observed aggregate export performance during the period 1997-2000 
and indicates the importance of plant and industry characteristics in determining the export- 
supply response.
The descriptive analysis showed some evidence of sales redirection. First, some plants 
changed status from non-exporting to exporting, although only a very small number relative 
to the total number of non-exporting plants in the industry. Second, a large number of 
exporting plants became more export oriented and those which had been export oriented were 
likely to remain so. Despite this, there was a large variation in the crisis’ impact on export 
performance, suggesting not all exporting plants were able to materialise the increase in 
competitiveness.
The econometric analysis showed that exporting history significantly determined export 
participation in the crisis period. Exporting before the crisis increased the probability of 
continuing to do so during the crisis. This finding emphasises the presumption that exporting 
is a costly economic activity to initiate, which is often time consuming, so that most of the 
increased competitiveness was likely to have been captured by plants already exporting.
The ability to compete in the international market -  by being efficient and able to produce 
international-standard goods -  is another key determinant, and the effect of this factor was 
particularly large for non-exporting plants. This helps to explain the low switching rate from 
non-exporting to exporting observed earlier.
Foreign ownership was found to have affected the response, as it was positively related to 
both the change in export propensity and export participation. Foreign ownership also played 
an important role in helping non-exporting plants become exporters during the crisis. The 
magnitude of the foreign ownership variable was higher for the group of non-exporting 
plants.
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In addition to the above findings, the results indicated the export supply response was 
negatively affected by the extent of the financial constraint faced. The negative relationship 
was observed for both exporting and non-exporting plants, although the magnitude of the 
impact was likely to have been higher for non-exporting ones.
Chapter 10 examined whether there are differences in the factors determining entry over the 
period 1994-2000.
The econometric results show some substantial changes in the determinants. Seller 
concentration and trade protection, indicated to have attracted firm entry before the crisis, 
were no longer important during the crisis period. The effect of capital requirement changed 
significantly from encouraging entry before the crisis to discouraging entry during the crisis 
period. However, the negative effect of capital requirement is only clearly shown during the 
peak of the crisis rather than during the early recovery period. In the crisis period entry, was 
largely encouraged in export oriented industries but discouraged in high capital industries. 
Despite this, the positive effect of sales orientation weakened during the early recovery 
period.
The results revealed more information about entry behaviour during the crisis period. The 
positive effect of the demand situation was only clear in the early stage of recovery, 
indicating the greater competitive pressure after the crisis means plants were no longer able 
to rely on stable profit expectations. A consistent finding was that the effect of trade 
protection changed dramatically from encouraging entry before the crisis to discouraging 
entry during the peak of the crisis, and continuing to lose importance in the early stage of 
recovery.
Changes were also observed for the factors that determine interdependence between entry 
and exit. The results indicated the importance of displacement entry during the crisis period, 
although its effect declined in the early recovery stage. This suggests the extent to which 
potential entrants pushed out less efficient incumbents occurred only when the economy was 
contracting severely. The results also show that replacement entry became less important 
during the crisis period. This suggests the large number of exiters did not necessarily attract 
substantial entry.
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The results help in understanding why plant entry does not seem to have recovered compared 
to the other performance indicators. First, the declining entry pattern might have been caused 
by an increase in the cost disadvantages faced by potential entrants. The econometric analysis 
found the effect of capital requirement as a barrier to entry changed from positive before the 
crisis to negative during the crisis period. The most important cost disadvantage was likely to 
have been higher capital cost, due to the collapse in the domestic financial system and more 
selective banks after the crisis. Another possible explanation is that there was a dramatic 
increase in competitive environment. This inference was mainly driven by the results which 
indicated the effect of non-competitive behaviour before the crisis became significantly less 
important during the crisis period.
The results also suggested the crisis provided opportunities for some foreign entrants and 
those able to compete in export markets. However, these opportunities were not likely to 
have translated into a higher recovery rate in entry, because the numbers of favoured firms 
are usually very small relative to total potential entrants.
11.3 Policy implications
The author is confident in asserting that foreign ownership and export orientation were the 
key factors for the success of firms in responding to the crisis. The findings from the core 
chapters consistently point to this conclusion.1 Thus, trade and industrial policy before the 
crisis, which was not designed to anticipate such a deep economic contraction as in 1997/98, 
unexpectedly became important. Chapter 2 showed that the share of foreign ownership and 
export intensity in industry only improved several years after the trade reforms initiated in the 
mid 1980s.
This study is quite clear in suggesting that such policies should be maintained. More 
explicitly, policies for higher foreign involvement and export participation should be 
encouraged. These policies would even be more important in the post-crisis period, for at 
least three reasons. First, to ensure that industry could rapidly recover to the pre-crisis 
situation. To a large extent the high growth in the industry before the crisis was fuelled by 
export oriented industries. Second, and related to this, the policies are also important because 
export recovery is likely to have been more difficult after the crisis. The post-crisis period
1 The conclusion is also supported by some case studies (e.g. Tanudjaya 1999; Feridhanusetyawan et al. 2000; 
Aswicahyono and Hill 2004).
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coincides with a period where many low cost exporters, such as China, and Vietnam, were 
expanding their exports rapidly (James et al. 2003; World Bank 2004). These new 
competitors could lower Indonesia’s export share in world markets and hence its export 
performance. Third, the policies are important to reduce the dependency of firms on the 
domestic financial sector. This is because banks are likely to be more selective in lending 
(Pardede 1999). The implication is that domestically-owned firms were less likely to have 
recovered rapidly. Because these firms make up a major part of the firm population, a low 
foreign participation rate could translate to slow recovery at the aggregate industry level. In 
this respect, a higher foreign involvement, for example through merger and acquisition, can 
help financially distressed firms to have access to alternative sources of funds, and hence 
promote more rapid recovery.
The above suggestion points to the important role played by investment policy. Any policy 
that discourages investment, particularly foreign investment, is certainly not to be preferred. 
Unfortunately, some policies in the last few years have had this effect. The labour law which 
substantially increases severance pay obligations (i.e. the Decree of Ministry of Manpower 
No. 150/2001) provides a good example. Aswicahyono and Hill (2004) report that the law 
has substantially increased the severance cost in Indonesia, making Indonesia’s dismissal 
regulation one of the most costly in the world. James et al. (2003) and Aswicahyono and 
Maidir (2004) reported that the law could have significantly constrained the potential 
increase in exports from the improved competitiveness.
Discriminative policy is another sort of policy to be discouraged. This is particularly 
important, for example, in regard the popular view that small firms performed better than 
large firms during the crisis. While it might be true that some small firms were able to 
weather the crisis better, such as those in the furniture industry (Sandee and van Diermen, 
2004), it was certainly not a general pattern. In fact, our findings tend to suggest the opposite.
Regardless of some contradicting policies in the last few years, there have been some 
illustrations of the importance of the policy approach suggested above. For example, 
Aswicahyono and Hill (2004) report that efficiency in the automotive industry has improved 
recently, owing in part to a significant increase in foreign investment. Another illustration is 
provided in the context of the more recent policy to reduce the fuel subsidy at the end of
2 The increase in investment was mostly due to a significant increase in Japanese investment in the industry in 
the years after the crisis (Aswicahyono and Hill 2004).
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2005. Although there is substantial variation in the performance impact on firms, some casual 
observations show that some export oriented firms survived better, for example as was 
reported by the newspaper Kompas (15/11/2005) for manufacturing firms in Medan.
It is important to emphasize there is a more complex policy agenda than the simple 
framework of ‘encouraging’ investment policy. The business community in Indonesia often 
complains about the continuing erosion of the country’s competitiveness from the high-cost 
economy situation. For example, the Employers’ Association of Indonesia (Apindo) claims 
that, among other things, the industry’s competitiveness after the crisis has been eroded by 
lack of access to raw materials and high shipping and transportation costs, as well as high 
labour and bureaucratic costs (Jakarta Post, 10/11/2005). Despite this claim, a few of the 
examples cited earlier indeed suggest foreign investors still consider investing in Indonesia. 
The interest of the investors, was most recently reflected in the $80 million investment of a 
leading Indian motor cycle manufacturer in the country (Jakarta Post, 23/11/2005). Thus, 
overall, the encouraging investment policy framework needs to be supplemented by a 
consistent policy approach towards eliminating the high cost economy.
11.4 Suggestions for further research
Although the findings have generally been satisfactory, there are several areas that require 
further research. These can be classified into: (1) data improvement, (2) methodology, and 
(3) further relevant research.
Data improvement and methodology
There are some areas in which the manufacturing survey data can be improved. First, it 
would be very useful if a code that allows researchers to identify multi-plants firms could be 
added into the data. This would give more reliable information and analysis related to the 
demographics of firms. The availability of firm level data is also more appropriate in view of 
theory, since most of the analytics on firm performance and behaviour are framed at the level 
of firm instead of plant. Second, some information about the reasons for entry and exit, or the 
types of entry and exit, could also be useful to improve analysis on firm demographics. As 
explained, both entry and exit can take several forms for different reasons, e.g. greenfield 
entry or entry by merger and acquisition. Third, some improvement in data quality is clearly 
essential. As demonstrated, there are quite significant errors in some of the variables. The 
quality improvement will significantly reduce the time-consuming data adjustment process 
and obviously improve the quality of the research.
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Methodology
The statistical approach adopted in this study, i.e. descriptive and econometric, are useful 
tools for analysing firm responses to the crisis. However, as mentioned the empirical models 
-  particularly those of Chapter 8 and 9 -  are limited in capturing unobserved firm 
characteristics which could be important in shaping the responses, such as managerial skills 
or access to some specific resources. To overcome this limitation, other methodological 
approaches are obviously necessary to supplement the statistical findings. Case studies are 
useful in this context.
Further relevant research
There are at least three directions where research could be extended based on the findings in 
this study. First, it would be valuable to further explore the role played by foreign ownership, 
sales orientation and size in determining the success of firms in responding to the crisis. The 
research could focus on determining which mechanism helps these characteristics in creating 
success. It could be thought of as an extension to the analysis in Chapters 7 to 9, and an 
empirical investigation into the reasoning outlined and discussed in Chapter 4. For this 
research, a few case studies revealing the behaviour of firms would be needed. Second, it 
would be valuable to find out whether there were differences in the type of firms entering the 
industry between the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This could be thought of as an extension of 
Chapter 10. Finally, it would be important to examine whether the basic findings of this study 
are still relevant several years after the crisis, because the data in this study covers only up 
until the early stage of recovery and it is natural to expect some substantial change in the 
structure of the industry after such a deep economic contraction and a radical change in the 
country’s political and policy settings.
345
Bibliography
Aguiar, M. (2005), ‘Investment, Devaluation, and Foreign Currency Exposure: The Case of 
Mexico’, Journal o f Development Economics, 78(1), pp.95-113.
Aitken, B., G. Hanson and A. Harrison (1997), ‘Spillover, Foreign Investment and Export 
Behaviour.’, Journal o f International Economics, 43(1-2), pp. 103-132.
Anagnostaki, V. and H, Louri (1995), ‘Entry and Exit from Greek Manufacturing Industry: 
A Test of the Symmetry Hypothesis, International Review o f Applied Economics, 9(1), p.86- 
95.
Ariff, M. and H. Hill (1985), Export-Oriented Industrialisation: The ASEAN Experience. 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
ADB (2002), ‘Did East-Asian Developing Economies Lose Export Competitiveness in the 
Pre-Crisis 1990s?’, ADB Institute research Paper, No. 34, Tokyo: ADB Institute.
Aswicahyono, H.H. (1998), ‘Total Factor Productivity in Indonesian Manufacturing’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
Aswicahyono, H.H. and H. Hill (1995), ‘Determinants of Foreign Ownership in LDC 
Manufacturing: An Indonesian Case Study’, Journal o f International Business Studies, 26 
(1), pp.139-158.
Aswicahyono, H. and M. Pangestu (2000), ‘Indonesia’s Recovery: Exports and Regaining 
Competitiveness’, Developing Economies, 38(4), pp. 454-89.
Aswicahyono, H. and H. Hill (2004), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin of 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 40(3), pp.227-305.
Aswicahyono, H. and I. Maidir (2004), ‘Indonesia’s Textiles and Apparels Industry: Taking a 
Stand in the New International Competition, CSIS Economics Working Paper Series, No. 64, 
Jakarta: CSIS.
Athukorala, P. and B. Hazari (1988), ‘Market Penetration of Manufactured Imports from 
Developing Countries: The Australian Experience’, Journal o f World Trade, 22(5), pp. 49- 
65.
Athukorala, P., S. Jayasuriya and E. Oczkowski (1995), ‘Multinational Firms and Export 
Performance in Developing countries: Some Analytical Issues and New Empirical Evidence’, 
Journal o f Development Economics, 46(1), pp. 109-22.
346
Austin, J.S. and D.I. Rosenbaum (1990), ‘The Determinants of Entry and Exit Rates into U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries’, Review o f Industrial Organization, 5(2), pp.211-23.
Austin, J.S. and D.I. Rosenbaum (1991), ‘The Determinants of Entry and Exit Rates into US 
Manufacturing Industries, Review o f Industrial Organization, 5(2), pp.l 19-28.
Aw, Bee Y. and A.R. Hwang (1995), ‘Productivity and Export Market: A Firm-level 
Analysis’, Journal o f Development Economics, 47(2), pp.313-32.
Aw, Bee Y., S.C. Chung and M.J. Roberts (2000), ‘Productivity and the Turnover in the 
Export Market: Micro-level Evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China)’, The 
World Bank Economic Review, 14(1), pp.65-90.
Azis, I.J. (2000), ‘The Nonlinear General Equilibrium Impact of the Financial Crisis and the 
Downfall of Manufacturing,’ Developing Economies, 38(4), pp.518-56.
Bain, J.S. (1949), ‘A Note on Pricing Monopoly and Oligopoly’, American Economic 
Review, 39(1), pp.448-69.
Bain, J.S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Baldwin, J.R. and P. Gorecki (1987), ‘Plant Creation versus Plant Acquisition: the Entry 
Process in Canadian Manufacturing’, International Journal o f Industrial Organization, 5(1), 
pp.27-41.
Bappenas (2000), ‘Indonesia: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Industry Performance’, 
in D. Dwor-Frecaut, F. Colaco and M. Hallward-Driemeier (eds), Asian Corporate Recovery: 
Findings from Firm-level Surveys in Five Countries. Washington DC: The World Bank, 
pp.141-57.
Barney, J. (1992), ‘Integrating Organizational Behavior and Strategy Formulation Research: 
A Resource-based Analysis’, in P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, and J. Dutton (eds.), Advances in 
Strategic Management. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 39-62.
Berger, A.N., and G.G. Udell (1998), ‘The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles 
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle,’ Journal o f Banking and 
Finance, 22(6-8), pp.613-73.
Bemanke, B. and M. Gertler. (1989), “Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations”, 
American Economic Review, 79(1), pp.31-41.
Bernard, A.B., J.B. Jensen and R.Z. Lawrence (1995), ‘Exporters, Jobs, and Wages in U.S. 
Manufacturing: 1976-1987’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Microeconomics, 1995, 
pp.67-119.
Bernard, A.B. and J. Wagner (1998), ‘Export Entry and Exit by German Firms’, NBER 
Working Paper Series, No. 6538, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Bernard, A.B. and J.B. Jensen (1999), ‘Exceptional Exporter Performance: Cause, Effect, or 
both?’, Journal o f International Economics, 47(1), pp. 1-25.
347
Bernard, Andrew., and J.B. Jensen (2004), ‘Why Some Firms Export’, Review o f Economics 
and Statistics, 86(2), pp.561-69.
Berry, A., E. Rodriguez and H. Sandee (2001), ‘Small and Medium Enterprise Dynamics In 
Indonesia’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 37(3), pp. 363-84.
Berry, R.A. (1992), ‘Firm (or plant) Size in the Analysis of Trade and Development’, in G.K. 
Helleiner (ed.), Trade Policy, Industrialization, and Development: New Perspectives. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, pp. 46-88.
Bertero, R. and L. Rondi (2000), ‘Financial Pressure and the Behaviour of Public Enterprises 
under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints: Evidence from Italian Panel Data,’ Journal o f 
Public Economics, 75(1), pp.73-98.
Bertero, R. and L. Rondi (2002), ‘Does a Switch Budget Regimes Affect Investment and 
Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises?: Evidence from Italian Firms,’ Journal o f 
Comparative Economics, 30(4), pp.836-63.
Bird, K. (1999), ‘Industrial Concentration and Competition in Indonesian Manufacturing’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, Canberra.
Blalock, G. and P. Getier (2004), ‘Learning from Exporting Revisited in a Less Developed 
Setting’, Journal o f Development Economics, 75(2), pp. 397-416.
Blalock, G. and P.J. Gertler (2005), ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Externalities: The Case 
for Public Intervention’, in T.H. Moran, E.M. Graham and M. Blomstrom (eds.), Does 
Foreign Direct Investment Promote Development?. Washington DC: Institute for
International Economics, pp.73-106.
Blomstrom, M. and R.E. Lipsey (1993), ‘Foreign Firms and Structural Adjustment in Latin 
America: Lesson from the Debt Crisis’, in G. Hansson (ed.), Trade, Growth and 
Development. New York: Routledge, pp. 109-32.
Bonaccorsi, A. (1992). ‘On the Relationship between Size and Export Intensity’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 23(4), pp.605-35.
Booth, A. (1999), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 35(3), pp.3-38.
BPS (2000), Table Kesesuaian Lapangan Usaha/Kegiatan Ekonomi: KB LI 2000 -  KLUI 
1990. Jakarta: BPS.
Calof, J.L. (1994), ‘The Relationship between Firm Size and Export Behaviour’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 25(2), pp. 367-87.
Cameron, L. (1999), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 35(1), pp.3-40.
Campa, J.M. (2004), ‘Exchange rates and Trade: How Important is Hysteresis in Trade?’, 
European Economic Review, 48(3), pp.527-48.
348
Caves, R.E. (1982), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Caves, R.E., (1998), “Industrial Organization and New Findings on Turnover and Mobility of 
Firms,’ Journal o f Economic Literature, 36(4), pp. 1947-82.
Caves, R.E., J. Khalilzadeh-Shirazi and M.E. Porter (1975), ‘Scale Economies in Statistical 
Analysis of Market Power’, Review o f Economics and Statistics, 57(2), pp. 133-40.
Caves, R.E. and M.E. Porter (1976), ‘Barries to Exit’, in R.T. Masson and P.D. Qualls (eds.), 
Essays on Industrial Organization in Honor o f Joe. S. Bain. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 
pp.36-39.
Caves, R.E., and M.E. Porter (1977), ‘From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjectural 
Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition’, Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 
91(2), pp.241-61.
Caves, R.E. M.E. Porter, A.M. Spence and J.T. Scott (1980), Competition in the Open 
Economy: A Model Applied to Canada. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Chamberlin, Edward H. (1933), The Theory o f Monopolistic Competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Cheh, J.H. (1974), ‘United States Concessions in the Kennedy Round and Short-run 
Adjustment Costs’, Journal o f International Economics, 4(4), pp.323-40.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov and L.C. Xu (2000), ‘Corporate Performance in the East Asian 
Financial Crisis’, World Bank Research Observer, 15(1), pp.23-46.
Clerides, S., S. Each and J.R. Tybout. (1998), ‘Is “Leaming-by-Exporting” Important?: 
Micro-Dynamic Evidence from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco’, Quarterly Journal o f 
Economics, 113(3), pp.903-47.
Colin, N.R. and L.E. Preston (1969), ‘Price-Cost Margins and Industry Structure’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 51, pp.271-86.
Corden, W.M. (1966), ‘The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protective Rate,’ 
Journal o f Political Economy, 74(3), pp.221-37.
Davis, S.L., J.C. Haltiwanger and S. Schuh (1996), Job Creation and Destruction. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Desai, M., C.F. Foley and K.J. Forbes (2004), ‘Financial Constraints and Growth: 
Multinational and Local Firm Responses to Currency Crisis’, NBER Working Paper Series, 
No. 10545, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Deutsch, L. (1984), ‘An Examination of Industry Exit Patterns’, Review of Industrial 
Organization, 1, pp.60-69.
Diamond, D. (1991). Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and 
Directly Placed Debt, Journal o f Political Economy, 99(4), pp.688-721.
349
Dierickx, I. and K. Cool (1989), ‘Asset Stock Accumulation and Sustainability of 
Competitive Advantage’, Management Science, 35(12), pp. 1504-11.
Ding, W., I. Domaq and G. Ferri (1998), ‘Is There a Credit Crunch in East Asia?’, Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 1959, Washington DC: The World Bank.
Doi, N (1999), ‘The Determinants of Firm Exit in Japanese Manufacturing Industries, Small 
Business Economics, 13(4), pp.331-37.
Dollar, D. and M. Hallward-Driemeier (2000), ‘Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailand’s 
Industrial Firms’, World Research Observer, 15(1), pp.1-22.
Domowitz, L, R.G. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen (1986), ‘Business Cycles and the 
Relationship between Concentration and Price-cost Margins’, RAND Journal o f Economics, 
14(1), pp. 1-17.
Dunne, T., M. Roberts and L. Samuelson (1988), ‘Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in US 
Manufacturing’, Rand Journal o f Economics, 19(4), pp.495-515.
Dunne, T., M. and M. Roberts (1991), ‘Variation in Producer Turnover across US 
Manufacturing’, in P. Geroski and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: an 
International Comparison, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 187-203.
Dunne, P and A. Hughes (1994), ‘Age, Size, Growth and Survival: UK Companies in the 
1980s, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), pp.l 15-40.
Dunning, J.H. 1993, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Wokingham: 
Addison-Wesley.
Duttagupta, R. and A. Spilimbergo (2004), ‘What Happened to Asian Exports during the 
Crisis?’, IMF Staff Papers, 51(1), pp.72-95.
Dwor-Frecaut, D., F. Colaco and M. Hallward-Driemeier (eds.) (2000), Asian Corporate 
Recovery: Findings from Firm-level Surveys in Five Countries, Washington DC: The World 
Bank.
Eaton, B.C and R.G Lipsey (1980), ‘Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: the Durability of 
Capital as a Barrier to Entry’, Bell Journal o f Economics, 11(2), pp.721-29.
Evans, L.B. and J.J Siegfried (1992), ‘Entry and Exit in United States Manufacturing 
industries from 1977 to 1982’, in D.B. Audretsch and J.J. Siegfried (eds.), Empirical Studies 
in Industrial Organization: Essays in Honor o f Leonard W. Weiss. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, pp.253-73.
Fane, G. and T. Condon (1996), ‘Trade Reform in Indonesia, 1987-95’ Bulletin o f Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 32(3), 33-54.
Feridhanusetyawan, T., H. Aswicahyono and T. Anas, ‘The Economic Crisis and the 
Manufacturing Industry: the Role of Industrial Networks, CSIS Economics Working Paper 
Series, No. 53, Jakarta: CSIS.
350
Fields, G.S. (1994), ‘Changing Labour Markets and Economic Development in Hong Kong, 
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and China’, World Bank Economic Review, 8(3), 
pp.395-414.
Flynn, J.E. (1990), ‘The Determinants of Exit in an Open Economy’, Small Business 
Economics, 3(3), pp.225-32.
Forbes, K.J. (2000a), ‘Cheap Labor Meets Costly Capital: the Impact of Devaluations on 
Commodity Firms’, Journal o f Development Economics, 69(1), pp.335-65.
Forbes, K.J. (2002b). “How do Large Depreciations Affect Firm Performance?, IMF Staff 
Papers, 49, pp. 214-238.
Fotopoulus, G. and N. Spence (1997), ‘Net Entry of Firms into Greek Manufacturing: The 
Effect of Business Condition’, Small Business Economics, 9(3), pp.239-53.
Fotopoulus, G. and N. Spence (1998), ‘Entry and Exit from Manufacturing Industries: 
Symmetry, Turbulence and Simultaneity -  Some Empirical Evidence from Greek 
Manufacturing, 1982-1988\  Applied Economics, 30(2), pp.245-262.
Fukao, K. (2001), ‘How Japanese Subsidiaries in Asia Responded to Regional Crisis: an 
Empirical Analysis based on the MITI Survey’, in T. Ito and A.O. Krueger (eds.), Regional 
and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, pp.267-303.
Fukuchi, T. (2000), ‘Econometric Analysis of the Effects of Krismon Shocks on Indonesia’s 
Industrial Subsector’, Developing Economies, 38(4), pp.490-517.
Geroski, P.A. (1991), ‘Domestic and Foreign Entry in the United Kingdom’, in P. Geroski 
and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: An International Comparison. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.63-88.
Geroski, P.A. (1995), ‘What do We Know about Entry?’, International Journal o f Industrial 
Organization, 13(4), pp.421-40.
Geroski, P.A. (1998), ‘An Applied Econometrician’s View of Large Company Performance’, 
Review o f Industrial Organization, 13(6), pp.271-93.
Geroski, P.A. and J. Schwalbach (1991), Entry and Market Contestability: An International 
Comparison. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Geroski, P.A. and P. Gregg (1997), Coping with Recession: UK Company Performance in 
Adversity. London: Cambridge University Press.
Gertler, M. and S. Gilchrist (1994). “Monetary Policy, Business Cycles and the Behavior of 
Small Manufacturing Firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109 (2), pp.309-340.
Ghei, N. and L. Pritchett (1999), ‘The Three Pessimisms: Real Exchange Rate and Trade 
Flows in Developing Countries’, in L.E. Hinkle and P.J. Montiel (eds.), Exchange Rate 
Misalignment: Concepts and Measurements for Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.467-96.
351
Ghemawat, P. and B. Nalebuff (1985), ‘Exit’, RAND Journal o f Economics, 16(2), pp. 184- 
94.
Globerman, S., C.R John and I. Vertinsky (1994), ‘The Economic Performance of Foreign 
Affiliates in Canada’, Canadian Journal o f Economics, 27(1), pp. 143-156.
Goeltom, M.S. (1995), Indonesia’s Financial Liberalization: An Empirical Analysis o f 1981- 
88 Panel Data. Singapore: ISEAS.
Gosh, S.R. and A.R. Gosh (1999), ‘East Asia in the Aftermath: Was there a Crunch?’, IMF 
Working Paper, No. 38, Washington DC: IMF.
Green, E.J. and R.H. Porter (1984), ‘Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price 
Information’, Econometrica, 52(1), pp.87-100.
Greenaway, D., N. Sousa and K. Wakelin (2004), ‘Do Domestic Firms Learn to Export from 
Multinationals?’, European Journal o f Political Economy, 20(4), pp. 1027-43.
Grossman, S and O. Flart (1982), ‘Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives’, 
in J. McCall (ed.), The Economics o f Information and Uncertainty. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 107-40.
Gujarati, D.N. (1995), Basic Econometrics. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
Gupta, P., D. Mishra and R. Sahay (2003), ‘Output Response to Currency Crisis’, IMF 
Working Paper, No. 230, Washington, DC: IMF.
Hadi, Ali S. (1992), ‘A New measure of Overall Potential Influence in Linear Regression’, 
Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 14(1), p.1-27.
Hall, B.H. and J. Mairesse (1995), ‘Exploring the Relationship between R&D and 
Productivity in French Manufacturing Firms’, Journal o f Econometrics, 65(1), pp.263-93.
Hallward-Driemeier, M.G. Iarossi and K.L. Sokoloff. (2002), ‘Exports and Manufacturing 
Productivity in East Asia: a Comparative Analysis with Firm-level Data’ NBER Working 
Paper Series, No. 8894, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Hart, O.D. (1983), ‘The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme’, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14(2), pp. 366-82.
Heckman, J. (1976), ‘The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample 
Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimation for Such Models’, 
Annals o f Economic and Social Measurement, 5, pp.475-92.
Highfield, R. and R. Smiley (1987), ‘New Business Starts and Economic Activity: an 
Empirical Investigation, International Journal o f Industrial Organization, 5(1), pp.51-56.
Hill, H. (1996), Southeast Asia’s Emerging Giant: Indonesian Economic Policy and 
Development since 1966. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, H. (1999), The Indonesian Economy in Crisis: Causes, Consequences and Lessons. 
Singapore: ISEAS.
352
Hill, H. and P. Phillips (1997), ‘Factor Proportions and East Asian Industrialization: A note’, 
Asian Economic Journal, 11(1), pp.81 -94.
James, W.E., D.J. Ray and P.J. Minor, ‘Indonesia’s Textiles and Apparel: The Challenges 
Ahead’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 39(1), pp.93-103.
Jensen, M.C. and W. Meckling. (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal o f Financial Economics, 3(4), pp.305-360.
Jeong K.Y. and R.T. Masson (1991), ‘Entry during Explosive Growth: Korea during Take­
off, in P. Geroski and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: An 
International Comparison. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 143-67.
John R. Baldwin (1998), The Dynamics o f Industrial Competition: a North American 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, C. (1998), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic 
Studies, 34(2), pp.3-57.
Johnston, J. and J. Dinardo (1997), Econometric Methods. Singapore: McGraw-Hill.
Jones, F.L. (1987), ‘Current Techniques in Bankruptcy prediction’, Journal of Accounting 
Literature, 6, pp. 131-64.
Jovanovic, B. (1982), “Selection and the Evolution of Industry”, Econometrica, 50 (3), 
pp.649-70.
Kawai, M., H.J. Hahm and G. Iarossi (2000), ‘Corporate Foreign Debt in East Asia: Too 
Much or too Little?’ in D. Dwor-Frecaut, F. Colaco and M. Hallward-Driemeier (eds), Asian 
Corporate Recovery: Findings from Firm-level Surveys in Five Countries, Washington DC: 
The World Bank, pp.l 11-21.
Khemani, R.S. and D.M. Shapiro (1986), ’The Determinants of New Plant Entry in Canada’, 
Applied Economics, 18, pp.1243-57.
Koo, A. and S. Martin (1984), ‘Market Structure and U.S. Trade Flows’, International 
Journal o f Industrial Organization, 2(3), pp. 173-97.
Krueger, A. and A. Tomell (1999), ‘The Role of Bank Restructuring in Recovering From 
Crises: Mexico 1995-98’, NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7042, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Laffont, J. and J. Tirole (1993), A Theory o f Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Lay, T. (2003), ‘The Determinants of and Interaction between Entry and Exit in Taiwan’s 
Manufacturing’, Small Business Economics, 20(4), pp.319-34.
Leibenstein, H. (1975), ‘Aspects of the X-efficiency Theory of the Firm’, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 6(2), pp. 580-606.
353
Liebowitz, S.L. (1982), What Do Census Price-Cost Margin Measure’, Journal o f Law and 
Economics, 25, pp.231-45.
Lipsey, R.E. (2001), ‘Foreign Direct Investors in Three Financial Crises’, NBER Working 
Paper Series, No. 8084, Cambridge, MA: NBER.
Liu, L. (1993), ‘Entry-exit, Learning, and Productivity Change: Evidence from Chile’ 
Journal o f Development Economics, 42(2), p.217-42.
MacDonald, J. (1986), ‘Entry and Exit on the Competitive Fringe’, Southern Economic 
Journal, 52(3), pp.640-52.
Manning, C. (1998), Indonesian Labour in Transition: an East Asian Success Story?. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Manning, C. (2000), ‘Labour Market Adjustment to Indonesia’s Economic Crisis: Context, 
Trends and Implications, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 36(1), pp. 105-36.
Mata, J. (1993), ‘Entry and Type of Entrant: Evidence from Portugal’, International Journal 
of Industrial Organization, 11(1), pp. 101-22.
McLeod, R. (1997), ‘Postscript to the Survey of Recent Developments on Causes and Cures 
for the Rupiah Crisis’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 33(3), pp.35-52.
Meyer, B.D. (1995). ‘Natural and Quasi-Experiment in Economics’, Journal o f Business and 
Economics Statistics, 13 (2), pp. 151.
Nickell, S. (1995), The Performance o f Companies. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Oi, W. (1962), ‘Labor as A Quasi-fixed Factor’, Journal o f Political Economy, 70(6), pp.538- 
55.
Orr, D. (1974), ‘The Determinants of Entry: A study of the Canadian manufacturing 
Industries’ Review o f Economics and Statistics, 56(1), pp.58-66.
Pangestu, M. (1996), Economic Reform, Deregulation, and Privatization: the Indonesian 
Experience. Jakarta: CSIS.
Papke, Leslie E. and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (1996), ‘Econometric Methods for Fractional 
Response Variables with an Application to 401 (K) Plan Participation Rates’, Journal of 
Applied Econometrics, 6(11), pp.619-32.
Pardede, R. (1999), ‘Survey of Recent Economic Development’, Bulletin o f Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 35(1), pp.3-44.
Petersen, M.A. And R.G. Rajan (1994), “The Benefits of Firm-creditor Relationship: 
Evidence from Small Business Data, Journal o f Finance, 49(1), pp.3-37.
Porter, M.E. (1974), ‘Consumenr Behavior, Retailer power, and Market Performance in 
Consumer Good Industries’, Review o f Economics and Statistics, 56(4), pp.419-36.
354
Porter, M.E. (1979), ‘The Structure within Industries and Companies' Performance’, Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 61 (2), pp.214-27.
Porter, Michael. (1980), Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press.
Pratap, S. and C. Urrutia (2004), ‘Firm Dynamics, Investment, and Debt Portfolio: Balance 
Sheet Effects of the Mexican Crisis of 1994’, Journal o f Development Economics, 75(2), 
pp.535-63.
Pregibon, D. (1980), ‘Goodness of Link Test for Generalized Linear Model’, Applied 
Statistics, 29(1), pp. 232-42.
Ramstetter, E.D. (1999), ‘Trade Propensities and Foreign Ownership Shares in Indonesian 
Manufacturing’, Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 36(2), pp.61-95.
Ramstetter, E. (2002), Trade Propensities and Foreign Ownership Shares in Thai 
Manufacturing, 1996\ICSEAD Working Paper Series, Vol. 2002-03, Kitakyushu: ICSEAD.
Roberts, M.J. and J.R. Tybout (1997), ‘An Empirical Model of Sunk Costs and Decision to 
Export’, American Economic Review, 87(4), pp.545-64.
Rosen, H. (1998), ‘The Future of Entrepreneurial Finance’, Journal o f Banking and Finance, 
22(6-8), pp. 1 105-07.
Rosenbaum, D.I. and F. Lamort (1992), ‘Entry, Barriers, Exit, and Sunk Cost: an Analysis’, 
Applied Economics, 24, pp.297-304.
Rosner, L.P. (2000), ‘Indonesia’s Non-oil Export Performance during the Economic Crisis: 
Distinguishing Price Trends from Quantity Trends,’ Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies, 
36(2), pp.61-95.
Rotemberg, J.J. and G. Saloner (1986), ‘A Supergame-theoritic Model of Price Wars during 
Booms’, American Economic Review, 76(3), pp.390-407.
Rotemberg, J.J. and Woodford, M. (1992) ‘Oligopolistic Pricing and the Effects of Aggregate 
Demand on Economic Activity’, Journal o f Political Economy, 100(6), p.l 153-207.
Rumelt, R.P. (1984), ‘Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm’, in R.B. Lamb (ed.), 
Competitive Strategic Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 556-70.
Sandee, H. and van Diermen (2004), ‘Exports by Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in 
Indonesia’ in M.C. Basri and P. van der Eng (eds.), Business in Indonesia: New Challenges, 
Old Problems. Singapore: 1SEAS, pp. 109-21.
Sato, Y. (2000), ‘How Did the Crisis Affect Small and Medium-sized Enterprises?: From a 
Field Study of the Metal-working Industry in Java, ‘Developing Economies, 38(4), pp.572- 
95.
Schary, M.A. (1991), ‘Probability of Exit’, RAND Journal o f Economics, 22(3), pp. 339-53. 
Schary, Martha A. (1991), ‘Probability of Exit’, Rand Journal o f Economics, 22(3), p.339-53.
355
Schmidt, K.M. (1997), ‘Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition’, CEPR 
Discussion Papers, No. 1382, London: CEPR.
Shapiro, D. and R.S. Khemani (1987), The Determinants of Entry and Exit Reconsidered’, 
International Journal o f Industrial Organization, 5(1), pp. 15-26.
Shepherd, W.G. (1972), ‘The Elements of Market Structure’, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 54(1), pp.25-37.
Sjoholm, F. and S. Takii (2003), ‘Foreign Networks and Exports: Results from Indonesian 
Panel Data’, ICSEAD Working Paper Series, Vol. 2003-33, Kitakyushu: ICSEAD.
Slade, M.E. (1989), ‘Price Wars in Price-setting Supergames’, Economica, 56, pp.295-310.
Sleuwagen, L. and W. Dehandschutter (1991), ‘Entry and Exit in Belgian Manufacturing’, in 
P. Geroski and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: An International 
Comparison. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 111-20.
Soesastro, H. and M.C. Basri (1998), ‘Survey of Recent Developments’, Bulletin o f 
Indonesian Economic Studies, 34(1), pp.3-54.
Soesastro, H. and M.C. Basri (2005), ‘The Political Economy of Trade Policy in Indonesia’, 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 22(1), pp.3-18.
Stiglitz, J.E. And A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information”, American Economic Review, 71 (3), pp.393-410.
Storey, D.J. (1991), ‘The Birth of New Firms -  Does Unemployment Matter? A Review of 
Evidence’, Small Business Economics, 3(3), pp. 167-78.
Storey, D.J. and A.M. Jones (1987), ‘New Firm Formation -  a Labour Market Approach to 
Industrial Entry’, Scottish Journal o f Political Economy, 34, pp.37-51.
Sutton, J. (1997), ‘Gibrat’s Legacy’, Journal of Economic Literature, 35(1), pp.40-59.
Takii, S. and E. Ramstetter (2000), ‘Foreign Multinationals in Indonesian Manufacturing 
1985-1998: Shares, Relative Size, and Relative Labour Productivity’, ICSEAD Working 
Paper Series, Vol. 2000-18, Kitakyushu: ICSEAD.
Tanudjaja, S. (1999), ‘Efforts in Revitalizing the Real Sector’, paper presented at the 
Conference on the Economic Issues Facing the New Government. Jakarta, 18-19 August.
Thee, K.W. (1994), Industrialisasi di Indonesia: Beberapa Kajian. Jakarta: LP3ES.
Thee, K.W. (2000), ‘The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Indonesia’s Manufacturing 
Sector, Developing Economies, 38(4), pp.420-53.
Tomatzky, L.G and M. Fleischer (1990), The Process o f Technological Innovation. 
Lexington: Lexington Books.
356
Tybout, J., J. de Melo and V. Corbo (1991), ‘The Effects of Trade Reform on Scale and 
Technical Efficiency: New Evidence from Chile, Journal o f International Economics, 31(3), 
p.231-50.
Urata, S. (1998), ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Asia: Its Impact on Export 
Expansion and Technology Acquisition of the Host Economies’, in N. Kumar (ed.) 
Globalization, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer: Impacts on and 
Prospects for Developing Countries. New York: Routledge, pp. 146-74.
Urata, S. (2002), ‘Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia with particular Focus on 
ASEAN4’, paper prepared for the Conference on Foreign Direct Investment: Opportunities 
and Challenges for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Hanoi, August 16-17.
Utterback, J.M. (1994), Mastering the Dynamics o f Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press.
Von der Fehr, N. H. (1991), ‘Domestic Entry in Norwegian Manufacturing’, in P. Geroski 
and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: An International Comparison. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 89-115.
Watkins, K., D. van Dijk and J. Spronk (2004), ‘Macroeconomic Crisis and Individual Firm 
Performance’, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. TI 2004-057/2, Rotterdam: 
Tinbergen Institute.
Williamson, O.E. (1985), The Economics of Institution o f Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002), Econometric Analysis o f Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
World Bank (2000), East Asia: Recovery and Beyond. Washington D.C.: World Bank
World Bank (2004), Making Indonesia Competitive: Promoting Exports, Managing Trade. 
Washington DC: World Bank.
WTO (1995), Trade Policy Review: Indonesia 1994. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
WTO (1998), Trade Policy Review: Indonesia 1998. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
WTO (2003), Trade Policy Review: Indonesia 2003. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
Yamawaki, H. (1991), ‘The Effects of Business Condition on Net Entry: Evidence from 
Japan’, in P. Geroski and J. Schwalbach (eds.), Entry and Market Contestability: An 
International Comparison. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 168-85.
Newspaper
Kompas, 15 November, 2005 
Jakarta Post, 10 November, 2005 
Jakarta Post, 23 November, 2005
357
